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ABSTRACT
MINORITY RIGHTS REGIME IN TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN- 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
B. Ali Soner
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisors: Banu Helvaciogiu and Ahmet í^duygu
This thesis examines the framework of minority rights in the context of 
Turkey and the European-regional organizations focusing on the ways of 
accommodating two interrelated dimensions of minority conditions: citizenship 
equality and ethno-cultural particularity. Due to fact that ideological discourse and 
practices of nation-state system have often conflated ^^citizenship” (state- 
membership) and ‘^nationality” (ethno-cultural membership), the possibility of 
developing genuine equality in ethno-culturally diverse circumstances has depended 
on the capacity to create a true reconciliation between citizenship equality and 
ethno-cultural particularity. This thesis affirmed that norms, principles, practices 
and instruments adopted in the European-regional organizations have largely 
reconciled citizenship equality and ethno-cultural diversity. The two concepts, 
however, have often excluded each other in the Turkish context where the principle 
of equality has usually been conflated with national uniformity while ethno-cultural 
diversity has frequently been associated with practices of inegalitarian treatment. It 
is only under the influence of EU integration that legal-political framework and 
practices of Turkish regime began to take substantive steps in the direction of 
reconciling citizenship equality with ethno-cultural, religious and linguistic 
particularities.
Keywords: Minority, Minority Rights, Citizenship, Equality, Diversity.
ÖZET
TÜRKİYE VE AVRUPA BÖLGESEL KURUMLARINDA 
AZINLIK HAKLARI REJİMİ
B. Ali Soner
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticileri: Banu Helvacıoğlu ve Ahmet İçduygu
Bu tez, etnik-kültürel farklılıkların eşit vatandaşlık ilkesi temelinde 
korunması koşulları üzerinde yoğunlaşarak, Türkiye ve Avrupa bölgesel 
kurumlarmda azınlık hakları çerçevesinin genel görünümünü çıkarmayı 
amaçlamıştır. Modern dönemin egemen siyasi kurumu olan milli-devlet, ideolojik 
söylemi ve pratiği içinde, “vatandaşlık” (siyasi-hukuki mensubiyet) ile “milliyet” 
(etnik-kültürel mensubiyet) arasındaki ayrımı aşındırdığından, vatandaşlık 
kavramında saklı olan eşitlik ilkesi ethnik-kültürel farkhhklan dışlamıştır. Oysa, 
ethnik ve kültürel farklılıklar gösteren toplumsal ortamlarda gerçek eşitlik, eşit 
vatandaşlık adına kültürel farklılıkların dışlanmadığı bir zeminde
sağlanabilmektedir. Bu gerçekten hareketle, azınlık hakları alanındaki çabalar, 
“eşitlik” ve “farklılık” kavramlarını aynı siyasi-yasal çerçeve içinde bağdaştırmaya 
çalışmıştır. Bu tez göstermektedir ki Avrupa bölgesel kurumlarmda benimsenen 
değerler, ilkeler ve pratikler, birey-odaklı tanımlanan eşit vatandaşlık hakları ile 
grup-odaklı şekillenen kültürel farklılıkları önemli ölçüde bağdaştırabilmiştir. 
Türkiye’de ise bu iki boyut birbirini sık sık dışlamış, eşit vatandaşlık ile ulusal 
türdeşlik aynı algılanmış ve etnik-kültürel farklılık eşit olmayan bir muamelenin 
temelini oluşturagelmiştir. Bu geleneksel yapı, Avrupa Birliği ile bütünleşme 
sürecinin etkisi altında kabul edilen uyum yasaları ile kırümış, ülkedeki siyasi- 
hukuki çerçeve ve pratikler, etnik, kültürel, dinsel ve dilsel farklılıkları koruma ve 
geliştirme imkanlarını, vatandaş eşitliği ilkesini dışlamadan, tanımaya başlamıştır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Azınlık, Azınlık Hakları, Vatandaşlık, Eşitlik, Farklılık.
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INTRODUCTION
There has not yet appeared an internationally working definition of the concept of 
minority. The term, however, has generally been associated with those sections of national 
citizens who manifested, among others, ethno-cultural, linguistic and religious distinctions as 
compared to those citizens who belong to the mainstream identity category of a country’s 
population. From this point of view, minority peoples have categorically indicated “different 
citizens” of a national population whose legal-political and social position, in modem 
conditions, has been based upon two constitutive sources: universal equality of state- 
membership (citizenship) and group-specific particularities of ethno-cultural membership.
The discourse and practice of citizenship has been projected upon the similarities of 
peoples. The concept has generally neglected particularity and difference and given everyone 
the same status in the public realm in which rules and law were formulated blind and 
exercised in an indifferent manner with regard to peoples’ ethno-cultural, religious and 
linguistic circumstances (Young, 1994). Grounded in the legal and political spheres of action, 
citizenship was never conceptually tied to national identity (Habermas, 1994: 23). Yet, the 
two concepts have usually been conflated in the modem state practices. One came to imply 
the other (Oommen, 1997a: 15-19). Owing to this fact, the principle of citizenship equality 
has usually lost its ethno-cultural neutrality in practice and molded as an instmment of 
national uniformity (Kymlica and Norman, 2000).
Although egalitarian premises of citizenship status have become the sine qua non 
condition of state-membership in the modem world, the universalist-individualist framework 
of formal equality has proved insufficient to guarantee achievement of genuine equality, 
particularly, in those social conditions where population displayed ethno-cultural, linguistic
and religious diversity. Peoples have dissimilar as well as similar characteristics. Because of 
this, on the part of “different citizens”, treating essentially different groups on the same 
footing as the majority has equally tended to violate the principle of equality so long as it 
operated in the form of uniformity. In its broader interpretation, apart from equal treatment, 
the full-fledged scope of citizenship equality has required measures of differential treatment 
pertinent to the protection and promotion of ethno-cultural distinctions (Parekh, 2000; 239- 
263).
Thus, the mere implementation of citizenship equality has tended to level off minority 
differences in favor of cultural and linguistic characteristics of a majority group. Similarly, 
group-specific treatment, in the absence of citizenship equality, has usually culminated in the 
emergence of discrimination, persecution or even oppression on the part of minority peoples 
(Oommen, 1997a). This thesis argues that the possibility of developing genuine equality 
between minority and majority sections of population depends upon the capacity to create a 
working balance between citizenship universality and ethno-cultural particularity. Bearing 
this fact in mind, this thesis aims at exploring how and to what extent the two notions of 
citizenship equality and ethno-cultural particularity were accommodated in Turkey and the 
three major European-regional organizations: the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE), and the European Union (EU). In order to 
achieve this aim, from an historical, political and legal perspective, it focuses mainly on legal- 
political formulations and policy practices adopted in both contexts.
The thesis suggests that there has existed a traditional divergence between legal- 
political formulations and practices of the European-regional and Turkish regimes* in 
accommodating two-fold circumstances of minority peoples. This thesis argues that, from the 
inception of the modem state system, bilateral and multilateral endeavors in the European
' In this study, the notion o f “regime” is used in a loose way to denote distinct framework o f rights and practices 
adopted in accommodating minority issues in a specific time period and in the context o f  national and 
international organizations.
context have sought to create a true reconciliation between citizenship equality and the group- 
specific particularities. In arguing this, the thesis draws attention to a set of norms, values, 
principles and instruments developed by the European regional organizations for the 
protection and promotion of ethno-cultural, religious and linguistic distinctions in an 
egalitarian framework of citizenship status.
A wide range of studies, conducted on its conceptual, historical, legal, political, social 
and institutional dimensions, has examined the issue of minority rights in the European- 
regional context. At the conceptual level, the focus has centered chiefly upon the legal- 
political implications of the concept of minority on the way of identifying potential bearers of 
group-specific rights. The attention has been drawn to the fact that although no universally 
admitted definition has yet been reached on the concept, international law documents have 
accounted for a number of constitutive criteria, including ethnic, religious, linguistic and 
cultural distinctions, through which subjects of minority rights would be defined (Ramağa, 
1992a; Ramağa, 1992b; Girasoli, 1995, Parker, 1993).
Legal-political analyses, on the other hand, concerned standard-setting acts of the 
OSCE, CoE and the EU organs as well as the League of Nations and the UN. Drawing 
attention to the gradual standardization of the minority rights issues in the region, the studies 
in this category illustrated the development of a regional regime, that is, the framework of 
norms, rules, principles and instruments of implementation, in the field of minority protection 
(Benoit-Rohmer, 1996; Cumber and Wheatley, 1999; Bloed and van Dijk, 1991; Neuwahl and 
Rosas, 1995; Gilbert, 1996; Hillgruber and Jestaedt, 1994; Cuthbertson and Leibowitz, 1993; 
Parker and Myntti, 1993; Miall, 1994; Pentassuglia, 2001; Preece, 1997; Wright, 1996). This 
was coupled with several students of international law who have put emphasis on the global 
dimension of minority issues and addressed the emergence and prevailing scope of minority
rights and freedoms on a universal scale (Macartney, 1968; Akermark, 1996; Capotorti, 1991; 
Crawford, 1992; Brolman, Lefeber and Zieck, 1993; Smith, 1991, Thomberry, 1991).
It is upon this conceptual and legal-political ground that minority issues, on the one 
hand, have been assimilated into general scope of human rights protection. Here is where 
group-specific aspects of minority issues have been disregarded in favor of a universalist- 
individualist understanding of human rights protection (Donnelly, 1989; Whitaker, 1984; 
Rosas and Hegelsen, 1992; Jones, 1994; Mullerson, 1997). Following legal-political 
developments in the field, several advocates of modem political thought insisted, on the other 
hand, that minority issues has retained a two-dimensional form which contained both 
universalist-individualist and group-specific aspects. It is at this point that several studies have 
promoted reconciliation of citizenship universality with ethno-cultural particularities of 
minority groups (Kymlicka, 1995; Kymlicka and Norman, 2000; Schnapper, 1998; Oommen, 
1997; Brubaker, 1992; Hannum, 1990; Hannum, 1999).
In the Turkish context, this thesis draws attention to a deadlock which has inhibited the 
emergence of a stable reconciliation between two notions of citizenship equality and legal- 
political acconunodation of ethno-cultural distinctions. In comparison with the European- 
regional case, inclusion/exclusion practices of the Turkish minority rights regime have largely 
proved the fact that the two foundational dimensions have often excluded each other. Rooted 
in the traditional practices, socio-political and legal formulations, the Turkish citizenship 
policies have established a close linkage between citizenship and national identity and 
developed a Muslim-inclusive and non-Muslim-exclusive practice. The full-fledged scope of 
citizenship equality has usually been confined to the national citizens, that is, borrowing from 
Anderson (1991), the “imagined community” of Turkish-Muslim peoples. On the name of 
unity, the principle of citizenship equality, however, has neglected their ethno-cultural 
particularities. The non-Muslim citizens, by contrast, have been conferred positive measures
of differential treatment with regard to their ethno-cultural circumstances. Depending upon 
their national “otherness”, they have often been denied the universal implications of 
citizenship equality.
Concerning the Turkish case, the overwhelming part of the studies has chiefly 
concentrated upon case-specific, group-specific and historical analysis. Unlike the conceptual 
broadness of the European-regional context, the former has generally constituted minority 
issues around religious distinctions and associated it with the traditional condition of non- 
Muslim minorities. Here is where the focus has become either on the formulations and 
practices of the Ottoman millet system and/or treacherous aspirations and activities of non- 
Muslim minorities (Davison, 1954; İnalcık, 1998; Karpat, 1986; Sonyel, 1993; Eryilmaz, 
1990; Eryilmaz, 1992; Bozkurt, 1996a; Lewis and Braude, 1982; McCarthy, 1983). It is upon 
this limited form of conceptualization that elaborating on specific cases or particular groups, 
many studies have been undertaken on the ramifications of Ottoman and Republican policies 
and practices adopted in the treatment of minority peoples (Aktar, 2000; Alexandris, 1992; 
An, 2000; Bali, 2000; Demir and Akar, 1999; Akar, 2000; Akçam, 1995; Galanti, 1995; 
Gülsoy, 2000, Levi, 1998; Ökte, 1987, Özyılmaz, 2000).
This being the case, there has not yet been any comprehensive study on the Turkish 
minority rights regime which examines its foundational practices in the context of universal 
and regional developments in terms of both conceptualizing the concept of minority and legal- 
political standards of minority treatment. Considering the increasing influence of the 
European-regional standards on the Turkish regime, it is important today, first, to display the 
roots and contemporary framework of the norms, principles and practices developed in the 
European-regional organizations. In order to disclose the underlying logic and general scope 
of the Turkish minority rights regime, second, historical development and current position of 
minority issues in the Turkish context is to be investigated. However, Turkish studies on the
issue of minority rights have rarely gone beyond documentary works having little, if any, 
implication with regard to the general framework of the Turkish minority rights regime 
((^avu§oglu, 1999; Oran, 2001). Most significantly, the issue of minority rights has rarely 
been situated at the inclusion/exclusion practices of Turkish citizenship policies. Whenever 
citizenship practices was related to minority circumstances, the concern again remained at the 
level of group-specific or case-specific analysis (Ekinci, 1997; Ekinci, 2001).
Bearing shortcomings of the previous studies in mind, this thesis follows the 
reconciliatory approaches promoted in the western liberal tradition. For doing this, it aims, 
first, at filling the gap that has existed between case-specific/group-specific analysis and the 
regional framework of the question that would give a general picture of the question, 
internally in the country, and externally in the regional organizations with which Turkish state 
has established close links from their inception. In relation to this, the second objective is to 
delineate contextual dimension of minority issues with respect to the emergence of both 
European-regional and Turkish regime. The thesis, in this context, suggests that none of the 
minority rights regimes rested upon a static ground but instead evolved in a dynamic process 
of production and reproduction with regard to rules, norms, principles and practices of 
minority-related policies. It is argued that political, ideological, social or demographic 
changes in the circumstances of peoples have resulted in the emergence of parallel changes in 
the constitutive parameters of minority issues. Here, historical development of the European- 
regional regime displays contextual transformations in the norms, practices and instruments in 
the field of minority protection.
Taking into account the fact that the Ottoman legacy has constrained both the legal 
scope and policy practices of the Turkish minority rights regime, we will point out historical 
roots of today’s standards and practices. At this point, the objective of the study will be on the 
major policy areas that drifted the Turkish regime from the general principles of the
European-regional organizations. Having disclosed constitutive parameters of minority 
circumstances, that is citizenship universality and ethno-cultural particularity, we will 
examine whether there is a possibility on the part of the Turkish regime to reconcile 
citizenship and minority particularities in both its legal-political setting and policy practices.
Due to fact that the European standards of minority rights have challenged traditional 
framework of the Turkish regime, particularly in the new order of the post-Cold War period, 
the elaboration of the question in the context of both Turkey and the European-regional 
organizations is expected to give prospective and policy-oriented outcomes. Taking into 
account the significance of the minority issues in the enlargement process of the EU, we are 
still in the process of examining the extent to which the Turkish regime would undertake 
progressive steps in the direction of meeting contemporary European standards. To this end, 
the thesis indicates how the Turkish state has retained its traditional regime up until the late 
1990s and why the Turkish regime now entered under an increasing pressure of 
transformation.
This thesis follows basically a qualitative research method based upon the content 
analysis of legal-political documents. For both European-regional and Turkish contexts, 
official documents (decrees, rules, laws, regulations, statutes, charters, resolutions, reports or 
declarations) are used as primary sources in assessing foundational networks of both 
European-regional and the Turkish minority rights regime. For the former, major documents 
include extracts of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648); minorities treaties of the League of 
Nations (1919-20); the UN Charter (1946), the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948) and the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); the OSCE Helsinki Final 
Act (1976) and the OSCE Copenhagen Document (1990); and the CoE Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), and the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (1994). Concerning the Turkish case, the thesis relies on the
Imperial Rescript of Gulhane (1839), the Reform Edict (1856), the First Ottoman Constitution 
(1876), the Republican Constitutions (1924, 1961, 1982) and a set of legislative acts which 
includes the law on capital tax, the settlement law, law on broadcasting and language 
education, and the EU reforms. Secondary sources of the study will cover the review of the 
second-hand data including books, journal articles and conference papers. Secondary sources, 
concerning historical, political and social aspects of the question, are used in assessing 
historical dimension and contemporary formulations and practices of the two minority rights 
regimes. In shaping our ideas on the practices of Turkish minority rights regime, a limited 
number of interviews were also conducted.
The thesis is divided into seven chapters which cover two main parts, that is, the 
European-regional and the Turkish contexts. In order to better delineate contemporary 
framework of the two regimes, preliminary chapters in both parts undertakes historical 
evolution of today’s standards. However, before doing this, chapter I gives an account of 
major parameters of minority issues, including the definition of the concept of minority; the 
scope of the rights of minorities; the form of rights and freedoms - whether collective or 
individual - and implications of the issue of minority rights on the area of state sovereignty. It 
is argued that as socio-political, legal and diplomatic circumstances changed, a parallel 
transformation has grown up in the meaning and scope of the norms, rules, standards and the 
instruments employed in the field of minority rights.
The chapter II examines the emergence of modem state system and minority 
questions. It suggests that in the absence of modem mling mechanisms and ideological 
incentives, though in an inegalitarian order of legal-political stratification, the European 
ancian regime permitted persistence of ethno-cultural and linguistic diversity. The emergence 
of modem state system, depended largely upon consolidated stmctures of nation-states, 
coincided with egalitarian conceptualization of legal, political and social spheres. However,
due to fact that modem political thought and state practices have often conflated those 
essentially distinct notions of nation, state, nationality and citizenship, legal egalitarianism has 
proceeded at the expense of minorities’ ethno-cultural, linguistic and religious particularities. 
Bearing this fact in mind, the chapter argues that minority concerns denied both 
inegalitarianism of the ancien regime and abstract universalism of the modem age. The issue 
of minority rights, instead, has sought to create reconciliation between the universalist- 
egalitarian aspects of the citizenship status and group-specific dimensions of ethno-cultural 
differences.
Having given the fact that minority concerns necessitated different accommodation of 
ethno-cultural distinctions, chapter III sets down national and international precedents to the 
contemporary norms and instmments in the field of minority rights. Starting from the Treaty 
of Westphalia, the chapter exhibits historical evolution of the major parameters on minority 
treatment that progressed in the European context in the direction of creating a tme 
reconciliation between citizenship equality and distinct treatment of ethno-cultural 
peculiarities. This historical evolution contains three main stages: religiously colored 
framework of the post-Westphalian system, geographically limited regime of the minorities 
treaties -the context of the League of Nations- and the individualist-universalist scope of the 
UN regime of the Cold War years.
Chapter IV explains the emergence and the framework of the post-Cold War European 
regime of minority rights as it relates to two dimensions of citizenship equality and group- 
specific treatment. The first concern here deals with political incentives that have led the 
European region to develop a new network of rights, freedoms and instruments pertinent to 
the protection and promotion of minority circumstances. Starting from the Cold-War 
approaches, the chapter displays the development of new standards in the major regional 
organizations in Europe. It is in this context that major parameters of the new regime, those of
the minority definition, minority rights, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, principles of 
equality and non-discrimination, are examined. It is suggested that the new context of 
minority protection added an ethno-cultural dimension to the notion of universal human rights 
protection. This chapter concludes that the post-Cold War standards of the OSCE, CoE and 
the EU largely reconciled group-specific aspects of minority distinctions with universal scope 
of citizenship equality.
After the historical unfolding and contemporary framework of the European minority 
rights regime were laid down, the chapter V examines the legacy of the Turkish ancien 
regime which is based on the legal-political framework and practices of the Ottoman 
administration. Having been aware of the fact that the Turkish regime inherited many aspects 
from the past and adopted them to the modem forms of minority treatment, this chapter, first, 
reviews the main characteristics of religious diversity embedded in the traditional scope of the 
Ottoman millet system. In this context, legal, political and social implications of the millet 
system are analyzed as it relates to the issue of protecting the “other” population categories. 
Second, this chapter focuses on the modem transformation of the millet system that proceeded 
under the impacts of the nineteenth century modernization projects. The main argument is that 
although Ottoman administration took a number of legal-political and administrative steps in 
the direction of reconciling ethno-cultural diversity with a universal formula of citizenship 
equality, the Ottoman egalitarianism failed due to nationalist aspirations of minority groups.
Chapter VI suggests that having learned much from the failures of the Ottoman 
administration, the nationalist leaders, from the advent of the Liberation War, renounced 
pluralist projects of ethno-cultural diversity. Following religious lines of millet demarcations, 
the founding leaders situated the Muslim adherence in the core of the “imagined nation” of 
the new regime while consolidating the “other” position of the non-Muslim minorities. The 
objective of this chapter is to delineate the inclusion-exclusion practices shaped by religious
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traits of citizens. After examining the final configuration of the majority/minority categories 
of the Republican population, this chapter sets forth legal-political and social framework of 
the modem Turkish minority rights regime incorporated in the political clauses of the 
Lausanne Treaty. The main argument at this stage is that the Lausanne Treaty integrated the 
Turkish regime into European context in terms of rights and freedoms accorded to the 
minority sections of the population. It is also argued that under the far-reaching impacts of the 
traditional practices, the scope of the Turkish regime largely drifted from its contemporaries 
in Europe in terms of minority/majority categorization.
Although the Lausanne regime adopted a substantive scope in the sense of reconciling 
citizenship universality and ethno-cultural diversity, at least for the non-Muslim sections of 
the population, chapter VII points out that the Turkish practices have been caught in a duality 
of equality and diversity. In conformity with the majority/minority classification, the Turkish 
minority rights regime has adopted, on the one hand, a Muslim-inclusive policy in which the 
principle of citizenship equality has been equated with ethno-cultural uniformity. The legal- 
political, educational, cultural or administrative policies of the Republican state have denied 
official accommodation of Turkish-Muslim distinctions. Having conflated the full-fledged 
scope of citizenship equality with Turkish-Muslim nationality, the same regime, on the other 
hand, provided non-Muslim citizens with measures of different treatment. However, due to 
fact that they have remained outside the mainstream identity category of the Republican 
nation, the latter group of citizens has often been subjected to inegalitarian treatment. The 
chapter shows that it is only under the pressure of increasing identity claims posed by 
minorities and enforced by the EU integration process that the Turkish minority rights regime, 
parallel to the post-Cold War European-regional standards, has begun to develop a 
conciliatory framework between citizenship equality and ethno-cultural diversity.
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CHAPTER I
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
1.1 Introduction
It is hardly possible to talk about compact regimes in the treatment of minority 
distinctions. National and international standards and practices relating to the issue of 
minority protection have underlined a general framework of norms, practices and 
instruments for a given time and space. It is this general framework that has introduced 
several parameters, formulation and practices which have marked essential distinctions 
between different regimes. This chapter aims to clarify implications and the scope of 
concepts and parameters contained in the field of minority rights. It first examines 
conceptual and legal-political definitions of minorities. In order to indicate the fact that 
the question of minority rights has exclusively been associated with the condition of 
minorities, the second concern of this chapter is on differentiating the concept of 
“minority” from that of the “peoples”. It outlines the potential beneficiaries of minority 
rights and lists major categories of rights that have been incorporated and implemented in 
relation to the issue of minority protection. Given the fact that formulation of minority 
rights and freedoms have projected different relations between majority and minorities, 
and between minority groups and their individual members, this chapter then delineates 
legal-political and moral implications of different categories of minority rights. Lastly, it 
elaborates on an inherently controversial issue of state sovereignty as it relates to 
accommodating minority distinctions in the legal-political setting of national-states. In 
this context, it is suggested that although the issue of minority rights has challenged
12
internal and external implications of state sovereignty, the prevailing transformation in 
the concept of sovereignty came to reconcile itself with internal and external aspects of 
minority rights.
1.2 The Question of Deflnition
The dictionary of the Turkish Language Association (TDK, 1998: 184) defines 
the concept of minority as “a group of peoples which differs in many respects from and 
counts less than the rest of the population”. In this general usage, the concept of minority 
covers a number of socio-political, legal and economic groupings including feminists, 
gays, homeless peoples, political Islamists, communists provided that they remain a 
minority as compared to the rest of the population. Aware of its generality, the Turkish 
dictionary further indicates that the concept of minority refers to “a population group 
which belongs to a different ethno-racial origin with regard to the sovereign nationality, 
and is numerically lesser than the rest”. In a similar maimer, another Turkish dictionary 
(Puskiilltioglu, 1994: 120) specifies the concept with “a group of citizens who share 
specific racial, religious and linguistic characteristics distinct from the dominant 
nationality of the country”. Thus, apart from religious and linguistic distinctions, the 
definition implied that in order to have minority status, a group must have accomplished 
legal-political standards of citizenship as well. In parallel to this Turkish usage, the 
Dictionary of International Human Rights (Gibson, 1996: 183) spells out that “a minority 
is a collectivity of people in a state sharing a common characteristic, usually one of 
nationality, religion, ethnicity, language or other identifiable property”.
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Thus, as concerned its literary meaning, the conceptual framework of the term 
seemed to be more or less clear. However, the UN Secretary-General agreed in 1950, 
“the term ‘minority’ can not for practical purposes be defined simply by interpreting the 
word in its literal sense. If this were the case, nearly all the communities existing within a 
state would be styled minorities, including (among others) families, social classes, 
cultural groups, speakers of dialects” (Capotorti, 1991: 6). Apart from literary meaning, 
the term has indeed retained legal-political implications as well. Because of this, when 
the term “minority” is received within a legal-politieal context, its scope has been 
elaborated in a restrictive manner in terms of legal inclusiveness or larger area of 
discretion on the identification of minority peoples has been left to the political 
arbitration of state actors. The issue of minority protection, therefore, has traditionally put 
the cart before the horse in stipulating rights without defining the subjects of these rights 
(Parker, 1993: 50).
Beyond doubt, if minority issues are to be treated rationally, the subject of rights 
and obligations contained in the legal-political documents should be made transparent. 
Otherwise, there will appear an ambiguity on the bearers of rights that would render its 
implementation ineffective and arbitrary at the hands of national and international actors 
(Parker, 1993). However, taking into account legal-political implications of a possible 
definition, state authorities and international organizations have refrained from 
articulating an internationally recognised definition. Partly depending on nation-state 
concern of ethno-cultural homogeneity and partly in fear of secessionist claims', few *
* The existence o f minorities and legal-political articulation of minority rights have often been considered 
by national authorities as a step towards minority secessionism. The act o f creating an internationally 
working definition has been simply equated with an act of creating secessionist groups within national 
frontiers. Taking into account these pejorative implications of the concept o f minority in the eyes o f nation-
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states, if any, have recognized the existence of corporate agents, legally and politically
defined, between sovereign state institutions and their citizens. Although several states
granted official recognition to the existence of ethno-linguistic, religious and cultural
minorities and incorporated various measures of group-specific treatment^, many others
have refrained from doing this (Alffedsson, 1993). As reported by Capotorti (1991), for
example, the French Government stated:
France cannot recognise the existence o f ethnic groups, whether minorities or not. As regards 
religions and languages -other than the national language- the French Government points out 
that these two areas form part, not of public law, but o f the private exercise o f public 
freedoms of citizens. The role of the Government is limited to guaranteeing citizens full and 
free exercise of these freedoms within the framework defined by the law and respect for 
rights o f the individual.
Thus, while the French Government accepted cultural diversity that existed within 
its population, political-legal categorization of sub-national distinctions has been denied. 
Social diversity, instead, has been considered within the scope of individual rights and 
freedoms bequeathed to the private realm of peoples.
Apart from state concerns, diverse circumstances of minorities themselves with 
regard to their historical, economic, legal, political and social conditions too have 
contributed to the persistence of disagreement on the concept of minority. Some minority 
groups, for example, have exhibited a regionally concentrated form while some others 
evenly scattered over the lands of the hosting country. The problem of “double minority”, 
those who took part in majority but fell in a minority position in a region of the country 
where minority population constituted majority, further complicated bearers of minority
states, Lerner (1993: 80-81) argues that national and international documents relating to minority protection 
should employ a certain word other than the concept o f minority. For this end, Lemer proposes using the 
term “groups” which may be preceded or not by the qualifying ethnic, cultural, religious, or linguistic 
notions. According to Lemer, in the absence o f a internally recognised definition o f the concept, this 
alternative connotation may overcome the prevailing shortcomings.
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rights (O’Brien, 1984). Moreover, minorities’ needs and demands have changed 
according to political, legal, geographical and cultural settings they encountered with. An 
ethnic minority, with its distinct characteristics in linguistic and cultural attributes, for 
instance, tended to seek extensive protection than religious minorities, who, apart from 
religious distinction, share mainstream identification of the majority. Depending on this 
fact, the scope of the concept displayed variations from region to region, country to 
country as well as from one historical period to the other (Capotorti, 1991: 10-11).
Thus, historical, political, legal and geographical circumstances have rendered a 
uniform definition globally applicable hardly possible to attain. International or regional 
documents relating to the issue of minority protection have, therefore, undertaken a 
tentative attitude in defining their potential bearers. Under these circumstances, one way 
of developing an approximate conceptualization would be to examine objective features 
contained in the international human rights documents. In formulating minority 
provisions, the League of Nations, the UN and the European regional organisations, 
including the CoE and the OSCE, have resorted to a specific wording of “ethnic”, 
religious”, “linguistic” and “cultural” minorities. Numerical size and ethno-cultural 
distinctions, here, drew definitional borders of the concept (Gilbert, 1992: 69-80).
The second way in reaching to an indirect definition has been achieved though 
interpreting the wording of legal-political documents that have been incorporated in 
international law relating to minority issues. The situation of minorities has been 
undertaken under international concern earlier in the duration of the post-Westphalian 
state system. However, since the then prevailing aura remained case-specific and
2 Several countries o f the former Eastern Bloc, including the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, had 
traditionally presented good examples in providing legal-political accommodation of minority distinctions
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concerned exclusively with the position of specific minorities, there emerged no need to 
create an internationally working definition (Gilbert, 1999; Preece, 1997). It was only by 
the establishment of the UN that minority questions obtained a universal aspect. It was in 
this context that the Sub-conunission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities (hereafter the Sub-commission) created indirect definitions on what 
international organizations understood by the term “minority”. An earlier example of this 
appeared in the Sub-commission in 1950 which provided (Capotorti, 1991: 6):
a) The term minority includes only those non-dominant groups in a population which possess 
and wish to preserve stable ethnic, religious or linguistic traditions or characteristics 
markedly different from those o f the rest o f the population;
b) Such minorities should properly include a number o f persons sufficient by themselves to 
develop such characteristics;
c) The members o f such minorities must be loyal to the state o f which they are nationals.
In the view of the Sub-commission, in order to have minority status, individuals 
or group of individuals should firstly be in a non-dominant position. Thus, the white 
minority of the Apartheid South Africa, for example, was not considered within the scope 
of the term minority. Secondly, they should exhibit ethno-linguistic or religious 
characteristics distinct from those of the majority. Thirdly, group or individuals should 
retain an open desire to preserve these distinctions. Fourthly, minority group must have a 
reasonable size sufficient to preserve its particular characteristics. Next, these peoples 
should not be in search of secession but be loyal to the state. And lastly, they should be 
nationals of the country in the sense of citizenship. It follows from these objective and 
subjective elements that ethno-lingual, religious and cultural distinctions do not 
necessarily and directly create a minority status. Objective attributes of cultural 
distinctions, it was affirmed instead, were to be supplemented by legal and subjective 
conditions. In particular, nationality of the country in the sense of citizenship was
within their national order (Capotorti, 1991:13-15).
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considered significant because, as Parker (1993) argued, political rights would be applied 
only to legal-political members of a polity.
Capotorti, the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission, introduced the second 
definition on the interpretation of the UN acts. The definition, which relied on the study 
of the Article 27 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), has become 
one of the most respected formulas in international political, legal and intellectual circles, 
particularly, in the duration of the Cold War era. In his analysis, Capotorti (1991: 96) 
concluded that a minority is:
{a} group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant 
position, whose members -being nationals of the state- possess ethnic, religious or linguistic 
characteristics differing from those o f the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, 
a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or 
language.
Thus, Capotorti agreed with the Sub-commission on the constitutive elements of
the term. Yet, unlike the Sub-commission’s version, Capotorti only implicitly indicated
the condition of “citizenship loyalty” as his definition limited minorities’ desire
exclusively to an act of preserving ethno-cultural peculiarities. In parallel to this,
Deschenes, the Canadian Rapporteur of the Sub-commission, entertained a new definition
in 1985. For Deschenes, the concept of minority indicated:
{a} group of citizens of a state, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant 
position in that state, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ 
from those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, 
motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve 
equality with the majority in fact and in law (Girasoli, 1995: 94-95).
Having counted those elements of citizenship, numerical inferiority, non­
dominance position, ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics, displaying solidarity for 
both preserving distinct peculiarities and achieving substantial equality, Deschenes 
revisited the Sub-commission’s tradition. Nevertheless, his version enhanced preceding
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approaches in several respects. Firstly, in order to inhibit political manipulation in 
interpretation, Deschenes replaced the phrase of "numerically inferior" with "constituting 
a numerical minority". Secondly, the new formula preferred to use "citizens" in place of 
"nationals of a state" which rendered condition of citizenship rather clear. Thirdly, 
"equality in fact and in law" appeared in a rather explicit manner in Deschenes's 
definition while it had implicitly been expressed in Capotorti's.
Beyond doubt, the UN context helped to draw conceptual borders of the term 
“minority”. Nevertheless, the context left many questions relating to the question of 
definition unsolved. In particular, the UN legacy has not made a differentiation between 
"minorities by will", who wished to preserve their distinctive characteristics within a 
legal-political framework, and "minorities by force", who wish to have an integration into 
a national society under a guarantee of non-discrimination. The distinction is seen 
imperative because, the latter is satisfied with a guarantee of equal treatment (non­
discrimination) while the former looks for a group-specific treatment pertinent the 
protection and promotion of minority characteristics. On the other hand, the status of 
foreigners, migrant workers, refugees and stateless persons has generated challenges to 
this UN tradition. Their exclusion from both minority status and its protective framework 
has received criticisms (Thomberry, 1991: 9-10). Expansion of the scope of definitions 
came to be considered a significant task in the field of minority protection. Wolfrum 
(1993) introduced one example of this new tendency as he divorced the concept from 
legal-political connections of citizenship. In his view, a formal bond of citizenship is not 
necessarily one of the constituting elements of minority status which is to be rested on the 
distinguishing characteristics of subject peoples. Thus, the issue of minority rights, in his
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view, is not a part of citizenship rights, but as an integral element of human rights. In 
doing so, irrespective of citizenship status, Wolfrum insisted that those immigrant groups, 
that is “the new minorities”, are to be granted affirmative treatment.
Thus, taking into account shortcomings of the traditional definitions, today there 
appeared a new approach in the direction of developing an inclusive definition 
compatible with gradually expanding diversity of the contemporary world. In doing this, 
putting aside those fixed traits of ethno-linguistic and religious distinctions, Parker (1993: 
45), for example, entertained a flexible and inclusive definition on the shared desires of 
peoples distinct from those shared by the majority. In his view, “the or a ‘minority’ is a 
group of people who freely associates for an established purpose where their shared 
desire differs from that expressed by the majority rule”. Similarly, Gurr (1993: 3) pointed 
out that "the key to identifying communal groups (minorities) is not the presence of a 
particular trait or combination of traits, but rather the shared perception that the defining 
traits, whatever they are, set the group apart". Having been aware of the restrictive 
function of ethno-cultural elements, Andersson (1990: 232-246) went further and 
proposed to create a shift from definition to a regime of no definition. In place of creating 
legal-political definition externally applicable to minorities, Andersson favored a form of 
self-identification.
Since this alternative approach sided with self-identification, it seemed rather just
and inclusive as concerned bearers of minority rights. Similarly, despite the fact that
ethnic, religious or linguistic precedents were kept intact, the latest institutional definition
adopted an inclusive formula. The UN Rapporteur Eide noted in 1993:
{a} minority is any group o f  persons resident within a sovereign state which constitutes less 
than half o f the population o f the national society and whose members share common
20
characteristics o f an ethnic, religious or linguistic nature that distinguish them from the rest of 
the population (Girasoli, 1995: 94).
Here Hide removed subjective elements from among the constitutive criteria of 
the concept and focused exclusively on such objective traits as numerical inferiority, 
ethnic, religious and linguistic distinctions. He dispensed with the condition of 
citizenship too. In so doing, his definition conditioned minority rights not on legal- 
political membership (citizenship) but on the fact of exhibiting ethno-cultural distinctions 
different from those of the majority. The “new minorities” of the contemporary world 
were, hence, considered within its conceptual borders.
Despite the fact that there appeared several definitions, almost none have gone 
beyond being intellectual endeavors or legal interpretations. Political concerns of states 
and the complexity of the issue have avoided emergence of a general definition. In 
particular, state parties have disagreed on the terms of a generally applicable definition, 
politically and legally recognized, since its absence has usually been used as a “tactical 
device” in order to deny legal-political accommodation of minority distinctions (Parker, 
1993: 26). In most cases, therefore, larger discretion on determining concrete bearers of 
minority rights has been entrusted to the arbitration of national governments who have 
exploited the lack of definition to disregard ethno-cultural diversity. Because of this, it is 
suggested today that in order to establish an effective minority protection, state parties 
should not be granted any say on the definition of minority groups. Instead, whenever and 
wherever a group meets objective and subjective criteria, it must be subjected to the 
norms of minority protection (Alfredsson, 1993: 70).
In conclusion, from literary meaning to the interpretations of international law, 
the elaboration of the concept has largely revealed qualifying characteristics of the term
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“minority”. Although states have continued to disagree on reaching an internationally 
respected definition, major elements of the concept, including citizenship, ethno-cultural 
distinctions, numerical inferiority, have drawn a general framework pertinent to 
identification of those population sections who would be bestowed rights and freedoms 
facilitating protection and promotion of their particular characteristics. This is why, 
despite the absence of legal definition, national governments will increasingly feel 
pressure of this general framework and have to act in a more restricted area in the field of 
minority protection.
1.3 Minorities and Peoples
Related to the legal-political conceptualisation of the term “minority”, there 
emerges a practical necessity to make a clear distinction between "minorities" and 
"peoples". Despite the fact that the two concepts have frequently been confused merely 
for the sake of political concerns, international law tradition has examined “minorities” 
and “peoples” in relation to two distinct sets of rights and legal-political status. As they 
were incorporated into two separate provisions, the CCPR, for example, differently 
treated the position of peoples and that of the minorities. The distinction is crucial in the 
minority rights regime, because only peoples were considered to have right to determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. In 
particular, the right of self-determination, involving an implication of territorial and 
political secession, has been restricted to those groups who were accepted as peoples.
Despite this fact, the meaning of the two, in practice, has been sacrificed to 
political intentions on the part of both minorities and state parties. In order to expand the
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scope of rights they enjoyed, for example, several minority groups have identified 
themselves within the terms of peoples. The reverse also proved to be true. When 
intended to deny any right of secession or self-determination, governments have 
delineated peoples as minorities whose claims were to be accommodated within the 
political borders of a state (Crawford, 1992).
As explained above, minorities have been defined on the basis of the combination 
of some objective and subjective elements including, among others, citizenship, ethnic, 
religious and linguistic distinction, and the existence of group solidarity on the 
preservation of these distinctions. Thus, minorities have been considered first of all 
integral parts of a larger society constituting a state’s population. The issue of minority 
rights, in this sense, has not completely been divorced from citizenship rights but added 
to these sets of rights. This means that the term “minority” is relatively defined and, 
therefore, implied presence of a "majority" expressed in terms of number, ethnicity, 
religion or language. That is to say, minorities would come to constitute a part of a 
majority population after they integrated themselves into their ethno-cultural kin through 
demographic, territorial changes or as a result of migration. However, it is hardly possible 
to conceptualise the term "peoples" in relation to a majority population or to other 
minority groups. In other words, peoples themselves, by definition, have been considered 
to constitute a majority population in the territory they occupied (Ramağa, 1992).
On the other hand, international concern has limited those concepts of “people” 
and “rights of peoples” to the historical terms of the colonial era. In that sense, the term 
“peoples” has connoted those population groupings who were taken under colonial 
occupation. Accordingly, rights of peoples have been associated with the principle of
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self-determination presented in the form of having either territorial autonomy or 
secession from a colonial domination. In the duration of the post-colonial era, the term 
"peoples" has indicated nothing but populations of already established states, while 
minorities constituted parts of these populations (Gurr, 1993: 15).
Nevertheless, it is significant to note here that when states steadily denied 
peaceful accommodation of minority distinctions within their legal-political systems but 
carried out oppressive policies against minority groups, then the minority groups 
concerned would eventually obtain in the eyes of international opinion characteristics of 
peoples. Thus, it has been argued, if existence and rights of minorities were constantly 
denied for the sake of national interests and subjected to those policies of discrimination 
or assimilation, their secessionist aspirations would gradually acquire legitimate grounds 
(Mullerson, 1997: 52-53). The latest example of this appeared in the case of Kosavo 
where as the Serbian government cancelled minority status of Albanians and embarked 
intensive policies of assimilation, secessionist cause of the Albanian minority came to be 
regarded legitimate.
1.4 Rights of Minorities
Conceptual definition of the term “minority’ held that minority peoples referred to 
those sections of citizens who manifested “ethno-cultural, linguistic and religious 
distinctions” in respect to those citizens who belong to the mainstream identity category 
of the country’s majority population. Thus, the term minority itself implied the 
establishment of a legal-political system which, apart from securing citizenship equality, 
would allow equal accommodation of social distinctions in a form of different treatment.
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In those states whose population are not homogeneous but differentiate along ethno­
cultural, linguistic and religious characteristics, the principle of equality would remain in 
short of guaranteeing substantive equality between members of minority and majority 
sections of a population.
As we will broadly explain in the next chapter, citizenship in the modem world 
constmcted basis of state-membership by creating direct linkages between individual 
members of polity and the state. In doing this, the concept has abstracted individuals from 
their ethno-cultural circumstances and indicated a certain form of legal-political status 
having nothing to do with peoples’ particularities. Rights and obligations have been 
formulated on the grounds of equality and allocated universally for the whole of the 
citizenry. The universal implication of the concept of citizenship, therefore, conferred an 
equal locus standi upon each member of social composition. Thus, since the concept of 
citizenship underlined legal-political membership to the state, individual citizens, 
whether they belonged to majority or minority, have been subjected to the same civil and 
political rights. In regard to citizenship, minorities shared formal equality on the same 
footing as the majority.
The principle of formal equality has urged national governments to treat like cases 
alike, that is, to treat individual members of citizenry equally in terms of rights and 
obligations. Yet, despite the fact that this formal approach would allow different 
treatment of minority cases, it has in no way compelled state authorities to do it. By 
contrast, equality and non-discrimination, as defined on civil and political equality, have 
been two major measures of the formal equality (Wenthold, 1992: 53-54). Because of 
this, universal implication of citizenship equality has often been practiced in a manner of
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uniformity and its legal aspect has been operated as an instrument of ethno-linguistic and
religious homogenization (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000).
Beyond doubt, legal equality is the sine qua non of citizenship status, but legal
equality in itself is not sufficient to guarantee achievement of genuine equality. The
principle of citizenship equality is generally described also “as the right to treat like cases
alike and different cases differently” (Wenthold, 1999: 53). Thus, despite the fact that
formal equality would never be seen insignificant, its mere implementation has tended to
remain short of securing true equality in those political entities where population is not
uniform but displayed ethno-lingual and religious diversity. It is under these
circumstances that treating essentially different groups in an identical fashion, that is,
treating minority groups in the same manner with majority, was considered to violate
principles of both equality and non-discrimination (Gilbert, 1992: 171). Because of this,
the full-fledged scope of genuine equality has sought an additional aspect which has
called for “unlike treatment of cases because of their unlikeliness” (Wenthold, 1999: 53).
Principles of equality/non-discrimination and of minority protection, thus, signified two
different practices. On the two concepts, the Sub-commission in 1947 stated that:
{p}revention o f  discrimination is the prevention o f any action which denies to individuals 
or groups o f peoples equality o f treatment which they may wish.
Protection o f  minorities is the protection of non-dominant groups which, while wishing 
in general for equality o f treatment with the majority, wish for a measure of differential 
treatment in order to preserve basic characteristics which they possess and which 
distinguish them from the majority o f the population (Capotorti, 1991: 40).
It follows from this argument that the principle of equality, with regard to the
distinct position of minority groups, must be interpreted in a broader manner. It should be
replaced by a substantive form of equality which prescribes that “unlike cases should be
dealt within a manner which reflects their unlikeliness” (Wenthold, 1992: 54). Putting the
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matter differently, the principle of citizenship equality in culturally diverse societies
should accommodate both similar and distinct circumstances of peoples. In the view of
Parekh (2000: 239-240), since “human beings are at once both natural and cultural
beings”, that is “they are both similar and different...We cannot ground equality in
human uniformity...(which) requires us to treat human beings equally in those respects in
which they are similar and not those in which they are different ”. For him, “While
granting them equality at the level of their shared human nature, we deny it at the equally
important cultural level” (Parekh, 2000: 240). Having pointed out the fact that a theory
and practice of equality “grounded in human uniformity is both philosophically
incoherent and morally problematic”, Parekh (2000: 240) insisted:
Since human beings are at once both similar and different, they should be treated equally 
because of both. Such a view, which grounds equality not in human uniformity but in the 
interplay o f uniformity and difference, builds difference into the very concept o f equality, 
breaks the traditional equation o f equality with similarity, and is immune to monist 
distortion. Once the basis o f equality changes so does its content. Equality involves equal 
freedom or opportunity to be different, and treating human beings equally requires us to 
take into account both their similarities and differences. When the latter are not relevant, 
equality entails uniform or identical treatment; when they are, it requires differential 
treatment.
Differential treatment renders specific treatment of minority distinctions not an 
external to individualist measures of equality and non-discrimination, but an integral 
norm of it which takes ethno-cultural, linguistic and religious distinctions into account 
(Wenthold, 1999: 58-60). Differential treatment, in the absence of equal citizenship 
status, however, is equally dangerous. Since citizenship equality guarantees equal 
grounds of non-discrimination, the neglect of it bears an immediate danger of 
inegalitarian treatment to be created between majority citizens and those groups who are 
entitled to measures of differential treatment. Discrimination, communal isolation, 
persecution or even oppression is likely to appear in a legal-political setting where fiill-
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fledged scope of citizenship status is denied to any section of population because of their 
ethno-cultural, religious and linguistic otherness.
Thus, rights of minorities depend upon two essential sources; universal equality 
inherent in the meaning of the state-membership (citizenship) and the group-specific 
traits of ethno-cultural membership. Since it seeks to correct shortcomings of the formal 
equality through creating legal-political grounds of ethno-cultural diversity within 
citizenship equality, differential treatment intends to reconcile individually enjoyed 
citizenship rights with those of the group-specific rights of minorities. Therefore, when 
discussing minority rights, it is significant to accomplish a true congruence between two 
categories of rights without excluding or separately promoting any part of it.
Historically, when complete integration with or assimilation into ethno-cultural, 
economic and political structures of the majority has become the objective, minorities 
have usually contended with minimalist formula of individual equality and non­
discrimination. The mere concern here has become to entitle individual members of 
minority groups with basic rights identical with those of the majority. In this context, 
there would appear no need to stipulate individual rights with group-specific rights 
pertinent to the protection and promotion of minority distinctions. While individuals are 
abstracted from their ethno-cultural particularities into universal scope of citizenship, no 
legal distinction between minority and majority sections of population is drawn. Under 
these circumstances, rights, including rights of minorities, are laid down in negative 
terms without urging states to take positive obligations with regard to the protection and 
promotion of minorities’ ethno-cultural, linguistic and religious distinctions (O’Brian, 
1984; Gilbert, 1992: 74-80).
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However, identical treatment does not always guarantee actual accommodation of 
the spirit of the principle of equality. In these circumstances where minorities wish to 
have isolation from, or to achieve technical, functional and economic integration without 
renouncing their group-specific particularities, a broader interpretation of the principle of 
equality comes to the forefront of minority concerns. Substantive implementation of the 
principle of equality, therefore, becomes significant. It was in this context that in addition 
to equality and non-discrimination, minority circumstances necessitates creating legal- 
political grounds of differential treatment (O’Brian, 1984; Alfredsson, 1993). And, here 
is where states are obliged to imdertake positive measures in accordance with the specific 
interests of minority peoples. In order to correct essentially unequal position of minority 
citizens, states are expected to consider minority distinctions in regulating their socio­
political, cultural, legal, administrative, economic and educational policies (Scarman, 
1984; Gilbert, 1992: 74-80).
The group-specific category of minority rights, as defined on the terms of positive 
rights, generally includes rights to:
a) learning and/or having education in mother tongues,
b) using minority languages in press, publications, judicial proceedings, 
audiovisual productions, and radio/TV broadcasting,
c) self-administration of minority schools and charitable institutions,
d) free practice of religious instructions,
e) have effective participation in those governmental decisions which would 
directly affect them,
f) have cross-border relations with kin groups living on the other part,
g) territorial autonomy.
National governments conceived the right to with caution. More specifically, 
granting territorial autonomy was generally thought of first step before complete 
secession (Mullerson, 1997: 58). Yet, right to territorial autonomy was considered apt
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merely in those circumstances where a minority is geographically concentrated. 
Otherwise, that is when minority peoples are geographically scattered or intermixed with 
majority or other minority groups, internal or personal autonomy, that is granting group- 
specific rights and freedoms irrespective of geographical criterion, stood more 
appropriate (Alfredsson, 1993: 67).
As was explained, the notions of secession, disintegration or self-determination 
has traditionally been reserved to the rights of the peoples. Yet, minority rights are related 
to the issue of self-determination in the context of its internal interpretation. Thus, despite 
the fact that external manifestations of self-determination involve a right to secession, its 
"internal" version, which means civil and political emancipation of individual citizens, is 
closely associated with the question of minority protection (Thomberry, 1991: 13-14). 
Concerning the internal implications of the concept of self-determination, the post-Cold 
War transformation has already recognized rights of the entire population, including 
minorities, to economic, political, cultural and social rights against its own government 
(Rosas, 1995).
It should also be noted here that despite it has inherently prompted additional 
spheres of rights, it is not just to evaluate minority rights within the terms of privileges. 
By contrast, minority rights must be considered a mechanism through which minorities 
would have identical circumstances on the same footing as the majority who taken the 
same circumstances for granted. The major objective of positive rights, thus, aims at 
facilitating protection, promotion and reproduction of minorities’ ethno-cultural 
differences that are already under protection in the case of majority citizens (Alfredsson, 
1993: 62-63).
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To conclude, minority rights are crucial to provide minority peoples with legal- 
political channels through which they would protect and promote their group-specific 
characteristics. In doing this, the scope of rights seeks to create a true reconciliation 
between two sources of minority identity; legal-political status of citizenship and ethno­
cultural identity of minority group. In addition to universal measures of citizenship 
equality and non-discrimination, the question urges national governments to provide 
positive conditions, legally and politically recognized, pertinent to the protection and 
promotion of minority distinctions.
1.5 The Form of Rights: Collective or Individual
Merely depending on the existence of an essential distinction between citizenship 
and ethno-cultural identity, minority rights have displayed two major forms in the sense 
that rights and freedoms have been granted either to individual members of minority 
groups or to the corporate existence of groups themselves. Since both formulations 
situated minority interests differently in the socio-political and legal realms, the form of 
rights has become one of the most contested areas in the fields of political theory, 
international human rights law, and political and constitutional settings of national states. 
The problem has rooted not only in the vague definition of the bearers of minority rights, 
whether minority groups or those individuals who belong to these groups are to be 
considered beneficiaries, but legal-political implications of the question have also 
mattered. After all, changes in the form of rights retained an immediate potential to 
change relations both between state instrument and minority peoples, and minority 
groups and individual members of these groups.
31
Rights exist only if the right-holder can drive from it a claim. That is, human 
beings would be subjected to privileges and obligations of a set of rights only if the 
content of rights renders them its bearers. In the context of individual rights, rights are 
bestowed upon every single human being personally making them the bearer and the 
claimant of rights. Here, individual is entrusted as the sole authority to claim a remedy in 
case of violations (Brunner, 1996: 292). In the view of van Dyke (1995; 33-36), this is 
the legacy of the western liberal tradition which has had constituted a pre-communal and 
group-independent existence for individual human beings rendering them irreducible 
right-bearing entities. Individual can exercise his or her rights independently, in his name, 
and in his own authority. The classical liberal rights, those of life, liberty and property as 
well as the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination has become fundamental 
rights to be enjoyed and exercised independent of the collective existence of minority 
groups (Buchanan, 1991: 74-75).
However, van Dyke (1995) added, individual would justly be considered and 
constituted the locus of rights appropriately in those particular circumstances where 
state’s population exhibited homogeneity in terms of ethno-lingual, cultural and religious 
characteristics. Otherwise, the legitimacy of government relies not upon the consent of 
abstract individuals but upon those minority groups and their fellow members seeking 
different treatment in respect to their communal particularities. It is under these 
circumstances that governmental authorities are often urged to adopt specific rights 
pertinent to the distinct characteristics of minority groups. It is again in this context that 
the question of collective rights arises.
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Not surprisingly, unlike the issue of individual rights embedded in the citizenship 
status of minorities, the notion of collective rights has closely been associated with the 
second dimension of minority issues, that of the group-specific characteristics of 
individual citizens. Individuals are not considered independent of groups but within and 
as members of human groupings. Legal standing of individual, under these 
circumstances, depends not only upon his or her natural existence or citizenship status, 
but membership that he or she holds towards a group is also taken into account. Apart 
from being equal citizens, individuals become subject to rights and obligations for being 
members of a collective entity.
Group, corporate or collective rights are granted to and exercised by the corporate 
body of a minority group through which minority individuals are provided with legal- 
political means allowing protection and promotion of their distinct circumstances. A 
softer version of collective rights, that is “individual rights having collective dimension”, 
are bestowed upon individual members of collectivities who are permitted to exercise the 
given sets of rights in collectivity with other members of the group. In this case, without 
having corporate recognition, group is regarded as not the holder but the beneficiary of 
individual rights. In so doing, collective rights are largely secured without creating 
corporate units between state and individual citizens (Brunner, 1996: 292).
For the sake of political and strategic considerations, collective rights are not 
clearly recognised in international instruments. However, adequate implementation of 
group rights has usually invoked the idea of individual rights with collective dimension. 
Protection of the freedom of expression, for example, often calls for the protection of its 
means, like media, press and associations, that would, in most cases, be implemented in
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the form of collective group rights. Similarly, freedom of religion, or the freedom of 
education in minority languages is generally exercised in community with other members 
of the group. Further, right to non-discrimination has a collective dimension in the sense 
that it takes place because an individual is a member of a religious, linguistic, racial or 
ethnic community. Thus, individual and collective elements are interdependent so far as 
minorities’ rights and freedoms are concerned (Kardos, 1995).
However, when the object or the interest, addressed in the formula of rights are 
irreducible to individual human beings but retain a collective nature, it becomes 
significant to grant rights to the corporate personality of human groupings. Accordingly, 
collective group itself, independent and outside of its individual members, is recognized 
legitimate bearer of rights and freedoms (Hartney, 1995: 21). Defined in this form, 
collective rights are ascribed to corporate personality of groups and exercised collectively 
or, at least, on behalf of the collectivity concerned (Buchnan, 1991; 74-75). Under these 
circumstances, rights and freedoms are possessed by a group having a distinct identity 
and legal standing independent of its members (Jones, 1994; 182-183). Right to self- 
determination; territorial autonomy; control of immigration policies in a specified region, 
and right to have control on the use of land and other natural resources where the group 
inhabits take place among the major examples of collective rights in corporate nature 
(Buchnan, 1991).
In the view of Jones (1999: 86-88), despite its joint enjoyment and collective 
exercise, individuals remain exclusive bearers of rights even in the context of collective 
rights. Individual human beings keep their moral standing in exercising a right in 
community with other members of the group. Collective dimension, here, stems from the
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fact that individuals obtain rights and freedoms for being members of a corporate group. 
On the other hand, in the context of corporate-collective rights, rights and freedoms are 
enjoyed not jointly but by the group as a unitary entity. Thus, while collective conception 
ascribes moral standing directly to the individuals who jointly hold the right, corporate 
formula ascribes moral standing to the group itself. In the latter, the group is regarded as 
having a stable identity and legal existence independent of those who make up the group. 
In the words of Jones (1999: 87-88),
On the corporate conception, a group must possess a morally significant identity as a group 
independently, and in advance, o f whatever interests or rights it may possess. Just as an 
individual has an identity and a standing as a person independently and in advance o f the 
rights that he possesses, so a group, if  it is to be conceived as a corporate entity, must possess 
a morally significant identity and status independently and in advance o f whatever rights it 
may hold. Its interests and rights follow upon its identity as a group; they are not what 
identifies the group as a group.
Thus, when it is disassociated from individual rights or those rights which are 
reducible to individual dimension, the notion of collective rights bequeaths legal-political 
and moral existence to corporate entities. Consequently, alongside state and individual, 
minority group concerned becomes an actor having legal and political recognition. In so 
doing, minority group is entitled to claim legitimate power on the management of its own 
interests, externally against state and other groups, and, internally against its own 
members.
Internal aspects of the idea of granting corporate status to minority groups bear a 
potential to endanger individual rights of those who belong to corporate entity. Donelly 
(1989: 143-160) suggested that corporate articulation of collective rights would make the 
entity a prison for the individual members of the group. In his view, at the hand of group 
leadership, corporate rights would operate as a tool of justification in denying universal 
rights of minority individuals on the pretext of corporate interests. In this context, thus.
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no reconciliation between universal and particularistic rights of minorities would be 
attained. Because of this, Donelly sided with subrogating corporate group rights with an 
idea and practice of individual human rights having collective dimension. Since 
individuals are members of groups and their particular interests originate from this 
membership, the latter, for him, would effectively guarantee basic rights of individuals 
against both state and their own groups.
However, in some circumstances, protection and promotion of minority 
differences would still call for corporate rights, for instance, in the issues of territorial 
autonomy, land use or migration policies. Yet, it is suggested that this would never justify 
denial of individual rights in the name of corporate interests. In order to overcome 
possible dangers of corporate conceptualisation, it is believed that corporate-collective 
rights should not override individual rights. In so doing, it is admitted that neither 
corporate rights would wholly represent rights and interests of their membership, nor 
individual rights might be considered sufficient for the preservation of group identity. It 
is under these circumstances that corporate-collective and individualist concerns would 
be reconciled in theory and practice without subjecting individual to the absolute 
authority of the group concerned (Kukathas, 1992a; Kukathas, 1992b).
Thus, Kukathas admitted that minority groups would have unlimited power over 
their own members so long as their individual members maintained the right to exit the 
community. In this context, some restrictions on individual freedom with regard to, 
among others, migration or land selling, were justified on temporary basis for the sake of 
group solidarity. By contrast, Kymlicka (1992) argued that minority groups would be 
granted no corporate power over their individual members. He asserted that a distinction
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is to be made between collective claims made on behalf of a group against its individual 
members and a collective claim made on behalf of a group against the rest of the society. 
While rejecting the former, Kymlicka (1989; 1992) recognised that minority groups 
would have corporate rights against the rest in order to remove inequalities within the 
larger community. For Kymlicka, protection of cultural minority aims at protecting 
autonomy of the members of the minority, while the authorization of the cultural 
community over its members tends to limit this autonomy. Because of this, the issue of 
minority protection does not justify, except some extreme cases, exercise of corporate 
rights against its own members. In his view, it was through this essential distinction that 
emergence of legal-political and cultural practices violating liberal freedoms of 
individuals would be avoided.
Given the controversial approaches to the question of “group”, ‘collective” or 
“corporate” rights. Green (1991) suggested that exclusively collective definition might 
neglect, if not oppress, individual members of the commimity. A minority group having 
authoritative rights over its members, for him, bears a strong potential to violate basic 
liberties of individuals that would under no circumstances be admitted in a democratic 
system. Yet, pointing out the fact that social existence would hardly be composed of 
isolated or atomistic individuals. Green admitted that a democratic system respecting 
peoples’ distinctions should not have disregarded cultural traits of individuals. Instead, 
legal and political practices of democratic systems, for Green, has to seek consolidation 
of those individual rights having group dimension that has appreciated individual 
freedom over collective interests.
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The issue of group rights has arisen in several international documents relating to 
the rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. Similar to the views of Green, 
many international documents, promulgated in the context of the UN, the OSCE or the 
CoE, have given priority to individualist concern on the group-specific rights of 
minorities. Facing strong state oppositions, international institutions have rarely agreed 
on the corporate articulation of rights. In fear of creating new legal-political actors 
between individual citizens and the state, the latter parties have fostered individualistic 
principles of international human rights. Under these circumstances, despite the fact that 
several instruments have approached, not yet reached, to the level of group or corporate 
rights, contemporary form of minority rights has been confined, at most, to individual 
rights having a collective dimension (Oliver, 1984).
1.6 Minority Protection and National Sovereignty
Sovereign existence has become one of the main pillars of modem state. On the 
contrary to the ancien regime, modem state has become the locus of the supreme 
authority, political, legal and administrative, over the whole population of a demarcated 
territory. Having been foimded on the absolute specification of jurisdictional area, in 
terms of both special and demographic borders, modem state has recognised partnership 
of no internal or external actor in legislating or enforcing law. Modem state has become 
the sole actor in regulating its relations with its own individual citizens, other states, and 
international organizations (Poggi, 1978: 87-92).
The European ancien regime was alien to this modem form of absolute state 
sovereignty. Ruling capacity of the state had instead been often encroached by corporate
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actors of ecclesiastical groupings, economic and hereditary classes, and the universal 
claims of religious institutions and imperial polities (Williams, 1970). By the seventeenth 
century, an international community composed of sovereign and central states gradually 
developed. At this stage, absolute monarchies, evolving at the expense of overlapping 
and conflicting regional and universal political entities, marked a revolutionary break 
from the forms and practices of the ancien regime (Hinsley, 1966: 45-125).
The Peace Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which gave an end to the long lasting 
confrontation of the overlapping regional and universal authorities, founded the basis of a 
new state system consisting of centralised and sovereign states (Philpott, 1997: 28-34). 
Henceforth, internal state sovereignty has indicated the supreme power in exercising 
jurisdiction over a given piece of territory, whereas external sovereignty specified state’s 
freedom from external interference in exercising its rule, that is formal equality of states 
in their relations with each other (Rosas, 1995: 63). Irrespective of the form of 
government, modem state was constituted as the sole authority in deciding the form of 
relations both between the state and its people, and state and the international community 
(Brown, 1996: 108-109).
Principles of hierarchical equality, non-interference, and non-aggression have 
constituted core principles in the Westphalian state-centric model. Between the 
seventeenth century and the twentieth century, the idea and practice of the state-centric 
model largely prevailed. However, globalization of economic, environmental, political 
and military issues in the twentieth century gradually created an international order which 
began to question sovereign prerogatives of modem states. It came to be admitted that 
political activities would no longer be decided solely within sovereign boundaries. The
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principle of absolute sovereignty has gradually lost its traditional basis founded on the 
concerns of indivisible and unlimited authority (Camilleri and Falk, 1992; Camilleri, 
19901.
Alongside this global tendency, evolving at the expense of state’s sovereign 
capacity, it came to be admitted today that national borders protected by states’ sovereign 
prerogatives would not, for all places and circumstances, be protective of individual 
rights and liberties. In many cases, it was recognised instead, the principle of sovereignty 
would be used as a pretext in oppressing human rights and freedoms. Pointing out this 
fact, Eide (1992: 8) noted:
Between states, it (external sovereignty) serves ideally the function o f restraining the use of 
violence, by clearly demarcating authority and jurisdiction over persons and places; but the 
assertion o f sovereignty has often functioned as a cover for oppression and the denial o f 
freedom for peoples and individuals. This, I submit, has been possible because of a narrow 
and archaic concept o f sovereignty not compatible with the modem international legal order.
In the view of Eide, in order to avoid mass violation of human rights under the 
pretext of sovereign premises, contemporary international order should reinterpret 
classical aspects of state sovereignty. Having been aware of this initial transformation, 
the issue of human rights, which once had been considered under the internal prerogative 
of the modem states, has gradually acquired an international dimension by the middle of 
the twentieth century (Philpott, 1997: 34-41).
Nevertheless, an essential turn in the internationalization of human rights 
questions, including rights of minorities, appeared only by the establishment of the UN in 
the aftermath of the WWII. The promulgation of universal standards in the field of 
human rights has become one of the main concerns of the UN acts from the outset. The 
UN Charter and the UDHR have greatly contributed to the international arbitration of 
human rights issues. Today, almost all of the world’s existing states recognised internal
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validity of the principles of the UN humanitarian declarations including those which 
contained principles relating to the promotion and protection of minority rights.^ In so 
doing, many states allowed international scrutiny upon national treatment of their own 
citizens (Marie, 1998: 117-132). This global tendency indicated the fact that horizontally 
constructed state-centric system of the Westphalian tradition is now under decline. There 
is a move towards a more diverse articulation of sovereignty. Depending on this open 
possibility, Rosas (1993) asserted that it was not the legacy of the 1648 (the Westphalian 
Treaty) but the principles of the 1948 (the UN UDHR) which need to be considered as a 
guide to the internal and external relations of the contemporary states.
Despite the fact that the UN acts externally obliged states to promote human 
rights, the Cold War dualism paralyzed international humanitarian acts. Under the 
influence of the then prevailing ideological confrontations, state parties frequently 
blocked promulgation and implementation of universal standards.^ Because of this, 
international standardisation of human rights issues gained a new pace by the early 
1990s. With the end of the Cold War politics, international institutions have imdertaken 
stronger approaches with regard to the national treatment of individual human beings, 
including those who belong to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities. It was in this 
context that, the UN went beyond the vague formulations of the Cold War years and, 
apart from individual human rights, began to give a special attention to the rights of 
minorities. The UN Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992), for example, incorporated
 ^ By 3 January 1998, 137 states ratified the International Covenant on Eeonomic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (1966); and 140 states ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
(Marie, 1998: 122).
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contemporary standards in the field of minority treatment. The Declaration compelled the 
partied states to undertake legislative, administrative and judicial measures appropriate to 
ethno-cultural, linguistic and religious diversity of minority conditions (UN Declaration, 
1993). In following, the Vienna Declaration adopted by the UN World Conference on 
Hiunan Rights (1993) considered humanitarian matters within the legitimate scope of 
international concern. The Declaration affirmed the fact that “human rights, including 
minority rights, are the birthright of all human beings, therefore, their protection and 
promotion is the first responsibility of governments and a legitimate concern of the 
international community” (UN, 1995a; Rosas, 1995: 62-63).5
Apart from the UN, European-regional organisations, including the CoE and the 
OSCE, have devoted significant labour to the internationalization of human rights issues 
and sought the ways for creating a human rights regime across the continent. The Council 
of Europe’s European Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (1949) and the OSCE’s Helsinki Final Act (1975) contributed to the 
standardization of human rights principles and practices in Europe. Although the OSCE 
mandate has remained rather political, the CoE has created a regional legal regime with 
open principles and rules, and with judicial means of implementation and enforcement. 
Because of this, by the promulgation of these acts, national sovereignty of the European 
states entered under an effective international scrutiny in the field of human rights issues 
(Forsythe, 1994).
The end of the Cold War politics and circumstances further decreased sovereign 
capacity of the European states. In particular, the rise of ethnic conflict by the collapse of *
* The Number o f vetoes in the UN Council amounted 279 between 1945 and 1989, while the contrary votes 
appeared only three times from then to 1993 (Fox, 1997: 117).
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the Eastern Block provoked international concern in the issue of minority protection 
(Liebich, 1996). Having seen social unrest generated from the maltreatment of minorities, 
the CoE and the OSCE, for example, instigated new scope of international norms, 
principles, and mechanisms limiting states’ capacities on the internal regulation of 
minority conditions. The OSCE’s Copenhagen Document (1990), the CoE’s European 
Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (1992) and the Framework Convention for 
the Protection o f National Minorities (1995) introduced a historical breakthrough in the 
area of international minority protection. In contravention with the classical form of 
sovereignty, the documents limited sovereign prerogatives in respect to the national 
treatment of minorities and gradually taken minority issues into legitimate area of 
international concern. The Framework Convention (FC, 1995: 98-101), for example, 
stated that:
{t}he protection o f national minorities and o f the rights and freedoms o f persons belonging to 
those minorities forms an integral part o f the international protection o f human rights, and 
such falls within the scope of international co-operation.
Obviously, the provision treated rights and freedoms of persons belonging to 
minorities as an integral part of universal human rights outside the sovereign realm of 
states. The European regional organizations have, therefore, attributed greater 
significance to the act of interfering with states’ internal affairs relating to minority 
conditions. It was in this sense that in the region, the regulation of relations between 
states and their individual citizens, that is states and minorities, was no longer left solely 
in the sole hands of national governments. Instead, international documents, whether 
political or legal, began to constitute a framework to be adopted at the national level.
 ^Articles 19-27 o f the Declaration stipulated the issue o f minority protection (UN, 1995a).
43
However, it should be noted here that states are still real actors at the level of both 
creating and implementing international human rights standards, while non-state or 
international agents continue to remain in a subordinate position. Yet, the framework of 
the so-called “soft laws”, that is international treaties, norms, values and monitoring 
mechanisms, have produced an international network of legal, political and economic 
instruments which have constrained states in their domestic actions. In particular, the 
“carrot and stick” implications of an interdependent world came to make it rather costly 
for the states to disregard implicit power of this network both in their national and 
international dealings (Rosas, 1995: 61-78).
Aware of the affects of global encroachments in the ruling prerogatives of states. 
Strange (1994) suggested that the prevailing decline in the sovereign rights of states does 
not automatically bring an identical decrease in the power of national governments in its 
internal and external dealings. In her view, as long as they acted in harmony and 
accordance with the norms of international organisations, states obtain greater 
international recognition and accession which, in turn, sustain their sovereign position as 
the key actor of international system. Thus, the issue of human rights. Fox (1997) argued, 
has become the key basis of legitimate governments in the contemporary world. Because 
of this, he admitted, though it would be regarded as an infringement of sovereignty at 
first, international interference in the fields of human rights maintained a strong 
possibility to contribute to state sovereignty in the long run. It is believed that sovereign 
capacity of a state increases as it acted in harmony with the international standards of 
human rights because, the state, in that way, would gain prestige and strength in its 
international relations, and receive legitimacy in its internal dealings.
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On the other hand, the decline of state sovereignty does not mean only the 
internationalization of those affairs that have been considered within the realm of internal 
matters. The current transformation of the state system came to imply also the act of 
reconfiguring state-society relations inside by devolving long established central powers 
of states to socio-political and economic groupings consisting of both citizens and 
foreigners (Rosas, 1993: 151-153). In this respect, national implementation of 
contemporary European-regional and the UN-universal standards of minority rights 
seems likely to challenge classical parameters of state’s internal sovereignty as well. 
Under international constraints, states would have to share some aspects of its legislative 
and administrative powers with autonomous minority groups. That is to say, the 
transformation of the external sovereignty, with the internationalization of human rights 
issues, today is driving states internally towards reformulating state sovereignty in a 
flexible and inclusive manner (Canefe, 1996).
In conclusion, the Westphalian model, rested on the equality of sovereign states, 
had advanced through the centralization of corporate states at the expense of external and 
internal sources of power. Central state, consequently, had been constituted as the 
supreme actor in its area of jurisdiction. In the present conjuncture, the gradual 
internationalization and localization of inherently national affairs have paved way for 
diverse structures of overlapping sovereignties. Especially in the field of human rights, 
including those rights belonging to minority peoples, state is no longer regarded as the 
locus of an uncontested authority. Modem state came to be subjected to a set of 
externally promulgated socio-political, economic and legal norms with which every state 
was expected to decide its internal affairs. In so doing, international concern in the
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question of minority rights went beyond the state-centric system of the Westphalian 
model. Today it is difficult to deny international standards of minority rights for the sake 
of internal sovereignty and the principle of external non-interference. The form of state- 
society relations, that is relations between the majority and minorities, has largely been 
submitted to the effect of international standards. The principle of sovereignty is being 
fragmented “upwards” and “downwards”. State sovereignty came to be defined now in 
conjunction with international rules, norms, standards and instruments. That is why, 
although states are still more or less sovereign actors, contemporary international system 
necessitates, if not imposes, a “responsible use of sovereignty” (Prease and Forsythe, 
1993: 306).
1.7 Conclusion
Modem era has developed a framework of mles, norms, standards and 
instmments pertinent to the protection and promotion of minority distinctions. It was the 
content of this framework that has marked major borders of minority rights regime 
stipulated according to socio-political and diplomatic circumstances of a given time 
period and space. New approaches in the meaning and scope of the major parameters 
have instigated iimovative transformations in the said norms, rales, standards, 
instruments and implementation area of minority rights. Definition of the concept of 
minority, scope of the rights of minorities, the form of rights concerned and the linkage 
established between state sovereignty and minority rights, among others, have taken 
place among prominent parameters of minority rights regimes.
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Although there has not yet appeared an international agreement on the definition 
of the concept, the term minority has been associated with those criteria of ethno-cultural 
distinctions and citizenship status. Hence, scope of minority rights has chiefly centered 
on creating a true reconciliation between universal equality of citizenship status with that 
of the different treatment accorded to minority groups. It was in this sense that the issue 
of minority rights has marked not rights of those foreign nationals but those of the 
“different citizens” of a country. In accordance with its universal aspects, citizenship 
rights have conferred legal existence merely to individuals while principles of different 
treatment have usually called for creating collective rights, at least, individual rights 
having collective dimension that ascertained an implicit or explicit recognition to 
corporate existence of minority groups. On the other hand, whether in individual or 
collective form, minority rights bear a strong potential to damage sovereign prerogatives 
of modem national states. State sovereignty has undergone fundamental transformation 
since the eve of modem era. Today, accommodation of minority distinctions in the legal- 
political setting of national states has tended to undermine modem form and 
imderstanding of state sovereignty. Next chapters will examine the emergence and 
advance of the said parameters in the duration of the modem era.
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CHAPTER II
MODERN STATE AND THE MINORITY QUESTION
2.1 Introduction
Ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural minorities have become a social reality 
almost in every stage of human existence. However, it is largely admitted today that 
the contemporary understanding and legal-political treatment of minority 
circumstances are rooted in the emergence of the modem state (Thomberry, 1991). 
Under a monolithic configuration of legal, political and social spheres that modem era 
fostered pre-modem corporate stmctures of mle and identity, located in regional 
bodies, religious and ethno-cultural communities, gradually replaced by those notions 
of nation-state, nationality and citizenship. The concepts considered peoples, for the 
first time, as equal members of the polity that largely eliminated legal, political and 
social grounds of inegalitarian treatment. But it was through the same process that 
ethno-cultural, legal, administrative and political diversity withered away as modem 
state practices and ideological discourses contemplated the state, nation, nationality 
and citizenship.
In fact, the constitutive notions of modem state, that is the nation, nationality 
and citizenship, inherently indicated distinct areas of socio-political and legal 
identification. By contemplating them, in contravention with diverse circumstances of 
human existence, the modem era celebrated monolithic designation of legal, political 
and social worlds. A dominant ethno-cultural and linguistic identity was situated at 
the core of national imagination. It was because of this reason that the principle of
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national egalitarianism and citizenship equality has usually been implemented in a 
form of national uniformity.
The question of minority rights, under these circumstances, has been introduced 
in order to remedy shortcomings of modem formations by creating a tme congruence 
between universal implications of citizenship equality and group-specific aspects of 
ethno-cultural membership. Bearing this fact in mind, this chapter will, first, examine 
medieval conditions of diversity which permitted natural accommodation of peoples’ 
distinctions at the expense of the egalitarian principles of universal equality. 
Secondly, it will examine the gradual transformation of the medieval diversity into 
uniform designations of mle and identification by reviewing major instruments of this 
transformation that evolved alongside the congmence of those notions of nation, state, 
citizenship and nationality.
2.2 Inegalitarian Diversity of the A ncien  R égim e
The contemporary position of ethno-lingual, religious and cultural minorities 
was rooted in the emergence of nation-states, particularly, in its monolithic 
configuration of political, legal and cultural realms (Thomberry, 1991: 1). Because of 
this, while elaborating on the historical evolution and traditional ways of minority 
treatment, my focus will be on those modem concepts of state, nation, nationality and 
citizenship. In order to reveal the effects of these modem formations upon ethno­
cultural circumstances, it is important to return back to the pre-modem condition of 
minority issues.
Nation-state with a sovereign central authority, definite frontiers, a society of 
national citizens having identical rights and obligations, and a centrally administered 
ethno-cultural identity is indeed a modem European innovation dated particularly to
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the aftermath of the French Revolution. During the medieval era and long after, states 
did have no definite political, legal, geographical, ethnic or linguistic unity as 
compared to precisely defined ethno-cultural and geographical borders of the 
succeeding forms. Ethno-cultural, legal and political diversity, instead, characterized 
major aspects of pre-modem forms of govermnental units. In contrast with the 
sovereign prerogatives of modem states, pre-modem states were the primus inter 
pares in the sense that it was not a single authority in a geographical area but one of 
the mling bodies claiming jurisdiction over the population of geographical area 
(Doyle, 1992; Weber, 1976).
From the political point of view, Europe of the ancien régime consisted of so- 
called corporative states, -an état d ’orders, or a stondestaad- which depended on the 
functional co-existence of legally and politically recognized corporate bodies. In this 
context, the mling mechanism was made up of frequently overlapping and 
hierarchically stratified authorities of estates, ecclesiastical communities, guilds, 
provincial or territorial forces, ethno-linguistic groups, and even monarchies, all of 
which lied between states and their subject peoples. Central administration acted on 
their subjects not directly, but through the intermediating function of these sub-state 
bodies, each of whom maintained definite legislative, executive and judicial powers 
independent of central administration that they were nominally subordinated 
(Williams, 1970: 25).
Pre-revolutionary picture of the French state presented a good example to the 
corporate quality prevalent in both medieval state and society. It was suggested that in 
1789 France did not yet fully achieved modem characteristics of what we understand 
today. It consisted of a loosely linked federation of provinces, ecclesiastical and 
temporal authorities. This legal-political diversity reflected itself in the inegalitarian
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stratification of the “French” population. Having no sense of national unity, the 
French population of the time did not yet reach to the modem stage of a nation of 
equal citizens. Instead, it was dominated by an association of communities each with 
their own status and privileges legally and socially recognised (Weber, 1976). Socio­
political and legal order of the rest of the Western world exhibited similar patterns. As 
well known, during the same period, for example, Germany was in a stage of 
stondestaad having no national, territorial or legal unity. In the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century, there were over 300 autonomous territories in Germany, all of 
whom were technically subordinate parts of an higher authority, that of the Holy 
Roman Empire (Doyle, 1992: 221; Poggi, 1978: 36-59).
Parallel to political diversity, legal order of the ancien régime rested upon a 
distinct form of legal diversity. Inegalitarian aspects of corporate system affected the 
legal sphere as well. There were no uniform and state-wide legal codes that would 
equally be applicable to each member of political community. The law was in the 
form of differentiated legal entitlements entmsted to the corporate mandate of the 
intermediating bodies to uphold and enforce them (Poggi, 1978: 72). Egalitarian 
formulation and implementation of legal codes were unknown. Legal inequality, not 
simply factual inequality, was the basis of social and political order. What determined 
the nature of relations both between the rulers and the ruled, and among different 
sections of the ruled was not the principle of equality, but special status granted to 
each corporate community of peoples. Under these circumstances, a person’s 
corporate membership, not political membership, decided his or her socio-political 
and legal position as well. State-membership carried almost no significance in 
receiving rights and obligations. Thus, the members of a political community were 
subjected to different sets of rights, obligations, privileges and immunities recognized
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by law or custom. Legal entitlements depended exclusively on the corporate category 
to which one belonged. In elaborating on the legal-political configuration of the pre­
revolutionary France, Brubaker (1992: 36) rightly pointed out this legal 
inegalitarianism in the following statement:
What mattered, as a determinant o f  one’s rights and obligations, was not, in the first 
instance, that one was French or foreign: it was that one belonged to a seigneurie, or that 
one was an inhabitant o f a pays d ’etat, or a bourgeois in a ville franche', or that one was a 
noble or a clergyman; or that one was a Protestant or a Jew; or that one was a member o f  
a guild, university, religious foundation, or parlement.
This wording indicated that socio-political and administrative decentralisation 
was accompanied by a particularistic understanding of the law. Peoples’ legal status 
was decided on the basis of their regional, social, religious or sectarian circumstances. 
Owing to this legal-political diversity, the locus of membership or belonging for the 
peoples of the ancien régime took shape in the sub-state level. The most immediate 
ethno-cultural, religious-sectarian, political or geographical characteristics, such as 
tribe, clan, autonomous town, feudal lord, dynastic state or religious community, 
provided peoples with meaningful referents of identification (Kohn, 1965: 9). If there 
appeared any supra-local identification in the duration of the period, it was in the form 
of religious brotherhood but not ethno-cultural identification (Tilly, 1990: 107).
In fact, ethno-cultural and linguistic diversity was natural under the then 
prevailing political and ideological conditions which urged almost no incentive to 
develop a strong linkage between social and political realms. Cultural and political 
realms did not coincide before the emergence of nation-state system. Political realm 
was almost completely separated from peoples’ ethno-cultural circumstances 
(Gellner, 1983: 10-20). Having nothing to do with modem models of multiculturalism 
or pluralism, one reason of this diversity lied in the absence of ideological drives and 
technical instruments comparable to that of nation-states that included bureaucracy, 
standing armies and schools. It was under these circumstances that almost none of the
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medieval authorities either felt a strong incentive to create ethno-culturally, legally 
and politically united states nor saw an interest in promoting a politically administered 
ethno-cultural homogeneity (Doyle, 1992).
Central authorities confined their business to those minimalist functions of 
maintaining public order, achieving justice and making wars without seeking active 
loyalties of their subject population. Generally speaking, as long as they paid taxes 
and fulfilled labor obligations, central authorities, before the emergence of centralized 
states, if not nation-states, did not interfere with peoples’ ethno-cultural 
circumstances, languages, customs or belief systems. More specifically, they had 
nothing to do with what peoples believed or which languages they spoke (Doyle, 
1992: 238-240).
On the contrary, since socio-cultural, legal and political diversity had provided 
useful instruments through which state authority would indirectly be mediated to 
individual subjects in the absence of modem mling mechanisms, imperial 
administrations adhered stronger significance to cultural differentiation instead of 
ethno-cultural, linguistic, legal and political integration. It was because of this basic 
concern that they even invented and reinforced social compartments whenever and 
wherever society lacked appropriate cultural cleavages (Gellner, 1983: 10). Under 
these circumstances, if there was any socio-political homogeneity, it was in the form 
of horizontally created internal homogeneity within the same mling strata or among 
the members of the same social compartment, both of which frequently constituted 
“inward-closed” communities (Gellner, 1983: 9-13).
Thus, notions of state-membership and ethno-cultural membership were 
clearly disassociated in the pre-modem politics. There appeared no identification 
between ethno-cultural and political borders of states. Even in the latin usage, the
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word natío referred to “communities of people of the same descent, who are 
integrated geographically in the form of settlements or neighborhoods, and culturally 
by their common language, customs and traditions, but who are not yet politically 
integrated in the form of state organization” (Habermas, 1994: 22). It was in this 
context that exercising jurisdiction upon a single ethno-cultural and linguistic 
community was an exception, rather than an overriding rule. By contrast, while one 
political unit exerted authority over various ethno-cultural groups, that is “national”, 
the same kind of communal groupings scattered over the borders of various political 
units. The French royal dynasty, for example, involved Germans, Flemings, Bretons, 
Basques, and other “foreign nationalities” as well as those who belonged to the 
French ethno-linguistic category (Hayes, 1931: 6-7).
Given ethno-cultural, political and legal diversity that preceded emergence of 
nation-state system, it seems to be appropriate to conclude that the order of the ancien 
régime did not, or, could not touch, if not directly protect, peoples’ ethno-cultural, 
religious and linguistic distinctions. Ethno-cultural heterogeneity characterized human 
reservoir of political units. Similarly, social distinctions with regard to ethno-cultural 
differences of peoples did not seek political expression. There existed a natural 
diversity among different sections of territorial populations as they were divided 
along jurisdictional boundaries and corporate groupings. In the absence of common 
rights and obligations, neither the idea nor practice of universal citizenship developed. 
Ethno-cultural distinctions largely remained intact without creating an integral society 
of citizens. Due to fact that diversity had been accomplished in an inegalitarian legal- 
political environment, the notion of state-membership did not indicate a sense of 
common rights and obligations. The locus of identification for almost all of the 
national population sprang from local, religious, sectarian or ethno-cultural
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membership. Before they were Frenchmen, for instance, the inhabitants of the lands 
belonging to the King of France were first Germans, Flemings, Bretons, Basques, or 
Normans; or Catholics, Protestants or Jews (Williams, 1970: 18; Gilbert, 1999).
This implies the fact that diverse circumstances of the anden régime were 
formulated and achieved at the expense of legal equality. Having been situated at the 
local circumstances of peoples, ethno-cultural distinctions were left untouched but not 
attributed identical treatment. In most circumstances, discrimination, if not 
persecution, constituted an integral part of legal systems. Social differences were not 
accommodated within a system of substantive equality which would seek egalitarian 
treatment within a context of ethno-cultural diversity. The concept of equality itself 
came to surface only after nationalism and universal citizenship revolutionary 
transformed configuration of both state and society as well as the nature of relations 
between state and its subject peoples.
2.3 Nation-State: A Path to Ethno-Cultural Homogeneity
Corporate quality of the anden régime accommodated social distinctions in an 
inegalitarian order of socio-political and legal spheres in which political and cultural 
affairs remained largely independent of each other. However, since the middle of the 
eighteenth century, categorical distinction that had existed between the classical 
notion of natio and “politically organized people”, that is ethno-cultural and political 
spheres, gradually disappeared. The meaning of the term “nation” changed from 
designating a pre-political entity to indicating political association of a group of 
peoples (Habermas, 1994: 22-23). It was this congruence of political and cultural 
realms that rendered ethno-cultural identity problematical for both state and its 
population. Ideal image of the “nation” component of the modem state altered socio­
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political and legal position of ethno-cultural and linguistic minorities. While once had 
been viewed within the terms of natural diversity, modem transformation began to 
articulate peoples’ particularities in terms of minority/majority categories with all of 
its socio-political and legal ramifications.
It was under the influence of modem constraints and opportunities that were 
created by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’ socio-political and industrial 
revolutions, central authorities embarked intensive policies in the direction of 
eradicating ideological and functional roles of corporate agents that traditionally 
existed between state and its subject peoples. Absolutist states, as a result, came to be 
conceived political norm in the Western world that gathered, in a manner of 
“bureaucratic incorporation”, economic, political, administrative, legal and military 
prerogatives in the hands of central mlers. It was this integrative process that signified 
the end of the ancien régime's political and legal diversity (Poggi, 1978: 60-86).
Cultural aspect of the integrative process advanced though ideological and 
political incentives and opportunities created by the theory and practice of nationalism 
(Habermas, 1994: 22). As modem transformations exchanged previous forms of 
political and legal diversity with uniform designations of legal-political formulations, 
political realm ceased to have been separated from the cultural (social) one. The 
integrative process of state-building, hence, accompanied with an extensive process of 
nation-building which unfolded in a manner of ethno-cultural and linguistic 
homogenisation. Legal-political integration created both ideological-political and 
technological grounds upon which central authorities constituted congmence between 
political and ethno-cultural borders and promoted identification of the former with the 
latter (Gellner, 1983).
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Having removed corporate instruments of rule, modem state necessarily 
instituted a direct linkage between state and subject peoples. Major reason of this 
development depended upon the concentration of legal-political, economic, cultural, 
educational and administrative functions in the hands of central authorities who had to 
take over those basic businesses that had hitherto been fulfilled by intermediary 
corporate agents. Modem state, therefore, exhibited an increasing conviction to 
develop intensive social communication and social compliance that would more 
appropriately be attained in an ethno-culturally and linguistically unified society. 
Under these circumstances, prevalence of ethno-religious and linguistic cleavages was 
considered barriers inhibiting establishment of a social cohesion well-suited to the 
functional existence of a modem state (Birch, 1989: 8-9/40-46; Deutsch, 1969: 18- 
19).
Beyond doubt, political and economic transformations of the modem age 
drove state mechanisms to create ethno-culturally and linguistically homogeneous 
societies. However, the same transformation itself had also activated a process of 
socio-economic mobilisation that simultaneously created social conditions of ethno­
cultural and linguistic homogeneity. It is argued that when industrial revolutions 
gradually uprooted millions of peoples from their local circumstances of “inward- 
closed” communities, state-wide mobility and enhancing social communication made 
different members of population groups not only more familiar with each other but 
also more similar to each other. The same process slowly withered away local cultures 
and languages, socio-political ties, identities and loyalties, and assimilated them into a 
dominant ethno-cultural formation. In most occasions, peoples abandoned their ethno­
cultural particularities in favor of a uniform and bounded cultural and political 
identity promoted in the center of political authority. Although limited by territorial
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concerns, peoples’ imagination went beyond regional, local and communal sources of 
identification.^^
The emergence of the modem state, therefore, prompted the single 
identification of ethnicity, language, religion and culture at the expense of peripheral 
sources of sub-national identities. As Balibar (1996: 134) argued, when it was 
building centrally consolidated states, state-building processes of the non-national- 
dynastic state apparatuses progressively produced elements of nation-states or 
nationalisation of society. Ethno-cultural homogenization, hence, became an integral 
part of modem state formation which is essentially a political process. From this point 
of view, modem nationalism revisited patterns of primitive tribalism invigorated on 
an enlarged and more artificial scale (Hayes, 1931: 12).^^
The so-called policy of “France, one and indivisible” (nation une et 
indivisible) presented a good example to the case of national integration that evolved 
at the expense of peripheral sources of ethno-cultural identification. In advancing on 
the way of modernization, national policy of the French state gradually transformed 
ethno-cultural composition of the French population from a “wealth of tongues” into a 
linguistic quality strongly dominated by Ile-de-France. On the way of becoming 
members of a unified French nation, more than half of the France’s population lost 
their mother languages (Weber, 1976). The French example indicated that when it 
attempted to build a national society, characterized by common ethno-cultural 
identification, modem state, at the same time, destroyed other nations that existed 
within the same political borders. Borrowing from Connor (1972), it seems
This view represented the functionalist discourse o f the theory o f nationalism (Gellner, 1993; 
Deutsch, 1966; Calhoun, 1997; Anderson, 1983).
In the words o f  Hayes (1931: 1), a tribe is “a relatively small and homogeneous group o f  great 
cohesive strength. Each tribe has a distinctive pattern o f life and culture, a distinctive dialect, a 
distinctive social and political organisation, a distinctive system o f  religious beliefs and magical
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appropriate to claim that the “nation-building” process proceeded, in practice, in a 
manner of “nation-destroying”.
To sum up, unlike the ancien régime, socio-political and legal diversity lost its 
ideological and functional grounds by the emergence of modem state which promoted 
convergence of political and cultural realms. States began to seek not only legal- 
political centralization but also ethno-cultural homogeneity accomplished around a 
centrally administered ethno-cultural and linguistic designation. In so doing, modem 
state transformed social conditions “from the form of a Gesellschaft, or functional 
existence, to a Gemeinschaft organisation, or a homogeneous community” (Bloom, 
1990; 55). Originally political concept of the state came to be identified with a 
traditionally non-political and cultural concept of the nation. Henceforth, state and 
nation, state-membership (citizenship) and ethno-cultural membership (nationality) 
came to be perceived synonymous. In many cases, ethno-cultural traits began to play 
constitutive roles in defining political identity of peoples (Habermas, 1994: 22). 
Bearing this fact in mind, in order to better explain socio-political and legal position 
of ethno-cultural minorities in the age of nation-states, it is significant to have a closer 
look at modem connections established between state, nation, nationality and 
citizenship.
2.3.1 Nation and State
Socio-political, legal and technological transformations of the modem age 
prompted convergence of political and cultural realms. In this context, the state 
instmment has often been apprehended as the political expression of an ethno- 
culturally homogeneous grouping of peoples. It was this homogeneous understanding
practices, a distinctive set o f customary laws and ceremonies and art-forms. Each tribe works and wars 
as a unit and indoctrinates its members with supreme loyalty to it.”
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and identical political practice that blurred demarcating lines between essentially two 
distinct notions of state and nation. The maxim of “one nation, one state” dominated 
modem thinking. It was believed that every ethno-cultural community would have its 
own state or every state would rely upon an ethno-culturally homogeneous 
population. However, it is clear enough that there has existed a lack of coterminality 
between two distinct concepts of nation and state. Several nationalities have coexisted 
in the lands of the same state or an ethno-cultural community scattered over the 
borders of several states. The European continent, for example, has over 70 ethno­
cultural communities within 28 states. The number of states has often changed in the 
history of the continent but the number of ethno-cultural communities remained 
constant (Oommen, 1997b: 25).
The two notions of state and nation have signified different sources of identity 
and loyalty. The former has essentially depended upon the terms of political- 
membership and, hence, referred legal-political locus in peoples’ identity and loyalty. 
The latter, by contrast, has been associated with particular circumstances of peoples 
and referred to communal loyalty and identity sprang from ethno-cultural membership 
(Shnapper, 1998). Despite this fact, from the inception of modem times, as Seton- 
Watson (1977) rightly suggested, the two concepts have frequently been confused and 
used interchangeably in common usage. Modem connotations of the League of 
Nations, United Nations and 'miemational relations, which are inter-governmental or 
interstate formations in essence, have already indicated that modem world has 
recognised almost no distinction between the two concepts. In the view of Seton- 
Watson, this common approach misrepresented cultural diversity that existed in the 
body of national component. The author, therefore, suggested making a clear 
distinction between legal-political category of the state and ethno-cultural category of
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the nation, particularly, in those circumstances where population displayed ethno­
cultural diversity in composition.
Thus, since the two concepts overlapped in the modem state tradition, legal- 
political scope of the state has been considered to represent characteristics and 
interests of a single ethno-cultural community which was largely totalized in a 
uniform designation of legal-political, educational and administrative affairs in which 
almost no room was left to the issue of accommodating and expressing minority 
particularities. Having taken into account this aspect of the nation-state formation, 
Emerson (1962) suggested that in order to overcome its totalizing patterns, the two 
has to be divorced from each other. According to him, state instrument has, in fact, 
depicted a jurisdictional entity, not an ethno-cultural one, which claimed to assert a 
single legal-political authority upon those peoples who inhabited its political borders. 
Because of this, a clear distinction, for the author, is to be drawn between the area of 
jurisdiction and the body of jurisdiction. It is only under these circumstances that the 
nation and state concepts would be divorced from each other in a way of facilitating 
equal accommodation of ethno-cultural differences.
Conflating the two concepts has, thus, tented to complicate relations between 
states and their national populations. In particular, when the “nation” component 
involved ethno-cultural and linguistic diversity, “nation-state” connotation has tended 
to bear socio-political complexities on the part of both state and nation. Then, while 
discussing contemporary circumstances of minority issues, it is imperative to make it 
clear how the “nation” component of the modem state has been understood. Broadly 
speaking, the concept of the nation has been approached within two categorical 
explanations: one is based on political-territorial and the other on ethno- 
cultural/kinship ties. The former has represented the western, civic or French model
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according to which the nation has been considered a voluntary association of peoples 
inhabited lands of the same political authority (jus soli).
In the view of Renan (1996), the prominent advocate of the civic model, 
ethno-cultural and linguistic bonds are regarded insufficient to constitute a national 
society. The view suggested that the nation is not an ethno-cultural community but a 
voluntarist association of peoples who shared a legacy of common historical 
memories and are willing to continue to live together in the future. In this model of 
nationhood, though its members might have had ethno-cultural particularities, group- 
specific distinctions are generally considered to have withered away in favor of a 
legal-political formula of national entity. Hence, what determined nationality in this 
view is not ethno-cultural membership based on particular identities of communal 
groupings, but political membership held towards a legal-political unit, that of a 
common state. In Renan’s view, state-membership (citizenship) constitutes national 
identity.
On the other hand, ethno-cultural model, known as eastern or the German 
model, projected nationhood on the membership of a kinship commimity. In the 
context of the model, the concept of nation is associated with a community of descent 
in which the locus of membership is based not on legal-political membership of a 
political organization but upon blood ties of ethno-cultural community. Inheritable 
characteristics of a population group (Jus sanguinis), in other words, define the 
criterion of nationality. It is admitted that having no condition of territoriality, ethno­
cultural borders of national category override legal-political borders. The major 
reason of this discrepancy, created between nation and state, is the fact that national 
awakening preceded emergence of the nation-state, that is national imagination 
developed independent of territorial and political constraints. Putting the matter
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differently, national consciousness, the process of nation-formation, advanced 
independent of and prior to the stage of state-formation. As a result, ethno-cultural 
category involved all of the members of the Volk irrespective of territory they resided 
while it tended to exclude all those who remained outside the Volkish characteristics 
(Kohn, 1965).
Under these circumstances, it is expected that since the civic understanding of 
nationhood, in principle, would refer to an indifferent attitude to ethno-cultural 
affiliation of peoples, the western model would develop an inclusive approach in 
treating ethno-cultural distinctions of its national population. Ethno-cultural 
particularities, in other words, would be secularized in the same way that has been 
implemented in the case of religion. Peoples would be permitted to pursue ethno­
cultural interests in their private realms as long as they respected legal-political 
framework of the state. Since secularism prohibits establishment of an official 
religion, state would have no official culture having favorable status over ethno­
cultural allegiances of minority groups (Kymlicka, 1995; Kymlicka, 1997).
However, as Kymlicka (1997: 27) rightly observed, ethno-cultural neutrality 
of the Western civic model has remained a myth in the duration of the modem era. 
Notwithstanding the legal-political formulation of citizenship policies, civic model 
too has been engaged in cultivating a single ethno-cultural characteristic. Having 
advanced at the expense of minority languages and cultures, on most occasions, the 
state has adopted ethno-cultural characteristics of a dominant ethnic group. In this 
way, state-membership (citizenship) has tacitly been associated with ethno-cultural 
membership.
In spite of the apparent distinction that existed between ethno-cultural 
membership and political membership, the western-civic model too, in practice, has
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established a direct linkage between political and cultural worlds. On most occasions, 
almost no attention has been attributed to the issue of accommodating minority 
differences at the legal-political structure of state. Presence of a formal discrepancy 
between nation and state has remained an illusion. Because of this, political 
membership has not guaranteed persistence of minorities’ cultural and linguistic 
circumstances. By contrast, the legal-political context of the civic model has 
promoted assimilation of peripheral identities into a dominant one. Ethno-cultural and 
linguistic elements decided membership criteria of nationality in the French-type as 
well. For Smith (1996; 113), the only difference was the fact that common myths, 
memories, or symbols, which, in reality, belonged to a dominant ethnic group, have 
been introduced in the French model as if they were representing the whole of the 
national population.
Thus, not only ethnic but also civic model has entailed an ethno-cultural core. 
Despite the fact that discourse of nationalism has usually situated the two models in 
two different categories, the civic practices usually culminated in the convergence of 
political and ethno-cultural membership. Given the significance of kinship ties in the 
formation of national identity, this convergence was considered unreachable in the 
German ethnic model. In the civic form, as soon as one received citizenship status, 
that is legal-political membership to the state, he or she would automatically be 
granted national, that of the ethno-cultural membership. Although discrimination 
and/or persecution on the basis of one’s ethno-cultural characteristics would, in 
general, remain out of question, assimilation was introduced as an alternative way of 
treatment.
The civic model of nationality, therefore, tended not to subject members of 
ethno-cultural, linguistic or religious minorities to those policies of discrimination or
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persecution, but provided that they relinquished their particular characteristics into a 
national category. The French model, hence, left no room to facilitate free and equal 
accommodation of minority differences but the principle of equality went hand in 
hand with practices of uniformity. However, having associated nationality with 
common descent, ethnic model closed all the doors to policies of assimilation. 
Instead, ethno-cultural segregation has been used in order to hold outsiders away from 
national membership. The two models have, therefore, established citizenship 
practices in conformity with their understanding of nationality. The ideal formulation 
of the two concepts of nationality and citizenship has largely indicated social position 
and legal-political treatment of ethno-cultural minorities.
2.3.2 Nationality and Citizenship
Political authorities of the ancien régime, as was laid down above, did not seek 
to create a strong connection between the state-membership and ethno-cultural or 
nation-membership. During this period, the two concepts largely operated 
independent of each other. However, by the emergence of consolidated states, which 
sought to monopolize administrative, judicial, legislative as well as cultural realms in 
the sole hands of the central administration, the form of links between state and 
society underwent a comprehensive transformation.
Thus, as modem ideology and mechanisms of the rule operated “in the whole 
intermediate sphere that had become so strong in medieval times -the sphere of guild, 
manor, town, monastery, and many other associative ties -  individual and sovereign 
were brought closer together in legal and administrative terms than would otherwise 
have been possible” (Nisbet, 1994: 8). A direct form of state-membership replaced 
indirect forms of rule and identification. As a result, legal-political connections
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between political authority and individual began to be built in a relation of directness 
(Nisbet, 1994: 8-9).
It was indeed by the collapse of corporate units that traditional implications of 
state-membership and ethno-cultural membership acquired new scopes. In particular, 
individuals were, for the first time, obtained a legal standing independent and out of 
corporate bodies. Having released from “inward-closed” framework of communal 
structures, individuals came to be conceived prominently equal members of the ruling 
polity. Instead of ethno-cultural ties, legal-political realm of the state came to 
constitute primary bonds among individuals. The community of citoyens substituted 
for privelegies of the corporative regime (Brubaker, 1992: 41). Central authorities 
were, henceforth, compelled to develop new channels with respect to state-society 
relations (Nisbet, 1994: 10-13).
In doing this, however, it was already evident that inegalitarian order would no 
longer determine criterion of state-membership due to fact that the latter had come to 
be perceived identical with the concept of national membership. This is why, 
emergence of modem state proceeded as a process standardisation on the legal status 
of the members of state institution. Hence, without taking into consideration ethno­
cultural qualities, universal rights and obligations replaced corporate privileges and 
private immunities. It was these rights and obligations equally applicable to each 
member of national society that resulted in the emergence of community of citizens in 
the modem state system (Bmbaker, 1992: 35-49).
Thus, the conception of citizenship as a general membership status was created 
in place of the liberties, immunities, and privileges of feudal lords and corporate 
bodies (Bmbaker, 1992: 41). The concept appeared as an “equalizing word” which 
established a reciprocal relationship between state and its individual members on the
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universal premises of legal-political membership. Rights and obligations came to be 
defined in egalitarian terms that ignored, among others, differences of race or 
ethnicity (Kerber, 1997: 834). The concept of citizenship, in so doing, indicated a 
legal-political status constmcted by common rights and obligations having nothing to 
do with particular rights and obligations.
In this form, citizenship symbolized a general, formal and abstract status of 
membership in the political community. Accordingly, the formulation of either law or 
politics would no longer pay attention to ethno-cultural, religious or sectarian 
circumstances of the ruled. By contrast, legal-political integration evolved as a 
generalization and abstraction of the legal-political realm that went hand in hand with 
abstracting individual from his or her ethno-cultural circumstances (Bmbaker, 1992: 
40). Putting the matter differently, “just as law and power were generalized, made 
‘more imitary and abstract,’ so too the condition of being a subject came to be 
conceived in more general, unitary and abstract terms”. The word “citizen” {citoyen, 
Bürger, Staadbürger), therefore, came to be used to depict subject peoples in general 
irrespective of their corporate attachments (Brubaker, 1992; 41).
Indeed, modem political thought and state practices generally thought that 
universal ramifications of citizenship status would transcend group-specific 
particularities of the whole members of polity whatever ethno-cultural, linguistic or 
religious distinctions they might have. Universality has generally been defined in 
opposition to particular. It was believed that citizenship would give eveiyone the 
same status as equal members of the political entity. It was in this context that 
universal equality of citizenship status has been conceived in a manner of sameness or 
uniformity (Young, 1994: 386).
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It was expected that the term of citizenship, associated with universal rights and 
obligations, would have no connection with national attachment. Thus, parallel to the 
ancien regime during which state-membership and culture-membership had existed at 
two distinct spheres, it was believed that the concept of citizenship, which is the 
modem indicator of state-membership, would be constituted and implemented at two 
different levels of political and ethno-cultural worlds. Provided this, the concept 
might have been thought politically inclusive irrespective of ethno-cultural belonging. 
However, abstract, universal and general formulation of citizenship status, as 
expressing a general will over peoples’ group-specific differences, has usually 
operated as an instmment of ethno-cultural and linguistic homogeneity. The two 
distinct processes of “nation-building” and “citizen-building” have generally gone 
hand in hand. Because of this, citizenship practices have often inclined to exclude or 
to put at a disadvantage position some groups, even when they obtained formal 
citizenship status (Young, 1994: 388-391).
Thus, notwithstanding its theoretical universalism, state practices have usually 
colored the concept of citizenship with ethno-cultural interests of a dominant ethnic 
group. Because of this, on the part of minority groupings, egalitarian aspects of the 
concept have often sustained policies of ethno-cultural assimilation. Due to fact that 
the notions of nationality and citizenship have frequently been considered identical, 
legal-political borders of citizenship have often operated in an exclusivist manner 
towards ethno-cultural others. Whenever or wherever it has been formulated in an 
inclusive form, this time, the concept has not created equal accommodation of 
minority distinctions but has mostly operated as an instmment of assimilation (Young, 
1994: 401-402).
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The idea of exchanging one’s ethno-cultural identity for purposes of equal 
treatment, embedded in the abstract notion of citizenship, was however, not 
voluntarily admitted. By contrast, many wanted to have both ethno-cultural identity 
and citizenship equality (Oommen, 1997b: 35). Putting the matter differently, apart 
from being entitled to all benefits of citizenship, ethno-cultural and linguistic 
minorities have sought, at the same time, group-specific rights pertinent to the 
protection and promotion of their religion, language and culture (Young, 1994: 404).
This is to say, socio-political and legal position of minorities in the context of 
citizenship practices has closely been related to the formulation of national identity 
and citizenship practices in terms of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. As was already 
given above, citizenship has provided a legal-political linkage between political realm 
and individual members of the polity which was colored with a dominant ethno­
cultural identity. Therefore, citizenship status, directly or indirectly, has associated 
individuals to an ethno-cultural and linguistic category. Yet, depending upon distinct 
origins of the two concepts, it is still possible to assert that nationality is not 
necessarily a prerequisite of becoming citizen. That is, one can choose to be a member 
of a polity (citizen) without relinquishing his or her ethno-cultural particularities. But, 
whether or not this is possible has depended upon the concept of citizenship that a 
state adopts (Oommen, 1997b: 232).
The politics of citizenship have been shaped around a number of distinctive 
traditions of nationhood that is deeply rooted in the practices of nation(al)-states on 
their understandings of what constitutes a nation (Steaward, 1995: 66). Because of 
this, in order to see true position of ethno-cultural minorities in a modem state, it is 
necessary to disclose the connection that has been established between citizenship and 
nationality in modem conditions. At this point, it seems significant to turn back to two
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major traditions of nationhood that is the western-civic and eastern-ethnic models. 
Since citizenship and nationality, at least in principle, have signified two different 
sources of identification and allegiance, the form of relationship established between 
the two has carried significant implications on the treatment of minority distinctions.
2.3.2.1 Civic Nation and Citizenship
The western-civic model, in principle, has an ethno-cultural neutrality. Ethno­
cultural differences have not prejudiced conditions of national membership. It is 
argued in this sense that “in accordance with the revolutionary tradition of 
egalitarianism and universalism, citizenship is based not on ethnic group (as defined 
by blood or cultural ties), but on the legal criterion wherein the droit de soil 
predominates” (Veil, 1994: 30). Thus, state-membership (citizenship) is considered 
fully a “legal-status”, that is “membership in a particular political community” 
(Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 352). The civic version has treated citizenship 
synonymous with national membership. However, as given above, civic model has in 
no way acted blind to ethno-cultural features but maintained a latent form of cultural 
and linguistic coloring. Because of this, while conflated those notions of citizenship 
and national membership, the same practice has converged ethnic and civic elements. 
Citizens have been considered both ethnic and civic members of the state. It was in 
this context that citizenship equality has been implemented in a form of national 
uniformity. Because of this, when individuals adopted legal status of state- 
membership with universal ramifications of citizenship equality, the civic model 
usually compelled the same group of peoples to adopt its ethno-cultural and linguistic 
characteristics. As a result, the civic version of citizenship practices has often
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operated, on the part of minority groups, as an instrument of ethno-cultural 
homogenization (Veil, 1994).
The emergence of modem state and nation in France represented a good 
example of acculturating minority cultures into an integrated national form by using 
the instmment of equal citizenship. The convergence of nationality and citizenship 
has become an instmment of assimilation in the French context (Heater, 1999: 103). 
Defined on legal-political and territorial criteria {jus soli), the French notion of 
nationhood came to be synonymous with '"patrié” and "peuple”. The idea of the 
French people brought together ethno-cultural groups as well as economic classes 
under an all-inclusive national form. The "patrie” and “nation” were used 
interchangeably. Citizenship and nationhood were melted into a political designation 
of integrated and non-divisible whole. Thus, having merged minority differences into 
French cultural and linguistic category, the terms of citizenship and nationhood in the 
French model no longer signified separate notions (Heater, 1999: 95-99; Bmbaker, 
1992: 35-49).
As the French case already indicated, a theoretical identification of citizenship 
and nationality has occurred whenever or wherever the concept of nation was 
understood as a political community, a civic community, or as a “community of 
citizens”. It is in this form that political membership has operated as an instmment 
and channel of ethno-cultural membership. Accordingly, when one received 
citizenship status, he or she was automatically involved in the ethno-cultural category 
of national membership. Therefore, notwithstanding diverse circumstances of national 
population, it came to be recognised ethno-culturally homogeneous, and its citizens 
were, at the same time, considered its nationals (Oommen, 1997b: 241).
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Not surprisingly, therefore, civic version of nationality and citizenship by no 
means introduced political and legal grounds upon which minority distinctions would 
equally be accommodated. Instead, those population categories who remained outside 
the mainstream identification category have been expected to relinquish their ethno­
cultural and linguistic particularities in favour of the dominant one (Veil, 1994). Thus, 
from the minorities’ point of view, full-fledged framework of the citizenship status 
would be attained at the expense of their group-specific characteristics. Because of 
this, universal equality embedded in the meaning of citizenship status molded, in 
practice, in a manner of national uniformity (Oommen, 1997a: 15-19). Alongside 
identical formulation and practices of civil and political equality, the subject peoples 
were, at the same time, compelled to match a set of ethno-cultural qualities celebrated 
at the center. Egalitarian practices of the principle of citizenship have, therefore, 
advanced “by encouraging, sometimes imposing, one language from the many 
spoken, one religion among the many followed, one set of myths and symbols among 
the many produced” (Alfonsi, 1997).
To sum up, the universal scope of the citizenship status removed inegalitarian 
order of the ancient regime. In the context of the latter, peoples were provided with a 
free space to learn, teach and practice their group-specific distinctions but within an 
inegalitarian system of legal-political order. Civic understanding of nationality, 
accompanied with a universal application of citizenship equality, accorded identical 
rights and obligations to whole members of the polity. However, notwithstanding its 
abstract formulation, citizenship practices have usually urged subject peoples, this 
time, to relinquish their group-specific differences in favor of ethno-cultural 
circumstances of a dominant ethnie.
11
23.2.2 Ethnic Nationalism and Citizenship
In the Eastern-German model, as was argued before, the criterion of nationality 
rested upon an “inward-closed” framework of inborn ethno-cultural characteristics. In 
this context, the state was considered political expression of pre-modem kinship 
community based on blood ties. The condition of state-membership (citizenship) was 
exclusively limited to kindred blood. The German-ethnic model was not a political 
one nor was it linked with the abstract and universalist idea of citizenship. 
Accordingly, the German model has developed politics of formal citizenship which 
relied upon exclusion rather than inclusion. The full-fledged scope of citizenship 
rights and privileges has been conferred to those groups of peoples who descended 
from the same blood or ethno-cultural heritage (Steaward, 1995: 66). Putting the 
matter differently, in the eastern-ethnic model “where the two are fused, membership 
in the nation is inherent, that is, nationality has nothing to do with individual will and 
citizenship is inherited. One implies the other” (Oommen, 1997b: 241). Having 
formulated upon the racist concerns of the Nazi government, the Nuremberg Law of 
1935, for example, stipulated:
A citizen o f the Reich may be only that subject who is o f German or kindred blood 
who proves by his conduct that he is willing and suited loyally to serve the German 
people and the Reich. The Reich citizens is the sole bearer o f full political rights as 
provided by the laws; only a Reich citizen...can exercise the right to vote on political 
matters, or hold public office (Oommen, 1997b: 144).
Thus, when nationality was understood as an extended kinship community, tied 
together by ethnic or blood relations, full and equal citizenship status have been 
closely associated with conditions of nationality. Almost no theory or practice of 
universal citizenship, equally applicable to each section of citizenry irrespective of 
ethno-cultural characteristics, was, therefore, developed. Rights and freedoms sprang 
from citizenship status were denied to ethno-cultural others. During the Nazi era, for 
example, confirming their externality to national category, the Jews, Slavs and
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Gypsies, among others, were eliminated from public life, professions and state 
education. None of them were permitted to purchase rural property or to take place 
financial institutions, in particular, whole of the “others” were disenfranchised and de­
naturalized (Oommen, 1997b: 144).
On the part minority peoples, the eastem-German model has maintained a clear- 
cut distinction between those notions of state-membership (citizenship) and ethno­
cultural membership (nationality). Egalitarian premises of nationality and citizenship 
have privileged ethno-cultural brothers. On most occasions, therefore, the eastern 
model has created two distinct categories of citizens: citizens by nationality (national 
citizens) and citizens by law (formal citizens). Inclusion/exclusion practices of the 
German model of citizenship, hence, took shape around intemality of the national 
citizens and externality of the formal category of citizens. Because of this, although 
they might have coexisted for centuries in the same homeland, citizenship practices of 
the eastern model not infrequently attributed an extreme form of intolerance towards 
its “co-nationals” (Oommen, 1997a).
This is to say, similar to the practices of the civic model given above, no 
reconciliation was attained between two dimensions of minority issues: universal 
citizenship equality and group-specific treatment of ethno-cultural distinctions. The 
civic version introduced a form of citizenship practice which provided peoples with 
identical rights and obligations. But, it was the same practice that has denied creating 
legal-political measures pertinent to the protection and promotion of minority 
distinctions. Legal equality has been practiced in the form of national uniformity. By 
contrast, the eastern-ethnic model has displayed almost no concern in the direction of 
ethno-cultural assimilation. Having decided national criterion on ethic/blood ties, 
ethno-cultural others have been segregated from the mainstream category of national
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identification. In so doing, however, the latter has conflated the meaning and practices 
of citizenship and nationality. Full and complete scope of citizenship rights and 
obligations has, therefore, accorded to those sections of population who were 
considered within the kindred affinity. Thus, ethnic model has naturally displayed 
almost no intention to interfere with distinct circumstances of minority groups but 
largely opened ways of discrimination and persecution. Persistence of minority 
distinctions has been recognized at the expense rights and freedoms embedded in the 
framework of universal citizenship.
2.3.3 Nation(al)-state and Ethno-cultural Minorities
Practices of the two versions of nationalism have indicated that ethno-cultural 
diversity would rarely be reconciled with the expected forms of ethno-cultural 
uniformity enshrined in the ideological discourses and practices of nationalist 
doctrines. It is widely accepted today that only a few of the existing states could 
accomplish homogeneity standards of a “nation-state” with regard to ethno-linguistic 
and cultural affiliation of their individual citizens. Political boundaries of few states, 
in other words, coincided with their ethno-cultural boundaries. Ethno-cultural 
diversity has instead succeeded its continual presence as an integral feature of modem 
conditions (Conner, 1994; Smith, 1995).^* As Alfredsson (1993) pointed out, 
celebrated homogeneity of the nation-state model has remained an illusion. 
Depending on this fact, Charles Tilly (1995: 86) rightly suggested that we have to 
exchange the traditional connotation of “nation-state” with the technical frame of the 
“national-state”. The latter, in his view, signified consolidated stmctures of the
According to recent estimates, 184 states contained approximately 600 living languages and 5000 
ethnic groups (Kymlicka, 1995: 1).
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modem state but affirmed, at the same time, ethno-cultural diversity prevalent within 
its national population.
However, despite the persistence of ethno-cultural diversity, integrative 
centralization of modem states progressively imposed, since the sixteenth century, 
monolithic policies over the different cultural, religious or ethnic groupings resident 
within its jurisdiction. Putting the matter differently, “although the fusion between 
citizenship and nationality was not realized even in the Western Europe, the idea of 
homogenization caught the imagination of intellectuals and politicians” (Oommen, 
1997b: 135). In doing this, although not all of the dominant groups have acted in 
oppressive or tyrannical forms, few of them, as was suggested so far, have paid 
attention to the issue of meeting distinct expectations of their societies. In many cases, 
granting official recognition to ethno-cultural diversity was considered in 
contravention with national and territorial premises of the ideal state (Geertz, 1963). 
Because of this, many minority groups have displayed vulnerable characteristics in a 
community of nation states, and so, frequently resented to acquiring means in order to 
protect and promote their distinctions. As a result, not only subordinated minority 
groups resisted to assimilationist policies of modem state but also they were pushed 
into a position which has disturbed peace and security within as well as between states 
(Thomberry, 1991; Scarman, 1984).
Thus, notwithstanding the extent of national homogenization, modem states 
have had to contend with their “outsiders”, those of the citizens who did not belong to 
mainstream category of national identification. The issue of accommodating minority 
distinctions has preoccupied humanitarian and security concerns for centuries. 
Beginning from the Treaty of Westfalia (1648), national and international endeavors 
have, therefore, sought to devise an adequate instmment of minority protection in
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their legal-political settings in order to ensure positive conditions of substantive 
equality. In association with international efforts, many nation(al)-states have, hence, 
created their own legal and political regimes in accommodating minority differences 
whereas many others opted for a systematic policy of assimilation, integration or even 
discrimination (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993; Macartney, 1968).
However, it is by no means reasonable to state that prevailing regimes of 
minority protection over the world generated from a unilateral path that culminated in 
a uniform treatment of ethno-cultural diversity. History of minority protection 
indicated that minority/majority classifícation with its corresponding rights and 
privileges have rarely generated as a product of sudden invention (Macartney, 1968; 
Preece, 1997). Unique experiences in political, legal, social and even economic 
histories of world’s different countries greatly affected the framework of minority 
regimes they obtained today.^^ Foundational basis of both “dividing” and 
“integrating” factors of national societies have rooted in inclusion/exclusion practices 
going back to earlier times (Steaward, 1995: 66). For example, it is commonly 
acknowledged that “language and culture” in France and “blood ties” in Germany 
historically operated as the instruments of national cohesion while the same factors 
have been used as major devices of national exclusion on the way of creating their 
own minorities (Brubaker, 1992).
Consequently, as was already examined above, despite the fact that there has 
existed a credible distinction between ethno-cultural and political-civic versions of 
nationalism, cultural element has become an integral part of citizenship practices in
State declarations, recently promulgated on the Council o f  Europe’s Framework Convention for the 
Protection o f National Minorities, presented a good example to the fact that what determined the 
meaning o f  “national minorities”, if  not the ways o f treatment, rested upon states’ historical 
experiences and practices (CoE, 1999: 74-78). Similarly, “in view o f the range o f the different 
situations”, the provisions o f the Convention provided the partied states with a secure measure o f
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both cases. The relevance of tradition, ethnicity and language on the emergence of a 
national entity has inserted influence on the legal-political framework of citizenship 
practices as well. In many multi-ethnic and multinational states, the rhetoric of 
citizenship has often been used historically as a way of advancing interests of a 
dominant national group (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 10-11).
Bearing diverse circumstances of the modem conditions in mind, 
accommodating ethno-cultural diversity within citizenship equality has sought for 
creating a clear disassociation between nationality and citizenship. Thus, legal- 
political act of receiving citizenship was to be thought and practiced distinct from 
ethno-cultural implications of receiving nationality. In other words, state mechanism 
ought to be viewed as a collectivity of citizens who enjoy judicial equality in the 
territory of the state, irrespective of group-specific identities based on, among others, 
ethnicity, religion or language (Oommen, 1997b: 27). It is in this context that the 
issue of minority rights has sought a true reconciliation between notions of citizenship 
equality and that of the different treatment of ethno-cultural minorities. It has been 
expected that persistence of minority distinctions would be secured within the 
universal scope of citizenship equality without forcing them to renounce ethno­
cultural distinctions (Schnapper, 1998).
As was argued, citizenship practices adopted in the two models of nationalism 
have failed in creating a tme congmence between citizenship equality and distinct 
treatment. Major reason of this lies in the fact that both models have established 
closer linkages between two distinct notions of citizenship and nationality. In so far as 
the notion of citizenship is linked to nationality, there would be almost no possibility 
to create a reasonable congruence between citizenship equality and minority
discretion “enabling them to take particular circumstances into account” when implementing minority 
clauses therein (CoE, 1999: 17-37).
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treatment. Since egalitarian frame of civil and political rights has generally been 
associated with the condition of meeting a national criterion, national others, whether 
obtained citizenship or not, would be subjected to discriminatory treatment.
It is suggested that citizenship does not exclude ethno-cultural distinctions as 
long as a clear distinction is made between those notions of legal-political identity 
(citizenship) and private particular identities (ethno-cultural identity). It is believed 
that when a national formation is constituted as a “community of citizens”, not ethno­
cultural grouping, then it can safely be projected upon the grounds of ethno-culturally 
heterogeneity. Under these circumstances, a public domain, independent, but not 
superior, of private interests and private belongings, is created in order for national 
heterogeneity to be a part of the nation(al)-state. The public domain is represented as 
a neutral “empty-space” in the front of any particular ethnic, religious or linguistic 
belonging. It is because of this neutrality that individual citizens are permitted to 
enjoy their particularities in ethno-cultural groups while, at the same time, 
participating in a political sphere of citizenship universality having nothing to do with 
private distinctions. It was by the achievement of this disassociation that, it is 
believed, one would guarantee both cultural autonomy and equal citizenship status 
which is divorced from ethnic, religious or linguistic affinities. In this context, it is 
suggested, national category would no longer signify ethno-cultural brotherhood but a 
political organization made up of a community of citizens. Political and legal act of 
receiving citizenship, hence, is clearly separated from the cultural act of receiving the 
nationality of this state (Schnapper, 1998).
It follows from this argument that if minority peoples were to be secured with 
legal-political grounds upon which they would protect and promote their ethno­
cultural distinctions, national settings were to adjust themselves with diverse
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circumstances of their population. In particular, citizenship practices, both in theory 
and implementation, should respect persistence of minority distinctions without 
violating universal implications of citizenship equality.
2.3.4 Conclusion
Contemporary position of ethno-cultural, linguistic and religious minorities 
rooted in the emergence of the nation(al)-state system. In the absence of modem 
mling mechanisms and ideological incentives, central authorities of the European 
ancien regime did neither wish nor attempted to interfere with diverse circumstances 
of peoples who were organized in corporate instmments of rule having almost no 
direct linkages with the state. However, within an inegalitarian order, policies of 
medieval diversity had nothing to do with any notion of universal equality. It was by 
the emergence of nation-states that egalitarian concerns began to dominate legal- 
political realms of the public. In search of building direct linkages with individual 
subjects, central authorities, on the one hand, dispensed, from the seventeenth century 
on, with intermediating corporate bodies, on the other hand, created the concept and 
practice of citizenship with its universal aspects of individual equality.
However, due to fact that theoretical discourse and practices of nationalism 
preached ethno-cultural homogeneity, the two distinct concepts of citizenship and 
nationality were usually conflated in the policies of the modem state. Because of this, 
citizenship equality has often unfolded in a manner of uniformity that urged peoples 
to exchange their particular characteristics with an abstract formula of citizenship 
equality. Whatever may be definitions of citizenship, nationality or ethnicity, there 
existed an implicit expectation that they should coincide. Where they do not, national 
policies drifted towards assimilation, discrimination, exploitation and even oppression
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of ethno-cultural others. Neither ethnic nor civic versions of national articulation 
would, therefore, create legal-political conditions that would facilitate protection and 
promotion of ethno-cultural distinctions within citizenship equality.
As opposed to the circumstances of a nation-state in which legal and cultural 
community was expected to coincide, citizenship in a diverse society would, in fact, 
operate as a mechanism to provide essential grounds of both unity and diversity. 
Thus, in so far as the legal-political concept of citizenship was disassociated from 
ethno-cultural substance of nationality, the former would cease to function as a 
channel of assimilation on the part of minority peoples. In place, peoples would come 
to enjoy all the benefit of citizenship status without having had to renounce their 
ethno-cultural particularities. The legal-political choice of receiving citizenship would 
no longer deem it necessary to internalize cultural or linguistic characteristics of a 
dominant nationality. It was in this context that a true reconciliation between 
citizenship equality and group-specific treatment of ethno-cultural minorities would 
be reconciled.
Coincided with the emergence of modem state system, national and 
international have developed a number of norms, values, principles or instmments in 
order to create the said reconciliation. Next two chapters will elaborate emergence, 
general scope and practices of policies, principles and instruments developed in the 
European context, particularly, in the framework of the European regional 
organizations.
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CHAPTER III
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES IN MINORITY RIGHTS 
Precedents to the Contemporary Norms and Instruments
3.1 Introduction
Rooted in the emergence of the modem nation-states, the question of minority 
rights has preoccupied national and international authorities in the duration of the last 
four centuries. The disappearance of corporate states of the European ancien regime, 
because, has left many non-dominant groups face to face with politics of extinction, 
assimilation, migration, subordination or oppression. Intensive centralization of the socio­
political and economic sources of power has threatened minority peoples with regard to 
their ethno-cultural, linguistic and religious characteristics. For the sake of political and 
humanitarian considerations, therefore, the fate of minority groups has been incorporated 
into the general scope of national and international politics. In order to allow for the 
legal-political accommodation of minority distinctions, national govenunents have 
imdertaken internal and external commitments which have gradually built a network of 
rights, norms, instruments, and the ways of treatment in the field of minority protection. 
It was within this context that a limited regime of minority rights was created by the 
second half of the seventeenth century before it evolved into a more comprehensive and 
expanded regime in the early decades of the last century.
Given this fact, before elaborating on the European-regional and the Turkish 
minority rights regimes, the focus of this chapter will be on delineating major stages and 
aspects of minority protection that has largely affected, in particular, the shape of the
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former. In this respect, minority rights regimes, which preceded or co-existed with the 
development of the European and Turkish models, will be examined in three stages. The 
first stage involved the Westphalian system that covered the period preceding the regime 
established by the Minority Treaties of the pre-WWI. During this early stage, a non- 
systematic form of minority politics, limited in terms of both geographical area and 
content, prevailed. In relation to the territorial and population transfers, the concern of the 
regime exclusively concentrated upon the protection of religious minorities inhabited in 
specific regions or states of the European continent. Despite its limited application, the 
Westphalian regime gradually established a political and legal tradition upon which a 
new system was founded towards the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century. The 
second regime accounted for the period of the League of Nations during which a set of 
bilateral and multi-lateral treaties, commonly known as Minorities Treaties, created a 
framework of norms, rules, principles and instruments in the field of minority protection. 
Lastly, the present chapter will outline the UN framework of minority protection as it 
relates to the main characteristics of its humanitarian acts. In this context, this chapter 
will indicate that the UN regime shifted the focus from the rights of minorities to the 
universal rights of human beings. This chapter will show also the fact that during the 
post-Cold War era, the UN attention has turned towards creating a regime of minority 
protection which was expected to harmonise state rights, individual human rights and 
group-specific rights of minority peoples.
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3.2 Prelude to Minorities Treaties: The Westphalian Regime
As was noted before, the European ancien regime manifested a corporate nature 
in the sense that political, administrative and legal privileges of central authorities had 
been devolved upwards and downwards among which the central ruler was no more that 
a primus inter pares. While symbolized the emergence of sovereign states, territorially 
consolidated, politically and administratively centralized, the Treaty of Westphalia 
(1648) gave an end to the corporate state system.' The same process prompted European 
states to devise an earlier model of minority protection within a network of norms and 
instruments addressing protection and promotion of minority distinctions (Fink, 2000: 
385). During the period concerned, since “Catholic or Protestant, Lutheran or Calvinist 
rather than Irish or English, German or French were the labels variously used to separate 
insiders from outsiders” (Preece, 1997: 77), rather than ethno-lingual and cultural 
distinctions, the focus of the Westphalian regime took shape around the availability of 
religious freedoms.
The Treaty of Westphalia affirmed the principle of cuius regio, eius religio which 
entitled central rulers to determine religion of the land of their jurisdiction. In so doing, 
state authorities displayed an open desire to construct mainstream identification of the 
territorial population on a definite religious belief, while pushing those sections of 
population who differed from the dominant belief system into a legal-political category of 
minority status. The Westphalian settlement, hence, opted to urge state authorities to
' The actual transformation from ancien regime’s corporate state system into an international system 
consisting o f sovereign states was, o f course, a gradual development which began earlier and ended long 
after the Treaty o f Westphalia. The Treaty represented no more than one case where distinct polities sought 
sovereign authority by securing their internal and external independence. In this sense, not a single treaty 
but a collection o f treaties contributed to the eventual consolidation o f the Westphalian conduct o f affairs. 
Most significantly, the development o f the Westphalian state system displayed not an even development 
but varied from country to country and from region to region in Europe (Beaulac, 2000).
84
grant a significant degree of tolerance to those subjects who differed in faith. 
Accordingly, although states were to maintain an official religion of their choice, it was 
also acknowledged that followers of minority religions would freely protect and practice 
instructions of their religions (Lee, 1992: 117-123; Beaulac, 2000).
The Westphalian regime presented a limited version of minority protection in 
regard to the beneficiaries of the liberties. In addition to religious delimitation, the 
concern of the regime was further curtailed as it was associated exclusively with the 
condition of those religious minorities who were affected from territorial changes. As 
Macartney (1968: 158) suggested, “where the adherents of one state religion were 
passing under the rule of a state where a different religion was the established one, only 
the communities which might be expected to suffer by the change were ordinarily 
protected”. In doing this, guarantees were secured to religious particularities resulted 
from those circumstances where territorial changes were accompanied with population 
transfers. The issue of minority definition, in other words, was delimited with the 
condition of transferred populations. Members of the same religious or sectarian 
commvmity who were already subjects of the state receiving territory were exempted 
from the benefits of the same principles (Hudson, 1921: 210).^
According to Preece (1997: 77), this second limitation rooted in the then 
prevailing political and moral considerations. Rights, liberties and obligations, contained 
in the documents of the period, in her view, reflected not an international norm of
 ^ Despite the prevalence o f this general principle, where the state ceding the territory had already practiced 
religious toleration, the same liberties were stipulated for all religions. One example o f this kind was 
presented when the Belgium was assigned to Holland in 1814. The relevant article o f the treaty stipulated; 
“There shall be no change in those articles o f the Fundamental Law (of Holland) which assure to all 
religious cults equal protection and privileges, and guarantee the admissibility o f all citizens, whatever be 
their religious creed, to public offices and dignities (Macartney, 1968: 158-159).
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religious tolerance but aimed at controlling anomalies created by territorial 
redistributions. Since state authorities were granted exclusive rights to determine 
religious affiliation of their populations, the kin-states sought to created legal-political 
grounds of survival for those co-religious communities after they were transferred into 
jurisdiction of a ruler belonging to a different creed.
Though limited in its scope, these earlier attempts laid down significant rights and 
liberties pertinent to the protection and promotion of minority particularities. The Treaty 
of Oliva (1660), concluded between Prussia and Sweden, for example, incorporated 
definite clauses guaranteeing inhabitants of the ceded territory the enjoyment of their 
existing religious liberties including persistence of legal privileges which they enjoyed 
before (Macartney, 1968; 158-159). Similarly, the Treaty of Osnabrück, the follow-up 
treaty of Westphalia, stated:
(Those) who...profess and embrace a Religion different from that o f the Lord o f the 
Territory, shall in consequence o f the said Peace be patiently suffered and tolerated, without 
any Hindrance or Impediment to attend their Devotions in their Houses and in Private, with 
all Liberty o f Conscience, and without any Inquisition or Trouble, and even to assist in their 
Neighbourhood, as often as they have a mind, at the public Exercise o f their Religion, or send 
their children to foreign Schools o f their Religion, or have them instructed in the Families by 
private Masters; provided the said Vassals and Subjects do their Duty in all other things, and 
hold themselves in due Obedience and Subjection, without giving occasion to any 
Disturbance or Commotion (Beaulac, 2000: 164-165).
In addition to religious practices and learning, the same treaty promised civil and 
political equality as well. Its provisions accordingly affirmed that Catholics and 
Protestants would have equal representation in the assemblies and in other decision­
making instruments of the Empire. In this context, it was also recognised that believers of 
minority religions were not to be “excluded from the community of merchants, artisans or 
companies, nor deprived of secessions, legacies, hospitals, lazar-houses, or alms-houses, 
and other privileges and rights” (Beaulac, 2000; 165).
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Liberties, immunities, and obligations, characterized the general framework of the
Westphalian regime, were contained in other treaties of the age including Nijmegen
(1678), Ryswick (1697), Dresden (1745), and Warsaw (1772). Granted on the condition
of subjects’ loyalty to the state, the content of the treaties provided rights and liberties,
most of which were formulated in the sense of individual rights having collective
dimension. Those rights to religious practices and religious learning were conferred to the
individuals who would exercise them in community with other members of the minority
group. Yet, some others, as such equal representation in the decision-making organs of
the state and maintaining community privileges enjoyed before territorial changes, were
granted to the corporate personality of the minority group. An obvious example of
corporate rights took place in the Convention of Costantinople (1881) which recognised:
(It) guaranteed Mahomedans ceded to Greece freedom of religion and public worship; no 
interference was permitted with the autonomy, hierarchical organisation, or management of 
Musulman religious bodies, existing or to be formed; and the local courts o f the Cheri were to 
continue to exercise their functions in purely religious matters (Macartney, 1968: 172).
Thus, in addition to providing individual freedom of religious practice, the 
Convention affirmed corporate rights of the “Musulman religious bodies”. It was in that 
sense that the Westphalian regime contained both individual and collective rights without 
making strict differentiation between the two. In particular, if the community held 
corporate authority on its members before, the same authority was given due recognition 
after it was ceded to the rule of another polity.
Minority provisions of the Westpahlian regime were usually inserted into treaties 
as a condition of peace. However, sovereign authority of a prince receiving territory was 
in no way limited but instead remained absolute. The treaties concerned did neither 
contain legal sanctions upon signatory states nor did they establish international
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instruments of implementation. The content of the treaties generally did not allow one 
part of the signatories to interfere with the internal affairs of the other on grounds of 
violation. The task of implementation, instead, was left to the good will of the state 
authorities who just promised to put the principles into practice (Gilbert, 1999: 398).
This indicates the Westphalian regime represented special concessions granted by 
the ruler to his new subjects in the interests of international peace and stability. It was 
because of this that subjects were in no way understood to inalienably possess such rights 
by virtue of their citizenship, humanity or natural law. By contrast, bearers of the rights 
and liberties gained and continued benefiting them as long as the sate authorities or the 
ruler permitted to do so. Principles of non-interference and sovereign equality allowed 
state interests to weigh the implementation process at the expense of subject communities 
(Preece, 1997: 77-78).
However, principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state, 
particularly on behalf of religious minorities, frequently disregarded in the case of the 
Ottoman heritage. Concerned with the extension of their political and economic interests, 
European Powers, by the eighteenth century, used condition of non-Muslim minorities in 
the Ottoman Empire as a pretext of intervention. Leaving broader discussion of the 
question to the coming chapters, it suffices to note it here that each sectarian group of the 
Ottoman Christians were gradually taken under the protectorate of a European Great 
Power throughout the nineteenth century (Macartney, 1968: 161-174).
Apart from the Ottoman State, international recognition of newly emerging states 
of the Ottoman heritage, including Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania and Bulgaria, 
was also conditioned upon commitments relating to civil and political liberties as well as
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religious freedoms of minorities. Going contrary to the principle of sovereign equality, 
before granting international recognition, they were expected to prove that they met 
standards of civilization specified in terms of adherence to the rule of law, respect for 
civil liberties and minority guarantees.^ Thus, unlike earlier practices of the Westphalian 
regime, minority undertakings ceased to be voluntarily admitted norms of action in the 
Ottoman world.^
On the other hand, by the early nineteenth century, alongside the rise of 
nationalism, as an ideology and political project, the element of nationality was, in the 
sense of ethno-lingual differences, began to be inserted into minority questions as a new 
criterion distinguishing insiders from outsiders (Gilbert, 1999). In response to the rise of 
national identities, political formulation of minority rights started to change. In the 
aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, along with major territorial alterations, the Congress of 
Vienna (1815), for example, not only redrew the map of Europe but also extended the 
principle of minority protection to national groupings (Fink, 2000: 386).
Nevertheless, incorporating nationality element into the conceptual category of 
minority provisions did not bring a sudden and complete break in the scope of the 
Westphalian regime. Instead, religious groups and their rights and liberties remained in 
the forefront of minority issues throughout the nineteenth century. For instance, when it 
was granted independence in 1830, the Greek State was required to undertake specific
 ^ However it should be noted that despite they were admitted as a condition o f recognition, it was not at 
any time withdrawn on the account o f non-fulfilment o f principles relating to the rights and liberties o f  
minorities (Macartney, 1968: 168). For instance, although Romania defied the terms o f the Berlin Treaty 
by granting citizenship to only 200 o f 230.000 Jewish inhabitants, no effective external interference was 
instigated (Fink, 2000: 387).
^ Different from the minority guarantees dictated upon the new states o f the central and eastern Europe, the 
Ottoman state was to undertake minority stipulations not in return o f admission to international society as 
an independent state. Instead, such stipulations were aimed at taking classical Ottoman practices o f 
minority freedoms under a system of international guarantee (Preee, 1997: 80, fh. 10).
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commitments towards its religious minorities. The Greek government recognised that “all 
the subjects of the new State, whatever their religion may be, shall be admissible to all 
public employments, functions and honours, and be treated on a footing of perfect 
equality, without regard to difference of creed, in their relations, religious, civil or 
political” (Macartney, 1968: 164-175).
To conclude, the Westphalian regime, firstly, rested merely on the protection of 
religious minorities ceded to a state professing a different religion. Whether collective or 
individual in formulation, rights and liberties were merely confined to the circumstances 
of religious groupings. Secondly, since the regime advanced through bilateral treaties, it 
gained neither an international outlook in application nor did it create an international 
instrument of implementation. In essence, the regime was bom within a non-systematic 
network of state-to-state practices and remained limited to the circumstances of specific 
religious groups. It was not until the end of the WWI that state-specific practices of the 
Westphalian regime gained an international dimension.
3.3 Minorities Treaties: The League of Nations Era
The impetus creating political and moral grounds of the Westphalian regime was 
the regional response given to the tragedy of the Thirty-Years War which had been 
provoked by religious antagonisms. Because of this, its concern fell merely on the 
condition of religious minorities resulted from territorial changes. In spite of the fact that 
the Westphalian regime created a network of norms and principles with regard to the 
treatment of minority particularities, it lacked an internationally admitted instmment of
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implementation. It was, in short, a regime limited in geographical application, scope of 
rights and beneficiaries, and of the instruments of international enforcement.
By the nineteenth century, the issue of minority protection underwent a gradual 
transformation. On the one hand, it was no longer exclusively religious but national 
identities of peoples, expressed in ethno-cultural and linguistic peculiarities, came to 
preoccupy national and international politics. Apart from religious communities, ethno­
cultural and linguistic groups were gradually added to the field of minority issues. On the 
other hand, there appeared an urgent need to develop a more inclusive, comprehensive 
and systematic regime of minority protection having political and legal mechanisms of 
implementation legitimately applicable in both national and international fields (Preece, 
1997: 81-82).5 Having resulted particularly from insufficient international cooperation in 
minority issues, the WWI had already indicated shortcomings of the previous regime 
(Claude, 1969: 45). Therefore, it came to be believed that only an international 
organization, having a mandate of mediating international conflicts would avoid 
expansion of minority related problems (Rodley, 1995: 48).
Creation of an expanded form of minority rights regime constituted the prime 
motive of the peace settlement in the aftermath of the war. Due to fact that the principle 
of self-determination had intensively been propagated in the duration of the war, many 
minority groups had convinced that they would attain to independence by the end of the
 ^ When writing to Paderewski, the Polish Premier, on the rationale o f the Polish minorities treaty, 
Clemenceau, the French Premier, reported novelties o f the time in his following words: “The situation with 
which the Powers have now to deal is new, and experience has shown that new provisions are necessary. 
The territories now being transferred both to Poland and to other states inevitably include a large 
population speaking languages and belonging to races different from that o f the people with whom they 
will be incorporated” (Gilbert, 1999:402).
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war.^ The victorious leaders, however, saw at the end of the war that it was completely 
unfeasible to fulfill all the national aspirations on the one hand, and to create 
homogeneous nation-states on the other (Preece, 1997: 81). Depending on a number of 
economic, strategic and historical considerations, instead, the post-WWI state frontiers 
were drawn without giving due consideration to the ethnographical circumstances 
(Macartney, 1968: 192-208).
Beyond doubt, creation of new states or border shifts taking place in the course of 
the peace settlement incorporated some of the former minorities into those states in which 
they constituted parts of the majority nationality.’ In some other cases, as it happened 
between Germany and Poland or between Bulgaria and Greece, the principle of physical 
transfer of minority populations also contributed to decreasing the size of minorities who 
were akin to destabilise the state system of the post-WWI.* However, the revision of 
frontiers and the reshuffling of populations did by no means remove the problem of 
national minorities from the agenda of the world politics (Claude, 1969: 12). The 
principle of self-determination or the exchange of populations had exhibited definite 
limits in practice. “It was recognized that, no matter how frontiers would be drawn, there
 ^ Having believed that a sustainable world peace would be secured by the general satisfaction of the 
principle o f nationality, the US president Wilson supported nationalist aspirations o f minority peoples in 
the course o f the war. In 1917 for example, he stated: “no peace can last, or ought to last, which does not 
recognise and allege the principle that Governments drive all their just powers from the consent o f the 
governed, and that no right anywhere exist to hand peoples over from sovereignty to sovereignty as if  they 
were property” (Macartney, 1968: 186). On another occasion, speaking on his “Fourteen Points”, President 
Wilson declared in 1918: “Peoples are not to be handed from one sovereignty to another by an international 
conference or understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be respected; 
peoples may now be dominated and governed by their own consent. Self-Determination is not a mere 
phrase, it is an imperative principle o f action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.” 
(Macartney, 1968: 189-190).
’ The creation o f a Czechoslovakia and redrawing borders o f Poland in the course o f the peace settlement 
gave an end to the minority status o f many Czech, Slovak and Polish peoples (Macartney, 1968, 196-201).
* When Bulgaria ceded Western Thrace to Greece in the aftermath o f the WWI, the two countries signed a 
treaty, in November 1919, on the exchange o f minorities left on the other side o f territories. Throughout the
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will always be groups in Europe who will have to live in a state the territory of whose 
inhabitants are ethnically, linguistically or religiously different” (Kunz, 1956: 282).
Thus, the post-WWI peace settlement was unable to create a perfect matching 
between state-membership and ethno-cultural membership. Although the subjects of the 
minority questions might have changed in several areas, minority question continued to 
take place among the prominent, if not the first, issues in the agenda of those leaders who 
came to Paris in order to conclude the peace process. In addition to those minorities 
inherited from the pre-war period, territorial changes and the emergence of newly states 
had produced larger numbers of minority groups.^ In this context, “nationalizing” policies 
of the host countries were creating a subordinate level of citizenship paving way for the 
development of oppressive minority policies (Fink, 2000: 388). Under these 
circumstances, putting aside humanitarian aspects of the question, maltreatment of 
minority peoples was likely to jeopardize national as well as international peace and 
security (Preece, 1997: 82).'®
Thus, unless a just order guaranteeing fundamental rights, liberties and distinct 
identities of minority peoples was devised, the post-WWI world system on the part of 
minorities would mean no more than exchanging one bad master with another one.
implementation o f the treaty, some 50.000 Greeks were exchanged for about 100.000 Bulgarians 
(Psomiades, 1968: 64).
® Though the number o f minority people had declined half as regards to the pre-war circumstances, 
approximately 16.000.000 people, most of whom were from the kin groups o f the defeated states, had been 
reduced to a minority status in the post-war map o f the European continent (Buxton and Conwill-Evans, 
1922: 80-84). After the settlement of the Peace Conference, the total number of minorities counted about 
25-30 million constituting 20-25 per cent o f the national populations of some states (Macaitney, 1968: 
211). For instance, a quarter o f the population o f Yugoslavia, one third o f that o f Romania, two fifths of 
that of Czechoslovakia and almost one half o f that o f Poland consisted o f ethno-cultural or religious 
minorities (Mover, 1931: 455, cited in Gilbert, 1999: 402).
'® Having been aware o f the disruptive nature of minority questions, the US president Wilson addressed the 
Conference leaders: “Nothing...is more likely to disturb the peace o f the world than the treatment which 
might, in certain circumstances, be meted out to minorities” (Macartney, 1968: 232).
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Because of this, it was believed that there was a moral responsibility on the part of the 
leaders to compensate the situation of those ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities 
who could not gain their own independent states (Hudson, 1921: 204-205). Thus, apart 
from its political-strategic and moral aspects, a comprehensive regime was necessary in 
order to make the post-war situation more acceptable in the eyes of the newly created 
minorities. Clemenceau, the French Premier, put stronger emphasis upon this aspect of 
the new regime when he stated that “these populations (newly created minorities) will be 
more easily reconciled to their new position if they know that from the very beginning 
they have assured protection and adequate guarantees against any danger of unjust 
treatment or oppression” (Macartney, 1968: 239).
Having strategic, political, and moral concerns in mind, the League of Nations 
was founded as an integral part and one of the main agents of the post-war peace 
structure. It was stated in the Covenant of the League of Nations that the objective 
followed with the establishment of this international organisation was to set up an 
enduring peace and security by promoting cooperation between states (Akermark, 1996: 
101). In doing this, the Conference, in the words of the President Wilson, was “trying 
...to eliminate those elements of disturbance so far as possible, which may interfere with 
the peace of the world” (Macartney, 1968; 232). And, the most significant element of 
disturbance, at the time, was the situation f national minorities.
Despite the fact that there appeared several proposals in the direction of creating a 
universal minority rights regime,*' the League Covenant, however, did not incorporate a
The second draft o f the Covenant, submitted by the USA President Woodrow Wilson, included an 
article wording as: “The League o f Nations shall require all new states to bind themselves, as a condition 
precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomous States, to accord to all racial or national 
minorities within their several jurisdictions exactly the same treatment and security, both in law and in fact,
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general and all- inclusive provision relating to the question of minority protection. In 
place, the field of cooperation was confined to those specific cases which seemed most 
prone to create minority problems disruptive for the world peace. It was also indicated by 
the geographical distribution of the minorities treaties that the effect of the treaties were 
limited, with few exceptions, to those certain areas ceded from the lands of the empires 
where unsatisfied minorities inhabited. It was believed that unless the Conference would 
agree on the terms of a comprehensive protection, these historically established 
minorities would expose serious threats to both national and international dynamics of 
world peace (Macartney, 1968: 291-293).
Consequently, apart from the defeated states, the newly created or enlarged states 
were subjected to the provisions of the League of Nations’s regime set forth in the 
provisions of the minorities treaties. It was in this context that those states of Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia), Romania and 
Greece were required to abide with the principles of minorities treaties. Although 
Germany was interestingly exempted from the effect of the new reg im e,special 
minority provisions were incorporated into peace treaties agreed with the defeated states 
of the WWI including Austria, Bulgaria Hungary and Turkey.'^ On the other hand.
that is, accorded the racial or national majority of their people” (Miller, 1928: 91, cited in Capotorti, 1991: 
16). The stipulation was incorporated in the third draft o f the Covenant, submitted by the President Wilson, 
in a more extended form. The article VI of the third draft read as follows: “The League o f Nations shall 
require all new States to bind themselves, as a condition precedent to their recognition as independent or 
autonomous States, and the Executive Council shall exact of all States seeking admission to the League of 
Nations the promise, to accord to all racial or national minorities within their several jurisdictions exactly 
the same treatment and security, both in law and in fact, that is accorded the racial or national majority of 
their people” (Miller, 1928: 105. cited in Capotorti, 1991: 16).
Yet, the Germain government unilaterally declared that “Germany, for her part, is determined to treat the 
minorities on her territory in accordance with the same principles” (Macartney, 1968: 133).
Poland was bound with the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, Czechoslovakia by the 1919 Treaty of St. 
Germian-en-Laye, Romania by the 1919 Treaty of Paris, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later 
renamed Yugoslavia) by the 1919 Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, Greece by the 1919 Treaty Sevres,
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Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Iraq were subsequently admitted into the scope of 
the League regime after they made unilateral declarations to the League of Nations that 
they would comply with the principles of the regime.
3.3.1 Substantive Framework of the Minorities Treaties
Minorities treaties aimed at making loyal citizens out of unsatisfied minorities. It 
was believed that once minority sections of the national population were guaranteed 
conditions of equal and non-discriminatory treatment, without denying their ethno­
cultural and religious characteristics, they would no longer become a source of dispute 
neither within nor between states. The drafters of the treaties, hence, situated the issue of 
“equality within diversity” at the basis of national policies relating to the position of 
minorities (Macartney, 1968: 274-280). This objective would be realised only if 
minorities were provided with two essential rights. The first part related to the citizenship 
status of minority peoples who were to be subjected to identical rights and obligations as 
those who belong to the majority. Secondly, universal implications of citizenship rights 
were to be supplemented with a group-specific dimension addressing preservation of 
minorities’ ethno-cultural, religious and linguistic distinctions (Akermark, 1996: 111).
Minority provisions of the peace treaties concerned, firstly, with citizenship rights 
of individuals in general without relating it to group-specific circumstances. It was in the 
second place that the minorities treaties outlined group specific rights granted to the 
benefit of those national citizens who belong to ethnic, religious, linguistic or racial 
minorities. The former section of rights was formulated in the form of negative rights in
Austria by the 1919 Treaty o f St. Germain-en-Laye, Hungary by the 1920 Treaty o f Trianon, Bulgaria by 
the 1919 Treaty o f Neuilly-sur-Seine, and Turkey by the 1923 Treaty o f Lausanne.
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the sense that states were not expected to create special conditions for the members of 
minority groups. Minorities were to be permitted to enjoy the same civil and political 
rights on the same grounds as the members of the majority. Partied states undertook to 
guarantee, accordingly, measures of universal equality and non-discrimination. The 
treaties provided in this context (Capotorti, 1991: 18):
a) the acquisition of the nationality (citizenship) of the new states;
b) full and complete protection of life and liberty;
c) equal treatment before the law and the civil and political equality of members 
of the minority group with the majority population;
d) a general right to use mother tongues, including those of the minority groups, 
either in written or orally, in private intercourse, in commerce, in religious 
practices, in press or other publications, in public meetings, and in the judicial 
proceedings;
e) free practice of religious instructions in public and private;
f) equality in admitting public positions or in exercising professions.
In the second category, minority provisions were stipulated in the form of positive 
rights which obliged states to take appropriate action in order to create legal-political and 
economic grounds facilitating protection and reproduction of minority differences. Unlike 
the universal nature of the former category, the second naturally included group-specific 
rights conferred exclusively to the benefit of the members of minority groups. In this 
respect, treaties guaranteed (Capotorti, 1991: 19):
a) freedom of association;
b) right to establish, manage and control, at their own expense, charitable, 
religious or social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, 
and to use their own language and to exercise their own religion therein;
c) (without excluding the necessity of learning official language) right to use 
minority languages as the medium of instruction in the primary schools in 
those regions where the minority group constituted a considerable proportion;
d) to allocate an equitable share of public funds for minority groups in those 
regions where the minority group formed a considerable proportion.
The wording o f the minorities treaties relating to the meaning of “considerable proportion” was left 
unclear in the formula o f the treaties. One o f the earlier drafts o f the minority treaties, presented by the US 
authorities, pointed out that “each minority comprising at least 1 percent o f the total population should 
constitute an autonomous body with the rights o f establishing its national, religious, educational, charitable.
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The two categories of rights indicated the fact that the formula of the minorities 
treaties concentrated chiefly on individual rights. The treaties granted rights, including 
minority-specific ones, to the individual members of national population. Minority- 
specific rights, nevertheless, displayed a collective nature in its formulation and exercise 
because, rights and freedoms specified in this category, including associations, schooling, 
religious practices, were to be enjoyed by the members of minority groups in community 
with other members of the group. Because of this, despite the fact that general formula of 
the treaties did not contain rights completely collective or corporate in nature, its 
provisions involved rights having collective dimension.
Hence, with the exception of allocating state funds to minority educational 
establishments, the League regime did not consider minorities as collective entities. 
Without having adopted a politically ambiguous and discouraging concept of “national 
minorities”, the provisions addressed individual “nationals belonging to racial (ethnic), 
religious or linguistic minorities” (Fink, 2000: 389). Thus, although peoples’ ethno­
cultural membership was taken into account, minority provisions were completely 
formulated in the form of citizenship rights granted on a legal-political condition of state- 
membership. Basic reason behind its individualist orientation was the fear that corporate 
designation of rights and freedoms would create “states within states” that would, on the 
one hand, hinder both internal and external sovereignty of partied states, while prompting 
secessionist aspirations, on the other (Capotorti, 1991: 19).
and social institutions.” We can, therefore, deduce from this draft formula that the wording “considerable 
proportion,” in the eyes o f the Conference leaders, meant I percent o f the total population (Macartney, 
1968:221-222).
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The issue of corporate rights, however, was not completely abandoned. As we 
pointed out above, almost every minorities treaty, taking place in the context of the 
League regime, adopted clauses, in the form of corporate rights, addressing specific 
circumstances of minority groups concerned. As will broadly be examined below, the 
Polish Treaty, for example, urged the Polish government to facilitate establishment of 
educational committee for its Jewish minority. The Greek treaty, on the other hand, 
undertook several commitments in corporate form with respect to the non-Greek 
communities of Mount Athos and personal laws of its Muslim minorities.
To sum up, as supplemented with legal-political grounds of differential treatment, 
without neglecting universal rights and obligations of citizenship, the scope of the 
minorities treaties brought into existence a form of substantive equality. Going beyond 
assimilationist nature of the principle of legal equality, the substantive content promoted 
equality both in law and in fact. In so doing, the concept of state-membership, expressed 
in the notion of citizenship, was divorced from that of ethno-cultural membership 
(nationality). It was secured that minority individuals would continue to benefit from the 
egalitarian privileges of citizenship status without exchanging their ethno-cultural 
narticularities in return.
3.3.2 Polish Treaty: The Forerunner of the League Regime
The post-WWI peace treaty concluded with Poland was the first example of the 
minorities treaties upon which legal, political, cultural and international framework of the
Article 14 o f the Greek treaty stipulated to allow her Muslim minorities to regulate questions o f family 
law and personal status in accordance with their own traditions, to assure the nomination o f the religious 
leaders, to protect mosques and cemeteries, to recognise and give facilities to existing pious foundations 
(wakfs) and to allow the establishment o f new foundations o f this kind (Macaitney, 1968: 248).
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follow-up treaties founded. Hence, it will be useful to have a closer look at the content of 
the Polish Minorities Treaty concluded on 28 June 1919 (Polish Treaty, 1919). As being 
a prototype example, its minority section embodied two foundational objectives. First, the 
Treaty stipulated universal rights equally conferred upon whole citizens of the country 
without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion. Second, the 
framework of the treaty concerned directly with group-specific rights granted to those 
nationals of the country who belonged to racial, religious or linguistic minorities.
In its brief form, as Rosting (1923: 648-649) pointed out, provisions of the Polish 
treaty incorporated:
a) common rights granted to all of the nationals or the citizens of the state,
b) acquisition of the nationality of the country,
c) group-specific rights granted to nationals belonging to ethnic, religious and 
linguistic minorities,
d) national and international instruments of implementation,
e) special provisions on local and particular conditions.
The first section of the Polish Treaty (Arts. 1-12) was assigned to the issue of 
protecting and promoting linguistic, religious and racial (ethnic) minorities resident in the 
Polish territory. Having concerned predominantly with citizenship equality, the first part 
of the section provided those principles of citizenship equality and non-discrimination. In 
this context, residents bom in the Polish territory were considered ipso facto Polish 
nationals irrespective of ethno-lingual, racial or religious affiliation (Arts. 3-6). In so 
doing, the Polish government undertook that no section of minority groups would be 
deprived of the right to the membership of Polish nationality on the ground of having 
minority distinctions. The full and complete protection of life and liberties were 
guaranteed on equal grounds without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or 
religion (Art. 2). As an integral part of it, principles of equality and non-discrimination
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were specified to include civil and political rights, eligibility to public employment, and 
the exercise of professions. As a result, it was clearly admitted that membership to a 
minority group would not prejudice benefiting universal citizenship rights conferred to 
the majority nationals of the country (Art. 8).
However, as we noted above, principles of equal and non-discrimination 
constituted one dimension of minority protection. The other aspect, which is no less 
significant, was the differential treatment facilitating protection and promotion of distinct 
minority characteristics. Having this concern in mind, the Treaty introduced group- 
specific measures relating to the protection and promotion of linguistic, religious and 
cultural differences of minority communities resident in the Polish territory. In this 
context, the free usage of minority languages in private intercourse, in commerce, in 
religious practices, in press and publications, and in public meetings was effectively 
guaranteed. In addition, the area of linguistic rights was extended to the judicial 
proceedings in such a way that minority peoples were provided with the right to use their 
own languages, either orally or in written form, before the courts (Art. 7).
On the other hand, the scope of linguistic rights was sustained with cultural 
freedoms as well. Concerning the latter, minority provisions of the Treaty laid down 
specific principles addressing educational, religious and conununal affairs of the groups. 
Accordingly, it was affirmed that minority peoples would establish, manage, and control, 
at their own expense, schools, charitable and religious institutions (Art. 8). Although 
official language was admitted obligatory in all schools without excluding those which 
belong to minority groups, it was also stipulated that minority tongues would be used as 
the medium of instruction in the primary schools of those regions where a minority group
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constituted a considerable proportion of the local population. In the same regions, 
governmental or municipal authorities undertook also to allocate an equitable proportion 
of public funds to the benefit of minorities’ educational, religious and charitable 
institutions (Art. 9).
Obviously, both groups of rights, whether citizenship or group-specific, exhibited 
no idea of corporate formulation but rested on individual rights, at most, individual rights 
having collective dimension. In most cases, in fear of creating “states within a state”, the 
idea of granting legal recognition to the corporate body of minority communities was 
denied. Nevertheless, in addition to these stipulations generally applicable to minority 
circumstances, minorities treaties took into consideration state-specific and group- 
specific conditions as well. It was in this context that the concept of corporate rights was, 
to some extent, recognized. The Polish provisions, for example, introduced special 
stipulations addressing protection and promotion of the religious particularities of Jewish 
peoples. Accordingly, although it was subjected to governmental control and supervision, 
a specific educational committee, composed of the members of the Jewish minority, was 
instituted. The committee was charged with a corporate authority in the management of 
Jewish schools and distributing communal funds allocated to the minority group 
concerned (Art. 10).
In the issue of national implementation, it was entrusted to a twofold guarantee of 
internal and external mechanisms. Internally, the said minority provisions were officially 
integrated into constitutional system of the country. Thus, it was admitted that no national 
law, regulation or official action would conflict or interfere with these stipulations (Art. 
1). Externally, it was a very significant innovation of the new regime that the question of
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minority protection was rendered an integral interest of international law. International 
supervision on the national implementation were entrusted to the political arbitration of 
the League of Nations and the legal review of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) (Art. 12). In so doing, the issue of elaborating possible disputes was partly 
removed from political realm of states and transferred into judicial and diplomatic 
authority of international organizations.
Thus, the Polish treaty largely set up legal and political bases of substantive 
equality on the part of both minorities and majorities. Without neglecting universal scope 
of the citizenship status, the Polish government undertook positive obligations in order to 
guarantee persistence and development of minority identities. In doing this, the rights and 
liberties of individual Polish citizens were considered within the legitimate domain of 
international concern. Significant spheres of national government were, therefore, 
devolved to an emerging regime of international governance. The shape of state-society 
relations, in other words, came to be decided not solely through a national process but 
international arbitration was accepted a part of it.
3.3.3 National and International Instrnments of Implementation
Unlike state-to-state practices of the previous regime, the League system devised 
an international instrument of implementation. As was given in the Polish case, national 
implementation of the minorities treaties was placed under a two-fold guarantee. The 
Westphalian regime, as underlined above, had entrusted kin states or a group of states, 
such as great powers, with the task of monitoring on the issue of national implementation. 
In the latter practice, however, since national interests generally overweighed, the regime
103
had frequently been assimilated into political considerations of states. Emergence of a 
new state system, depending on international cooperation, therefore, necessitated an 
international instrument of execution. Clamenceau, the French Premier, clearly indieated
t
this innovative instrument in his following words:
The new Treaty (the Polish Treaty) differs in form from earlier conventions dealing with 
similar matters. The change o f form is a necessary consequence and an essential part o f the 
new system of international relations which is now being built up by the establishment of the 
League o f Nations. Under the older system the guarantee for the execution o f similar 
provisions was vested in the Great Powers. Experience has shown that this was, in practice, 
ineffective, and it was also open to the criticism that it might give to the Great Powers, either 
individually or in combination, a right to interfere in the internal constitution of the states 
affected which could be used for political purposes (Macartney, 1968; 238-239).
Having been aware of this traditional weakness, national implementation of 
minority provisions was, on the one hand, instituted as a constitutional principle in the 
partied states. It was stipulated that no national law, statute, regulation or official action 
would neither prevail over nor conflict with the minority provisions. On the other hand, 
implementation was taken under the supervision of the League of Nations. Accordingly, 
it was affirmed that no provision of the treaties would be modified without the approval 
of the Council of the League of Nations. Thus, if there appeared any infraction or any 
danger of infraction, it was no longer kin states or great powers but the League Council 
was to take appropriate action. In particular, if there appeared any dispute between the 
Council and a state party, the case was to be submitted to the legal discretion of the PCIJ 
whose decision was binding over the parties (Stone, 1932; Capotorti, 1991: 20).
The League’s supervisory acts relied upon a network of information gathering 
collected through a system of petitioning. At its earlier period, right of petition was 
vested in the hands of the members of the Council. This right was later extended to the 
individual members of minority groups, representatives of minority associations as well 
as to those states not represented in the League Council. However, the task of elaborating
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petitions remained in the domain of the Council’s authority that was delegated later to the 
Committee of Three (Minorities Committee) composed of the President of the Council 
and two of any other member states (Stone, 1932). In the League system, most of the 
minority cases were resolved through the mediating acts of the Minorities Committee. 
However, since the petitioner was not given a legal standing, the system operated in a 
secret manner between the Committee and the state concerned in which state views and 
interests weighed (Capotorti, 1991, 22-24).
Thus, it seems quite naive to conclude that monitoring acts of the League 
provided, legally and politically, an effective instrument of supervision. On the contrary, 
since state parties continued to dominate the process, the issue of minority rights in the 
context of the League turned out to be more a matter of political negotiation than legal 
sanction (Gilbert, 1999; 404). Nevertheless, involvement of the minority individuals and 
the groups in the monitoring process represented a significant progress in the field. 
Internationalization of the implementation process was also significant in the sense that it 
provided, at least in principle, a supra-national procedure through which minority 
disputes would be handled without taking it in confrontational terms (Gilbert, 1999: 406).
3.3.4 The Dissolution of the League Regime
The drafters of the new regime were not minority groups but state parties had 
almost single-handedly directed the process.*^ Yet, with its comprehensive scope of 
rights and beneficiaries, the League system helped to produce a safer socio-political and
In order to provide a secure political, legal and economic environment for the Jews of the post-WWI 
states, the Jewish organisations o f the USA, Western Europe, and the Central and Eastern Europe, such as 
Joint Foreign Committee and Alliance Israélite Universelle, actively involved in the drafting process of the 
minorities treaties (Macartney, 1968: 212-218).
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legal environment that was unlikely to reappear again till the radical breakthrough of the 
1990s. Taking into account this innovative turn, Gilbert (1999), for example, 
acknowledged that “in many ways, it was a system based on ideas ahead of their time.” 
Another example of this progressive nature was that the regime obliged not only states to 
undertake commitments in respect to minority circumstances, but it compelled also 
minority peoples to bear respect to the sovereign rights of the state they inhabited. 
Irredentist and secessionist aspirations of minorities were accordingly condemned. The 
League regime, to this end, imposed obligations not only upon states but also on the 
beneficiaries of minority treaties. A resolution of the League Assembly, adopted on 21 
September 1920 declared:
While the Assembly recognises the primary right o f the minorities to be protected by the 
League from oppression, it also emphasises the duty incumbent upon persons belonging to 
racial, religious or linguistic minorities to cooperate as loyal fellow-citizens with the nations 
to which they now belong (Capotorti, 1991: 19).
Apparently, the new regime intended to make loyal citizens out of unsatisfied 
minorities ceded to new states without recognising an expanded version of the principle 
of self-determination. Thus, the focus of the regime shed light on the newly “transferred” 
minorities of the post-WWI states. From this point of view, minority treaties retained a 
margin of continuity with the objectives of the previous regime.
Another continuity was the fact that the minority provisions were not formulated 
in the form of universal obligations but were dictated upon those states who were looking 
for international acceptance. It was in this sense that although the issue of minority 
treatment ceased to be the concern of few relevant states, it did not generate into a 
complete international system working outside and above state actors. When commenting 
on the Polish Treaty, the French Premier Clamenceau pointed out;
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This Treaty does not constitute any fresh departure. It has for long been the established 
procedure o f the public law o f Europe that When a state is created, or even when large 
accessions of territory are made to an established state, the joint and formal recognition o f the 
Great Powers should be accompanied by the requirement that such states should, in the form 
of a binding international convention, undertake to comply with certain principles o f 
government (Macartney, 1968: 238).
Thus, “certain principles of government” relating to the internal governance of 
certain states were to be decided externally “in the form of a binding international 
convention”. But, despite the execution of the provisions was vested in the supervisory 
authority of a “supra-national” organisation, the regime had no capacity of international 
applicability. The effect of the treaties was limited to the case of “certain states” whose 
minority problems brought into existence the League system (Bagley, cited in Capotorti, 
1991: 25). The issue of minority protection was associated with the geographical areas of 
minority problems. In a discriminatory manner, positive obligations relating to the 
circumstances of minority citizens were confined to those of the newly created, newly 
enlarged or some of the defeat states. It was this structural defect that undermined, from 
its outset, its legitimate grounds in the eyes of those state authorities who had been 
subjected to its norms and instruments. Because of this, far from being an act of 
international cooperation, minority commitments were strongly conceived humiliating 
and an external limitation infringing the principle of the sovereign equality of states.'^
Geographical limitation of the League regime did run counter to the modem 
doctrine of sovereign equality. It was admitted that legal-political position of citizens and 
their relations with the state would be determined and supervised externally. However, no
When it was required to undertake similar commitments towards ethno-cultural and religious minorities 
on the occasion o f incorporating new territories, the Italian government, for example, held that “she did not 
stand on a level with the other Successor States, and was too great a Power to submit to such a derogation 
to her sovereignty (Macartney, 1968: 252).
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parallel obligation was imposed upon Western states including Italy, France, Belgium, 
Denmark all of whom had acquired new territories (Preece, 1997: 82).
It was accepted that a universal regime of minority protection could not be 
instituted in the then prevailing circumstances of the world politics. The victorious 
powers of the war, in particular, were not ready to undertake parallel obligations because 
they would restrict their colonial policies (Rodley, 1995: 48). Because of this, a universal 
regime seemed neither politically feasible nor applicable in practice. It was believed that 
generalization would have hindered effectiveness of the League regime by making all 
states reluctant to support wishful implementation of its provisions. Under the then 
prevailing international system, it was suggested, the alternative of this limited formula 
would be “not a universal system, but rather no system at all” (Claude, 1955: 35-36).
It was because of this essential defect that the regime of the minorities treaties 
was bom weak. It was argued, an international system formulated on unequal relations of 
participating states, divided into two categories of free and “under control”, was destined 
to failure from its beginning (Sierpowski, 1991: 28). Almost on every occasion, indeed, 
the subjected states criticized discriminatory aspects of the system and sought 
generalization of the minority commitments to whole of the states. Having found their 
minority obligations humiliating for their sovereign rights, the treaty-bound states, in 
particular, deeply resented their exceptional position in international law and avoided 
them whenever possible (Akermark, 1996: 116).
As a result, fundamental objectives of the regime sunk into defunct. Neither 
minority particularities would be provided with safeguards against assimilationist 
tendencies of majority nationalities nor would internal and external stability be secured.
108
Acted on their own national interests, international community paid little attention to 
national implementation of minority obligations as long as their national interests were 
not concerned. Minority questions, with few exceptions, often developed into a political 
struggle between kin-states and treaty-bound states. While kin-states sought revision in 
the post-WWI boundaries, host-states kneed on the preservation of status quo. In 
contravention with its foundational objective, therefore, the League regime became “an 
instrument for fomenting international rivalry and discontent” (Preece, 1997: 83).
However, what brought the end of the League regime was not its institutional 
weaknesses but political transformations that occurred between the interim years. 
Principally, the national execution of the League provisions, beyond doubt, accounted a 
pluralist regime respecting ethno-cultural differences of minority citizens. However, in 
the aftermath of their ratification, political regimes in Europe gradually inclined towards 
totalitarian and authoritarian formulations of nationalism. Under these circumstances, it 
was believed, there would remain almost no room even for the preservation of 
individuals’ basic rights and liberties, let alone international guarantees associated with 
the protection and promotion of minority distinctions (Lemer, 1993; 82).
Under the influence of growing nationalism, state authorities began to consider 
minority presence within their countries a threat to their imagined homogeneity. From the 
first decade of the minorities treaties, therefore, the concept of “minority protection” was 
replaced by the idea and practice of “protection from minorities” (Girasoli, 1995: 25-26). 
Along side the rise of anti-minority attitudes inside, particularly on the side of the treaty- 
bound states, nationalist policies fostered an effective unwillingness to abide with 
international obligations. This culminated in the collapse of the League with its integral
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network of standards, norms and instruments. A student of international law summarized 
this process in his following words:
It is unjust to view the failure o f the minority system of the League o f Nations independently 
of the general international condition o f its time... the minorities system depended on the 
general state o f international order and relations, and inevitably when that order disintegrated 
the system collapsed with it... (in) the between war period... dictatorships replaced 
democracies, hate and intolerance flourished, power overrode reason, and passionate 
nationalism crushed the growing bloom of international cooperation. That minorities should 
suffer in such a climate was inevitable; in fact, it was quite natural that they should be first to 
suffer therefrom (Bagley, cited in Capotorti, 1991: 26).
It was emphasized here that the League regime bom from the circumstances of 
time and relied upon the newly projected principles of the post-WWI world order. 
Because of this, changes in the internal and external understanding of the state-society 
and state-international community relations gradually eroded legitimate grounds of the 
League regime as well. The regime symbolically came to an end when the Polish 
government unilaterally denounced its minority obligations in 1934. The last blow that 
hit its effect came with the World War II (WWII). Depending on the emergence of new 
territorial and population transfers, and new international norms and instmments as well 
as changes in the circumstances from which the League regime had bom, the UN 
Commission on Human Rights officially judged in 1950 that the regime of the minorities 
treaties was extinct (Preece, 1997: 84; Gilbert, 1999: 407).'*
3.4 The UN Regime: A Universal-Individualist Orientation
The main impetus behind the League Nations’ concern on minority issues was 
political rather than humanitarian. Its prime objective was not to provide humane 
conditions for distinct position of minorities but to prevent minority related conflicts from
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becoming a source of international disputes. Because of this, the overwhelming interest 
of the League regime centered on those minorities who inhabited specific regions and 
countries, those of the Central and Eastern Europe. Whatever the extent of minority 
oppression and maltreatment, it did not invest much concern on such minority problems 
which seemed unlikely to expose an immediate threat to international peace and security.
However, the League system did not succeed even in this limited political 
objective. Depending on the political transformations of the western world, by the WWII, 
minority questions came to be considered a destabilising factor for both internal and 
external politics. Because, during the war, the Nazi politicians had, on the one hand, 
exploited German minorities living in other states as an excuse for aggression and 
occupying these states. On the other hand, several German minorities in their host states 
had acted as a fifth column force to spread the Nazi propaganda. Most significantly, even 
some of the non-German minorities, such as Slovaks, Croats and Hungarians, had 
cooperated with Nazi governments in order to further their nationalist aspirations (Preece, 
1997: 84-87). It was evident that the League regime had neither satisfied minority 
aspirations nor did it avoid another world war. Most dramatically, geographically limited 
aspects of the minorities treaties had proved unable to deter Nazi policies of Holocaust 
executed merely on the Jewish minority (Claude, 1969: 51-69).
The failure of the League regime and the war-time anomalies discredited the issue 
of minority rights in the eyes of world leaders. Because of this, the post-WWII settlement 
was founded on a network of norms, principles, commitments and instruments different 
in understanding and scope from that of the League of Nations. The issue of minority *
** In the same secession, apart from the Aaland Island agreement, the UN Commission recognised 
continual validity of undertakings concerning the Lausanne Treaty on the account that there had been no
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protection, in particular, was no longer taken as an independent issue but submerged into 
a general framework of universal human rights protection.
3.4.1 Emergence of a Universalist-Individualist Regime
The UN minority rights regime developed in response to the collapse of the 
League regime in the duration of which minority questions were often associated with 
those pejorative notions of ethno-nationalism, irredentism and aggression. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the post-WWII regime aimed at correcting deficient aspects of the 
preceding system. To this end, while combating with the weaknesses of the previous 
decades, such as non-humanitarian objectives, geographical limitation, political 
exploitation and misuse, the UN regime denied the framework of the minorities treaties. 
Political authorities, instead, favored a new conception of human rights which rested 
upon abstract individuals regardless of their ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural 
affiliation. The UN orientation, therefore, preached universalist-individualist approaches 
rather than group-specific formula of minority rights (Benoit-Rohmer, 1996: 21). A 
universalist-individualist view also prevailed because, the issue of minority protection, 
this time, would in no way be examined solely as a European problem but a general 
problem comprising all the countries of the world. Thus, in addition to the ethnic 
antagonisms prevailing in the old-world, the new regime would have to invest interest in 
the migration problems of the North and the South America as well as the colonial 
questions of the European powers (Choedon, 1994: 283).
It seemed hardy feasible to find a uniform solution at global level to various 
minority questions. Both the United States and Latin American governments, dominated
material changes in the circumstances and no new treaty had replaced it (Gilbert, 1999: 407).
112
by descendants of settlers coming from different European countries, for example, 
strongly denied recognition of group-specific rights in favor of assimilationist policies 
based on minimalist principles of equality and non-discrimination. European states, on 
the other hand, displayed mixed feelings. While the colonial powers were reluctant to 
undertake minority commitments in the fear of anti-colonial movements, central and 
eastern European states, under the fresh influence of the Nazi occupation, largely 
conceived the issue of minority rights as an instrument of internal destabilisation and 
external interference (Eide, 1992: 213).
As a result, international concern in the issue of minority rights shifted from 
group-specific rights towards a universal humanitarian agenda. The UN process, 
therefore, attributed almost no direct concern to the problem of minorities. The UN and 
human rights advocates believed that principles of equality and non-discrimination would 
suffice to protect interests of minority groups in preserving their traditions and cultural 
particularities. Many other thought that gradual acculturation would eventually decrease 
or even remove the necessity of devising special measures on minority protection 
(Hannum, 1999, 163). While drafting the UN Charter, the San Francisco Conference 
(1945) focused exclusively on the issue of universal human rights. Similarly, the Paris 
Peace Conference (1946) incorporated commitments in the direction of prohibiting 
discrimination and promoting civil and political equality. But, it undertook a silent 
position on ethno-cultural, linguistic and religious rights of minority peoples. 
Accordingly, the post-WWII peace treaties concluded, among others, with Romania, 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Italy contained general guarantees against discrimination based on 
ethno-cultural characteristics of peoples. But, unlike minorities treaties, having “a strong
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desire not to repeat the mistakes of 1919”, none of them involved specifically formulated 
minority provisions (Preece, 1997: 85-87).
Consequently, the UN Charter (UN, 1993a) and the UN Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) (UN, 1991) officially marked the overwhelming norm of the new 
orientation and gave no special place in their content to the issue of minority rights. 
Despite the fact that several proposals appeared on the example of the League’s minority 
rights regime, the UN, in general, attributed an idle stand towards the question of 
minority protection. Putting aside substantive aspects of the former regime, the UN 
Charter and the UDHR rather addressed those minimalist principles of equality and non­
discrimination. Articles 1 (3) and 55 of the UN Charter, for example, specified that rights 
incorporated in the Charter were universal in nature and would be enjoyed and exercised 
equally without distinction of race, sex, language or religion. Similarly, the UDHR put 
emphasis on the principles of equality and non-discrimination, particularly, in the 
enjoyment and exercise of human rights specified in the Declaration.^^ The universalist- 
individualist wording of the UN documents appeared also in the provisions of 
subsequently promulgated UN acts relating to the issue of human rights.^^
Russia proposed involvement of a special clause in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the 
protection o f minorities. In parallel to the scope of the League regime, the Russian proposal read: “Every 
people and every nationality within a state shall enjoy equal rights. State laws shall not permit any 
discrimination whatsoever in this regard. National minorities shall be guaranteed the right to use their 
native language and to possess their own national schools, libraries, museums and other cultural and 
educational institutions’’ (Capotort, 1991: 27).
Especially articles 2, 7 and 21 o f the UDHR incorporated a wording which put a strong emphasis on the 
principles o f universal equality and non-discrimination to be attained irrespective of sex, age, ethnicity, 
language, religion or sectarian affiliation (UN, 1993a).
Prominent UN acts in the field o f human rights included Convention on the Prevention o f the Crime of 
Genocide (1948), UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960), International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms o f Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or 
Belief (1981), Convention on the Rights of Child (1989) (Harris, 1991; Wallece, 1997).
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Nevertheless, despite its individualist-universaiist standing, the UN could by no 
means remain wholly indifferent to the question of minorities. The establishment of a 
Sub-Commission of the UN Commission on Human Rights (1947), that is the Sub- 
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (hereafter the 
Sub-Commission), already signified an earlier UN interest in the issue of minority 
protection. Having been charged with the task of elaborating and recommending 
standards relating to the field of non-discrimination and the protection of minorities, the 
Sub-Commission helped to hold the issue on the UN agenda.^^ The UN Resolution 217 
(1948), for example, came to a conclusion that “the UN could not remain indifferent to 
the fate of minorities”. However, the Resolution did not create a comprehensive 
framework of minority rights and, instead, affirmed the fact that “it was difficult to adopt 
a uniform solution of the complex and delicate question (of minorities), which had 
special aspects in each state in which it arose” (UN Report, 1990). In addition, it was also 
difficult to reach to an agreement because, the Sub-Commission had become an 
ideological battle-ground between the individualist-universalist views of the Western 
states and the group-specific concerns of the Eastern Bloc. Group-specific proposals of 
the latter were defeated several times in the Sub-Commission by the contrary votes of the 
Western states (Claude, 1969, 145-152).
Nevertheless, as the war-time memories receded and the growing anti-colonial 
movements created ever increasing minority and refugee problems, the UN, by the 
middle of the 1950s, became more actively involved in minority issues. Though within an 
individualist-imiversalist understanding, the Sub-Commission’s acts, for example.
Abjom Eide, the Special Rapporteur o f the Sub-commission, concluded a comprehensive study on the 
organisational structure and the operation o f the Sub-Commission (Eide, 1992: 211-264).
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culminated in drafting a minority provision incorporated in the UN International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) which was promulgated in 1966 (UN, 
1995b). Notwithstanding its minimalist wording and scope, the Article 27 of the CCPR 
set forth basic norms that were to decide framework of minority treatment in the duration 
of the Cold War era. During the period, without having introduced any further 
standardization in the field of minority rights, the Sub-Commission devoted itself to the 
explanation and implementation of the principles contained in the Article 27.
3.4.2 Article 27: The Universal Principle of the Cold-War Era
As we underlined above, the UN has invested an exclusive interest in the issue of 
universal human rights bestowed upon the benefit of individuals without considering 
their ethno-cultural circumstances. The UN’s humanitarian documents, therefore, 
refrained from making direct references to the issue of minority rights. During the years 
1945-1989, the only exception was the CCPR. In its final formula, the Article 27 of the 
Covenant provided:
In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to 
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members o f their 
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their 
own language.
Drafted in a negative formula of “persons... shall not be denied”, the article urged 
states not to interfere with ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics of minority 
peoples. Although national governments were not required to undertake positive 
obligations, except universal rights of equality and non-discrimination, minorities’ right 
to “difference” was clearly affirmed. Oppressive and assimilationist policies were equally
An earlier example o f this was conducted by Francesco Capotorti, the Special Rapporteur o f the Sub- 
Commission, who completed his report {Study on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and
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condemned (Alfredsson and de Zayas, 1993; 2). In so doing, the UN context, for the first 
time, divorced minority questions from the general scope of the universal human rights 
and attributed to the former an independent status in the field of its humanitarian 
concerns. The subsequent reports of the UN Human Rights Committee also confirmed 
this view, according to which, states were expected not to confuse minority-specific 
nature of the Article 27 with those universal principles of equality and non­
discrimination. It was hence suggested that in order to enable minorities to protect and 
promote their ethno-religious and linguistic particularities, states must have gone beyond 
those measures of non-discrimination and equal treatment (Wallace, 1997: 145-148).
However, under the influence of the then prevailing aura, the Article 27 was 
formulated in an extremely cautious and vague manner. It left many questions open that 
must have been clarified by national and international interpretations. In particular, the 
wording was ambiguous with regard to the definition of the beneficiaries, obligations of 
the partied states and the national and international instruments of its implementation. It 
was not made clear, for example, whether the terms “ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities” involved refugees, migrant workers or other social minorities that existed in 
the partied countries. These weaknesses were significant because national goverimients 
would easily obliterate enforcement of the rights in the concrete circumstances (Benoit- 
Rohmer, 1996: 21). Although official interpretation of the article stipulated that existence 
of an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority does not depend upon a governmental 
recognition but requires to be proven by objective criteria (Capotorti, 1991: 97), 
depending on this literary ambiguity, many states have denied that their countries 
involved minority groups. Many others have limited the effect of the article to certain
Linguistic Minorities) in 1977.
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sections of ethno-cultural and linguistic minorities. The French government, for example, 
declared on the recognition of the CCPR that “in the light of article 2 of the Constitution 
of the French Republic,...Article 27 (of the Covenant) is not applicable so far as the 
Republic is concerned.” 4^ The same argument was used in France’s second periodic 
report which stated that “since the basic principles of public law prohibit distinctions 
between citizens on grounds of origin, race or religion, France is a country in which there 
are no minorities...” (Alfredsson and de Zayas, 1993: 6).
Thus, the imprecise definition provided state parties with “escape” possibilities 
through which they obtained a free hand in putting in force the scope of the article. 
Nonetheless, the absence of definition was not the only weak point in the article. As to be 
understood from its negative formula, its drafters did not want to bind themselves with 
international standards of differential treatment with respect to their minorities. Because 
of this, the article simply urged states to undertake a tolerant policy towards the diverse 
characteristics of their minority peoples. In its minimalist interpretation, this would be 
satisfied with those universal measures of equality and non-discrimination. Unlike the 
group-specific provisions of the League regime, no direct appeal was made to group- 
specific concerns of minorities. It is because of this that whenever the effect of the article 
was recognised, governmental authorities denied granting collective recognition to its 
beneficiaries (Benoit-Rohmer, 1996: 21-22).
However, depending on the same imprecise aspect, it was also inferred from the 
wording that grounds of a genuine equality between majority and minority nationals 
would compel national governments to develop positive conditions facilitating protection
Article 2 o f the French Constitution provided that “France is a Republic, indivisible, secular, democratic 
and social. It shall ensure the equality o f all citizens before the law, without distinction o f origin, race or
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and promotion of minority particularities. It was underlined that since its spirit sought 
establishment of equality both in law and in fact, a broader interpretation of the article 
would enhance universal principles of equality and non-discrimination with group- 
specific rights of differential treatment. It was implicitly admitted that state authorities 
were to refrain from any act which would endanger minorities’ physical and ethno­
cultural existence. It was instead argued, under the implications of the Article 27, that 
persons belonging to minorities were to be provided with appropriate legal-political 
instruments facilitating persistence of their different identities, particularly in the fields of 
educational, cultural and religious matters (Nowak, 1993).
However, the UN Sub-Commission in its mandate intended to ignore implications 
of a broader interpretation in favor of a minimalist approach. In the duration of the Cold 
War period, implementation of the Article 27 remained loyal to the foundational 
philosophy of the UN as it was laid down in its individualist-universalist approaches as 
regards to the field of human rights including minority rights. Because, in opposition to 
group-specific rights, individual human rights was considered by both national and 
international actors compatible with national policies aimed at assimilation of disloyal 
minorities. The practice thus promoted ethno-cultural homogenization came to be 
credited even within the realm of international organisations as a way of overcoming 
troubles associated with minorities (Preece, 1997: 85-87).
To sum up, the UN regime on the issue of minority rights marked a radical 
breakthrough from its predecessor. Leaving aside its broader interpretation, substantive 
framework of the previous regime was almost completely renounced in favour of the 
individualist-universalist conceptualisation of universal human rights. Hence, while the
religion. It shall respect all beliefs” (Alfredson and de Zayas, 1993).
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UN regime expanded the effect of the humanitarian principles at a global level, it largely 
limited its scope in terms of minority rights. The narrow formula of citizenship equality, 
consequently, reduced minority members of national societies to a status of mere 
individuals abstracted from their ethno-cultural circumstances. Therefore, whether it was 
the objective of the regime or not, the UN framework advanced, in concrete 
circumstances, in an assimilationist manner. The ideological confrontation of the cold 
war system, which concerned more with intra-bloc stability, further pushed minority 
questions behind national policies of integration. Because of this, the resurrection of 
minority issues coincided with the demise of the cold war state system.
3.4.3 The UN Post-Cold War Regime: A Substantive Turn
Each massive war, including the Thirty-Years Wars, the Napoleonic Wars, the 
WWI, and the WWII, as was explained, were accompanied by drastic changes in the 
norms, instruments and practices of minority rights regimes. Although it was not a “hot” 
war, the termination of the cold war politics presented no exception to this long-lasting 
tradition. During the last decade, new states came to the scene in Central and Eastern 
Europe but it hardly created any considerable reduction in the number of minorities. 
More than half of these states, instead, contained minority groups in proportions varying 
between 20 to 50 percent. Moreover, despite the fact that they had been frozen within the 
ideological confrontations of the previous decades, minorities and minority claims came 
to surface again seeking, at least, substantive equality and ethno-cultural protection 
within the new national and international order. Under these circumstances, individualist- 
universalist legacy of the UN acts seemed insufficient to meet minority expectations.
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Taking into account growing nature of minority-related conflicts and antagonisms, the
UN Secretary-General, for example, proclaimed in 1992:
One requirement for solutions to these problems lies in commitment to human rights with a 
special sensitivity to those o f  minorities, whether ethnic, religious, social or linguistic. The 
League o f Nations provided a machinery for the international protection o f minorities. The 
General Assembly will soon have before it a declaration on the rights of minorities. That 
instrument, together with the increasingly effective machinery of the United Nations dealing 
with human rights, should enhance the situation o f  minorities as well as the stability o f  states 
(emphasis was added) (Alfredsson and de Zayas, 1993: 1).
This indicated the fact that following the League example, by the fall of the cold 
war system, there appeared within the UN an urgent need to revise its essentially 
universalist-individualist approaches in the field of humanitarian acts in favor of “human 
rights with a special sensitivity to those of minorities”. With this new concern, the UN 
General Assembly recognised that there was a need “to ensure even more effective 
implementation of international human rights instruments with regard to the rights of 
persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities.” It was in this 
context that associating “ the situation of minorities” with the “stability of states”, the UN 
General Assembly, for the first time, attributed a direct concern to the issue of minority 
protection and resolved in 1992 a specific declaration on the rights of ethno-cultural, 
linguistic and religious minorities. Having adopted in 1992 the UN Declaration on the 
Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 
(hereafter the UN Declaration), the General Assembly revisited the comprehensive 
framework of the League regime (UN, 1993b).
Formulated in a detailed and substantive manner, the Declaration attempted to 
reconcile the rights of individuals, minorities and that of states. To this end, individualist- 
universalist wording of the UN human rights instruments was reinterpreted progressively 
and in a broader sense so as to take into account group-specific circumstances of minority
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peoples. It was affirmed that the UN context had hitherto intended “to promote and 
encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction 
as to race, sex, language or religion”. As a logical extension of this historical interest in 
the principles of equality and non-discrimination, it was stated in the Declaration, the UN 
was now ready to go beyond this original stand and undertake “an important role to play 
regarding the protection of minorities”. In doing this, on the one hand, the UN General 
Assembly aimed at granting a substantive protection to ethno-cultural and religious 
minorities that would “contribute to the political and social stability of states in which 
they live.” On the other hand, it was expected that a broader fi'amework of minority rights 
would sustain “development of society as a whole and within a democratic framework 
based on the rule of law” which, in turn, facilitates “strengthening of friendship and 
cooperation among peoples and states” (preamble).
Therefore, in conformity with the basic objectives of this radical turn, the 
individualist colour of the UN humanitarian acts was supplemented with group-specific 
rights of persons belong to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. Because 
of this, the new UN agenda involved strong commitments with regard to the two 
components of minority protection: civil and political equality of citizenship status and 
the differential treatment of minority particularities. In other words, the new UN tendency 
aimed at creating conditions facilitating not only protection but also promotion of 
minority identities. In that respect, exhibiting substantive aspects of the new regime, the 
UN Declaration put emphasis on a number of principles, addressing differential treatment 
of minorities, which included:
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a) right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, to 
use their own language in public and private without external interference or 
any form of discrimination (Art. 2-1).
b) right to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and 
public life (Art. 2-2).
c) right to participate effectively in decisions concerning minorities (Art. 2-3).
d) right to establish and maintain their own associations (Art. 2-4).
e) right to establish free and peaceful contacts, both within and without state, 
with other members of their community and with persons belonging to other 
minorities (Art. 2-5).
f) right to have appropriate conditions to develop their culture, language, 
religion, traditions and customs (4-2).
g) right to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in that language (Art. 
4-3).
It was also added that group-specific provisions would be exercised individually 
or in community with other members of the group concerned. In this way, the UN 
framework regarded beneficiaries of rights as individuals belonging to a minority group. 
No collective definition was incorporated in the dociunent. Yet, different from the earlier 
regimes, potential bearers of rights were also protected against any possible oppression or 
discrimination that would come either from state bodies or minority group itself. In doing 
this, the issue of whether an individual is subject to the effect of rights was left to the free 
discretion of individuals. It was assured that “no disadvantage shall result for any person 
belonging to a minority as the consequence of the exercise or non-exercise of the rights 
set forth in the present Declaration” (Art. 3-2).
Notwithstanding its comprehensive scope, the issue of national implementation is 
not automatic but, in the last instance, it was to be entrusted to national governments. 
Taking into account the shortcomings of the article 27, the document renounced its 
negative language and laid down positive obligations on the part of states to “adopt 
appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve these ends” (Art. 1-2). Apart from 
establishing legal-political grounds through which minorities would benefit from the
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above given rights, it was laid down that governmental policies and programs were to be 
“planned and implemented with due regard for the legitimate interests of persons 
belonging to minorities.” In educational field, for example, state actors were urged to 
“take measures... in order to encourage knowledge of the history, traditions, language and 
culture of the minorities existing within their territory.” At the international level, on the 
other hand, it was stipulated that cooperation and assistance among states would “be 
planned and implemented with due regard for the legitimate interests of persons 
belonging to minorities.”
In so doing, persistence of minority particularities in the field of cultural, religious 
and linguistic affairs was guaranteed at both national and international levels. Most 
significantly, parallel with the League regime, the document reasoned that 
accommodation of minority conditions would by no means be contrasted with the 
principle of citizenship equality. Group-specific measures taken by the national 
authorities, instead, were formulated and implemented in supplementary way to universal 
human rights of individuals (Art. 83). It was because of this that the Declaration 
incorporated strong commitments to the area of universal rights set forth in other human 
rights documents of the UN including the UDHR. To this end, alongside the differential 
treatment, “where required,” states were to undertake appropriate measures guaranteeing 
full and effective equality of persons belonging to minorities (Art. 4-1). Article 8 (1) of 
the document, for example stated that “the exercise of the rights set forth in the present 
Declaration shall not prejudice the enjoyment by all persons of universally recognised 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.”
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In doing this, the document imposed upon partied states to take positive
obligations allowing and facilitating equal accommodation of ethno-cultural, religious
and linguistic differences. However, having learned much from the failures of the League
regime, which had largely been exploited by nationalist aspirations of both majorities and
minorities, the UN framed a “security clause” in its Declaration. Accordingly, it was
stated that not only state actors but also minorities themselves were to act responsible and
sincere in the implementation process of the group-specific rights. Thus, the Declaration
attempted to balance minority rights against the sovereign rights of states. The scope of
minority rights was, therefore, delimited by states’ sovereign equality, territorial integrity
and political independence. Article 8 (4) of the document provided that:
Nothing in the present declaration may be construed as permitting any activity contrary to the 
purposes and principles o f the United Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial 
integrity and political independence o f states.
Thus, having been aware of the fact that state actors have been reluctant in 
recognising and implementing minority rights in fear of internal upheaval and external 
interference, the document intended to satisfy also their sovereign concerns. This formula 
would make the new scope of minority treatment not only more acceptable in the eyes of 
state parties, but also encourage them in the implementation stage. Perhaps depending on 
this optimism, unlike the League regime, the document did not create national and 
international instruments of implementation and sanctions that would be imposed on 
those states who act reluctantly in implementing the framework of the rights.
To sum up, the comprehensive turn of the UN regime in the 1990s extended its 
humanitarian concern from individual human beings to those persons belonging to 
minorities. Therefore, the regime ceased to regard individuals as abstract beings but 
began to treat them within their ethno-cultural circumstances. In doing this, the UN
125
regime, at least in principle, largely reconciled individualist rights of citizenship status, 
differential rights of minority circumstances and sovereign rights of the partied states.
3.5 Conclusion
Historical evolution of minority rights regime in an interactive way between states 
and international system convinced us to claim that each transformation in the world 
system was accompanied with radical changes in the parameters of the minority rights 
regimes. In particular, massive wars, whether “hot” or “cold”, have induced 
transformative impacts on the national and international norms of minority treatment. 
This is to say, parameters of minority protection would in no way be decided in an 
exhaustive way but have been and are constituted contextually. Time and space have 
effectively constrained both subjects and legal-political borders of minority protection.
Exclusively religious focus of the Westphalian regime, both in subjects and rights, 
was extended, by the late nineteenth century, to a comprehensive regime which 
incorporated ethno-cultural and linguistic differences into national and international 
concern of minority rights. The concept of minority was obtained new meanings as the 
majority component of a national population was described around changing sources of 
identification. The era of the minorities treaties concentrated on the protection and 
promotion of ethno-cultural, religious and linguistic minorities. In spite of geographical 
and definitional limits, the scope of the League regime reconciled universal implications 
of citizenship equality with group-specific dimension of ethno-cultural particularity.
Upon the failure of the League regime, the UN projected a universal system of 
human rights which left almost no room for the issue of minority rights. The issue of
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minority protection was subsumed into general scope of universal human rights. In the 
duration of the cold war, the UN invested little concern on the issue of minority 
protection and content with those minimalist standards of equality and non­
discrimination. No reconciliation between particular rights of minorities and the universal 
rights of citizenship status would be achieved up until the break down of the cold war 
politics. It was by the fall of the eastern bloc that the UN began to revise its originally 
universalist-individualist orientation in favour of a substantive formulation of human 
rights sensitive to the rights of minority peoples.
In the same period, the same winds of transformation hit also the European 
regional organisations, those of the CoE, the OSCE and the EU, all of which gradually 
renounced their cold war silence and came to engage in standardisation acts in the field of 
minority rights. In particular, having faced with civil wars and turbulence in the regions 
of the former Yugoslavia and ethno-religious and linguistic confrontations of eastern 
European’s post-socialist countries, by the early 1990s, regional organizations in Europe 
have developed a network of rights and instruments in respect to national treatment of 
minorities (Miall, 1994). It was this contemporary regime of minority rights that came to 
challenge essential foundations of the Republican minority rights regime. Taking this fact 
into account, the next chapter will elaborate on the emergence and scope of today’s 
minority rights regime prevalent in the contexts of the CoE, the OSCE and the EU.
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CHAPTER IV
MINORITY RIGHTS REGIME IN THE EUROPEAN-REGIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS
The Emergence and the Framework of the post-Cold War Regime
4.1 Introduction
The rise of a new international order has usually prompted establishment of a 
new international regime in the field of minority rights. Parallel with the territorial, 
socio-political, economic or diplomatic transformations, new norms of minority 
treatment have replaced preceding state practices and legal-political designations. 
Two different approaches that appeared in the aftermath of the two world wars 
already presented good examples to this general trend (Preece, 1997: 76).
Given the traditional linkage that existed between revolutionary international 
transformations and the issue of minority rights, I intend to analyze the emergence of 
a new minority rights regime in the context of a new world order established 
following the fall of the eastern bloc.' As international institutions and relations face 
transformative processes, foundational values, codes, rules and norms of the order too 
are subjected to parallel changes. This is what happened in the issue of minority rights 
in Europe following the 1989/90 revolutions.
The collapse of communist regimes, indeed, affected the mode of conduct 
with respect to state-to-citizens, state-to-state and state-to-intemational organisations 
relations. As the “balance of power” politics of the Cold War accompanied with the 
economic, cultural and political waves of globalisation, central role of nation-states in 
organising every aspect of human life began to be questioned more frequently.
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Regional frameworks, dedicated to the establishment of cooperation, coordination and 
maintenance of peace and security, came to the forefront in governing national 
policies. Apart from economic affairs, more and more areas of national policies have 
been involved in the domain of international concern. As was argued before, one of 
the most outstanding domains of international expansion has appeared in the issue of 
creating “humane governance” both in national and international settings (Falk, 1999: 
33-34). Universal standards of human rights, including those of minorities, have come 
to decide international credibility of nation-states (Donnelly, 1998).
Due to its central position in the post-Cold War transformation, the European 
context naturally became the playground of the new order. Facing its maladies, 
regional organizations suddenly found themselves in charge of developing adequate 
standards and mechanisms addressing circumstances of the new order. As the eastern 
communist regimes collapsed by the late 1980s, it broke down the Cold War 
formulations and practices in the realm of minority treatment as well. At this stage, 
putting aside universal orientation of the UN acts, a new understanding of minority 
treatment set in motion in the European regional organizations including the OSCE, 
the CoE, and the EU. It was in this period that the said organizations gave an end to 
the Cold War salience on minority questions and began to promulgate specific 
conventions, charters and declarations on the protection and promotion of minority 
distinctions.
In order to be able to better explain its contemporary implications for the 
Turkish case, this chapter outlines the emergence and the framework of the post-Cold 
War European regime in the field of minority protection. In doing this, I will first 
review the underlying reasons which led the regional organizations to develop a new
' The concept o f  “order” refers to the existence o f a working balance in the distribution o f  power 
among global actors (states, citizens and international organizations) that guarantees stability, peace
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regime. Second, starting from their Cold-War approaches, I will examine the 
development of the new standards of minority treatment in the major regional 
organizations. Third, the chapter will display the post-Cold War framework of the 
minority issues in the continent. It is in this context that major parameters of the new 
regime, those of the minority definition, minority rights, national sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, principles of equality and non-discrimination, will be examined.
4.2 Emergence of a New Order in Europe
Early responses to the collapse of the Eastern Block announced the victory of 
liberal values and institutions over authoritarian and totalitarian forms of politics. 
While speaking just after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which symbolised the Cold War 
ideological demarcations, Boutros-Ghali (1993; 441-442), the Secretary-General of 
the UN, argued;
Two months earlier, the Berlin Wall had fallen, carrying away with it a certain vision o f  
the world, and thereby opening up new perspectives. It was in the name o f freedom, 
democracy and human rights that entire peoples were speaking out. Their determination, 
their abnegation, -sometimes their sacrifices- reflected then, and still reflect, their 
commitment to do away with alienation and totalitarianism.
In Ghali’s view, the pos-Cold war democratic transformation was likely to 
create a national and international order in which human rights would receive 
appropriate respect and protection. He believed that “it is through democracy that 
individual rights and collective rights, the rights of peoples and the rights of persons, 
are reconciled. It is through democracy that the rights of states and the rights of the 
community of states are reconciled” (Boutros-Ghali, 1993: 443).
Notwithstanding expected grounds of this optimism, similar statements were 
made in the period by different sectors of national and international order. Socio­
political revolutions of the post-1989 introduced great opportunities for the
and security on the global stage (Falk, 1999: 29).
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democratic reorganisation of the continent. Yet, this transformation did not proced 
smoothly on the way to establishing a new order of the peaceful co-existence of 
states, nations, and citizens. On the contrary, the new order entailed strong challenges 
having potential to jeopardize expected grounds of optimism. The most immediate 
one was the situation of minorities.
Indeed, the fall of the Cold War accompanied with the re-emergence of 
minority issues. After having been neglected for decades in the ideological 
confrontation of the Cold War years, socio-political and legal position of minorities 
began to receive a renewed interest throughout the European region by the early 
1990s. According to Kymlicka and Norman (2000), the prominent reason of this 
raising interest lied, among others, in the resurrection of ethnic nationalism across 
Europe on the part of both minorities and majorities. One dimension of this ethnic 
resurgence appeared in the national awakening of minority peoples. It suddenly 
became explicit in the aftermath of the 1989/90 revolutions that civic definition of 
individual identity, based on universal equality of citizenship status, came to fall short 
of satisfying nationalist aspirations of minority peoples (Liebich 1996). Minority 
groups, released from long years of repression and manipulation, began to raise 
increasing claims which ranged from equal participation, official recognition, 
territorial autonomy, secession to international protection (Klebes, 1995: 92). 
Secession has particularly become once again a real possibility for those states whose 
population diversified along ethno-lingual and religious identities (Preece, 1997: 88).
The other dimension lied in the fact that democratic transformation of the 
post-communist states resulted, in many cases, in the reemergence of “nationalizing 
states” which attributed greater emphasis to the linguistic, cultural, demographic and 
economic domination of its core ethnie (Brubaker, 1996). Not only civic definition of
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citizenship was discredited, but also those concepts of diversity and pluralism were 
“sacrificed on the altar of nation-building” (Hannum, 1999: 167). By the year 1991, 
soon after they obtained political independence, Baltic States, for example, chose to 
embark a strong political struggle in order to restore dominant position of their ethno- 
linguistic and cultural characteristics. Many “foreign” elements were subjected to 
systematic persecution and discrimination and denied equal citizenship status that 
culminated not only in the outburst of minority conflicts but also massive amounts of 
emigration problems (Poleshchuk, 2001: 1-6).
Baltic States were not alone in this post-Cold War venture of re­
nationalization. The former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, among others, presented 
good examples to nationalist policies rested upon ethno-cultural superiority of a 
dominant nationality. Leaving aside the possibility of plural and multi-cultural co­
existence, both cases celebrated ethnic articulation of legal-political organizations. 
Peaceful partition of Czechoslovakia between two constituent nationalities 
represented a nonviolent renunciation of the plural politics whereas the case of the 
former Yugoslavia, in seeking ethnically homogenous populations, went hand in hand 
with massive practices of “ethnic cleansing”.^
Dramatic consequences of ethnic cleansing and forced deportation proved 
once again that minorities still occupied vulnerable positions in the national 
environments. Taken into account the international dimension of minority questions, 
apart from exacerbating socio-political life internally, this situation was likely to 
undermine international peace and security. In spite of the fact that minority-oriented 
tensions had resulted in the dissolution of several multi-national states, minority
 ^ One-third o f  the Serbs who resided in Crotia were repatriated from this country by the middle o f  
1992. In the same period, approximately half a million people from Serbian minority was displaced 
from Bosnia. The fate o f Muslim minority who resided in Serbian territory was not much different as
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issues were by no means disappeared.^ Because of this, governments came to believe 
that broadening the scope of international standards in the issue of minority protection 
would play a stabilizing role over minority related tensions and violence (Klebes, 
1995: 92). In particular, new standards pertinent to the creation of a balance between 
raising aspirations of minorities and the concerns of majority seemed an urgent need 
(Malinvemi, 1991: 265). It was in this context that national states and international 
organizations began to revise their traditional views and practices in the issue of 
minority rights (Lozinski, 2001).
4.3 New Approaches in the European-Regional Organizations
In the early 1990s, many states in central and Eastern Europe concluded 
bilateral treaties in order to secure protection and promotion of their kin groups 
resident in another state.'* These kinds of endeavours helped to decrease possibility of 
an open friction between the states concerned. It became, therefore, quite evident that 
establishment of a sustainable peace and stability in the new world depended not only 
guaranteeing universal rights of individual citizens but also particular identities of 
ethno-linguistic, religious and cultural distinctions did need equal accommodation. 
Individualist-universalist agenda of the Cold War tradition was to be supplemented 
with group-specific rights. It was in this context that the CoE, the OSCE and the EU 
gradually adopted a substantive framework of minority treatment.
70.000 Muslims out o f 200.000 were forced to leave Sanjak province in the course o f  dissolution (Bell- 
Fialkoff, 1993; Preece, 1998).
 ^ None o f  the sixteen states emerging from communism can be considered ethnically homogeneous. 
The size o f minorities ranges from about 33 per cent in Macedonia, Montenegro and Moldova to 38 per 
cent in Estonia and almost 47 per cent in Latvia. Moreover, only the size o f  Hungarian minority 
counted 2 million in Romania, 600.000 in Slovakia, 400.000 in Serbia, 200.000 in Ukraine, 40.000 in 
Crotia, 16.000 in Austria, and 10.000 in Slovenia (Ijgyarto, 1993: 274).
'' In order to decrease possibility o f  an open friction on the treatment o f kin-minorities, many states 
have concluded bilateral treaties since the fall o f the eastern communist regimes (Gal, 1999).
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4.3.1 Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Having been founded in 1975, the OSCE, formerly the CSCE^, has intended to 
provide an international instrument for the establishment of a pan-European security 
system. The primary interest of the Eastern countries in taking part in such a 
conference was to ensure stability of postwar borders whereas the western states 
wanted to further security and humanitarian issues (Wright, 1996: 191). Thus, the 
western support was conditioned, among others, on the inclusion of human rights 
issues in the agenda of the conference (OSCE, 1999: 7).
Human rights agenda of the organisation, including those rights of persons 
belonging to minority groups, took shape under the constraining influence of two 
factors. On the first hand, depending on the ideological confrontation of the Cold War 
system, principles of “sovereign equality” and “non-interference” weighed human 
rights concerns. Participant states often denied international obligations relating to 
minority rights. On the other hand, the OSCE agenda on minority rights intended to 
avoid mistakes of the interim practices that had facilitated expansionist desires of 
nationalist regimes. Under these circumstances, state authorities convinced that both 
national and international stability required strong state apparatuses against divisive 
impacts of minority distinctions. The interim idea of “minority protection” was, 
therefore, conceded to a general imderstanding which called, in reverse, for 
“protection from minorities” (Girasoli, 1995: 25-26).
Notwithstanding these foundational concerns, the OSCE’s humanitarian 
dimension has vested a specific interest in the issue of minority protection. The
 ^ Since the time o f its formation, the OSCE has been transformed from a serious o f  conferences to a 
permanent and institutionalised arrangement. In conformity with its foundational objectives and 
working processes, the Organisation has been named as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE). However, by the institutionalisation o f the Conference mechanism, it was decided in 
the first Review Conference in Budapest (1994) that as o f  1 January 1995 the CSCE would be renamed 
the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (OSCE, 1999: 15-16).
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minority question in the context of the OSCE process should be examined, however, 
in view of two definite stages. The first stage is the minimalist framework of the 
Helsinki Final Act which, bom in the constraining atmosphere of ideological 
confrontations, delimited minority questions with a universalist-individualist 
framework of citizenship equality and non-discrimination. The second stage started 
when the OSCE attempted to meet the challenges which resulted fi'om the collapse of 
the eastern communist regimes. In this sense, the Copenhagen Document (1990) 
marked the end of the Cold War regime of minority rights (Benoit-Rohmer, 1996: 
56). It was by the new document that moving away from its minimalist approach, the 
OSCE began to develop a substantive framework which sought not only protection 
but also promotion of ethno-cultural particularities.
4.3.1.1 Helsinki Process: Equality and Non-Discrimination
The Cold War regime of minority protection in the context of the OSCE acts 
evolved along the guiding principles of the Helsinki Final Act.^ Provisions of the Act, 
laid down within three main chapters or “baskets”, in general, concerned:
I. Questions relating to security in Europe: respect for sovereign equality, 
refraining from the threat or use of force; inviolability of frontiers; 
territorial integrity of states; peaceful settlement of disputes; and non­
intervention in internal affairs.
II. Cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and 
the environment.
III. Cooperation in humanitarian and other fields.
The OSCE undertook a multi-dimensional approach to the questions of peace, 
security, economics and hxunan rights protection. The principles extended the 
legitimate scope of inter-state cooperation to the issue of human rights, including 
those sets of rights relating to the protection of minorities. The issue of human rights.
 ^ After a series o f preliminary works, 35 participant states, from both Western and Eastern blocs, 
agreed on the terms o f the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 (for the full text see, OSCE Act, 1993).
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in particular, ceased to be belong exclusively to the internal affairs but became a 
legitimate concern to all participating states (OSCE, 1999; 11-12).
However, it is too early to think that the Final Act opened internal position of 
minority conditions to a system of international scrutiny. On the contrary, sovereign 
rights of participating states, documented in those principles of “territorial integrity”, 
“sovereign equality”, “non-interference” and “political independence” largely 
constrained the OSCE principles. In other words, state interests weighed peoples’ 
concerns, including those of minorities that blocked international interference in their 
internal affairs. Under these circumstances, state parties retained their capacity to 
deny international criticisms in their practices of minority rights.
Domination of state interests was a weakness of the system. Another weakness
lied in the formulation of the minority rights. Obviously, following individualist
principles of the UN conventions, particularly Article 27 of the CCPR, the Helsinki
Final Act adopted a negative formulation that urged no positive obligation on state
parties to create political and legal guarantees of distinct treatment. Having satisfied
with the universal equality of citizenship status, the issue of minority protection did
not go beyond minimalist scope of equality and non-discrimination. The principle VII
of the Final Act laid down this minimalist attitude in the following way:
The participating states on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right 
o f  persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the 
full opportunity for the actual enjoyment o f human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.
The wording is clear enough that apart from the equal treatment of persons 
belonging to minority groups, no appeal was made to the second aspect of minority 
rights that called for differential treatment in ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural 
matters. Staying within the universal agenda of the individual human rights, despite
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minorities were specifically mentioned, the issue of minority protection was delimited 
by minimalist concepts of equality and non-discrimination.
The document did not involve any definition of the concept of minority. The 
effect of the principles centered on those “participating states on whose territory 
national minorities exist”. It was acknowledged that nothing but the discretion of 
nation-states would decide whether they involved minorities or not. Thus, without 
paying attention to objective or subjective constituents of minority identity, national 
government would easily follow their political considerations in depicting minority 
peoples resident on their territory. The article provided national authorities with the 
rights to deny the application of the principle in their internal affairs.
Notwithstanding minimalist approach embedded in its minority provision, 
individualist framework of the Helsinki Final Act drew the limits of minority rights 
regime in the context of the OSCE process in the duration of the Cold War years. 
Individual-oriented view overwhelmingly dominated the follow-up meetings of the 
human dimension mechanisms (Wright, 1996: 193-196).^ It was not before the early 
1990s that the OSCE moved away from the equality/non-discrimination packages into 
a comprehensive formula of minority treatment.
4.3.1.2 The Legacy of the Copenhagen Document: Equality Within Diversity
Coinciding with the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the post-1945 individualist- 
universalist tradition of minority protection ceased to define political and legal 
borders of minority rights in the framework of the OSCE. The new regime favored 
substantive formulations which, in addition to universal measures of citizenship 
equality, took into account particular circumstances of minority groups. In other
’ The Follow-up Conferences o f  the OSCE’s human dimension mechanism took place in Belgrade 
(1978), Madrid (1980-1983), and Vienna (1986-1989).
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words, the idea of universal rights came to be reconciled with group-specific aspects 
of minority issues. Unlike widely accepted norms of preceding decades, a clear line 
gradually arose between the notion of equal treatment and that of the unanimous 
treatment. Thus, as the Cold War world system withered away, first examples of the 
post-Cold War standards of minority treatment came into being. The concluding 
document of the Copenhagen meeting (June, 1990), that is the Copenhagen Document 
(hereafter CD), marked the new frame of humanitarian orientation in the OSCE works 
(Copenhagen Document, 1990).
The Copenhagen meeting was the first OSCE meeting to take place after the 
demise of the Cold War regimes. Because of this, the participants no longer 
represented monolithic blocs of ideological confrontation during which “no such 
words would have been allowed into any CSCE document” as Buergenthal (1990: 
221) rightly observed. In the meeting, the participant states reflected the spirit of the 
transformation and anticipated new problems and challenges. The drafters of the new 
regime acted more courageous in drawing its legal and political borders. Many 
shortcomings of the Cold War regime as it related to the issue of minority protection 
were to a significant extent superseded (Buergenthal, 1990).
Indeed, minority rights policy of the OSCE, was subjected to fundamental 
transformation in the provisions of the CD. For the first time since its emergence, the 
said instmment ceased to make brief references in the general wording of concluding 
documents and assigned a full chapter to the issue of minority rights. Going beyond 
those conventional principles of equality and non-discrimination, the said chapter 
incorporated provisions comprehensively addressing distinct position of minorities. 
Concerning the latter, the document interested not only in granting group-specific 
rights but also formulated legal-political instruments in which the granted rights
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would be implemented. To this end, the CD obliged partied states to create 
appropriate conditions in which national accommodation of minority distinctions 
would be secured in an environment of citizenship equality. For doing this, the 
document adhered to the ideals of democracy, political pluralism and the rule of law 
(preamble). In response to totalitarian and authoritarian forms of Eastern European 
countries, the CD drew an image of democratic Europe in which human rights, 
including distinct rights of those peoples who belong to ethnic, religious, linguistic 
and/or cultural minorities, would receive due respect (Art. 30).
Pluralist democracy was expected to guarantee different existence of 
minorities within the universal terms of citizenship equality. It was in this sense that 
the language of the OSCE document went beyond human rights/non-discrimination 
package of the Helsinki process. In order to achieve effective equality, apart from 
equal citizenship rights, minorities were granted legal, administrative, educational and 
cultural instruments of differential treatment whenever it was deemed necessary for 
the protection of minority identity. Accordingly, the new OSCE context confirmed 
that persons belonging to national minorities “have the right to freely express, 
preserve, and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity and to 
maintain and develop their culture” (Art. 32).
The principles contained in the document raised a new understanding in the 
OSCE that has determined minority rights agenda of its succeeding meetings. Not 
long after, the minority provisions of the CD took an official recognition from 
member countries. In its following months (November 1990), the European 
governments admitted principles of the CD in Paris as the basis of the “new Europe”. 
The Charter o f Paris for a New Europe (OSCE Charter, 1993) considered the issue 
human rights protection, including those rights of minorities, among prominent
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responsibilities of governments, the form of which was to be “representative” and 
“pluralist” democracy. Having established a close connection between democratic 
government and effective protection of fundamental human rights, the European 
leaders expressed their full conviction to build a pluralist democracy as “the best 
safeguard of freedom of expression, tolerance of all groups of society, and equality of 
opportunity for each person”.
The Charter attributed also a particular attention to the issue of minority 
protection. As concerned the consolidation of a sustainable peace, justice, stability 
and a plural democracy, the question of minority protection was regarded an 
indispensable element. Because of this, the document put a special emphasis on the 
fact that “human rights and fundamental freedoms are the basis for the protection and 
promotion of rights of persons belonging to national minorities”. However, it was no 
longer the individualist legacy of the Cold War years but the emerging norms of the 
new Europe that became most influential on drawing the scope of minority rights. 
Going beyond universal human rights/non-discrimination packages, it was affirmed 
by the participating leaders that:
...the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity o f national minorities will be 
protected and that persons belonging to national minorities have the right freely to 
express, preserve and develop that identity without any discrimination and in full equality 
before the law...ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity o f  national minorities be 
protected and conditions fo r  the promotion o f  that identity be created (emphasis was 
added).
Apart from citizenship equality, the leaders expressed their conviction to 
creating legal-political conditions allowing free expression, preservation and 
development of minority identities. It was this effective accommodation of ethno- 
linguistic, religious and cultural distinctions indicated, at the same time, that the issue 
of minority protection should have been thought in association with the pluralist 
settlement of democratic structures. The Charter, in this respect, added that questions
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related to national minorities would only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic 
political framework. Because of this, the document considered that “rights of persons 
belonging to national minorities must be fully respected as part of universal human 
rights.. .respect for them is an essential safeguard against an over-mighty state”.
The rationale of the relational link established between pluralist democracy 
and minority protection was subsequently clarified in the Geneva Report o f the CSCE 
Meeting o f Experts on National Minorities in July 1991 (OSCE Report, 1993). 
Having been formulated in conformity with the provisions of the CD, the Report put 
explicit emphasis on the minority-inclusive form of democracy and introduced it as a 
framework which “guarantees full respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, equal rights and status for all citizens, including persons belonging to 
national minorities, the free expression of all their legitimate interests and aspirations, 
political pluralism, social tolerance...”. Parallel to the CD, the Report fostered the 
development of a pluralist democracy tolerant of political-legal expression and 
institutionalisation of minority distinctions.
Apart from national accommodation of minority distinctions, the new OSCE 
context concerned international aspects of minority issues as well. To this end, in 
order to meet “The Challenges of Change”, the OSCE Helsinki Meeting (1992) 
decided to establish the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) (OSCE, 
1999: 93-97). The mandate of the HCNM was to inform the competent OSCE 
institutions about tensions involving national minorities at an earliest possible stage. It 
was expected that depending on this information, the OSCE would provide “early 
warning or an early act in regard to tensions involving national minority issues which 
have not yet developed beyond an early warning stage” (OSCE Helsinki, 1993).
141
Having limited its mandate to a security concern of “early warning”, the 
HCNM failed in undertaking a larger role in standardizing minority rights practices in 
the participant states (Heintze, 2000). Despite this failure in creating an instrument of 
active involvement in minority related issues over the OSCE area of concern, the CD 
with its succeeding instrument of the Paris Charter indeed created a breakthrough in 
the OSCE’s tradition with regard to the minority rights issue. Contrary to the 
minimalist attitude of previous decades, plural accommodation of minority 
differences has been accepted prevalent norm of democratic governance. It came to be 
considered in the OSCE area that “in states with national minorities, democracy 
requires that all persons, including those belonging to national minorities, enjoy full 
and effective equality of rights and fundamental freedoms”. It is this legacy that has 
been influential up to present day on the minority-related acts of the organisation. The 
Budapest meeting of the OSCE, for example, noted in 1994 that “the protection of 
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, is an 
essential foundation of democratic civil society. Neglect of these rights, in severe 
cases, contributed to extremism, regional instability and conflict” (OSCE, 1994).
As was pointed out earlier, the OSCE was the first international organisation 
in giving a due response to meet revolutionary changes of the 1990s that occurred in 
Eastern Europe. One of the most brilliant aspects of this response was the radical turn 
that happened in the standard-setting acts of the organisation in the issue of minority 
rights. However, these standards, from the legal point of view, were merely in the 
form of political commitments without having force of direct national 
implementation. Yet, it must be noted that the OSCE’s new regime contributed much 
to the emergence and spread of new norms in the region in the realm of minority 
protection. An immediate example was the paralleling legislation that has been
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adopted in the context of the CoE which considerably fulfilled legal weaknesses of 
the OSCE acts.
4.3.2 Council of Europe (CoE)
At the end of the WWII, there emerged a general consensus in Europe that 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms was the only basis on which 
peace and democratic stability would more strongly be assured (Weil, 1963: 804- 
805). To this end, the CoE was established in 1949 as an interstate regional body. 
Soon after its foundation, following humanitarian standards of the UN UDHR, the 
CoE began to work on a European Convention on the Protection o f Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The Convention was signed on 4 November 
1950, and came into force on 3 September 1953 (ECHR, 1993).
However, having been developed under the circumstances of the Cold War 
era, the CoE traditionally struck with individual human rights and non-discrimination 
measures and attributed almost no direct and specific attention to the issue of minority 
rights (Weil, 1963: 824). The drafters considered universal human rights as an 
appropriate measure in protecting democratic institutions against destabilising 
sabotages of minorities (Weil, 1963: 805). The Convention, therefore, sided with the 
then prevailing language of human rights protection. The document contained 
universalist-individualist rights and freedoms including, among others, prohibition of 
torture, slavery, the right to personal liberty, the guarantee of a fair trial, the right to 
respect for private and family life, the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
the freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and assoeiation. National governments 
were not obliged to undertake specific obligations addressing protection and 
promotion of minority identities (Weil, 1963: 804-827).
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This Cold War neglect remained prominent norm of human rights protection 
in the context of the CoE up until the 1990s. It was by the collapse of the bipolar 
world system that though the ECHR maintained individualist orientation, following 
the OSCE’s humanitarian acts, the CoE began to invest greater interest in particular 
circumstances of minorities. Given this two staged process, in order to better see its 
implications on the Europe’s new minority rights regime, I will first outline the roots 
and evolution of the minority protection in the context of the CoE. This will reveal 
the universal-individualist focus that dominated human rights concerns of the Council 
till the breakthrough of the 1990s. The second stage will exhibit minority sensitive 
legislation of the last decade developed within the CoE organs.
4.3.2.1 The Universalist Focus of the ECHR
In the duration of the Cold-War years, individualist perspective governed
standard-setting acts of the CoE with respect to both universal human rights and
minority rights. However, it would be inaccurate to conclude by looking at the
provisions of the ECHR that the relevance of minority question was completely
omitted in its drafting process. The elaboration of the ECHR, instead, faced several
proposals of specific guarantees facilitating individuals to enjoy their own culture,
language, schools, and religions. Lannung’s address presented a good example to the
early interest of the Council in the field of minority protection. Having taken into
account adverse role of minority disputes in establishing a sustainable peace and
stability in the region, the Danish delegate addressed:
When we are dealing with human rights, we should stress the very important point that 
human rights should also include national minority rights and their protection. Important 
aspects are protected through the fundamental human rights, such as freedom of speech 
and expression, freedom o f association and assembly, etc. But it is necessary to extend, 
supplement and elaborate in order that national minorities may secure the right to a free 
national life and protection against persecution and encroachment on account o f their 
national convictions, aspirations and activities (Hillgruber and Jestaedt, 1994: 13).
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In this statement, Lannung underlined the fact that individual human 
rights/non-discrimination package would secure minorities with universal standards of 
human rights, but the task of protecting minority distinctions would still seek specific 
rights going beyond universal definitions. In other words, the principle of equality 
embedded in the concept of universal citizenship was to be supplemented with group- 
specific rights emanating from membership of a minority group (Rady, 1996; 54). The 
proposal, hence, sought a formula which would ensure protection and promotion of 
minority differences without violating equal citizenship status of minority peoples.
The Lannung’s cause received an immediate advocate from some other 
delegates as well (Hillgruber and Jesteadt, 1994). However, under the fresh influence 
of the interim years, even making slight references to the condition of minorities was 
considered unacceptable. Group-specific treatment was regarded contrary to those 
state interests of national unity and territorial integrity. Because of this, though it was 
admitted that minority individuals would be allowed to express their views, it was 
also insisted that rights and freedoms would be curtailed, among others, for the sake 
of national and territorial integrity (Hillgruber and Jesteadt, 1994: 17).*
Under these circumstances, the issue of minority protection was limited in the 
document with those minimalist measures of equality and non-discrimination. In 
association with a general provision of non-discrimination, the Convention embodied 
only a single reference to the question. Article 14 stipulated that “the enjoyment of the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention” would be implemented in the 
national settings “without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour.
* Article 10 o f the ECHR recognized: “the exercise o f  these freedoms...may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests o f national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention o f disorder or crime..
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language, religion.. .national or social origin, association with a national minority...". 
From this point of view, the ECHR was concerned not with promoting minority 
peculiarities but with the issue of protecting those persons who belonged to minority 
groups against discrimination. In so doing, the formulation of the Convention 
assimilated the issue of ethno-cultural distinctions into a general scope of universal 
human rights.
Obviously, the major focus of the ECHR fell on guaranteeing equal and non- 
discriminatory treatment, particularly, in exercising rights and freedoms set forth in 
the Convention. However, this wording carried a danger of unanimous treatment 
contrary to the diversity of social reality. Concerned with this aspect, Gillbert (1992: 
86; Gilbert, 1999) argued that treating essentially different groups on an identical 
ground might still be discriminatory in the sense of achieving an effective equality 
between the members of majority and minority sections of population. In his opinion, 
despite the fact that individual-oriented language of the ECHR provided significant 
guarantees on individual equality, it lacked measures of differential treatment that 
would urge partied states to create legal-political conditions pertinent to the 
promotion of minority distinctions. Under these circumstances, Gilbert observed that 
though the acts of non-discrimination would be avoided, one would easily be denied 
the right to assert his cultural, linguistic or religious identity.
Nevertheless, it was also admitted that a broader interpretation of the non­
discrimination measures would facilitate ethno-cultural accommodation. Due to fact 
that the spirit of the ECHR intended to expand democratic principles, a partied state 
would enact certain measures in order to safeguard linguistic, religious or cultural 
peculiarities of its minority citizens. According to this argument, although the ECHR 
did not urge, a partied state would go beyond simple interpretation of non-
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discrimination measure through implementing specific arrangements pertinent to the 
recognition and promotion of minority identities. It was in this context that the 
practice of differential treatment was considered not to violate the ECHR’s universal 
orientation but thought to have been seeking effective equality between majority and 
minority citizens (Gilbert, 1992: 81-93).
Some progresses in the direction had already been achieved in the duration of 
the Cold War years (Gilbert, 1999: 56-61). Having been inspired with the Lannung 
reports, the Assembly of the CoE, for example, adopted in 1961 the Recommendation 
285 which drew attention to the issue of safeguarding peculiar identities of minority 
peoples in the cultural, linguistic and religious policies of the member states. To this 
end, the Recommendation examined the possibility of creating an additional protocol 
on the rights of national minorities not covered in the Convention.^ But, the 
Committee of Experts insisted on the adequate capacity of the non-discrimination 
measures and came to an agreement in 1973 that it was not legally necessary to 
legislate a special provision on minority protection (CoE Memorandum, 1995: para. 
2). Consequently, humanitarian acts, within the CoE context of minority protection, 
continued to deny recognition of minorities and specific formulation of minority 
rights till the radical turn of the 1990s.
4.3.2.2 The Innovative Breakthrough of the Post-Cold War Regime
The individualist attitude of the CoE organs underwent a revolutionary 
transformation by the early 1990s. It was by the start of the period that the CoE acts 
began to progress towards comprehensive formulation addressing not only protection
’ The Recommendation 285 (1961) worded: “persons belonging to a national minority shall not be 
denied the right, in community with the other members o f  their group, and as far as compatible with 
public order, to enjoy their own culture, to use their own language, to establish their schools and
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but also promotion of minority differences. Thus, going beyond universal human 
rights/non-discrimination packages, the CoE’s standard-setting acts began to take into 
account specific and different conditions of minority peoples. Having faced post-Cold 
War ethnic problems, it had become evident that individualist-universal view of the 
CoE standards would no longer meet contemporary claims of minority citizens. Under 
these circumstances, parallel to the latest acts of the UN and the OSCE, the CoE too 
started to give a parallel response to the post-Cold War order.
Indeed, the resurrection of minority issues took a prominent place in the CoE 
acts in guiding the democratic transformation of the continent. In the context of the 
CoE, the European Commission for Democracy through was the first in
developing a minority-related instrument. The Commission drafted, in March 1991, a 
Proposal for a European Convention for the Protection o f Minorities (hereafter the 
Draft Convention) (Draft Convention, 1991). Having attributed greater value to the 
“cultural diversity within European states” and “considering that adequate solution to 
the protection of minorities in Europe is an essential factor for democracy, justice, 
stability and peace”, the Draft Convention pointed out that there was a necessity for 
“an effective protection of the rights of minorities and of persons belonging to these 
minorities” (preamble, para. 6, 9, 10). Departing from individualist tradition, hence, 
protection and promotion of minority distinctions was directly associated with the 
framework of a democratic governance. In addition, following the OSCE standards, 
the issue of minority rights began to be considered “a fundamental component of the
receive teaching in the language o f  their choice or to profess and practice their own religion” (CoE 
Memorandum, 1995: para. 1).
The Commission was established by the Committee o f the Ministers o f  the Council o f Europe in 
March 1990, just after the fall o f the Berlin Wall, and has played a leading role in guiding 
constitutional changes in Eastern Europe towards building o f  democracy, human rights and the rule o f  
law. Concerned with the latest transformation in Eastern Europe, though established by the Council o f  
Europe, the Venice Commission was opened also to the participation o f those eastern European states 
who were not yet members o f  the Council o f  Europe.
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international protection of human rights” and it was admitted that the question “falls 
within the scope of international cooperation” (Art. 1).
The Draft Convention intended to guide democratic transformation in the 
eastern European states. In this sense, the work of the Commission remained a by­
product of the CoE activities and entailed no binding nature in implementation. The 
mere advantage of the document was the fact that the principle of minority protection 
would theoretically be extended to the non-member states who displayed will to 
comply with the human rights standards of the CoE (Klebes, 1993: 141). That is why, 
despite the Draft Convention exhibited innovative transformation within the CoE 
context, new standards came to the surface only after the Committee of Ministers 
adopted, on 5 November 1992, the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages (hereafter the European Charter) (CoE Charter 1996).
Developed under the impacts of democratic transformations, the Charter 
aimed at creating a compromise between state interests and minority rights. To this 
end, the provisions set forth the principle that state concerns on territorial integrity 
and national sovereignty should not be conceived in contravention with the 
persistence of minority languages. By contrast, drafters of the document admitted that 
heritage of minority languages would be safeguarded within the framework of 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity that was significant in “building of a 
Europe based on the principles of democracy and cultural diversity”. To this end, the 
Charter promoted plural formulation of educational policies. Although the existence 
of an official language was considered unquestionable, monolithic application of the 
linguistic policies was discredited. The Charter insisted, instead, on “the value of 
interculturalism and multilinguism”. As will be explained shortly, governments were
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compelled to facilitate establishments of legal grounds through which minority 
peoples would have capacity to learn and be learned in their mother tongues.
Unlike the assimilationist aspects of the Cold-War decades, the CoE’s Charter 
credited persistence of minority languages. Yet, humanitarian dimension of the CoE 
still lacked in legislating a legal instmment on the protection of minority distinctions 
that would no longer be neglected under the constraints and possibilities of the post- 
Cold War period. A new process was, therefore, initiated in 1993 within the CoE with 
an objective of updating individualist scope of the ECHR on the question of minority 
rights. To this end, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council adopted the 
Recommendation 1201 (CoE Recommendation, 1993). It was in this document that 
“considering that the international protection of the rights of minorities is an essential 
aspect of the international protection of human rights”, the Assembly charged the 
Committee of Ministers with a task of drawing up an additional protocol on the rights 
of minorities to the ECHR. It is worth to note here that minority protection was 
required to take place in the form of an additional protocol because, the ECHR has 
long maintained a tested experience in the legal supervision of human rights. In the 
context of the ECHR, an additional protocol would provide persons belonging to 
minority groups with a legal instrument to remedy acts of violation."
However, it was bound to remain in the status of a mere parliamentary 
recommendation without having legally binding force unless was ratified by the 
Committee of Ministers (Klebes, 1993: 140). But, the Recommendation did not find 
an immediate response in the Committee. Bearing in mind deeper implications of a 
legal instrument, ministers refrained from drafting an additional protocol on minority
“ The final opinion o f  the Parliamentary Assembly highlighted the fact that “through the inclusion in 
the European Convention on Human Rights o f certain rights o f persons belonging to minorities as well 
as organisations entitled to represent them, such persons could benefit from the remedies offered by the
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rights. Nevertheless, the CoE member came to an agreement in its Vienna Summit 
(1993) that a specific instrument on minority circumstances must be devised to meet 
the challenges of the new period.*^ In place of an additional protocol, however, taking 
into account its political flexibility, the CoE organs opted in 1994 for a separate 
instrument of the Framework Convention for the Protection o f National Minorities 
(hereafter the Framework Convention) (CoE Framework, 1995).
The Framework Convention indeed became a breakthrough in the CoE context 
with regard to the issue of minority protection. The principles of the document largely 
inspired from the post-Cold War standards of the OSCE and the UN. In this sense, the 
Framework Convention represented one of the latest responses given to the 
ramifications of the minority-related issues of the post-Cold War European heritage.'^ 
The main objective of the Convention was “to ensure...the effective protection of 
national minorities and of the rights and freedoms of persons belonging to those 
minorities, within the rule of law, respecting the territorial integrity and national 
sovereignty of states”.
Thus, the Framework Convention was the “Copenhagen Document” of the 
CoE in the sense that it signified the beginning of a new legal era in the Council acts. 
Indeed, going beyond individualist and universal orientation of the ECHR, the 
document advanced a comprehensive approach in the issue of minority rights. 
Contrary to the minimalist framework of the ECHR, rights and obligations set forth in 
the Convention made a clear distinction between the notion of “equal treatment” and 
that of the “unanimous treatment” . The Framework Convention has sought creation of
convention, particularly the right to submit applications to the European Commission and Court o f  
Human Rights” (Benoit-Rohmer, 1996: 112).
The Vienna Summit, to this end, charged the CoE organs “to draft with minimum delay a framework 
convention specifying the principles which contracting parties commit themselves to respect, in order 
to ensure the protection o f  national minorities” (CoE Memorandum, 1995: para. 5).
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“a Europe, united in its diversity”. In so doing, its provisions largely undermined the 
long-lasting perception and practices that state and nation, citizenship and nationality 
were synonymous (O’Riagain, 1999).
The Convention promoted the idea that contemporary form of democratic 
governance would have to reconcile the principle of citizenship equality with the 
group-specific treatment of minority circumstances. It was in this sense that the 
Convention highlighted the fact that measures of minority protection should no longer 
be confined to general scope of non-discriminatory measures but integrated into legal- 
political conditions through which minority identity would be freely expressed, 
preserved and promoted. To this end, democratic governance was closely associated 
with the free and equal accommodation of minority differences. An increasing 
emphasis was placed on the idea that “a pluralist and genuinely democratic society 
should not only respect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of each 
person belonging to national minority, but also create appropriate conditions enabling 
them to express, preserve and develop this identity”.
To sum up, human rights standards of the CoE, including rights of those 
persons belonging to minority groups, originally took shape under the circumstances 
of the Cold War politics and fresh memories of the WWII experiences. The area of 
minority rights was limited to those minimalist measures of citizenship equality and 
non-discrimination. Individualist-universalist scope of the ECHR governed minority 
rights regime of the CoE throughout the Cold War era. It was only by the collapse of 
eastern bloc that the CoE’s humanitarian dimension began to take steps in the 
direction of legislating a framework of diversity within unity. The Framework 
Convention has drawn prevailing borders of minority rights in the CoE context.
Its Preamble stated three sources o f inspiration for drafting the Convention; the ECHR, the CSCE 
Copenhagen Document, and the UN Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or
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4.3.3. European Union (EU) and the Minority Protection
In comparison to the OSCE, CoE and the UN, the EU has long remained silent 
on the issue of minority rights. According to Toggenburg (2000), this institutional 
attitude has several reasons. To begin with, despite the fact that it displayed political 
aspects from its outset, integration process of the EU has largely rested on economic 
considerations. Because of this, central organs of the Union did not need to intervene 
in political or cultural affairs of the member states. Next was the impossibility of 
achieving a consensus on legislating general standards relating to the issue of minority 
rights. Third, supranational nature of the community law rendered centrally 
inaugurated standards of minority rights more dangerous for the member states. 
Depending on these reasons, in the words of Toggenburg, “an initial commitment on 
minority issues seems to be, politically spoken, more difficult than in a traditional 
international context”. This was what happened in reality. Untill the early 1990s, not a 
single treaty of the Community involved any provision devoted to the protection and 
promotion of minority rights.
In explaining international practices of human rights policies, Frank (1997: 
182) noted that Western states have concerned exclusively with the observance of 
human rights in the third countries rather than taking them seriously at home. In 
particular, taking into account double standards that existed between West and the 
Rest in furthering respect for human rights, he added that “intervention on behalf of 
human rights resembles the Mississippi River: it only flows from North to South”. 
The EU policy too attributed a similar pattern in the 1990s. Almost no coherent form 
of minority rights regime has occurred within the realm of the EU acts. Even after it
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.
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gave a closer attention to the issue in the 1990s, the EU organs opted to make a clear 
distinction between internal and external minorities. In doing this, despite the Union 
has appropriated a rather ambiguous attitude in regard to those minorities existed 
within its borders, there has been developed a more obvious approach in recognizing 
minority rights outside the EU. For the former, the EU and the member states 
continued to undertake individualist and universalist understanding of human rights 
obligations without ever having committed themselves to the protection and 
promotion of distinct minority identities.''* Barrowing from Frank’s analogy, it seems 
rights to state that the issue of minority rights in the context of the EU has resembled 
more the Danube River: it has flowed from West to the East in the region. The EU’s 
new regime of minority protection should, therefore, be elaborated in light of two 
separate dimensions of its internal and external minorities.
4.3.3.1. The £U and Internal Minorities
As was given above, due to overwhelming economic orientation, the EU has 
remained for a long time indifferent to minority questions. The regulation of minority 
rights within member states has been considered a task vested in the sovereign 
competence of national governments. It was because of this that the most active organ 
of the Union in dealing with the issue has become the EU Parliament which retained 
no competence to enact legislative acts legally binding on the acts of member 
governments. Because of this, though several reports relating to the regulation of
Under the impact o f the Cold War regime, the French government, for example, signed the European 
Charter for Regional and Minority Languages in 1999. However, insisting on “unity o f the people, 
indivisibility o f the Republic and the official status o f the French language’, the Conseil 
Constitutionnel nullified the act for considering any act o f  granting group-specific rights to any group 
defined by its origin, culture, language or religion in contravention with the principles o f the Republic 
(Oellers-Frahm, 1999).
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minority rights and freedoms has been communicated within the Parliament, they all 
were destined to failure without acquiring legally binding force.
In place of legal formulations, the EU has constantly been concerning 
internally with the issue of minority protection in a form of cultural programs outside 
the domain of political affairs. Linguistic rights of minority peoples living in the 
member states, for example, were entrusted to the interest of an NGO which is known 
as the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (EBLUL). Having been founded 
in 1982, the EBLUL devoted its task to the protection and promotion of more than 
fifty million peoples in the EU, speaking more than thirty different regional languages 
(Eblul). The mandate of the Bureau have received financial support from the EU 
budget and was charged with a research program, the so-called MERCATOR, which 
developed in parallel with the EU and CoE policies addressing protection of 
minorities, equal citizenship and the promotion of linguistic diversity. The charge, 
which was taken over, in 1994, by the European Commission, was carried out through 
studies and seminars conducted on those general minority issues ranging from 
bilingualism, education, media and legal legislation (Mercator).
Although these cultural acts brought little change to the legal status of 
minorities within the EU and the member states, they have indicated presence of a 
growing interest in the EU context given to the value of linguistic and cultural 
diversity. Parallel to the developments in the Eastern Europe that induced an 
immediate transformation in the acts of both the CoE and the OSCE, this EU interest 
too further increased. It was under these circumstances that traditionally indifferent
The Charta o f Regional Languages and Cultures, Charter o f  Rights o f  Ethnic Minorities (1981); 
Resolution on Linguistic and Cultural Minorities (1983); and Resolution on the Languages and 
Cultures o f the Regional and Ethnic Minorities (EU Resolution, 1987); Resolution on Linguistic and 
Cultural Minorities in the European Community (EU Resolution, 1994); Council Directive 2000/43/EC 
o f  29 June 2000 Implementing the Principle o f Equal Treatment Between Persons Irrespective o f
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attitude of the EU underwent through a slight change towards recognizing culturally 
diverse composition of national populations in the member states. The Treaty on 
European Union (1992-TEU), the so-called Maastricht Treaty, for example, inserted a 
cultural dimension to the European economic integration in which the status of 
minorities was of a significant concern (EU, 2002a).
According to Biscoe (1999: 93), two recent developments have played a fatal 
role on the emergence of this new trend. First, similar to the OSCE’s Copenhagen 
Document, the TEU was the first community treaty in the aftermath of the Cold War 
and as such it marked the beginning of a new stage in the political attitude of the 
Union. Having been drafted under the awareness of ethnic conflicts that followed the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, the drafters were 
concerned about the adverse affects of ethnic conflicts spreading to Western Europe 
and jeopardizing both the political stability and economic development. Second, as 
the Union advanced on the way to substantive political integration, sub-regional 
groups from various EU member states too began to claim constitutional guarantees 
for enhancement of cultural diversity in the context of a united Europe. These two 
developments resulted in the incorporation of an ethnic dimension to the TEU that 
was specified in its Article 128 which worded:
The Community shall contribute to the flowering o f the cultures o f the member-states,
while respecting their national and regional diversity.
It is suggested that although this article did not urge the central organs of the 
EU to interfere in the internal affairs of the member states on behalf of minority 
groups, it represented a major change in the status of sub-state nationalities. It is 
acknowledged that the article explicitly recognized that member states are diversified 
along regional and national identities of minority groups. The provision indirectly
Racial or Ethnic Origin (EU Directive, 2000), among others, indicated existence o f a normative
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provided minorities with the right to claim official recognition and legal-political 
conditions pertinent to the flowering of their cultural circumstances (Toggenburg, 
2000). In line with the spirit of the article and in order to advocate cultural and 
linguistic enrichment of European minorities, therefore, the EU established several 
financial programs devoted to the protection and flowering of minority languages, 
among which the Ariane, Kaleidoscope, and the Raphael Programmes have taken the 
leading roles (Biscoe, 1999; 95).
However, contrary to what one might expect from the wording of the article 
128, the EU approach as concerned rights of internal minorities have remained 
ambiguous. In their part, the EU Commission and the Council have continued to 
hesitate in creating a systematic minority-related legislation. It seems to be safer to 
conclude, therefore, that from the point of internal standards of minority rights, the 
Union has insisted on preserving an individualist position limited to the principle of 
non-discrimination. The latest human tights instrument of the Union, the Charter o f  
Fundamental Rights o f the European Union (EU Charter, 2000) presented a good 
example in this view. Indeed, despite the Charter expressed its determination, in its 
preamble, to “respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of 
Europe”, the same preamble addressed the fact that the EU has placed “the individual 
at the hearth of its activities”. Notwithstanding the existence of a growing interest 
with regard to minority rights, the Charter devised no special place to the issue of 
minority protection. Following the example of the Cold-War tradition, the minority 
question was instead delimited by an assimilationist category of non-discrimination 
and universal rights. Those freedoms of expression, thought, conscience and religion 
framed universal-individualist orientation of the document (Arts. 10-11). Similarly,
approach in the European Parliament as concerned linguistic and cultural rights o f minorities.
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the issue of educational rights content with providing the whole of the national 
citizens with equal educational opportunities without addressing the group-specific 
circumstances of minority languages and cultures (Art. 14). It was only in the content 
of the Article 22 that a direct emphasis was made on the necessity of taking into 
account the “cultural, religious and linguistic diversity” in formulating and 
implementing EU policies. But, the wording was by no means supplemented with a 
provision of positive measures that would facilitate protection and promotion of this 
cultural diversity. On the contrary, the only reference to the concept of minority 
appeared in association with the principles of “equality before the law” and of non­
discrimination of any ground such as, among others, ^"membership o f a national 
minority” (Arts. 20-21).
Given this overwhelmingly individualist attitude, it becomes obvious that the 
EU attitude of human rights, particularly concerning the rights and freedoms of 
internal minorities, did not come to depart itself from the wording of human rights 
instruments adopted during the years of the Cold War. Similar to the previous 
approaches, the succeeding EU treaty, the Treaty o f Amsterdam, did not introduce the 
concept of minority rights into the legal scope of the founding treaties either (EU, 
2002b). It demonstrated a progressive step in the direction of formulating a non­
discrimination clause in a way to urge the EU to take “appropriate action” in order to 
combat discrimination based on “racial or ethnic origin”. The EU was obliged to take 
cultural aspects into consideration in its action particularly in order to raise respect 
and promote diversity. However, the wording of “appropriate action” was never made 
clear whether it meant to create specific measures that would be devoted to the 
promotion of minority identities (Brandtner and Rosas; 1998: 487-488).
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When we take into account coherent forms of instruments invoked throughout 
the years of last decade in other regional organizations in the realm of minority rights, 
we can safely conclude that the Union opted more for the standards of the previous 
decades. Though several recommendations appeared and a set of cultural programs 
was created in the field of minority protection, no binding decision has been 
concluded so as to regulate national policies of minority treatment in the member 
states. On the contrary, whenever a minority question came to the EU’s humanitarian 
agenda, it has been considered almost completely in association with the 
circumstances of those minority peoples who inhabited outside the EU borders.
4.3.3.2. The EU and External Minorities
As was outlined above, the issue of minority protection has received an 
increasing relevance within the EU context by the 1990s. The minority-related 
instruments, adopted in the post-Cold War framework of the OSCE, the CoE and the 
UN, have prompted the EU to reassess its silent position on the issue. However, 
unlike the standard setting acts of the two other regional organisations, the EU organs 
have, first, vested more interest in those ethnic problems and minority affairs that took 
place outside its borders. Second, rather than adopting its own instruments, the EU 
has chosen to rely on those standards of minority rights that have already been laid 
down particularly within the OSCE and the CoE organs. Thus, the EU policies of 
minority protection merely reaffirmed commitments that were already binding on the 
subjects of international law (Brandtner and Rosas, 1998; 475).
Concerned with the enforcement of already established standards of 
international human rights, including those of minorities, the question was dealt in 
association with its enlargement process. The issue of “respect for and protection of
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minorities” has constituted one of the main pillars of humanitarian dimension of the 
pre-accession strategies that have been inserted in the association agreements agreed 
with candidate countries. The eventual emergence of the new EU regime of minority 
protection, hence, progressed mainly in relation to the association agreements 
established with those of the eastern and central European states.
Indeed, similar to the creation of an ethno-cultural dimension in its founding 
treaty, the resurrection of ethno-linguistic conflicts in Eastern Europe played 
significant role in making the EU organs responsive to minority questions. As a 
matter of fact, the growing emphasis on minority rights has been conceived as a part 
of an instrumentalist policy of promoting stability and sustainable development in 
those countries which were undergoing a massive economic and political transition 
(Brandtner and Rosas, 1998: 488). In the context of political cooperation, the EU, on 
the one hand, has linked the question of granting official recognition to newly 
independent states to various conditions including prominently “guarantees for ethnic 
and national groups and minorities”.'^ On the other hand, in order to the support 
political and economic transformations, the EU concluded Europe Agreements with 
post-communist countries. One aspect of this policy was to guarantee stability in this 
state of anomie resulted from uncertain conditions of transformation that paved way 
in 1995 for the establishment of the Pact on Stability which has become an integral 
part of the Union’s common foreign policy.
The primary objective of the Pact was to create “a more united Europe 
distinguished by a will to consolidate democracy, to respect human rights, to extend 
economic progress, and to reduce threats to peace, and one capable of avoiding the
The Dutch Foreign Minister van Der Broek, acting as the head o f  the EU troika, declared on October 
4, October 199: “the recognition would be granted in the framework o f  a general settlement and have 
the following components: (among others) adequate arrangements to be made for the protection o f
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excesses of nationalism” (Benoit-Rohmer, 1996: 30). In so doing, the EU has 
launched political undertakings on the central and eastern European states, 
particularly, in relation to such a delicate area of minority treatment. It was underlined 
in the context of the Pact that the position of minorities and the implementation of 
minority rights, set forth in the framework of the CoE, the OSECE and the UN, would 
be put in effect and be rendered irreversible (Benoit-Rohmer, 1996: 30-36).
The EU, therefore, directed attention to the significant place that the issue of 
minority rights has occupied in the stability of the regional politics. The new attitude 
tacitly recognised also the fact that peaceful enlargement of the Union depended on 
the resolution of minority conflicts in the candidate countries within a pluralist order 
of their socio-political settings. In this sense, despite the Pact on Stability has troubled 
particularly with the task of resolving minority distresses in those “new democracies 
in transition”, the issue maintained a larger stake in the Union’s enlargement process. 
The issue of “respect for and protection of minorities” has conditioned membership 
status of “old democracies” as well, prominently those of C3T)rus and Turkey, who 
have long taken part in the liberal democratic bloc of the Cold War’s bipolar world 
system. The sine qua non conditions of accession, as they were identified in 1993 in 
the conclusions of the EU Council of Copenhagen, involved a strong emphasis on the 
question of minority rights. According to the so-called Copenhagen Criteria, a 
candidate country, before accession, has to fulfil a number of standards with respect 
to both their political stability and economic capacity. Political dimension of the said 
criteria put emphasis, among others, on “democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect and protection of minorities” (Verheugen, 2000: 440).
minorities, including human rights guarantees and possibly special status for certain areas” (Weller, 
1992:581).
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The Copenhagen conclusions rendered the issue of minority protection one of 
the basic conditions to be satisfied before having been accepted in the Union. It 
largely became an established principle in the enlargement policy that xmless a 
candidate country satisfied minimum standards of minority protection within its 
national borders, there would not be any progress in passing the negotiation stage. 
Verheugen, the Commissioner for Enlargement, openly stated the fact that “the EU is 
not ready to start negotiations with a country if there are any doubts about the 
democratic conditions, the respect of human rights and the protection of minorities” 
(Verheugen, 2000: 441).
Nevertheless, the Copenhagen Criteria had weak points on the scope of 
conditions, particularly, that of minority rights. The document broadly listed a number 
of political and economic criteria, but it did not make it clear what the wording of 
“respect and protection of minorities” would mean. No detailed articulation of the 
question was laid down with respect to the national regulation and implementation of 
minority-related issues. The implication of the wording was instead left to the 
progressive implementation of the Accession Partnership agreements reached 
between the EU and the candidate countries. The “short-term”, “medium-term” and 
“long-term” priorities of the accession process outlined expected standards of 
minority rights in the countries concerned. The Accession Partnership o f Turkey, for 
example, indicated the proceeding of the process. With an objective of identifying 
priority areas towards membership, the document referred “guaranteeing democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and respect and protection of minorities”. The 
document, therefore, included a set of priorities devoted to the enhancement of 
linguistic and cultural rights of minority peoples that were to be guaranteed before 
passing to the negotiation stage of the candidacy (CEC, 2000b).
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The most effective instrument of accession agreements has been advanced 
through the supervisory mechanism of annually documented progress reports 
conducted on the steps taken, in the candidate countries, on the requirements of 
accession. With an intention of assessing level of progress taken towards meeting 
membership standards, including those of minority rights, the reports concerned have 
noted yearly developments in the countries. From this point of view, the reporting 
procedure has guided identification of the framework that was to be implemented in 
satisfying EU requirements in the area of minority protection. In conformity with the 
EU’s already given post-Cold War practices, the progress reports, not surprisingly, 
focused on the enforcement of those minority standards that have been concluded 
particularly in the context of the CoE standard setting acts.'^ Starting in 1998, the EU 
Commission’s regular reports on Turkey’s progress towards accession have made 
comprehensive evaluations on the condition of minority treatment and legal-political 
accommodation of sub-national differences in Turkey. The Turkish government has 
been invited to ratify and put into practice particularly the scope of minority rights 
contained within the framework of the CoE acts. In particular, in giving standards of 
minority protection, to be satisfied as a part of the Copenhagen political criteria, the 
EU Commission has stated, by name, the Recommendation 1201, the European 
Charter and the Framework Convention.
The enlargement process is indicative of the new standards of minority 
protection nascent in the context of the EU, even though they are considered as 
principles imposed upon the candidate countries having insignificant internal 
implications. Recent acts of the EU bodies further showed the fact that external 
dimension of the issue was on the way of acquiring broader prospects going beyond
Annual reports, prepared by the European Commission on the candidate countries’ progress towards 
accession, have often made references to the CoE acts relating to minority rights.
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enlargement process. A Commission proposal, brought forth in 1997 in relation of the 
humanitarian aids of the Union, for example, contained a paragraph confirming that 
the EU human rights programmes should favor special groups, including minorities 
and indigenous peoples. Accordingly, it was acknowledged that Community 
assistance could promote minority rights in all third countries, not just the Central and 
Eastern European states (Brandtner and Rosas, 1998: 488). However, the issue still 
retains its externality to the community without having any binding effect on the 
member countries.
4.4. The Post-Cold War Framework of the European Minority Rights Regime
In the post-Cold War period, the European regional organizations, including 
the OSCE, CoE and the EU, developed a network of values, norms, rules and 
instruments in the field of minority rights that greatly departed from the practices of 
the Cold War regime. In contrast to the minimalist approach of the latter, the former 
has taken significant steps in the direction of creating a true reconciliation between 
citizenship status and ethno-cultural distinctions of minority peoples. For doing this, 
the post-Cold War regime, on the one hand, largely transformed the meaning of the 
concepts including the definition of minority or national sovereignty. On the other 
hand, the same regime expanded the scope of rights and freedoms addressing distinct 
circumstances of minority groupings. In order to assess the current framework of the 
European-regional regime, it is significant to examine the newly emerging network.
4.4.1. The Definition of the Concept of Minority
The question of definition has occupied a troublesome place in the issue of 
minority protection. As explained before, partly because of the diversity of situations
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and ethno-cultural claims displayed by minorities, and partly, depending on national 
states’ overriding will to preserve an ideal coherence in their national populations, 
international documents have remained silent on the definition of the concept.
As was underlined earlier, the EU has not set its own legislation in the area of 
minority protection but opted more for reaffirming the already established 
commitments laid down in other regional organisations. Not surprisingly, the EU 
context did not introduce a framework on the definition of the concept. Instead, those 
beneficiaries of the OSCE and the CoE documents relating to the issue of minority 
rights have largely decided the Union’s view. Because of this, in seeking 
contemporary meaning of the concept, I will focus on the acts of the OSCE and the 
CoE. The two institutions have, indeed, introduced, directly or indirectly, a set of 
definitions about which sections of national population were to be considered within 
the context of the minority rights.
In enforcing national implementation of international rights, national states 
have traditionally tended to adopt their own definitions of the concept. Up until the 
massive turn of the early 1990s, no progress was indeed achieved in the direction of 
identifying subject categories of minority rights. In a similar fashion, the Helsinki 
process refrained from bringing a minority definition. In conformity with the then 
prevailing aura, the wording of the Final Act treated the question within the context of 
universal human rights and categorized minorities as abstract individuals.
This Cold-War tradition withered away only after the collapse of the eastern 
bloc. The OSCE Copenhagen Document, for example, undertook a flexible and 
broader approach on the question of definition. The document noted that “to belong to 
a national minority is a matter of a person’s individual choice and no disadvantage 
may arise from the exercise of such choice”. This meant, on the one hand, that
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depending on the excuse of political and strategic concerns, no minority would be 
denied differential treatment provided that they whish to enjoy ethnic, religious, 
linguistic or cultural freedoms. The OSCE, hence, took the discretion of definition 
from the sole hands of national governments and entrusted it to minorities themselves. 
The same wording implied, at the same time, that states would not classify all sub­
national differences within the terms of the concept if there arose no demand in this 
direction. The Geneva Report admitted that “not all ethnic, cultural, linguistic or 
religious differences necessarily lead to the creation of national minorities”.
Similar to the Helsinki process, the CoE traditionally fostered an individualist
approach to minority questions. Partly because of its legally binding nature and partly
of the then prevailing weight of universal human rights, the ECHR lacked in giving
recognition to the group identity of minority peoples. Concerning much with the
principle of non-discrimination, the Convention viewed minority peoples within an
abstract frame of individual citizens (Gilbert, 1992: 82). This individualist orientation
of the CoE, if not that of the ECHR, has been subjected to an initial transformation by
the early 1990s. The Draft Convention, for example, noted:
For the purposes o f  this Convention, the term “minority” shall mean a group which is 
smaller in number than the rest o f the population o f a state, whose members, who are 
nationals o f  that state, have ethnical, religious or linguistic features different from those 
o f the rest o f the population, and are guided by the will to safeguard their culture, 
traditions, religion or language (Art. 2.1).
The Convention constituted major parameters of the concept around those 
criteria of numerical inferiority, citizenship, ethnic, religious and linguistic 
characteristics, and the existence of an explicit will to preserve these differences. It 
was accordingly added that “any group coming with the terms of this definition shall 
be treated as an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority” (Art. 2.2).
Perhaps the most innovative feature of the Commission’s definition was the 
fact that it did not exclude those groups of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers
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from the scope of minority rights provided that they obtained citizenship of the host 
country. No criterion relating to historical establishment was, at least at face, included 
in the definition. However, parallel with the Copenhagen Document, ethno-cultural 
distinctions were not automatically classified within the scope of the concept. The 
Draft precisely stated that “to belong to a national minority shall be a matter of 
individual choice” (Art. 2.3).
While it enacted the Recommendation 1201, the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the CoE presented another definition. In this field, the Recommendation followed 
primarily the formula of the Venice Commission and so included almost the same set 
of criteria in identifying beneficiaries of the protection. Nevertheless, though the 
Recommendation treated membership of a national minority within the terms of 
individual choice, it adopted a broader and detailed version of the former. Article 1 
stipulated that “for the purposes of this convention the expression “national minority” 
refers to a group of persons in a state who:
a. reside on the territory on that state and are citizens thereof,
b. maintain long standing, firm and lasting ties with that state,
c. display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics,
d. are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than the rest o f the population 
o f that state or o f a region o f  that state,
e. are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which constitutes their common 
identity, including their culture, their traditions, their religion, or their language.
Interestingly, what has indirectly been indicated in the Draft Convention was 
clearly documented in this definition. In addition to those criteria of citizenship, 
ethno-linguistic, religious and cultural distinctions and the existence of a will to 
preserve these distinctions, the concept of “national minority” was associated with the 
presence of “long standing, firm and lasting ties with that state”. Thus, the issue of 
historical establishment was explicitly added to the formula of definition in which 
migrants, refugees and asylum seekers were denied benefiting the scope of the 
concept. Beside this, the last definition took into account regional dimension as well.
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The status was granted not only to those who constituted numerically minor position 
in the country but also to those sections of national population who remained in 
minority in a certain region of that country.
Although the two categories of definitions did not entail a legally applicable 
capacity, they indicated the emergence of more concrete forms of norms in the 
European context with regard to the issue of identifying the bearer of the newly 
formulated rights.G enerally speaking, the definitions have constituted grounds upon 
which national implementation of rights would be practiced. As will subsequently be 
given, national implementation of the Framework Convention, for example, has relied 
upon the minority concept underlined in the OSCE and the CoE documents.
The Framework Convention did not come to an agreement on the 
beneficiaries of rights. Having admitted the fact that “at this stage it was impossible to 
arrive at a definition capable of mustering general support of all CoE member states”, 
the drafters decided to adopt a pragmatic approach by omitting the question of 
definition (CoE, 1999; 20). Yet, despite the absence of a definition, the document 
indirectly pointed out one constitutive elements of a definition. The preamble, for 
example, stipulated: “a pluralist and genuinely pluralist democratic society 
should...respect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of each person 
belonging to a national minor ity . (Klebes ,  1995; 93).
Thus, the provisions of the Convention indirectly delimited borders of the 
concept of minority. However, the “framework” nature of the Convention already 
indicated that principles contained in the provisions were not directly applicable in the 
jurisdiction of the member states but would be implemented through national
Having pointed out the significance o f  the definition included in the Recommendation 1201 (1993), 
the Parliamentary Assembly o f the Council o f Europe confirmed once again in 1995 (Recommendation 
1255) the underlying role o f the said definition in the realm o f minority protection (CoE 
Recommendation, 1995).
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legislation. It was this aspect of the Convention that provided national governments
with an instrument of acting loyal to their historical and political considerations in
identifying minority groupings (CoE, 1999: 20). Yet, the content of the other OSCE
and the CoE documents have generally determined subject groups of the Convention
as well. Reservations and declarations of the national states, made upon the
ratification of the Framework Convention, have proved this general tendency. The
Estonian Declaration, for example, adopted, almost in its exact wording, the definition
of the Recommendation 1201. The declaration noted that;
The Republic o f Estonia understands the term “national minorities”, which is not defined 
in the Framework Convention for the Protection o f National Minorities, as follows: are 
considered as “national minority those citizens o f Estonia who 
reside on the territory o f Estonia; 
maintain longstanding, firm and lasing ties with Estonia;
are distinct from Estonians on the basis o f their ethnic, cultural, religious or 
linguistic characteristics;
are motivated by a concern to preserve together their cultural traditions, their 
religion or their language, which constitute the basis o f  their common identity (CoE,
1999: 74-75).
Thus, although the Convention did not impose any specific definition, 
following the CoE standards, the Estonian government drew a definition on those 
criteria of historical existence, ethno-linguistic, religious and cultural distinctions, and 
the presence of a will to preserve these cultural distinctions. In the same manner, the 
Austrian government reported, on the ratification of the document, that “the term 
‘national minorities’ within the meaning of the Framework Convention...is 
understood to designate those groups.. .which live and traditionally have had their 
home in parts of the territory of the Republic of Austria”. The report also added that 
the same groups must be “composed of Austrian citizens with non-German mother 
tongues and with their own ethnic cultures” (CoE, 1999: 74). Thus, in addition to 
cultural and historical dimensions, the Austrian version adopted also citizenship status 
that was to be satisfied before having been considered within the scope of the 
Convention. Depending on the absence of a legal definition, the German government
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too limited the effect of the provisions to those German citizens of Danes, Sorbians, 
Frisians, Sinti and Roma who historically inhabited in the country (CoE, 1999; 75).
The post-Cold War European-regional context with regard to minority 
definition indicated two consequences. First, despite there emerged no ruling 
definition, the acts of the OSCE and the CoE, together with corresponding responses 
of the partied states, have gradually established throughout the 1990s a set of central 
criteria to be taken into account in identifying minority groups. Citizenship and 
historical ties, ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural distinctions took part among 
prominent constituents of working definitions. In so doing, potential bearers of 
minority rights have become more transparent leaving little room for political 
arbitration. From this point of view, national implementation of internationally 
formulated minority rights has obtained today a stronger hand.
Thus, the concept of minority today obtained a relatively higher precision in 
circumscribing constitutive features of those peoples who were to be treated within 
the protective realm of minority rights. Nevertheless, notwithstanding their indirect 
influence on the minority policies of partied states, the OSCE and the CoE definitions 
have not yet been transformed into legally binding instruments. It was this weakness 
that provides national governments with a free hand in carrying out national 
implementation of the minority provisions. Because of this, in the issue of national 
implementation, governments have kept a stronger capacity to restrain the scope of 
the documents in the direction of their political concerns. In spite of the fact that they 
might have been in need of differential treatment, many minority groups continued to 
remain outside the scope of minority protection.
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4.4.2. Rights of Minorities
Faced with the resurrection of ethnic confrontations and ethno-cultural claims, 
the post-Cold War European regime of minority rights came out with broader sets of 
rights and freedoms pertinent to the protection and promotion of minority 
circumstances. Apart from universal human rights, regional instruments began to seek 
rights to differential treatment. In addition to equal status of citizenship rights and 
non-discrimination measures, the issue of minority rights has slowly been added to 
the international concern of universal human rights protection.
Human rights agenda of the Cold War period was “person-centred, the 
premises (were) universal, the concerns (were) transcendent” as Thomberry (1999: 1) 
observed. Depending largely on the prevalence of ideological confrontations, 
international documents had given almost no place to the formulation of group- 
specific rights. The then prevailing aura affirmed the idea that if individual human 
rights would be taken under protection, minorities too would obtain legal-political 
guarantees through which they would protect and develop their distinctions. 
Whenever the issue of minority protection arose, hence, international instruments had 
sufficed with negative rights that compelled national governments to do nothing 
beyond minimalist formula of non-discrimination measures.
It was only by the 1990s that major international organisations broke this 
individualist tradition through developing specific declarations or conventions on the 
protection of peoples who belong to minority groups. As was examined, the UN 
Convention (1992) constituted universal dimension of the new trend. In the European 
context, the Copenhagen Document and the Framework Convention, among others, 
laid down major principles of the new regime. As was underlined before, the OSCE 
and the CoE adopted similar documents other than the given two instruments.
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However, almost all of the former ones remained mostly at the level of preliminary or 
supplementary works to these two major documents. Because of this, in outlining the 
new scope of minority rights in the region, although we make due references to the 
content of other documents, the main emphasis will be on the provisions of the 
Copenhagen Document (CD) and those of the Framework Convention (FC).
It was argued that the question of minority rights has traditionally sought to 
create a compromise between individualist-universalist and group-specific/particular 
circumstances of minority peoples. It follows from argument that there has existed an 
inherent duality in the formulation and practice of minority rights because minority 
individuals have displayed dual identities of being member of larger citizenry and that 
of the minority group. From the legal-political point of view, minority individuals are, 
first of all, individual citizens who are entitled to the affect of identical rights and 
obligations. Because of this, one dimension of minority rights has given priority to 
guaranteeing civil and political equality. However, since national minorities share 
ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural characteristics different from those of the 
majority, the principle of citizenship equality has been supplemented with group- 
specific rights and freedoms. Depending on his fact, in elaborating on the content of 
the new European regime of minority protection, this analysis makes a distinction 
between universalist-individualist and group-specific/particular principles of the two 
major documents.
4.4.2.I. Principles on Citizenship Equality
Measures of differential treatment, in general, have been considered after 
rights to universal equality and non-discrimination were guaranteed. Even in such 
circumstances where group-specific rights were denied, international instruments.
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such as the ECHR and the Helsinki Final Act, provided minority peoples with 
provisions of civil and political equality. Any discrimination, among others, on the 
grounds of being associated with a national minority has been condemned. In so 
doing, members of ethno-cultural, religious and linguistic minorities have been 
considered, first of all, individual citizens having identical rights and freedoms. The 
group dimension of minority rights has taken secondary, if not less significant, place 
in formulating foundational principles of minority protection.
The post-Cold War European regime constituted no exception to this tradition. 
Notwithstanding presence of a growing interest in the field of group-specific rights, 
the latest European instruments insisted primarily on safeguarding citizenship 
equality. The two constitutive documents of the new regime, namely the CD and the 
FC, displayed this general concern. Before addressing group-specific rights, the 
Copenhagen Document, for example, incorporated principles that aimed at 
guaranteeing “full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, equal rights 
and status for all citizens” (CD, 30). The document affirmed that “participating states 
will adopt, where necessary, special measures for the purpose of ensuing to persons 
belonging to national minorities full equality with the other citizens in the exercise 
and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (CD, 31).
Having been largely inspired from the scope of OSCE documents relating to 
minority rights, primarily that of the CD, the FC too prompted identical rights and 
freedoms in drafting its own formula. The dual concern, inherent in the question of 
minority rights, was accordingly involved in the provisions of the Convention. The 
prior concern of the Convention centered on guaranteeing citizenship equality for all 
members of the national society. The Convention, therefore, attributed a due reference
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to those groups of universal rights which included, among others, equality before law 
and freedom of thought, expression, conscience and religion (FC, 4.1, 7).
In conformity with the general language of human rights protection, principle 
of citizenship equality was also associated with those measures of non-discrimination. 
Any discrimination based on having membership with a national minority was 
prohibited (FC, 4.1). Persons belonging to national minorities were accordingly 
guaranteed to “have the right to exercise fiilly and effectively their human rights and 
fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality before the law” 
(CD, 31). Most significantly, the new instruments urged national governments to take 
measures against ethno-cultural discrimination. To this end, the new regime precisely 
condemned “totalitarianism, racial and ethnic hatred, anti-semitism, xenophobia, and 
discrimination against anyone as well as persecution on religious and ideological 
grounds” (CD, 40). It was affirmed that national governments would “provide 
protection against any acts that constitute incitement to violence against persons or 
groups based on national, racial, ethnic or religious discrimination” (FC, 6.2; CD, 
40.1,40.5,40.7).
Principles of universal rights and non-discrimination, as underlined so far, put 
emphasis on the individualist dimension of the post-Cold War European regime. This 
individualist-universalist orientation reflected itself also in the exercise of the rights 
and freedoms that incorporated in the constituent provisions of the new regime. The 
provisions granted rights to “persons belonging to minorities” but not to the collective 
entity of minority groups. The new scope granted no recognition to collective or 
corporate existence of minority groups. The formula of minority provisions indicated, 
at most, that minorities would exercise group-specific rights in community with other 
members of their minority groups. From this point of view, although collective
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designation was denied, the new regime set forth individual rights having collective 
dimension (FC, 3.2; CD, 32.6).'^
The new European-regional regime, therefore, affirmed once again the 
approach that has hitherto received a general appeal in the humanitarian acts of 
international organisations. It was through the use of this universalist language that 
the issue of minority protection has initially been integrated into the realm of 
universal human rights protection. As the principles of new minority rights protection 
has taken root, the issue came to be considered as an integral part of international 
protection of human rights. As a result, creating an innovative departure from 
practices of earlier regimes, national treatment of minority peoples was, to a large 
extent, divorced from the sovereign area of national governments. As will 
subsequently be touched upon, international interference in the field of minority rights 
was henceforth rendered a norm of universal human rights protection (FC, 1; CD, 30).
Thus, the post-Cold War standards of minority rights in the continent largely 
satisfied individualist-universalist dimension of minority circumstances. Minority 
peoples were considered, first of all, equal members of the national society and 
treated accordingly. This universalist focus has by no means neglected the second 
aspect, that of the measures of differential treatment. Major documents of the period 
have instead vested greater interest in the task of creating legal-political conditions 
pertinent to the protection and promotion of minority distinctions.
The Copenhagen Document involved several rights in collective dimension like inauguration o f  
regional administration. Similar rights appeared also in the provisions o f the Draft Convention o f  the 
Venice Commission. But, following an individualist attitude, when it was transforming these
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4.4.2.2. Rights on Group-Specific Treatment
The post-Cold War documents relating to the area of minority rights made it 
quite clear that universal principles of equality and non-discrimination would in no 
ways be interpreted as such that they would imply a form of uniformity. On the 
contrary, while tacitly denounced traditional policies, implemented in a manner of 
uniformity, it was explicitly recognised that national governments would undertake 
“where necessary, adequate measures in order to promote economic, social, political 
and cultural conditions of minorities on equal grounds with those of the majority” 
(FC, 4.2). To this end, pluralism and social tolerance have acquired a prevalent place 
in the scope of the new regime (FC, 5.2; DC, 30). National governments were 
required to provide persons belonging to minorities with legal-political means 
allowing protection and promotion of “the essential elements of their identity, namely 
their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage” (FC, 5.1; CD, 32).
Primary examples of group-specific rights appeared in the field of linguistic 
rights. National governments began to commit themselves to undertake positive 
measures in order to protect and promote minority languages. Having created a 
breakthrough in this field, it was acknowledged in the Copenhagen Document that 
minorities “have the right freely to express, preserve and develop (among others) 
linguistic identity” (CD, 32). The same provision affirmed minorities’ rights “to use 
freely their mother tongue in private as well as in public” (CD, 32.1). The Document 
did not go, however, into details of the implications of the “public” use of minority 
languages and those measures which would facilitate promotion of linguistic identity.
It was the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (EC) which 
comprehensively outlined contemporary scope of linguistic rights. In the view of the
documents into a legal text, the framework Convention omitted those rights which were inducing 
creation o f collective rights.
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Charter, protection and promotion of minority languages represented “an important 
contribution to the building of a Europe based on the principles of democracy and 
cultural diversity” (preamble, para. 6). In doing this, the Charter made a distinction 
between official and mother tongues and admitted that the two was not to be practiced 
in an exclusive manner. While addressing citizenship obligation to learning official 
language, the Charter stipulated that “the right to use a regional or minority language 
in private and public life is an inalienable right” (preamble, para. 3, 5).
On the other hand, putting a direct emphasis on the value of interculturalism 
and multilingualism in building socio-political and legal structures of the post-Cold 
War Europe, the Charter stipulated the use of minority languages in the affairs of 
schooling, judicial proceedings, administrative dealings, media and cultural activities. 
To this end, national governments undertook to take necessary measures to facilitate 
educational establishments, private or public, in which minority languages would be 
taught or minorities would receive education in their mother tongues (EC Art. 8). 
More precisely, the free use of minority languages in legal proceedings; to provide 
evidence, written or orally, in one’s mother tongue; and translation of legal documents 
into minority languages were extensively guaranteed (EC Art. 9). It was also admitted 
that minority peoples would communicate with administrative authorities in their 
mother tongues, and in those regions where minority group constituted a considerable 
proportion, regional or local authorities would incorporate minority languages in their 
administrative organs (EC Art. 10). In the cultural field, national governments were 
urged to facilitate radio/TV broadcasting, production and distribution of audiovisual 
works in minority languages (EC Art. 11). Similarly, the Charter fostered protection 
and promotion of minority cultures through creating, in minority languages, libraries,
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cultural centres, museums, archives, academies, theatres, as well as cinemas and 
festivals (EC Art. 12).
The Copenhagen Document and the Framework Convention too prompted a 
parallel formula with respect to the preservation and development of linguistic 
characteristics. Both documents affirmed the free use of mother tongues, in private 
and in public realms, orally or in written form (FC, 10.1; CD, 32.1). Minorities would 
freely receive and transmit information and ideas in their mother tongues without 
interference by public authorities. This field included the possibility of having equal 
means in accessing to the media (FC, 9.1; CD, 32.5). In those geographical areas 
inhabited traditionally and in substantial numbers by citizens belonging to minority 
groups, it was recognised that minority language would be employed in 
communicating with public authorities (FC, 10.2; CD, 34). The right to public usage 
of minority languages covered also legal proceedings taking place in the regional 
courts (FC, 10.3). Apart from administrative and judicial implications, linguistic 
rights took into account the right of expressing personnel and geographical names in 
mother languages. It was accordingly affirmed that in minority-populated areas, local 
names, street names or other topographical indications would be displayed in the 
language of the resident population (FC, 11).
Linguistic rights were granted basically to individual members of minority 
groups. Taking into aecount collective dimension of minority identity, the documents 
insisted also on the possibility of creating grounds through which rights and freedoms 
would be exercised in community with other members of minority groups (FC, 3.2; 
CD, 32.6). The provisions enshrined hence a set of rights having collective dimension. 
In order to exercise those freedoms of thought, expression, conscience and religion, 
minority peoples were provided, for example, with freedom of peaceful assembly and
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association (FC, 7). It was clearly specified that minorities would freely manifest their 
religion or belief and establish institutions, organizations and associations to that 
effect (FC, 8; CD, 32.2).
Concerning the collective dimension, the linguistic rights, in particular, were 
associated with the task of creating educational establishments. Here, national 
governments were required to undertake no commitment in the sense of allocating 
financial resources to minority educational establishments. Yet, it was guaranteed that 
minorities would, on their own expense, establish and manage educational institutions 
in which minority languages would be taught, or instruction would be practiced in that 
language (FC, 13; CD, 32.2-32.3). Thus, national education, in general, was not 
expected to give instruction in minority languages or to teach languages concerned. 
However, particularly in minority-populated areas, without neglecting the learning of 
official language, national governments committed themselves to take positive 
measures within their educational systems so as to teach minority language and give 
instruction in that language (FC, 14; CD, 34).
As was pointed out, minority questions have entailed external dimensions 
having links with the majority of another country or with a minority living outside the 
borders of hosting country. Because of this, the new regime of minority protection 
invested a close concern in developing cross-frontier relations between the members 
of the same ethno-cultural group living in different countries. To this end, both the 
Copenhagen Document and the Framework Convention put emphasis on the rights of 
minorities to establish peaceful relations across frontiers with those external groups 
with whom they shared an ethno-cultural, linguistic or religious identity, or a common 
cultural heritage (FC, 17; CD, 32.4). In this regard, partied states were further called
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to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements upon the protection of persons 
belonging to national minorities (FC, 18; CD, 36).
On the other hand, the scope of the new regime interested confirmed that 
formulation of governmental would be sensitive to minorities’ socio-economic, 
political and cultural concerns. The new age, in this regard, introduced significant 
obligations on the part of hosting governments. In doing this, although the form of 
participation was left to sovereign discretion of national authorities, minority 
provisions stipulated to “create the conditions necessary for the effective participation 
of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in 
public affairs, in particular those effecting them” (FC, 15; CD, 35).
Since those measures of differential treatment drew legal-political distinctions 
between majority and minority members of a state’s citizenry, such measures were 
expected to develop in conformity with the principles of equality and non­
discrimination with regard to the rights of the other members of national population 
(CD, 33). Concerning this aspect, the documents made it clear that differential 
treatment would by no means be implemented at the expense of majority rights. Since 
the underlying rationality of the practice lied in the existence of an actual difference 
between various sections of population, group-specific rights were expected to 
remedy anomalies stemming from the presence of a dominant identity (FC, 4.3).
4.4.3. National Implementation and International Supervision
National implementation of minority rights and creating of an effective 
international mechanism charged with the task of monitoring have constituted 
weakest sides of minority rights regimes. States have often retained a reluctant 
attitude in enforcing international formulations in their national settings, because
180
minority rights have carried extensive implications on the form of state-society 
relations. As was previously underlined, the post-WWI regime relieved the question 
of minority protection from self-interested politics of great powers and put it, for the 
first time, under the supervisory competence of an international organisation. The 
League of Nations and the PCIJ were charged with the task of political and judicial 
review respectively. However, since minority obligations had been drawn in a 
geographically limited form and imposed generally upon defeated states, the regime 
inhibited its effective enforcement in the national settings (Capotorti, 1991; 20-24).
Bom in a Cold War climate, international organisations’ mandate in the field 
of human rights protection were directed by standard setting, rather than policing or 
monitoring acts. In particular, the Cold War regime displayed a constant silence on 
the question of minority protection giving national governments a free hand in dealing 
with their minority related issues. It was only by the 1990s that international attention 
has focused once again on methods by which conformity to those standards of 
minority protection might be encouraged and checked. The contemporary instmments 
of minority protection in the context of the OSCE, the CoE and the EU created several 
mechanisms of implementation and monitoring. The innovative point appeared in the 
development of an eventual co-action between regional organisations particularly in 
the field of minority protection. In doing this, three regional organisations have 
inspired from each other’s documents relating to minority rights, and hence 
strengthened each other’s position in implementing these rights in national settings.
As was suggested before, the OSCE has played the leading role in the 
European region with respect to the issue of minority protection. However, the 
implementation of the OSCE commitments has traditionally depended on the “good 
will’ of participating states. The dominant view has been that the OSCE commitments
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are not treaties and, therefore, are not legally binding on the OSCE states (OSCE,
1999: 11). Yet, it is suggested that “signed at the highest political level, they have an
authority that is arguably as strong as any legal statute under international law”
(OSCE, 1999: 3). In a similar manner, Burgenthal (1990: 231) pointed out moral
impact of the OSCE commitments in guiding subsequent developments:
The fact that it is not a legally binding instrument but a political commitment does not 
really affect its long-term potential significance. After all, neither the Magna Carta, the 
American Declaration o f Independence, the French Declaration o f the Rights o f Man nor 
the Universal Declaration were adopted as legally binding instruments. They became the 
historic milestones they are today because, over time, they captured mankind’s 
imagination as eloquent expressions o f universal hopes and aspirations about human 
rights and freedom. That aspect, not their legal character, explains their overriding 
political and moral impact and their influence.
Thus, although the OSCE documents have not entailed a directly applicable 
nature in terms of having legal force, they have carried potential to guide ramification 
of agreed standards through creating a favourable international public opinion. That is 
why, it has been argued that implementation of OSCE standards were to be assessed 
by looking at consequences they produced. Borrowing from Bloed (XX: 4), “a 
commitment does not have to be legally binding in order to have binding force. The 
distinction between legal and non-legal binding force resides in the legal 
consequences attached to the binding force, not in the binding force as such”.
Indeed, neither the Copenhagen Document nor the following OSCE 
agreements went beyond being political views. The member states have generally 
expressed their good wishes in order to make the agreements an integral norm of 
national policies. However, emerging cooperation between regional organizations of 
the continent made the OSCE principles quite relevant for national politics. Although 
the OSCE standards, set forth in the content of the Copenhagen Document, introduced 
no legal obligation, when the same principles adopted in the CoE and the EU context 
they gained a binding effect.
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The influence of the OSCE standards on the scope of the Recommendation 
1201 and the European Charter was already prevalent. Yet, the most explicit 
inspiration was taken in deciding the scope of the Framework Convention. Having 
been established on the OSCE principles, the Framework Convention, in fact, aimed 
at giving a legal effect to the content of the Copenhagen Document. The Explanatory 
Memorandum of the Convention made it clear that the document intended to 
transform, “to the possible extent”, political commitments adopted by the OSCE into 
legal obligations for the participating states (CoE Memorandum, 1995; para. 5).To 
this end, the memorandum stipulated that “the framework Convention is the first 
legally binding multilateral instrument devoted to the protection of national minorities 
in general” (CoE Memorandum, 1995: para. 10).
However, since the CoE member states refrained from drafting an additional 
protocol to the ECHR, the Convention’s legal applicability came not from the judicial 
scope of the ECHR but from the status of being an international treaty (Klebes, 1995: 
93). Hence, the task of monitoring was entrusted not to the already established 
judicial organs of the ECHR, basically that of the European Court of Human Rights, 
but to a reporting system based on periodical reports delivered by the partied states to 
the Council of Ministers aided by an advisory committee of experts. That is, in 
contravention with the legal nature of the Convention, monitoring system continued to 
be a political arbitration in the hands of national states (CoE, 1999: 37-43).
As was discussed earlier, in addition to the political and judicial supervision of 
the League of Nations and the PCIJ, the post-WWI regime had directly made minority 
commitments a part of internal law. In so doing, they had left almost no room for 
national govenunents in interpreting the content of treaties in domestic application. In 
contrast to this settlement, the effect of the Convention was largely curtailed by its
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formula which vested a great margin of appreciation to hands of national 
governments. The “framework” structure of the Convention compelled governments, 
at most, to endeavor implementation of internal laws in conformity with this vague 
and imprecise scope of rights and freedoms (Gilbert, 1999: 63). Thus, implementation 
was left to “national legislation and appropriate governmental policies” (CoE 
Memorandum, 1995: para. 13). In so doing, instead of direct application, national 
authorities were granted an important margin of discretion in accommodating distinct 
characteristics of the minority groups (Benoit-Rohmer, 1996: 39).
Taking into consideration the complex circumstances of minority questions, 
the new regime introduced no overall mechanism of implementation unanimously 
applicable in each of the partied state. Instead, the new context of minority protection 
opted for “programme-type” provisions which were to be fulfilled by national 
legislation in conformity with their specific conditions.^® The “escape clauses” of the 
new regime further delimited the possibility of a unanimous application. Having 
incorporated those words of “where necessary”, “to the possible extent”, or “in 
conformity with the national legislation”, national governments were given a free 
hand in dealing with minority related issues.
Despite these limitations in national application, the enlargement process of 
the EU seems to fulfill the gap, at least, for the case of candidate countries. Acting on 
the standards of the OSCE and the CoE instruments, the Copenhagen decisions of the 
EU Council has conditioned new membership on the satisfaction of minority rights. 
The Framework Convention has particularly been addressed in the association
20 Paragraph 11 o f the Explanatory Memorandum (CoE Memorandum, 1995) worded: “In view o f the 
range o f  different situations and problems to be resolved, a choice was made for a Framework 
Convention which contains mostly programme-type provisions setting out objectives which the parties 
undertake to pursue. These provisions, which will not be directly applicable, leaving the States 
concerned a measure o f  discretion in the implementation o f the objectives which they have undertaken 
to achieve, thus enabling them to take particular circumstances into account”.
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agreements. Thus, specifically in the case of the candidate countries, the EU’s 
enlargement process has been an effective instrument to enforce the implementation 
of the new European regime of minority protection. Under the pressure of the 
accession process, many candidate countries have already given effect to many 
provisions of the Framework Convention in their national legislation (Melanie, 2001).
4.4.4. Territorial Integrity and National Sovereignty
As was underlined before, modem-state has been pinpointed the state as the 
sole instrument having the exclusive authority over a well-defined territory. It was 
sovereign in both external and internal dimensions of exercising this authority. 
Externally, modem-state has been thought of having the sole capacity to regulate and 
govern its internal affairs without resorting to any higher authority in the world. 
Internally, it has been projected as the sole actor of jurisdiction who would neither 
share its authority with nor receive any commandment from another actor within its 
borders (Gillespie, 1997).
The issue of minority rights, however, has maintained a constant tendency to 
undermine external and internal implications of state sovereignty. Because, 
international regulations relating to national treatment of minorities have, on the one 
hand, traditionally been established and imposed upon states externally by some great 
powers, kin-states or international organisations. Group-specific nature of minority 
rights has, on the other hand, invoked creation of a corporate status for minorities and 
called for devolution of some sort of state functions these groups. Bearing in mind its 
divisive implications on an ideal configuration of national entity, national authorities 
have been reluctant in giving official recognition to the different existence of minority 
groups within their territory. In place, international system has usually appreciated, at
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least up until the end of the Cold-War period, the so-called “territorial integrity norm”
which promoted monolithic rather than pluralist formulations (Zacker, 2001).
A significant departure from traditional practices occurred when the standards
of minority treatment began to be considered within the general scope of universal
human rights protection. It was by the early 1990s that a universal framework relating
to the scope of minority rights started to arise. The issue of minority treatment has
eventually been conceived an integral component of international human rights
protection. The Copenhagen Document, for example, affirmed in 1990 that “respect
for the rights of persons belonging to national minorities (was to be considered) as
part of universally recognised human rights” (CD, 30). In following, the Charter of
Paris marked a significant move on the way to internationalizing minority rights while
pushing it above and outside the sole discretion of nation-states. While human rights
agenda of the organisation was considered as “matters of direct and legitimate
concern” of all participating states, the follow-up meetings of the OSCE process
recognized the fact that minority rights ceased to be belonging “exclusively to the
internal affairs” of any particular state.^'
In parallel to the OSCE’s new approach, the CoE appropriated a similar
approach. The formulation of the Framework Convention, for example, presented one
of the most developed forms of the follow-up steps that have been taken in the context
of the Council in this direction. The Convention explicitly stipulated that:
The protection o f  national minorities and o f the rights and freedoms o f persons belonging 
to those minorities forms an integral part o f  the international protection o f  human rights, 
and as such falls within the scope o f international cooperation (Art. 1).
When it was delineating “challenges o f  change” resulted from the revolutionary transformations o f  
the last decade, the OSCE Budapest meeting (OSCE, 1994) noted in 1994: “We emphasize that 
commitments undertaken in the field o f human dimension o f the CSCE are matters o f  direct and 
legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs o f the 
State concerned”.
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That is to say, national governments would no longer claim exclusive
authority in deciding legal and political borders of minority treatment in their internal
politics. In the field of minority protection, traditional implications of state
sovereignty, therefore, entered in a gradual decay as it opened the issue of minority
treatment to the legitimate concern of international interference. Van der Stoel (1999:
viii-ix), the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities, stated in 1998:
.. .no state may any longer plead ‘non-interference in internal affairs’ when responding to 
concerns over respect for human rights, including the rights o f persons belonging to 
national minorities...on this basis that we speak increasingly in Europe about ‘good 
governance’ (not simply ‘democratic governance’), meaning that government must be for 
the benefit o f the whole population and not merely the majority...the duty o f ‘good 
governance requires responsiveness to the needs o f  all -majority and minorities alike- 
with a view to fulfilling not merely the minimum standards in terms o f obligations, but 
striving to fulfil the spirit o f  declarations, conventions and commitments in terms o f  
shared values. Accordingly, we should think in therms o f “the citizenry’’, rather than “the 
nation” -  o f  multi-cultural society as distinguished from mono-cultural society...
In Stoel’s view, the criterion of “good governance” is associated with the task 
of divorcing the concept of “nation” from its ethno-cultural substance in 
accommodating minorities’ claims in a “democratic governance”. In other words, the 
condition of creating an equal treatment between majority and minorities, Stoel 
suggested differentiating the notion of “citizenship”, which is multi-cultural in fact, 
from the notion of “nation” which recalls mono-cultural composition. In projecting 
this contemporary argument, it is also exhibited that international “declarations, 
conventions and commitments” relating to the issue of minority treatment came to 
determine the national framework of minority policies.
Thus, international standards of minority protection have, to a large extent, 
superseded today objections of national governments that have hitherto been made on 
those traditional concerns of “non-interference in internal affairs”. By contrast, it 
came to be argued that respect for universal standards of human rights started to 
delimit borders of national sovereignty (Falk, 1997: 179-180). Yet, in fear of minority 
secessionism, national governments have resisted extensive forms of minority
187
policies, as such creation of trans-frontier contacts or territorial autonomy, even in the 
growing regime prevalent in the 1990s (Gillespie, 1997: 145). Having taken into 
account this traditional concern, the contemporary regime in minority protection 
introduced precise obligations on the beneficiaries of minority rights as well. While 
compelling national authorities to undertake commitments pertinent to the principle of 
“equality within diversity”, the new European-regional regime, for example, came out 
with explicit obligations on the part of minority groups. Major documents of the new 
era affirmed that the question of minority rights would be resolved through 
democratic means and within the political independence, national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of partied states.
Thus, the issue of minority rights has been associated with multi-cultural and
pluralist regulation of internal politics. Because of this, the new regime constantly and
completely separated secessionist aspirations seeking political independence from the
area of cultural rights to be implemented within the territorial integrity of states. To
this end, the new European regime incorporated so-called “loyalty clauses” in its
constitutive provisions (Klebes, 1995: 96). Accordingly, while granting substantive
rights to those persons belonging to ethnic, religious, linguistic or cultural minorities,
major documents imposed, at the same time, obligations on the part of minority
groups. The Copenhagen Document, for example, noted:
None o f  these commitments may be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any 
activity or perform any action in contravention o f the purposes and principles o f the 
Charter o f the United Nations, other obligations under international law or the provisions 
o f  the Final Act, including the principle o f  territorial integrity o f  states (Art. 37).^^
Obviously, the fundamental instrument of the new regime delimited the scope 
of the new minority rights by “the principle of territorial integrity of states”. In a 
similar fashion, the Framework Convention stipulated that measures aimed at “the
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effective protection of national minorities and of the rights and freedoms of persons 
belonging to those minorities (be resolved) within the rule of law, respecting the 
territorial integrity and national sovereignty of states”. The Convention further 
confirmed that:
Nothing in the present framework Convention shall be interpreted as implying any right 
to engage in any activity or perform any act contrary to the fundamental principles o f  
international law and in particular o f the sovereign equality, territorial integrity and 
political independence o f states (Art. 21).
This is to say, national implementation of international standards has initiated 
a process which has considerably eradicated states’ sovereign authority. However, the 
process by no means proceeded in an exhaustive way. On the contrary, the current 
transformation has largely reconciled state sovereignty with international standards of 
minority protection. Because of this, as was argued above, the fulfillment of the 
universal standards of minority protection would raise international credibility of a 
state while making it more sovereign acting in the new-world system which obliged 
minority groups and external actors to respect its political independence, territorial 
integrity and sovereign equality. In this respect, the provisions of the major 
documents enhanced basic features of state sovereignty and, in fact, even 
strengthened it against secessionist aspirations of minority groups. No minority group 
would today engage in separatist acts provided that they were granted legal-political 
measures pertinent to the protection and promotion of group-specific characteristics.
4.5. Conclusion
At the end of the two “hot” world wars, the understanding, formulation and 
practice of minority rights underwent substantial changes both in national and 
international arena. The state-specific, group-oriented and geographically-limited
The same wording took part in the Article 5 o f the CoE’s European Charter for Regional or Minority
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regime of the post-WWI years gave way, in the aftermath of the WWII, to the 
emergence of a universalist-individualist human rights agenda which delimited the 
issue of minority protection with those minimalist principles of citizenship equality 
and non-discrimination. During the period, international organizations paid almost no 
direct attention to the fact that minority groups would be in need of differential 
treatment in order to maintain, preserve and promote their particular identities.
The end of “Cold” War presented no exception to this general tendency. The 
revolutionary changes of the early 1990s resulted in the reemergence of the group- 
specific scope of the minorities treaties, but this time, with a universal effect of 
application. The declarations, charters, conventions or documents of the UN, the 
OSCE, the CoE and the EU helped to grow throughout the 1990s a universal 
framework of minority protection. The new context incorporated an ethno-cultural 
dimension to the notion of universal human rights protection which came to be 
considered outside the classical borders of state sovereignty. The new concept of 
sovereignty, instead, has increasingly been defined in association with its capacity to 
accommodate minority differences. Consequently, those notions of ethno-cultural 
pluralism and multi-culturalism, that largely reconciled group-specific aspects of 
minority distinctions with universal scope of citizenship equality, became the integral 
norms of today’s minority rights regime. In so doing, the new framework of minority 
rights largely disassociated the concept of citizenship from its delimiting impacts of 
ethno-cultural distinctions in the direction of creating an inclusive formula based on 
the legal status of peoples. To this end, one of the latest CoE acts put strong emphasis 
on the fact that “nationality (citizenship) means the legal bond between a person and a 
State and does not indicate the person’s ethnic origin” (CoE, 1998: Art. 2).
Languages.
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CHAPTER V
TURKISH MINORITY RIGHTS REGIME 
The Ottoman Roots
5.1 Introduction
When discussing main features of the European minority rights regimes, previous 
chapters argued that national and international developments in the last three centuries 
culminated in the gradual consolidation of a network of norms, values, principles and 
national and international instruments relating to the question of minority treatment. 
Starting from the Westphalian regime of the seventeenth century, recent transformations 
appeared in the context of the CoE, the OSCE and the EU have presented the latest 
framework in the continent. Thus, the issue of minority protection in Europe exhibited 
not a static nature but a very dynamic process. Substantive content of the prevailing 
regime, in the sense of providing citizenship equality within ethno-cultural diversity, 
resulted from a long and escalating process of national and international changes. As 
well, the Turkish minority rights regime, with its conceptualization of the term minority, 
the formula of rights and obligations and national and international instruments of 
enforcement is not a sudden innovation. Rooted in the legal-political framework and 
practices of the millet system, the Turkish regime inherited many aspects from the past 
and adopted them to the modem forms of minority treatment.
Having been aware of this fact, this chapter will first examine main characteristics 
of religious diversity embedded in the legal-political formulation and practices of the 
Ottoman millet system. In this context, legal, political and social implications of the
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millet system will be analyzed as it relates to the issue of protecting the “other” 
population categories. Secondly, the chapter will explain the modem transformation of 
the millet system under the influence of the nineteenth century modernization projects of 
the Ottoman governments. Here, this chapter will examine steps taken in the direction of 
reconciling classical millet system with an egalitarian formula of Ottoman citizenship. 
Lastly, the emphasis will be on the failures of the Ottoman politics in accommodating 
ethno-cultural diversity within an egalitarian implementation of the principle of equality. 
In so doing, the chapter will crystallize socio-political and legal background upon which 
the Republican minority rights regime was founded.
When examining the main features of the European ancien regime, it was pointed 
out the fact that its state system rested largely upon corporate agents of communal 
groupings situated between rulers and the ruled. During the period, in the absence of 
ideological impetus and modem mling mechanisms, state authorities were neither willing 
nor capable of achieving a homogeneous population in terms of ethno-cultural and 
religious affiliation. It was within this value-neutral and functionalist configuration of the 
political context that the principle of “difference” prevailed over the concern of 
“sameness” up until the modem times (Rodrigue, 1995).
The European ancien regime drew a clear distinction between the notions of state- 
membership and that of ethno-cultural membership. Due to fact that political and cultural 
matters were constituted independent of each other, peoples were allowed to enjoy ethno­
cultural and religious distinctions in their social environments. However, this does not 
mean that each cultural category or members of the same category received identical
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treatment. The recognition of difference went, instead, hand in hand with inegalitarian 
treatment which frequently resulted in ethno-cultural discrimination or persecution.*
The Ottoman administration greatly differed from its medieval equivalents with 
regard to the issue of accommodating interests of ethno-cultural others within its classical 
system in which non-Muslim communities were provided with legal-political and 
administrative measures through which protection and promotion of communal 
circumstances were to a large extent guaranteed.^ Nevertheless, parallel to its 
contemporaries, the Ottoman administration too adopted and practiced an inegalitarian 
policy in treating the “other” population groups. The classical system took almost no step 
in the direction of creating congruence between the principle of individual equality based 
on state-membership and that of the group-specific treatment.
5.2. The Classical Millet System: Inequality of the Different
The Turkish ancien régime, presented no exception to religious and inegalitarian 
vision which characterized the European ancien régime. Despite the fact that many 
western politicians and travelers traditionally viewed the Empire, its rulers and the rule 
within the terms of “Turkey”, ‘Turks”, and -borrowing from Alexandris (1992: 17)- 
Tourkokratia respectively, this ethnic categorization was no more than a 
misrepresentation of the Ottoman reality (Kushner, 1984: 8). The Empire was not a
' Equal acconunodation of the Jewish concerns, the dominant minority group of the pre-modem Europe, 
was often denied and their disabilities would not infrequently be removed by converting to Christianity or 
by emigrating from the country they inhabited for centuries (Cohen, 1996). During the Middle Ages, for 
example, many Jewish groups were expelled en masse from England (1290), France (1306), Hungary 
(1349-1360), Austria (1421), Spain (1492) and from Portugal (1497) (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993).
 ^ Depending upon the existence o f an institutional instrument pertinent to the protection o f ethno-cultural 
others, when they were being expelled from various European countries, a leading Rabbi o f the Ottoman 
Jewry wrote to his coreligionists resident in Germany: “Ottoman country is a path to prosperity...do not be
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Turkish state in the modem sense of the word, but a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and 
multi-lingual Empire (Inalcik, 1996: 19). Yet, although Sultans had legal capacity to 
enact secular rules (kanun) , Islam was the mling religion at the state level (Barkan, 
1999; Berkes, 1998: 14; Inalcik, 1994: 70-75).
Compatible with dominant position of Islamic religion, the imperial order {nizam) 
incorporated a policy of ethno-lingual indifference. In the view of both Ottoman 
statesmen and the general public, an Ottoman subject was a Muslim, Christian or Jewish 
before being a Turk, Arab, Kurd, Albanian, Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian or Armenian 
(Davison, 1954: 844). The same religious classification characterized legal boundaries 
drawn between mlers (askeri) and the mled (reaya), on the one hand, and, among 
different sections of the ruled, on the other. Since professing the Sunni version of Islam 
was the necessary condition in accessing into the askeri class (Akgiinduz and Oztiirk, 
1999: 431), despite exceptions'*, it exhibited an ideological homogeneity in terms of faith 
(Inalcik, 1964a: 44). Although many Christian descents had also been admitted into the 
mling strata, they were recmited only after having been assimilated into the mainstream 
Ottoman value system (Menage, 1993).
Religious distinctions also drew horizontal divisions among different sections of 
the reaya which covered a multicultural, multi-ethnic, multilingual and multi-religious
lazy and come to this prosperous country...where everybody would safely live in his garden and enjoy 
gratitude o f peoples and state authorities” (Galanti, 1995:40).
 ^According to Barkan (1999), on behalf of the higher interests of the state, the Ottoman Sultans, though did 
never interfere with the affairs of family and personal law, had retained a legitimate capacity to enact 
secular rules in the field of public law, even when the canonical law had prescribed it differently. For 
Barkan, this was the peculiar aspect o f the Islamic law tradition which had provided a legitimate ground of 
discretion for the rulers in the affairs o f government so long as the canonical law clearly prescribed an 
adverse regulation.
'' Since it served to the interests of the Ottoman rulers to leave the subjects in peace as long as they admitted 
its rule and did pay their taxes regularly, many pre-conquest local privileges were sometimes preserved and 
adopted to the Ottoman administrative system without discrimination. This was an internal part o f the early 
Ottoman policy o f expansion which was called istimalet in Ottoman terms (Inalcik, 1998; 196-197).
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population particularly by the middle of the fifteenth century (Ortayli, 1995: 53-54). In 
accommodating distinct groups within its legal-political system, the Ottoman 
administration adopted earlier practices of the Islamic heritage and its religious doctrines. 
The imperial population was divided, on the one hand, into two religious categories of the 
Muslims and non-Muslims. The former, in the eyes of the Muslim rulers, constituted a 
compact religious brotherhood of “umma” or the “millet-i îslamiye”. It was doctrinally 
believed that there would be no sub-division within the umma community of the Muslim 
peoples. However, having been assessed on the origins of religions, non-Muslim sections 
were classified into two categories of “acceptable” and “non-acceptable” infidels: 
polytheists who did not have a divine origin and those of the “Peoples of the Book” (ahl 
al-kitab) who, though went to heresy over time, maintained a Godly origin. It was 
affirmed that only the latter group would be granted protection, dhimmi status, which 
secured a legitimate ground for the persistence of their communal distinctions.^ In 
Islamic tradition, the Jewish and Christian communities were the major groups belonging 
to the dhimmi category (Ercan, 2001,1-2; Gibb and Bowen, 1962: 207-208).^
Islamic tradition associated legal-political framework of the millet system with 
the instructions of the Qur’an and the practices of the Prophet (Aydın, 1999). In *
 ^ Despite the fact that Islamic tradition prescribed assimilation (conversion) or extermination o f the 
polytheist groups, in some circumstances, like Persia and India, the effect o f state protection was extended 
also to those groups who did not belong to legally admitted persuasions (Gibb and Bowen, 1962: 208).
* Despite its Islamic nature in the Ottoman context, the framework o f the millet system was not an Islamic 
innovation. Although the Ottoman administration and its Muslim predecessors improved the system in 
many aspects, the policy of religious diversity was, in fact, a long established practice of the encien regime. 
Apart from Roman, the Byzantine and the medieval empires, the pre-Islamic and non-Muslim states o f the 
Middle East had allowed subject communities, though in an subordinate and inferior position, to retain and 
practice their own traditions under the general jurisdiction of a communal authority (Gibb and Bowen, 
1962: 121-213; Y e’or, 1985). In the Sasanid Empire, for example, Christian communities were allowed to 
follow their own laws and customs on the same footing as the Christian population o f the Byzantine 
Empire. A set o f parallel inununities was recognized to the Zoroastrian conununities resident in the 
Byzantine Empire (Besworth, 1982: 37-40). Major difference in the Islamic tradition was the fact that
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particular, the Prophet’s agreements, concluded with neighboring non-Muslim 
communities, were generally considered to have delimited legal borders of the millet 
system (Ercan, 2001: 3-5)7 The system was also rooted in the secular arbitration of ruling 
authorities. Lapidus (1992) suggested that as Islamic states embraced larger sections of 
non-Muslim groups, their regimes began to be governed not completely by religious 
norms but laws of political survival also entered into the scene. Nevertheless, although it 
had been developed and practiced in a contextual necessity, in view of Lapidus, after the 
millet system was integrated into canonical law, unequal and subordinate position of non- 
Muslim minorities was frozen. Similarly, Muhibu-din argued that the Prophet established 
a complete civil and political equality between Muslims and non-Muslims during his 
lifetime. But, egalitarian system of the Prophet, in his view, degenerated into inegalitarian 
ways of treatment by the secular acts of the succeeding rulers (Muhibu-din, 2000).
Bearing in mind its religious and political bases, we can safely conclude that, at 
least, distinct circumstances of those “Peoples of the Book”, the Christians and the Jews, 
had been granted state protection in the Islamic tradition. Ottoman Sultans remained loyal 
to this Islamic legacy. By the middle of the fifteenth century, the Ottoman state adopted a 
system of self-rule, that of the millet system, in order to accommodate religious 
distinctions of its non-Muslim “minorities” .^  The prominent non-Muslim subjects of the 
Empire, those of the Orthodox and Armenian Christians, and the Jewish communities.
administrative practices o f the earlier periods “ were given religious sanction by the Islamic doctrine of the 
People o f the Book” (Hourani: 1947: 20).
 ^ The Pact o f  Khabar, concluded between Muslim conquerors and the Jewish population resident in the 
city, for example, was generally acknowledged as the foundational practice allowing religious diversity 
under an Islamic rule. For the terms of the pact, the resident Jews o f the city were permitted to live in peace 
with their own customs and traditions under the protection of the Islamic sovereign but at the expense of 
several economic obligations and socio-political restrictions (Ye’or, 1985: 44-50).
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were granted communal autonomy in spiritual as well as secular fields including 
religious, educational, juridical as well as fiscal affairs (Eryilmaz, 1990: 17’30).^
The legal-political formulation and practices of the classical millet system 
constrained the Republican framework and practices in the field of minority treatment. 
The Turkish version of inclusion/exclusion practices took shape under the influence of 
the basic parameters of the classical millet system. Because of this, this part of the thesis 
summarizes basic parameters of the Ottoman practice as it elates to the criteria of 
minority/majority classification and the official treatment of the “minority”.
5.2.1. Inegalitarian Treatment
Communal compartmentalization of the Ottoman nizam provided significant 
guarantees pertinent to the protection and promotion of religious distinctions of the 
subject peoples. However, what governed the Ottoman nizam was not the principle of 
equality but a certain version of justice (adalet) which recognized equality neither 
between the rulers and the ruled nor among different sections of the ruled. In a Platonian 
understanding of justice,^^ the Ottoman version of adalet prescribed, instead, to secure to
 ^ Although the Ottoman administration systematically adopted the instrument of millet system after the 
conquest of Istanbul (1453), similar practices had been applied before the given date, particularly, in 
relation to the government of the Orthodox and Jewish communities (Gibb and Bowen, 1962: 213-214).
 ^ Contrary to the generally held arguments, it was also suggested that despite the Ottoman administration 
permitted persistence of the non-Muslim particularities, these were not an integral part of the administrative 
system but remained in the form of ad hoc arrangements throughout the its classical period. In this view, 
the Ottoman policy of religious tolerance, exhibited in the form of the millet system, gained an institutional 
aspect only towards the middle of the nineteenth century (Braude, 1982).
According to Plato, democracy, the rule of poor majority, provides equal rights to each member of the 
polity. Fathers and sons, and citizens and foreigners are relegated to an equal level. In so doing, for Plato, 
unequal cases are treated equally in contravention with the true spirit o f justice which necessitates, in fact, 
unequal treatment of unequal cases (Şenel, 1991: 192). Although it is uncertain to what degree the thought 
of Plato influenced Ottoman political philosophy, it is acknowledged that the Empire derived the basis of 
its ideal rule partly from the Plato’s absolute ruler, standing apart from the society he rules, responsible 
only to God or to his own highest self, regulating different orders of that society in the light o f principles of 
justice (Hourani, 1974: 69)
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each of the communal groupings a legal status no less and no more than they deserved
(Berkes, 1998: 11). Communal autonomy had thus nothing to do with originally modem
concepts of universal equality or non-discrimination embedded in the discourse of the
Enlightenment philosophy of natural rights. In the absence of the latter, in conformity
with the inegalitarian formulations of its age, the instmment of the millet system relied
largely upon an idea of ontological inequality that was considered to have existed
between believers and unbelievers (dhimmis) (Ye’or, 1985). When defining main features
of the Islamic law Peters (1999: 9) put this fact as follows:
Within the Islamic territory, all lawful residents are protected by the law .,.how ever...not all 
persons have the same legal capacity or legal personality. Like all pre-modem legal systems,
Islamic law does not recognize the notion o f the natural equality of all persons before the law.
There are several categories of person and their legal capacities are different from each other.
According to the terms of the Islamic maxim of dhimma,^^ because, despite the 
fact that they were accorded state protection and a privilege of communal autonomy, each 
of the dhimmi communities obtained a lower socio-political and legal status as compared 
to those of the Muslim subjects. Thus, persistence of non-Muslim peculiarities within the 
legal-political order of the dar al-lslam}^ was conditioned on a set of inegalitarian and 
discriminatory treatment. Because of this, similar to the European ancien régime, the 
corporate compartmentalization of the millet system was formulated and practiced under 
an inegalitarian articulation of the socio-political and legal spheres. Rights and 
obligations were unequally distributed to Muslim and the dhimmi groupings.
“ It is a well-known fact that such provisions were not an innovation and unique for the Islamic doctrine 
and practice. The Jewish population o f the Byzantine Empire used to be subjected similar practices of 
discriminatory treatment. The Islamic heritage, including the Ottoman lands, hence, was already familiar 
with the unequal treatment o f religious minorities. In that sense, apart from canonical foundations, the 
Islamic maxim o f dhimma might have borrowed from traditional-secular aspects rooted in the policies of 
the preceding regional states (Bosworth, 1982; Y e’or, 1985:49).
In the classical doctrine o f Islam, dar al-Islam  (the land o f Islam) means the whole territory in which the 
law o f Islam (Sharia) prevails (Abel, 1993: 127).
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Nevertheless, it seems unjust to underestimate significance of religious diversity 
provided by the practices of the millet system. Braude and Lewis (1982: 9) rightly 
suggested that “if the law forbids them to rise above it, it also forbids Muslims to drag 
them down below it”. It was in this sense that the Ottoman non-Muslims obtained a 
legally secure ground of existence. Whatever the form of discriminatory treatment, 
Muslim rulers were bound not to subject their dhimmi peoples to any form of persecution 
(Ercan, 2001, 8-9). However, dominant position of the Muslim side tended almost always 
to make the situation of the non-Muslims vulnerable. In particular, when Muslim rulers 
began to think that their dhimmi subjects were violating terms of the dhimma contract, 
such as by revolting against the Muslim authority, punishment would then be considered 
legally valid (Braude and Lewis, 1982: 7-8).
Thus, religious diversity of the millet system “should not be equated with 
religious liberty in the modem understanding of human rights because traditional 
tolerance does not imply equality of rights” as Bielefeldt (2000: 107) observed. The idea 
of equal rights and duties was alien to the classical Ottoman system. In accordance with 
the norms of hierarchically stratified population, the imperial administration, in its 
classical socio-political and legal system, subjected Muslim and non-Muslim subjects to 
the effect of inegalitarian legal principles (Aslan, 1995: 107-109). It was because of this 
that the framework of the millet system was usually examined on the basis of the concept 
of religious “tolerance” which concealed within itself an institutionalized form of 
inequality and discrimination.'^ The concept indeed entailed an unequal form of
Pointing out hierarchical implications o f the word “tolerance” (hoşgörü), Mario Levi indicated the fragile 
aspect of the concept by maldng an interesting comparison between the Turkish words "hoşgörü' and 
'horgörü" (intolerance). According to Levi, as only one letter (ş-r) makes difference in each word, the 
practices of tolerance would easily turn into hatred and discriminatory acts and treatment. Because o f this.
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relationship in the sense that the unbelievers were tolerated to exist with their belief 
systems and religious practices but at the expense of some discriminatory obligations and 
responsibilities (Ye’or, 1985: 98-101; Yumul, 1998).
Although it granted significant freedoms as compared to its age, an inegalitarian 
practice of Islamic tolerance drew the limits of the communal autonomy in the Ottoman 
millet system. Rights, freedoms and obligations were distributed to Ottoman individuals 
not on the egalitarian basis of their political membership, which is the legal-political 
connection with the Ottoman state, but on the particularistic basis of their communal 
membership legally and politically recognized within the framework of the millet system. 
The religious diversity of the imperial administration represented an inegalitarian 
formulation of “tolerance” having nothing to do with modem concepts of 
multiculturalism or socio-political pluralism.'"*
5.2.3. Rights and Obligations
The Ottoman administration devolved a number of state functions to the corporate 
authority of millet administrations. Many aspects of spiritual, judicial and administrative 
matters, as such communal education, internal taxation, social welfare, health as well as 
the execution of legal proceedings and some fiscal policies, were entmsted to the 
legitimate concern of the millet leadership (Eryilmaz, 1992: 34-37). Luke gave a good 
summary of the scope of the communal autonomy in his following statement:
Levi prefers to elaborate the question o f minority rights or other inter-communal relations in terms of rights 
and freedoms (interview).
Kymlicka (1995: 150-185), for example, has claimed that a liberal form of multiculturalism requires 
individual freedom within group as well as equality between groups. In his view, although the Ottoman 
millet system represented the most developed form of religious pluralims, it lacked egalitarian principles in 
the sense that it recognized neither individual freedom within nor equality between groups.
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The millets were autonomous in spiritual and in certain administrative and judicial matters.
Their jurisdiction embraced, in the religious sphere, clerical discipline; in their administrative 
sphere, the control o f their properties, including cemeteries, education and churches; in the 
judicial sphere, marriage, dowries, divorce and alimony, civil rights and, in some millets, 
testamentary dispositions (cited in Hourani, 1947: 21).
Thus, although the millet classification was drawn upon religious distinctions of 
subject peoples, rights, freedoms and privileges went beyond purely religious issues. The 
scope of millet autonomy included spiritual as well as temporal matters so long as it was 
not directly related to the use of political power. The legal scope and practices of the 
millet system guaranteed (Bozkurt, 1996: 14-32; Akman, 1999):
1-
2-
3-
4-
5-
6-
freedom of religion and conscience which included prominently the
freedom of action in the affairs of practicing religious instructions.
freedom of learning and teaching communal characteristics, whether
customary or religious, without the interference of a state-sponsored
and centrally administered educational system.
communal freedom in the management of educational establishments
and deciding curriculum to be followed therein.
freedom of executing, particularly those judicial cases relating to
personal status and family law, including affairs of marriage, divorce,
and inheritance, in the communal courts based un religious and
traditional codes of the millet community.
communal mandate in registering population statistics relating to the 
matters of birth, marriage or death.
freedom of collecting a sum of communal taxes in order to finance 
administrative needs of the millet.
It was through the use of the said socio-economic, judicial, administrative as well 
as religious autonomy that millet leaders largely guaranteed preservation of their 
communities as compact entities without having been assimilated into the dominant 
Muslim value system (Hourani, 1947: 21). However, rights, freedoms or privileges of the 
millet system were not based upon an egalitarian formulation. By contrast, in conformity 
with the foundational principles of the dhimma maxim, no egalitarian implementation of 
civil and political rights arose in the classical Ottoman context. In a time period during 
which differential treatment was usually associated with discriminatory treatment.
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communal freedom to diversity went hand in hand with measures of discriminatory 
treatment in the fields of socio-political, cultural, religious, juridical as well as economic 
matters (Peters, 1999: 9). Its inegalitarian scope included (Bozkurt, 1996: 7-32; Inalcik, 
1993)'^:
1- the use of political power was exclusively reserved to the benefit of the 
members of the millet-i hakime (Muslim millet).
2- non-Muslims were exempted from public positions and military service 
which were under the realm of the authority of the askeri class 
consisting of Muslim subjects (see also Küçük, 2000: 209).
3- in return for being exempted from military obligation, non-Muslim 
subjects were urged to pay extra taxes in the form of poll tax (cizya) 
and a special land tax (harac).
4- non-Muslim testimony was denied in the Muslim courts.
5- open religious ceremonies and displaying religious symbols in the 
public were not allowed even in those places where they constituted the 
majority.
6- protection of holy buildings were guaranteed, but it was also affirmed 
that no church or synagogue would be constructed or repaired without 
getting official permission.
7- no non-Muslim was permitted to marry to a Muslim woman though the 
reverse was legally accepted.
8- no non-Muslim building would be constructed higher than those which 
belong to Muslim subjects
9- non-Muslims were to dress in different styles and colors as compared to 
those of the Muslims.
10- non-Muslims were not allowed to ride horses and carry arms.
11- non-Muslims were required to settle in different districts.
Thus, although their distinct circumstances were taken under state protection, 
millet freedoms and privileges legally separated Muslim and dhimmi sections of the 
population. Communal restrictions relating to judicial, administrative, political as well as 
daily lives depicted subordinate position of the latter. The exercise of freedoms and the 
fulfillment of obligations were entrusted to the religious hierarchy of the millets. Because 
both freedoms and obligations had been formulated on corporate terms, the classical
These discriminatory practices, however, were not fixed throughout the reign o f the Empire. Many had 
gradually disappeared in the nineteenth century.
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millet system situated non-Muslim minorities under the corporate authority of millet
units. Legal status was attributed to the corporate body of the millet groupings. In the
absence of communal membership, no Ottoman individual could claim legal existence. In
the words of Gibb and Bowen (1962: 211-212),
The Ottoman government did deal with Dhimmis o f all dominions as members o f a 
community, not as individuals. This was a consequence, partly o f the general organization of 
Ottoman society, which...was essentially ‘corporate’, but partly too o f the nature of the 
Sacred Law. For though the Sacred Law regulates the relations o f Dhimmis with both 
individual Moslems and the Moslem state, yet, for the very reasons that is a sacred law, and 
that the distinction drawn between Dhimmis and Muslims is a religious one, it can not 
provide for the relations of Dhimmis with one other. They are outside its scope...It therefore 
leaves these ‘internal relations of the Dhimmis to be regulated by its rivals, the laws o f the 
religions to which they adhere.
This is to say, membership to the Ottoman State did not automatically resulted in 
an egalitarian political and civil recognition. Although state membership decided one’s 
eligibility for being subjected to freedoms and privileges, the set of freedoms and 
obligations were indirectly obtained though the declaration of communal membership. 
Thus, religious affiliation of an Ottoman individual decided his or her socio-political and 
legal position in the imperial administration. Although they were members of the same 
political community, under the circumstances, Ottoman individuals were considered 
primarily members of the millet compartments.
Corporate formulation and exercise culminated in the emergence of a corporative 
state consisted of “inward-closed” and strictly separated communities having no sense of 
social coherence (Rodrigue, 1995; Hourani, 1947: 22). The principle of adelet prescribed 
that each member and communal leadership stayed within the limits (had) of what they 
were granted. Since it separated communal groupings in rights and privileges, the 
classical system promoted institutionalization of a form of religious diversity but never a
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pluralist system of government. Neither the concept nor the practice of citizenship 
involving identical rights and obligations appeared in the Ottoman Empire before the 
nineteenth century (Davison, 1954: 845). On the contrary, the classical Ottoman State 
exhibited characteristics of a “federation of millets” or a “conglomeration of umma 
communities” (Braude and Lewis, 1982: 1; Ubicini, 1998: 27).
5.2.4. Non-National Composition
It is evident also in the religious classification of population groups, the classical 
Ottoman administration attributed an ethno-lingual indifference in its administrative 
system. It was in this sense that despite the term ''millet” literally meant "nation” in 
Turkish usage, the composition of the millet compartments exhibited essential respects in 
contravention with modem configuration of a nation based largely upon secular 
distinctions of an ethno-culturally as well as territorially delimited population category. 
Within the legal and administrative rationality of the millet system, the concept was used 
in the sense of a technical term which came to denote semi-autonomous religious groups 
having legal and political recognition (Ursinus, 1993).
Compatible with its religious basis, millet units were neither uniform in terms of 
language and ethnicity nor did they have a compact geographic concentration. 
Administrative authority, communal privileges and immunities were conferred upon 
millet groupings without taking into account territorial, ethnic and linguistic criteria. On 
the contrary, since the universal imagination of religion superseded sub-religious 
particularities, each of the millets incorporated whole of the believers of a religion or 
sectarian persuasion from various ethnic and linguistic origins and from all regional parts
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of the Empire (Vucinich, 1974: 87). Bearing in mind this “non-national” picture, Karpat 
(1982: 141-169) argued that common ethnicity and language might have strengthened 
local solidarity among the members of the same ethno-linguistic grouping but, up until 
the advent of nationalist currents, neither people identified themselves with the said 
particularities nor did the same characteristics entail political significance.
Apart from the religious configuration of the Jewish millet and of the millet-i 
Islamiyye, the profile of the Greek-Orthodox millet presented a good example to this non­
national or even anti-national composition. When it was officially established after the 
conquest of Istanbul, the Greek-Orthodox millet was organized not on an ethnic and 
linguistic criteria but a religious criterion with its inherent universalism. The Patriarchate, 
the head of the Greek-Orthodox community, profoundly adhered to the universalism of 
the Orthodox doctrine. Despite the fact that its members scattered over the lands of the 
Empire and divided along ethno-linguistic affinities, legal and administrative authority of 
the Patriarch symbolized the unity of all Orthodox believers. Various ethno-cultural 
groupings, including the Greeks, Serbians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Vlacks, Orthodox 
Albanians, Orthodox Arabs as well as the Gagauz Turks took part within the spiritual and 
administrative jurisdiction of the Patriarchate (Amakis, 1974; Clogg, 1982; Inalcik, 
1998).
Interestingly enough, it was a general tendency within the classical Ottoman 
administration to label each of the millet units with the ethnic connotation of its dominant 
group. However, this administrative depiction never signified political articulation of an 
ethnic congregation. Depending on the Greek domination in its administrative 
mechanism, for example, the Orthodox millet was labeled in the Ottoman context within
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the terms of the Greek-Orthodox millet {Millet-i Rum). Contrary to the modem 
aspirations of Hellenism, however, the notion of Millet-i Rum did not imply the Greek 
ethnic nationality. The name “Greek” indicated no more than the Orthodox Christians. 
(Karpat, 1986; Gibb and Bowen, 1962: 234).
Similarly, principles of non-territoriality and ethno-lingual neutrality 
characterized the Armenian millet as well. Although its ethnic connotation might have 
complicated its tme nature, the community was granted official recognition not because 
they were from a different ethnic or linguistic origin but because they belonged to a 
different version of Christianity. The Armenian millet, therefore, did not represent solely 
administrative conglomeration of Armenian subjects but embraced also other imperial 
groups of the monophysite believers including the Assyrians, Copts, Caldians and 
Nestorians, which shared a doctrinal affinity with the former in terms of sectarian 
affiliation. (Bardakjian, 1982; Gibb and Bowen, 1962: 220-230).
The human composition of the millet compartments did not resemble a modem 
model. Notwithstanding ethnic labels appeared at face value, millet units displayed 
genuine examples of “imagined communities of religion”. In this context, there was 
almost no room for free existence of individual or development of an upper Ottoman 
identity depending on political membership of the Ottoman State and its common 
territory. In the eyes of both state authorities and the general public, individuals were 
primarily considered not within the terms of Ottoman subjects but of the fellow members 
of communal groupings (Vucinich, 1974: 87).
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5.2.5. Limited Diversity
The classical millet system framed an institutional place within its administrative 
system particularly for the Greek-Orthodox, Armenian-Gregorian and the Jewish subjects 
who obtained legal guarantees pertinent to the protection and promotion of communal 
differences. The sole focus of the system, however, was on a few religious communities 
whereas it lacked accommodating many other distinctions of the imperial population. The 
classical Ottoman nizam confined measures of differential treatment, on the one hand, to 
the benefit of the two big Christian churches (Orthodox and the Gregorian-Armenian) 
and that of the Jews. Both ethno-cultural and sectarian differentiation of the same 
communities and smaller groupings of eastern churches remained unprotected or they 
were subjected to the authority of the former ones.
Concerning the sectarian distinctions, particularly those smaller churches of 
Assyrians, Copts, Catholics, Caldians, Nestorians, Melkites, Jacobites, Maronites were all 
exempted from the legal scope and protective scope of the classical millet system. Their 
legal status was decided in according to the dominant view of the “official churches”. 
Non-Orthodox Christian subjects, which were heretical in the Orthodox view for being 
monophysite in persuasion,*^ were classified as Armenians (Gibb and Bowen, 1962: 227- 
232). However, due to fact that almost all of the smaller churches had inhabited 
geographically isolated areas distant from the capital, it proved practically impossible for 
the Armenian Patriarchate to take these smaller non-Muslim communities under its
The Orthodox Church, in its doctrine, recognised that Jesus had both a Divine and a Human nature 
combined in a single person. But, the doctrine o f the monophysite churches argued that Jesus had a single, 
divine nature and denied the orthodox view that Jesus had a dual nature, fully human and fully divine.
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communal jurisdiction. In many cases, therefore, eastern churches kept their autonomous 
status as de facto millets and, in practice, ruled themselves (McCarthy, 1997: 130). It was 
because of this essential neglect that their legal connection with the political authority 
became ambiguous. Since legal status was obtained through communal membership, de 
facto millets were the members of a religious community but without having legal- 
political membership of the state. As a result, eastern churches could not obtain secure 
grounds through which they would protect and promote their religious particularities.
On the other hand, while tolerated religious and, in the Armenian case, sectarian 
differences of its non-Muslim subjects and fostered their institutionalization within the 
framework of the millet system, the Ottoman administration strongly denied not only 
ethnic and linguistic but also sectarian differentiation among Muslim people. Ottoman 
rulers, including Turks, identified themselves with the Sunni version of Islam and 
submerged particular identities within it. In general, Muslim peoples were officially 
viewed as constituting a compact and uniform community. In so doing, legal-political 
ramifications of the official recognition were extended to none of the Muslim elements 
who were totalized under an all-inclusive category of the millet-i Islamiyye or millet-i 
Muslime and was governed accordingly (Kuran, 1997).
Thus, although the Muslim population was by no means a homogeneous 
community in terms of both ethno-lingual and sectarian affiliation, sub-Islamic -non- 
Sunni, in effect-, particularities were disregarded in favor of religious brotherhood. All of 
the Muslims, including Turks, Kurds, Bosnians, Albanians, Arabs, Circassians, Cretans, 
were treated, in private and public, as the equal members of the Muslim millet
Because o f this doctrinal difference, monophysite sects, including Armenian-Gregorian and eastern 
churches of Syria and Egypt, were gravely heretical in the eyes of the Orthodox Church.
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(McCarthy, 1983: 7; Karpat, 1985). Because of this, various communal designations, 
such as "'milel-i saire" (other millets) or “cemaat-i muhtelife” (different communities) 
never depicted ethno-linguistic or sectarian groups of the Muslim community but almost 
always indicated non-Muslim millets of the Empire (Eryilmaz, 1990: 154).
It is significant to note here that even the term “millet” indicated the non-Muslim 
groups, at least up until the reform period of the nineteenth century (Ursinus, 1993). Yet, 
organization of the Muslim millet operated on the same grounds as those of the non- 
Muslim millets. It was viewed and regulated as the single community of believers, an 
umma community in the true sense of the word. State authorities attributed greater 
significance to the preservation of this religious unity. As a result, the Alevies in Anatolia, 
the Shia population of the Arab lands, the Zaidies in Yemen, the Nusairies of Syria, and 
the Druzes in Lebanon were all considered by the Ottoman administration as heretical. 
Hence, no official recognition and millet-system-like communal autonomy were extended 
to these heterodox Muslims (Somel, 1997; Somel, 1999/2000; Ortayli, 2000).*’
Although the system created a hierarchical order both within and between 
conununities, once their rights and obligations were laid down, members of the same 
conununity were subjected to the effect of identical freedoms, privileges, restrictions or 
obligations. Unanimity prevailed within the same community that tended to create a form 
of self-identification among its fellow members. It was in this sense that despite the fact 
that religious and legal barriers avoided emergence of assimilation or national integration.
It is also acknowledged that some heterodox Islamic sects, like Druzes o f  Lebanon, gained local 
autonomy in districts where they were strong enough to maintain it. Within this autonomy, these heterodox 
groupings possessed their own courts for deciding cases in accordance with their own customs and 
sectarian doctrines (Hourani, 1947: 20).
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legal-political unanimity within the same community encouraged development of a 
gradual intra-group homogenization.^*
Therefore, we can safely conclude that the Ottoman version of the millet system 
did not bring a comprehensive formula in accommodating religious others in its legal- 
political system. Borders of the official recognition and communal protection were 
exclusively delimited with the religious distinctions of three larger non-Muslim 
groupings. In parallel to the prevailing identity markers of its age, sectarian and ethno­
cultural differences, on the part of both Muslims and non-Muslims, obtained, in general, 
no relevance in the framework of the classical system.
5.3. From Millet to Minority; The Transformation of the Millet System in the 
Nineteenth Century
The nineteenth century was the “longest century of the Ottoman Empire” as 
Ortaylı (1995) rightly depicted it. For Ortaylı, despite the fact that the Ottoman 
modernization rooted in earlier periods, the most radical changes in the socio-political 
and legal fields of the classical nizam appeared in the duration of this century. 
Transformation of the Ottoman’s classical corporate structures of the millet system into a 
new system of minority treatment based upon an egalitarian configuration of the Ottoman 
population was one of the most pressing and problematic wings of this process. When the 
nationalist currents of the early nineteenth century harbored pillars of the classical millet 
system, the Ottoman rulers faced contemporary Western concepts of state, nation.
Many Bulgarian-speaking groups in Thrace, for example, came to consider themselves Bulgarian­
speaking Greek during the time of national dismemberment. In the same manner, when they adopted Islam, 
Slavic groups o f the Balkans, Bosnians and Pomaks, were largely considered o f being Turk (Amakis, 1974; 
Karpat, 1985; 49-55).
210
citizenship as well as a new version of minority treatment. It was in this context that 
Ottoman reformers vested greater efforts in the direction of creating an egalitarian 
Ottoman citizenship out of the “federation of millets”.
Bearing this historical fact in mind, before on elaborating egalitarian reforms, it 
will be useful to examine two major and essentially interrelated developments: 
internationalization of the question of Ottoman “minorities” in the hands of the so-called 
European great powers, those of Russia, France and Britain; and ethno-cultural and 
territorial, that is national, disintegration of the classical millets.
5.3.1. Nationalization of the Christian Millets and the Internationalization of the
Minority Questions
Notwithstanding its inegalitarian aspects, the classical millet system functioned 
well as long as religion remained the dominant source of identity for all Ottoman 
subjects. As Stavrianos (1974: 195) argued, by the late eighteenth century, “economic, 
scientific and political revolutions that transformed Western Europe also transformed the 
Turkish-ruled (Ottoman) Balkans”. In particular, after the French Revolution’s basic 
tenets, -liberty, equality and “nationality”- filtered down predominantly into non-Muslim 
communities, the classical Ottoman nizam came to prove short of securing national and 
territorial integrity of the state as well as ethno-cultural claims of subject peoples (Lewis, 
1965). Contrary to the premises of classical system, prominently non-Muslim concerns
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began to shift from anational or anti-national millets towards national forms constituted 
chiefly around ethnic, linguistic and territorial peculiarities (Karpat, 1982: 159-161).'®
It is acknowledged that not only Western ideas, but also diplomatic and armed 
support of the Western states played significant roles in the ethnic dissolution of the 
religious communities (Küçük, 2000: 212). Indeed, ethnic disintegration of millets often 
took an immediate support from the Western great powers (Macdonald, 1913). Western 
involvement in the Ottoman minority questions was motivated by political and economic 
concerns (Macdonald, 1913: 36; Davison, 1963: 18). However, inegalitarian practices of 
the dhimma doctrine also offered a convenient pretext which great powers frequently 
exploited (Ye’or, 1985: 80-84). Thus, as the inegalitarian nature of the millet system 
made the Ottoman non-Muslims susceptive to external interferences, the great powers 
gradually extended their “protection” to all members of Ottoman Christians. As a result, 
the Ottoman dhimmis, whose freedoms and obligations had hitherto been decided by the 
terms of the millet system, slowly moved into a framework of European protégés whose 
rights and obligation began to be fixed by foreign powers (Braude and Lewis, 1982: 32).
In fact, external protection and universal equality symbolized the termination of 
the terms of the dhimma contract. Particularly the concept of universal equality gradually 
undermined legitimate grounds of the dhimmi inegalitarianism. Major parameters of the 
classical nizam, therefore, disappeared. A significant disharmony in the channels of 
communication between Muslim rulers and the non-Muslim subjects that had hitherto 
been provided through mediating role of the corporate leaders, developed. Their 
membership to the Ottoman State became highly controversial (Gökbilgin, 1967: 94-95).
As a result o f nationalist disintegration, for example, foundational ties that had once brought together the 
Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks, Vlacks, Romanians, Gagauz Turks, Orthodox Arabs and Albanians with the
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It was in this context that principles of civil and political equality came to the forefront of 
Ottoman politics. Instead of millet privileges, peoples began to seek “inalienable rights” 
(Davison, 1954: 845-846).^° Under these circumstances, it was barely possible to 
maintain ideological and structural parameters of the classical system. Aware of this fact, 
Ottoman rulers began to renounce, for the first time, inegalitarian principles of the 
dhimma system in favor of creating a universal Ottoman citizenship cutting across ethnic, 
linguistic and religious identities of the subject peoples. The classical parameters of the 
millet system, based on a distinct principle of tefrik-i anasır (separation of elements) 
henceforth, left its place to a political project of ittihad-i anasır (union of elements).
5.3.2. The Politics of Ittihad- A nasır: Equality within Diversity
It became explicit in the early nineteenth century that millet categories, isolated 
from each other without having a common Ottoman identity, operated as physical and 
ideological basis of national awakening as well a pretext of external interference 
(Mentzel, 2000). It was in response to these internal and external developments that the 
Ottoman statesmen launched an egalitarian project of Ottomanism {Osmanlılık) in order 
to replace corporate millet structures by an Ottoman population of equal individuals 
(Davison, 1963: 405-406; Hanioglu, 1985). It was believed that once the non-Muslim 
subjects obtained equal treatment, they would no more feel segregated and oppressed by 
the state and would no longer strive for independence (Inalcik, 1994: 183-184).
Greek-Orthodox millet disappeared (Amakis, 1974).
Under the influence of the nationalist ideas, the non-Muslim minorities had come to criticize traditional 
restrictions of the millet system. In their 1804 upheaval, for example, the Serbian communities had 
demanded that the Ottoman administration would allow restoration of churches, public use o f bell and 
religious symbols (Tanor, 1995: 52).
213
Bearing this concern in mind, the Ottoman administration, by the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, disregarded theological principle of dhimma inequality and began 
to treat all Ottoman subjects in egalitarian terms of civil and political equality. The 
earliest sign of the new policy came in the first half of the nineteenth century (1837) 
when the Sultan Mahmud II conceded:
Our intention is that the Muslims shall be considered as such only in the mosques, and that, 
according to the same principle, the Christians shall be Christians only in their churches, and 
the Jews, Jews only in their Synagogues. It is my will that outside those places, where all do 
similar worshipping to their divinity, they shall all equally enjoy the same political rights, 
together with my fatherly protection (Karal, 1965: 67-68).
When speaking to the non-Muslim communities in the same year, Mahmud II 
similarly stated that he considered the Greeks, Jews and Armenians on the same footing 
as the Muslims. The Sultan insisted that all of the Ottoman subjects were under the 
protection of law and his “fatherly rule” whatever their religion might be (Tanor, 1995: 
52).
As was argued, one’s religion had hitherto been viewed, in official and public 
circles, constitutive of his/her socio-political and legal status. From this point of view, the 
words of Sultan symbolized formal termination of the millet system while it opened the 
doors wide to egalitarianism in civil and political matters. However, the Sultan’s 
statement promised no more than his “fatherly protection” (Karal, 1964: 596). Concrete 
steps in the direction of creating substantive transformation in the classical parameters of 
the Ottoman anden régime were taken during the Tanzimat era (1839-1876) in which the 
Imperial Rescript o f Giilhane (1839) represented the first step.
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5.3.2.I. The Imperial Rescript of Giilhane (1839)
In an interview, Neoklis Sarris^* proclaimed that the concept of universal equality 
is an inherited principle in the Ottoman heritage. According to Sarris, when they were 
seeking to replace the centuries-old institution of religious tolerance, the Ottoman 
reformers of the nineteenth century imported the concept of equality from the West.^^ As 
was argued before, although it constituted legal-political ties between state and its 
individual subjects, religious scope of the millet system had by no means indicated any 
word of natural rights. Socio-political and legal status of individuals had instead been 
decided not on an inborn equality but on the membership of a religious community 
(Karal, 1964: 595). This inegalitarian tradition was, for the first time, abandoned in the 
Imperial Rescript of Gülhane (Imperial Recript, 1956; Sonyel, 1994: 353-388).
Contrary to the inegalitarian vision of the millet system, which had already lost 
effect, the main objective of the Rescript was to re-establish legal and political links 
between state and its subject peoples on the egalitarian basis of citizenship equality 
(Küçük: 2000: 212). Thus, in consistent with the project of ittihad-i anasır, the imperial 
act aimed at creating an Ottoman nation of equal individuals independent of ethno­
cultural and religious identities. To this end, the document introduced innovative 
regulations particularly with regard to the legal position of the non-Muslim Ottoman 
subjects (Aslan, 1995: 108-109). It was in this sense that the act signified a breakthrough
Neoklis Sarris was bom as a Turkish-Greek in Istanbul but was sent to Greece in 1964 when the Turkish- 
Greek relations strained on the Cypms question. Currently, he is a Professor in the Department of 
Sociology at the Panteion University in Athens.
It is acknowledged that following radical transformations that appeared in the inegalitarian aspects o f the 
European ancien régime, the Ottoman nizam too slowly moved, by the early nineteenth century, towards 
universal rights and principles based on inborn equality of individuals (Shaw, 1992: 54; Soysal, 1997: 12- 
13). The principle o f universal equality, proceeded in the Western world along the equality of all social 
classes and o f all citizens, however, manifested itself in the Ottoman context in civil, political and legal 
equality o f non-Muslims with their Muslim equivalents (Inalcik, 1964b: 621).
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in the minority policy of the Empire. Unlike the preceding regime in which one’s religion
had decided his or her legal, political and social standing, the new document, for the first
time, incorporated a secular outlook in regulating civil, political and legal position of the
imperial subjects. (Inalcik, 1964b: 616-617; Arsal, 1940: 90-93).^^
Unlike the inegalitarian nature of the former order, the Ottoman administration
affirmed in the new manuscript the principle of legal equality without taking into account
religious differences. The Rescript incorporated, in fact, a set of administrative
regulations including a regular method of assessing and collecting taxes, of levying,
recruiting and fixing the term of military service, the abolishing of the tax-farming. Its
innovative aspect came from the fact that the Ottoman authority promised to apply the
effect of the new regulations equally to the imperial subjects whether Muslim or non-
Muslim. Principles of equal treatment before the law and of public trial were accordingly
confirmed. Most importantly, security of the life, liberty and property was guaranteed on
the grounds of citizenship equality. The document worded:
Full security of person, reputation, honor and property, according to the precepts of the law, 
are therefore granted by us to all the inhabitants o f our well guarded dominions, in order that 
all our imperial subjects, whether Muslims or other sectarians may without exception enjoy 
these royal concessions.
By this provision, the Ottoman State recognized that people would have 
fundamental rights and freedoms to be taken under state protection without any 
condition. Beyond doubt, similar guarantees used to be granted in the decrees of the 
Sultans throughout the classical period. But, for the first time, they were formulated in 
terms of citizenship equality (Kuran, 1994: 34). It was because of this that the Rescript
Despite its secular form and intent, the document blamed the decline of the Empire on deviating from the 
true path of the Sacred Law that was to be corrected with new regulations to be enacted on the principles of 
the Islamic instructions. From this point of view, the document would be seen a return back to religious
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was admitted the Ottoman version of the nineteenth century European constitutionalism 
(Inalcik, 1964b: 619; Soysal, 1997; 20-21). Although the document demonstrated a 
progressive step taken in this direction, its formulation did not rest upon a theory of 
natural rights and/or social contract (Aslan, 1995: 107-108). Rather, an instrumentalist 
understanding underlined the rationale of these regulations that were expected to tie the 
subject peoples to the state, avoid upheavals, increase prosperity, and all of which would 
strengthen the state (Inalcik, 1964b: 620).
Having been formulated under the concerns of ittihad-i anasır, the principle of 
equality was expected to correct many shortcomings of the classical millet system. In 
particular, by the implementation of the Rescript, the millet concept of religious tolerance 
was gradually replaced by originally egalitarian ideas of rights and liberties. The grounds 
of inegalitarianism, therefore, began to lose legal foundations (Ye’or, 1985: 98). It paved 
the way for abandoning the different and, for some cases, discriminatory treatment to 
such a degree that the non-Muslims began to obtain political and legal equality on the 
same footing as Muslim subjects. This goal manifested itself in the specific innovation of 
the reform that the non-Muslims were granted proportional representation in the local 
councils established during the 1840s (Davison, 1968: 99-101; Shaw, 1992). In so doing, 
non-Muslim minorities, at least in appearance, were emancipated from the restrictions of 
the classical dhimmi status and started to become equal Ottomans would take part in the 
political realm (Hizmetli, 1999: 124-125).
Thus, contrary to doctrinal supremacy of the Muslim millet, its provisions sought 
political and legal equality (Akgündüz and Öztürk, 1999: 434). Because of this, the
roots of the earlier periods. However, its religious colouring was a lip service addressing merely 
conservative circles o f the Ottoman administration (Inalcik, 1964b, 618).
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Rescript represented a radical rupture from the legal order of the classical nizam which 
had hitherto been based almost exclusively on the prescriptions of the Sharia 
(Engelhardt, 1999; 44-45). Bearing in mind this secular rupture, Courbage and Fargues 
(1997: 104) rightly observed that the manuscript marked the emergence of the first un- 
Islamic (if not anti-Islamic) secular doctrine in the Ottoman context. Indeed, a criminal 
(1840) and commercial (1850) code, on the basis of secular principles, were subsequently 
adopted and their execution was entrusted to joint tribunals in which Muslims and non- 
Muslims would equally be treated (Tanor, 1996: 77-78).
Unlike the expectations of the Ottoman statesmen, the principle of equality 
pleased neither Muslim nor non-Muslim subjects. After centuries of legal, political, social 
and psychological domination, the Muslim millet was not yet ready to have equal 
treatment with non-Muslims. In view of Muslims and the state bureaucracy, universal 
equality contradicted with Islam and traditional state structure (Inalcik, 1964c; Karal, 
1964: 582; Davison, 1954). Due to fact that it established direct links between the state 
and individual subjects, equality also challenged vested interests of the millet leaders who 
were reluctant to exchange their educational, legal and administrative authorities with an 
abstract concept of equal Ottoman citizenship.^'* Moreover, those non-Muslims who 
already drifted towards nationalist currents already felt no enthusiasm in equality, 
because, what would satisfy them was not egalitarian treatment within but secession from 
the Empire (Jelavich and Jelavich, 1977: 105).
Nevertheless, in seeking legal-political foundations of an inclusive Ottoman 
nationality, traditional parameters of the imperial policy in minority treatment were, for
Having these concerns in mind, the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate remained cautious towards the 
proclamation o f the principle of universal equality (Clogg, 1982: 199).
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the first time, officially challenged. The unilateral practice of religious tolerance, that had 
hitherto determined the scope of millet privileges, was renounced in favor of 
“constitutional” rights and liberties (Tanör, 1996: 78). In so doing, the Rescript greatly 
contributed to the socio-political and legal emancipation of non-Muslims (Engelhard!, 
1999: 59). This first move towards the establishment of universal equality, however, did 
not culminate in the emergence of an integrated society and a consolidated state. Many 
features of communal freedoms, privileges and restrictions were left untouched. Non- 
Muslim testimony was still unacceptable in Islamic courts. Discriminatory taxation of 
cizye and harac was still in force. They were not eligible for public employment. This 
egalitarian turn created, at most, a duality between the notion of an Ottoman nation 
consisting of equal individuals and the corporate millet structures. The succeeding 
document of the Reform Edict (1856) further strengthened this duality.
S.3.2.2. The Reform Edict (1856)
Unlike the Imperial Rescript which had largely been formulated and enforced by 
the Ottoman statesmen, the Reform Edict was formulated under the direct impositions of 
the European powers. The Edict, hence, provoked a more extensive and substantive 
transformation in the classical basis of the imperial regime of minority treatment (Kuran, 
1999: 104-110).^^ The document, therefore, further expanded the scope of guarantees 
conferred upon non-Muslim imperial subjects. In fact, major objective of the reform was 
to reconcile universal equality of the Ottoman citizenship without violating minority 
circumstances. To this end, the Edict indicated that the Ottomanist equality, preached in
In order to reaffirm the privileges and immunities of the non-Muslim communities, the Reform Edict was 
promulgated by the Sultan Abdulmecid on February 18,1856 (Reform Edict, 1956)
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the provisions of both previous and this imperial decrees, by no means implied leveling 
off communal differences. It was affirmed instead that the reforms intended to correct 
inabilities of non-Muslim communities prevailed so far but had come to contradict with 
egalitarian policy of the ittihad-i anasır.
The Edict, hence, confirmed traditional privileges while, at the same time, seeking 
elimination of persistent structures of inequality. To this end, it was acknowledged that 
non-Muslim communities would continue to enjoy already established immunities and 
privileges, this time, in an enhanced aura of liberties. Going beyond traditional 
limitations of the dhimmi status, therefore, it was affirmed that state would no longer 
interfere with the construction or repair of the places of worship or pious foundations 
belonging to non-Muslim subjects. Thus, in contravention with the instructions of the 
dhimma contract, new churches, synagogues, community hospitals or schools would be 
constructed, and, if necessary, those old ones would be repaired freely without seeking 
official permission. It was also recognized that non-Muslim subjects would practice 
religious ceremonies and carry religious symbols in public where they constituted 
majority of the resident population.
On the other hand, members of the non-Muslim millets were conferred the right to 
enroll in all public schools including military schools. Moreover, non-Muslim 
conununities’ capacity to open their own schools in all branches of learning was 
confirmed. In the same schools, the communities were also permitted to formulate and 
practice their own curriculum. In doing this, in contravention with the integrative 
objectives of the policy of ittihad-i anasır, communal designation of the educational 
system tended to perpetuate traditional divisions (Bozkurt, 1996: 56). In the judicial field.
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the Edict did nothing to disassociate legal matters and religious affairs. The treatment of 
those legal affairs related to family law or personal status, as such marriage, divorce and 
inheritance, were still in the realm of communal authorities (Akyol, 1996: 102). 
Nevertheless, in order to ensure egalitarian treatment in those cases relating to the 
criminal or commercial matters, the Edict promised promulgation of secular codes and 
the establishment of joint tribunals (Bozkurt, 1996: 57).
Provisions of the document concerned with the internal secularization of the 
millet communities as well. To this end, spiritual and temporal authority of the clergy 
was limited exclusively to the realm of religious matters. Secular members of the non- 
Muslim millets were involved in the administration of communal affairs that had hitherto 
been entrusted to the hands of the ecclesiastical leaders. In addition, religious leaders 
were made salaried employees of the state bureaucracy. It was laid down that religious 
leaders would no longer collect voluntary or assessed taxes from their members in return 
of religious services. Religious hierarchy, therefore, lost its exclusive authority in both 
state administration and community affairs (Engelhardt, 1999: 139).
As a natural extension of civil and political equality, non-Muslims were also 
included in the political realm that had been reserved so far to the members of the millet-i 
hakime, that is the Muslim millet. In this regard, Ottoman subjects, including Muslims 
and non-Muslims were considered eligible for public employment. It was affirmed, 
henceforth, that in addition to local councils, non-Muslim members would be accepted to 
the quasi-legislative organ of the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (Meclis-i Vala-
yi Ahkdm-i Adliye) which was the key organ in implementing the reform process.26
Established in 1838, in the year before the proclamation o f the Imperial Rescript, the Council was 
entitled to deliberate laws and reforms to be adopted (Seyitdanlioglu, 1994).
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Concerning the economic aspect of equality, the Edict promised liquidating the 
discriminatory taxation practiced so far in the form of cizye and harac. In fact, it was 
believed that the said taxes had been levied on the non-Muslim subjects for being 
exempted from military service. Contrary to the policy of creating an integrated Ottoman 
nation, once the principle of equality preoccupied Ottoman minds, the discriminatory 
practice had come to function as a demarcating barrier between Muslim and non-Muslim 
elements. Because of this, liquidating cizye and harac was carrying already a practical 
necessity for the prevailing Ottoman policy of ittihad-i anasır that would remove another 
pillar of the classical inegalitarianism.
The drafters of the document were well aware of the fact that civil and political 
equality required also equality in obligation. In this respect, it was recognized that non- 
Muslim minorities would be subjected to compulsory military service from which they 
had been exempted in the duration of the classical system. However, centuries-old 
communal cleavages did not yet allow establishment of a working army out of ethno­
religious diversity. In the absence of a sense of national unity, it was acknowledged, 
diverse composition of military corps would produce a dangerous mob consisting of 
soldiers suspicious of each other (Engelhardt, 1999: 143). Because of this, although 
principle of equality in military service was recognized, it was converted in practice to a 
military exemption due {bedel-i askeri). It was not before the last decades of the Empire 
that military service was generalized in the Ottoman state (Gülsoy, 2000).
It is interesting to note here that the Edict considered socio-psychological aspects 
of equality as well. The Edict banned the use of degrading social designations depending 
on peoples’ ethnicity, language, race or religion. Especially, the usage of the humiliating
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term "'gavur” (infidel) was forbidden from being used both in the official documents and 
the general public. However, it was quite difficult to transform this psychological aspect 
with an immediate official regulation. The word, in practice, has been conventionally 
used to pinpoint the non-Muslim minorities and continued to operate as an instrument of 
social discrimination.^’
To conclude, similar to its predecessor, the document intended to create an 
Ottoman population consisting of equal individuals directly connected to the state 
without having intermediating role of the corporate millet structures. In other words, with 
the two reform packages, the Ottoman administration sought, on the one hand, to 
dispense with corporate structures of the classical system in the direction of creating both 
a centralized state and a community of equal individuals integrated in the notion of 
Ottomanism surpassing ethno-cultural distinctions. It was expected, on the other hand, 
that once obtained equal rights and obligations, impaired from the communal cleavages 
of the millet system, non-Muslim minorities would no longer seek secession from the 
imperial administration. Thus, the centrifugal tendency of ethnic disintegration would be 
directed from liberation towards personal emancipation and social integration. However, 
similar to the previous document, while seeking to eliminate socio-political and legal 
grounds of inegalitarianism, it created a duality between the notion of equal Ottoman 
subject and corporate privileges of the millet system. In this respect, the Edict left behind 
not an integrated population but a society compartmentalized along the affairs of religion.
Mario Levi and Hrant Dink repeatedly pointed out the prevailing function o f this word in discriminating 
non-Muslims in their everyday life. For both minority intellectuals, the word “gavur” has created barriers 
before the development of a possible integration between Muslims and non-Muslims even in modem 
Turkey (Interview, 2001).
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education and judiciary. This continuity of communal compartmentalization obtained an 
institutional basis in the millet reforms of the years 1860-1865.
S.3.2.3. Millet Reforms: A Corporate Continuity (1860-65)
The provisions of the Imperial Rescript and the Reform Edict reflected the desire 
of the Ottoman reformers to create a political community of Ottoman individuals by 
removing corporate power of millet communities. It had been expected that political and 
civil equality would introduce a direct connection between state and society that would, 
in turn, direct peoples’ loyalties from communal groupings to the Ottoman State. Having 
provided this, universal equality of state-membership would be reconciled with the 
distinct treatment of ethno-cultural membership. However, the provisions of the 
documents proved also the fact that though the new regulations conferred a legal status to 
Ottoman individuals, many aspects of the communal-corporate rights were also 
preserved. The most outstanding form of the latter appeared in the Reform Edict which, 
while granting rights on the basis of individual existence, promised also reorganization of 
the millets on the grounds of corporate rights.
According to Davison (1963: 114-115), millet reforms aimed at overcoming the 
then prevailing incongruity of the Ottoman minority policy with respect to two major 
fields of internal and external dimensions. Externally, the Ottoman reformers believed 
that since the western interference depended upon the possibility of state interference in 
the internal affairs of the non-Muslim communities, legitimate grounds of external 
interference would be curtailed when internal rule of the communities would wholly be 
devolved to the corporate authority of their secular and religious leaders. Internally,
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however, they were seeking the creation of an integrated Ottoman nation out of the 
conmiunal corporate agents. Because of this, it was believed that individuals would be 
emancipated from corporate control of religious leaders whereas secular participation in 
the administration of millet communities would direct communal loyalties to the state. 
Therefore, in accordance with the promises of the Reform Edict, the three official millets, 
those of the Greek-Orthodox, Gregorian-Armenian and the Jewish communities 
underwent an institutional reorganization in the period between 1860-1865.
The Armenian Constitution {nizamnamef'^ presented a good example to the 
question of millet reorganization. The constitution, which was ratified by the Ottoman 
administration in 1860, introduced a general assembly consisting of one ecclesiastical and 
a temporal council. While the former reaffirmed traditional authority of the clerical 
leaders, the latter provided a channel of secular participation in the administration of the 
millet affairs. The general assembly was charged with electing the patriarch and the 
members of the two constitutive councils. The religious council was entrusted with 
affairs of religious instructions, religious education and ordination of clergy. The civil 
council, on the other hand, undertook, among others, management of secular education, 
hospitals, millet property, finance and judicial affairs. The final control of these councils 
was vested in the general assembly. Since secular representatives considerably dominated 
the membership of the assembly, 120 out of 140, it presented a secular turn in the rule of 
the millet. Although the patriarch was still the medium of communication between the
The first draft o f the constitution of the Armenian Millet, prepared in 1960 by the leading members of the 
Armenian community, was entitled as the “Constitution o f the Armenian Millet” (Ermeni Milleti 
Anayasası). But, the Port changed it to “the Regulation o f the Armenian Millet” (Nizamname-i Millet-i 
Ermeniyan) (Yumul, 1999/2000: 346).
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millet and the Ottoman administration, he was accountable to the general assembly for 
his actions (Yumul, 1999/2000).
Following the Armenian example, the Greek-Orthodox and the Jewish millets 
adopted similar constitutional regulations in 1862 and 1865 respectively. Alhough the 
power of the religious authority remained relatively stronger in the Greek-Orthodox 
millet, lay participation in the administration of both millets was institutionally secured. 
Hence, secular representatives of the millets were granted a say particularly in those 
secular affairs including financing, schooling, and judicial matters. The ecclesiastical 
authority was limited exclusively to religious affairs (Shaw and Shaw, 1982: 164-169; 
Bozkurt, 1996: 170-194).
In its exact form, constitutional reorganization of the millet administrations 
secured codification of the traditional millet immunities that had hitherto been adopted on 
an ad hoc basis of the imperial decrees. Because of this, except the issue of secular 
participation, the reorganization meant no more that transforming the customary 
privileges into written principles (Yumul, 1999/2000: 347-349). Thus, although Ottoman 
reformers had aimed at providing a direct linkage between the state and its individual 
subjects, millet reforms further reinforced intermediating role of the communal actors. As 
a result, non-Muslim minorities continued to have been subjected primarily to the rule of 
their millet organizations and only indirectly, if any, to that of the Ottoman State.
The essential concern of the Ottoman administration in these reforms was to bring 
about national cohesion inside and to diminish foreign interference outside. However, 
none of the objectives would be fulfilled. The reforms did almost nothing to drive 
minority nationalist aspirations into a legal-political identification of the Ottoman
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citizenship. On the contrary, constitutional codification of the traditional cleavages 
helped to re-emphasize the lack of homogeneity among Ottoman peoples. Millet 
communities obtained, except territorial control, structures and functions comparable to 
that of the modem states. Although the power of the clergy declined and some degree of 
secularization was created, religious segmentation was reproduced (Bozkurt, 1996: 194).
Most significantly, codification of religious distinctions became a landmark in the 
nationalization of the millet communities. Secular participation in the temporal affairs of 
the millet administration rapidly expanded the relevance of secular learning that greatly 
emancipated non-Muslim individuals from religious authority of the millets. However, 
what replaced their religious aspirations was not a sense and loyalty felt to an abstract 
project of Ottoman nationhood and the state, but political articulation of their ethno- 
linguistic identities (Davison, 131-133). In particular, the scope of millet autonomy in the 
affairs of religion, education, justice and administration was this time articulated in the 
form of “acquired rights” (Berkes, 1998: 158). As a result, traditional duality that existed 
between those notions of Ottoman citizenship made up of equal individuals and the 
communal membership of the millet groupings remained unsolved. If there appeared any 
dissolution in the classical structures, it was in the nationalization of the Christian 
communities who gradually moved out of millet consciousness directly into a national 
consciousness without ever having accepted Ottoman citizenship (Davison, 1963: 407- 
408). Bearing in mind the centrifugal function of the millet reforms, Davison (1963: 131- 
133) rightly suggested that “the old clerical obscurantism, which kept the mass of the 
non-Muslims in ignorance, was a better ally of continued Ottoman dominion, although 
not of Ottomanism, than the new order in the millets”.
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S.3.2.4. The Ottoman Citizenship (Tabiiyet) Law (1869)
The Ottoman administration had invested no concern in the issue of promulgating 
a citizenship law as long as millet system provided indirect channels of linkages between 
the state and subject peoples. Depending merely upon the intermediating function of 
corporate agents, the Ottoman statesmen felt no incentive to regulate the status of 
individual within the Empire. As was stated before, individual had been granted no legal 
existence in the classical system. The Ottoman state exercised rule over not individual 
subjects but corporate communal structures However, by the decline of the millet system, 
communal channels came to remain insufficient to provide the necessary connection 
between the state and its subject peoples. In order to overcome this deficiency, Tanzimat 
reforms attempted to redefine legal and political links on the basis of egalitarian rights 
and obligations. The objective was to create Ottoman individuals out of millet 
communities by replacing the priority of communal membership with an inclusive 
formula of state-membership. In doing this, it was expected that individuals would be 
transformed from subordinated members of the millet communities to right-bearing 
citizens of the Ottoman State.
However, it became evident in the middle of the nineteenth century that the 
egalitarian regulations proved insufficient to create a direct linkage between the state and 
individual subjects. Despite the sincere implementation of the reforms, many of the non- 
Muslim, for example, had opted for the citizenship of the western powers though they 
have never been to these countries. Instead of benefiting emerging scope of the Ottoman 
citizenship, many non-Muslims had received capitulatory privileges of the protégé status
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in economic, political and legal fields. From the legal point of view, under these 
circumstances, the Ottoman administration came to govern many peoples who received a 
“foreign” status or those who were caught between state-membership and that of the 
conununal membership. Contrary to the raison d ’etre of the Tanzimat reforms, new 
social blocks beyond the reach of the state authority were developed. This situation 
resulted, among others, in the multiplication of the legally and politically stratified 
composition in society (Bozkurt, 1998).
In order to eliminate this ambiguity that appeared in the definition of the Ottoman 
individual, the Ottoman State, for the first time, promulgated a citizenship law (Tabiiyet-i 
Osmaniye Kanunnamesi) in 1869 (Eryilmaz, 1990: 147-148). In conformity with the 
spirit of the ittihad-i anasır policies, provisions of the Law considered no religious 
criteria in determining one’s membership to the Ottoman State. The first article of the 
Law, for example, affirmed that irrespective of religious affiliation, the concept of the 
“Ottoman citizen” (Osmanli) would indicate descents bom from an Ottoman mother and 
Ottoman father, or only from an Ottoman father. It was also recognized that inhabitants 
of the Ottoman territories would officially be regarded Ottoman citizens and be treated 
accordingly unless it was proved otherwise (Art. 9).
The Law laid down also the conditions upon which one’s citizenship would be 
liquidated. In this concern, unlike previous practices, the Law incorporated the principle 
that if one adopted a different citizenship without having official permission, his or her 
Ottoman citizenship would be cancelled by the state (Art. 6). This meant that bestowing 
or suspension of citizenship vested in the sovereign authority of the Ottoman State rather 
than the berats given by foreign embassies.
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This proves the fact that following the rationale of the reform period, the law 
reflected the spirit of Ottomanism as it symbolized another breakthrough from the 
inegalitarian content of the Ottoman ancien régime. Instead of religio-sectarian, political 
and legal classification of the latter, the Ottoman Citizenship Law adhered to the secular 
formulations of the policy of ittihad-i anasır. One’s membership to the Ottoman State 
was decided independent of his or her communal membership. In so doing, the Law 
created a legal space through which individuals would claim legal existence over and out 
of the millet communities. In so do, the Ottoman Citizenship Law delimited legal borders 
of political membership (citizenship) out of ethno-cultural membership that had hitherto 
drawn one’s legal status in the imperial administration.
5.2. The Constitutionalist Era and Minorities
As long as the dhimmi status drew boundaries between Muslim and non-Muslim 
subjects, it produced also a socio-political and legal duality between the terms of state- 
membership and conununal membership. Nevertheless, it was this duality that separated 
cultural world from political matters while facilitating persistence of ethno-cultural 
peculiarities. In this context, peoples’ status was decided on religious but not on 
numerical size. The millet system was, in essence, not a “minority policy’’ in the modem 
sense of the word. It was a unique instrument of the Islamic tradition adopted in 
governing peoples of “other” persuasions that had nothing to do with proportional 
numbers of the various sections of the population. However, as the legal boundaries 
disappeared under the egalitarian premises of the Ottoman citizenship, relative position of 
the communal groupings began to be decided more on numerical criteria. The traditional
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Muslim/i/ft/mmi classification, therefore, began to be articulated in terms of 
majority/minority relationships (Karpat, 1982: 162).
Indeed, in spite of its theological basis, the Ottoman state had never identified 
itself, politically and ideologically, with a Muslim majority up until the nineteenth 
century. In addition to millet leaders, the devshirme system, for example, had operated to 
establish a balance at the political level between Muslim and non-Muslim interests (Gibb 
and Bowen, 1962: 210-211). Similarly, there was no understanding or practice of official 
language. The Greek, Latin, Hungarian, and Serbian languages had frequently been used 
in the Ottoman official correspondence (Inalcik, 1996: 24; Köprülü, 1999: ,122-125). 
However, by the collapse of the corporate millet structures, a gradual identification 
between cultural and political realms began to arise. A mutual rapprochement between 
state and Muslim population gradually developed (Karpat, 1988: 44-45).
When we consider the notion of “nation-state” as the identification of the state 
with an ethno-lingual or cultural community, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
nineteenth century reforms gradually transformed the Ottoman Muslim millet into a 
“Muslim nation”. Although the egalitarian policy of equality hardly succeeded in creating 
a coherent Ottoman nation out of communal millets, classical form of the millet system 
no longer existed. Beside the sole criteria of religion, numerical size entered into the 
picture in the Turkish minority rights regime in which non-Muslims’ legal position came 
to be decided on majority/minority relationships (Kedourie, 1988: 27).
The eventual congruity between the Ottoman state and the millet-i Islamiye 
acquired constitutional basis by the last quarter of the nineteenth century. While the 
constitutionalist era continued to uphold the ideal policy of ittihad-i anasır, it came to
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credit, legally and politically, the domination of the characteristics of the Muslim millet 
and the Ottoman version of the Turkish language. In one sense, this political-cultural 
amalgamation was the natural result of the modernization process. But, it reflected also 
the deep resentment of the Ottoman statesmen felt towards the failure of the equal 
Ottoman citizenship.
5.4.1. The First Constitutionalist Era
In the 1860s, gradual secularization of the Ottoman minority issues and the 
constant foreign intervention in the minority policies of the imperial administration began 
to receive strong reactions from various sections of the population. The Young Ottomans 
was the leading group in this regard. Prominent members of the group attributed the 
decline of the Empire, apart from the absolutist policies of the Tanzimat reformers, to the 
interference of the western powers and the disloyal activities of the non-Muslim 
communities. In their view, the Ottoman citizenship had resulted in the inequality of the 
Muslims. Since non-Muslims obtained a constant western support, in contravention with 
the premises of the ittihad-i anasır, non-Muslim minorities had obtained a privileged 
status. Although they never abandoned the ideal of citizenship equality, the Young 
Ottomans sought removal of both the Western intervention and the privileged position of 
the non-Muslim minorities (Rahme, 1999).
For the Young Ottomans, the grounds of external interference lied in the 
corporate aspects of the millet system that had been left largely untouched in the 
preceding reforms of modernization. In the view of the group, corporate communal 
structures would only be undermined after the fusion of millets (imtizac-i akvam) and the
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unification of Muslims (ittihad-i Islam) were secured (Berkes, 1998: 221-225). However, 
the fusion was by no means associated with those policies of ethno-cultural denial or of 
assimilation. The path to the accomplishment of this political goal was the promulgation 
of an inclusive constitution and a representative parliament (Berkes, 1998: 206). 
According to the Young Ottoman leaders, the two instruments would, on the one hand, 
operate as an integrative mechanism through which non-Muslim subjects of the Empire 
would be tied to the conunon interests of the motherland (vatan). On the other hand, it 
was believed that once Christian peoples obtained representation in the parliament on 
equal footing as their Muslim counterparts, foreign powers would find no legitimate 
ground of intervention but the reformist ideal of an Ottoman nation of citizens would be 
fulfilled (Rahme, 1999).
Thus, a coherent “nation” consisting of equal individuals would only be attained 
in the absence of both western interference and minority nationalism. From this point of 
view, in consistent with the ideal of ittihad-i anasır, the composition of the “nation”, in 
their mind, embraced all Ottoman individual subjects regardless of their ethno-cultural, 
sectarian or religious affiliation. It was in this sense that they inherited many things from 
the views and practices of preceding reformers. What made them “radical descendants of 
the Tanzimat reformers” was their instruments (Akçura, 1998: 26-27). To be sure, they 
did not content with ad hoc decrees but attempted to change superstructural organization 
of the state as a whole. To this end, hoping to bring together scattered communities of the 
imperial population in a common political identity, they prompted promulgation of a 
constitution and a representative parliament. Not surprisingly then, underlying rationale 
of the first Ottoman constitution (1876) reflected the policy of ittihad-i anasır which, for
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the Young Ottomans, had been preached but could not completely be attained since the 
reign of the Sultan Mahmud II (Kili and Gdzubuyiik, 1985: 31-44).
Therefore, in response to the secessionist aspirations of minority nationalities, the 
main emphasis in the constitution fell on the indivisible unity of the empire with its 
“nation” and territory. To this end, having been aware of the fact that territorial unity 
needed first “national” integrity, the document incorporated an egalitarian formula based 
upon the notion of universal rights and obligations equally applicable to all Ottoman 
individuals. It was in this context that, following the legacy of the Tanzimat reforms, the 
doctrine of the Ottomanism characterized the most outstanding features of the 
constitution.
Bearing the unitary objective in mind, the document adopted an inclusive term of 
“Ottoman” (Osmanh) (Art. 8). Thus, irrespective of religious, sectarian or ethnic 
adherence, all subjects were regarded Ottoman which was a political designation over 
particular identities. Accordingly, strong emphasis was put upon the achievement of civil 
and political equality between Ottomans whose individual rights and liberties were 
officially guaranteed (Arts. 9-10). It was recognized that apart from exclusively religious 
affairs, Ottoman individuals would be subjected to the effects of identical rights and 
obligations (Art. 17). It was in this context that the condition of public employment was 
divorced from its religious coloring and admitted that all Ottomans were eligible to 
public offices (Art. 19).
Concerning the egalitarian content, it was the constitutional codification of the 
preceding imperial decrees and represented another step taken in the direction of creating
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ittihad-i anasır. This view was explicit in the statement of the Sultan Ahdulhamid II who,
in the first secession of the Parliament, remarked:
Our fathers had been ruling different religious and ethnic communities over these lands. But, 
one task remained unfulfilled, which was to bring together all these communities under the 
principles o f a common law and a common allegiance. Thanks to all mighty God, we will 
accomplish this task. From now on, all o f my citizens will live under the auspices o f the same 
law, and all will be called as Osmanli which has been the connotation o f our dynasty for six 
hundred years (Kili and GözübüyUk, 1985: 47-48).
Wile recognizing distinct circumstances of the non-Muslim minorities, the 
constitution aimed at creating an Ottoman unity on the basis of a common law. Yet, it 
was also recognized that the principle of civil and political equality would in no ways be 
implemented in the form of uniform treatment. Many aspects of traditional privileges in 
the fields of religious, educational and legal affairs were largely left intact. Despite the 
fact that minority educational institutions were taken under the control of central 
administration, the constitution, for example, affirmed communities’ traditional capacity 
to open, manage, control schools and other educational establishments and to decide the 
curriculum to be followed therein (Arts. 15-16). Apart from guaranteeing the freedom to 
practicing religious instructions (Art. 11), non-Muslim groupings were permitted to carry 
out communal autonomy in the affairs of private and family (Arts. 17, 23).
On the other hand, while accommodated diverse circumstances of minorities 
within an egalitarian scope of the Ottoman citizenship, the first Ottoman constitution 
crystallized majority characteristics of the state as well. The legal position of the non- 
Muslim peoples came to be articulated in minority/majority terms. The political sphere 
began to be identified, for the first time, with ethno-cultural and religious characteristics 
of the dominant Muslim millet. A gradual congruence, hence, occurred between political 
and cultural spheres that had been located so far independent of each other. In this
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respect, although it had hitherto been the dominant religion in practice, Islam was 
constitutionally rendered the official religion (Art. 11). It was accordingly specified that 
the Sultan was not only the head of the state but also the protector (hami) of the Muslim 
religion (Art. 4). As a result, the Sultanate was politically associated with the Muslim 
elements of the population. On the other hand, Turkish language (lisan-i Turki) was, for 
the first time, specified as the official language {lisan-i resmi). Public employment was 
accordingly conditioned on the knowledge of the Turkish (Art. 18). Similarly, it was 
affirmed that parliamentary elaboration was to be held in Turkish (Art. 57), that is, 
deputies were expected to speak, write and read in the official language (Art. 68).
Although the constitution developed a majority identity in terms of religious and 
linguistic characteristics, apart from the terms of citizenship equality, minority peoples 
were provided a substantive right to differential treatment. Principles of civil and political 
equality were conferred without violating legal-political conditions pertinent to the 
persistence of minority peculiarities. Hence, legal grounds of “national” unity within 
diversity appeared at the constitutional level that reflected in the composition of the 
parliament as well. One-third of the Senate and the Parliament consisted of non-Muslim 
deputies (Ortayli, 2000: 213-221).^^ Unlike the priority of communal membership in the 
ancien regime, representatives were considered, first of all, individual citizens of the 
Ottoman state. Thus, state-membership obtained priority in the front of ethno-cultural 
membership. It was affirmed in principle that no communal existence would have a 
special voice in the general assembly in which Christians, Jews and Muslims were to be 
depicted in a legal category of Ottoman. Therefore, deputies were to be represented not
According to Karal (1982: 387-400), total number o f deputies counted 115, out of which 48 were from 
non-Muslim communities.
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on the basis of membership to a millet or ethno-cultural community but according to the 
proportion that they counted in a constituency (Art. 71).^°
It is generally admitted that despite persistent impacts of the millet concerns, most 
members of the parliament promoted Ottoman patriotism. It became evident not long 
after, however, that in contravention with the optimistic expectations of the Young 
Ottomans, neither constitutionally guaranteed citizenship equality nor parliamentary 
representation created a “national” integration within ethno-cultural diversity, let alone a 
common political identity. Although non-Muslim minorities were granted equal share in 
the political realm, nationalist aspirations continued to weigh minorities’ concerns. Ethnic 
disintegration lasted in an enhanced pace that culminated in the Berlin Congress (1878) 
which marked secession of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania, and internationalization of 
another minority question of the Empire, namely the situation of Armenians.^'
This great loss of territory convinced the Ottoman statesmen that the policy of 
ittihad-i anasır was nothing but a dream. Because of this, after he suspended the 
parliament in 1877, Abdulhamid II attributed much attention to the policy of ittihad-i 
Islam (unity of Muslims). The ideal of an equal Ottoman citizenship was, therefore, 
substituted with a “religious nationalism” seeking a coherent unity not only among the 
Ottoman Muslims but also Muslims outside the Empire (Berkes, 1998: 267). However, 
Sultan’s Islamist orientation by no means indicated the end of the politics of ittihad-i 
anasır. In response to the Sultan’s Islamism and oppressive rule, a liberal opposition, led
The principle o f ethno-cultural neutrality based on citizenship equality did not completely run in reality. 
In the absence o f a new electoral law, deputies were elected according to the procedures of the Provincial 
Law of 1869 {Vilayet Kanunu) which admitted proportional representation o f the millets in the local 
councils (Davison, 1968; 106-107).
According to the terms of the article LXI of the Berlin Treaty, the Ottoman government promised new 
reforms to be implemented in the eastern provinces considerably inhabited by Armenian minority 
(Hurewitz, 1956; 189-.191).
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by the Young Turks, came to the surface as strong advocates of the Ottoman 
citizenship.^^ The group and its political organization, the Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP), believed that in order to guarantee political independence, territorial 
unity and the coexistence of Muslim and non-Muslim citizens in the country, an 
egalitarian formula of rights and liberties must have been restored in the Empire (Ahmad: 
1986: 17-36).
5.4.2. The CUP and the Minority Question
According to Bayur (1991: 115), the CUP’s minority policy was shaped by deep
feelings of resentment and suspicion. Under the influence of the Western interference and
the non-Muslim secessionism, the CUP had come to believe that religious segmentation
would no longer be maintained intact. Yet, similar to its predecessors, this would be
accomplished, in their opinion, not by the replacement of the Sultan’s oppressive policy
with another oppressive regime (Bayur, 1991: 5-11). Their prime objective was to restore
the policy of ittihad-i anasır. The CUP program (Tunaya, 1998: 70-75) accordingly read:
In order to warn out Muslim and Christian countrymen against the system of government of 
the present regime, which violates such human rights as justice, equality, and freedom, which 
withholds all Ottomans from progress and surrenders our country to foreign domination, an 
Ottoman Society o f Union and Progress has been formed, composed o f men and women all 
of whom are Ottomans.
Thus, the Young Turks expected to create a national unity made up of Ottoman 
citizens irrespective of religious or ethno-cultural origin. Writing to the foreign 
consulates, the CUP leaders proclaimed that the Committee aimed at uniting all Ottoman 
peoples, including Muslims, Vlachs, Jews, Armenians, Albanians, Bulgarians, Greeks
Despite the ethnic designation o f ‘Turk” in their name, no fraction o f the Young Turks ever used this 
word, which remained a western designation, but continued to style themselves as Ottomans (Berkes, 1998: 
305).
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and Arabs, under its inclusive organization (Kologlu, 1998: 30-31). Indeed, the CUP 
program stipulated that the Committee would work for the common good of the Ottoman 
peoples whatever their nationality (milliyet), ethnicity (kavmiyet), gender (cinsiyet) and 
sectarian adherence (Art. 2). In so doing, the program projected an Ottoman citizenship 
based on those principles of justice {adalet), equality (musavat), freedom (hurriyet) and 
fraternity (uhuvvet) (Tunaya, 1998: 95; Bayur, 1991: 8). They believed that once the 
oppressive rule collapsed, Ottoman individuals, irrespective of religious and linguistic 
characteristics, would unite under the rule of freedom and cease to seek political 
independence. In the minds of the Young Turk leaders, civil and political equality were 
an instrument to guarantee the future (beka) of the country (Tanor, 1996: 130).
Despite the fact they were suspicious about the sincerity of the non-Muslim
minorities, the CUP cadres, therefore, determined to attain an Ottomanist unity within
ethno-religious diversity of its cosmopolitan population. It was declared in 1906 that:
The Committee desires to create a genuine equality between Kurdish, Turkish, Bulgarian,
Arab, Armenian and other citizens o f the country and to unite them in its prosperity and the 
suffering. This country belonged to neither Turkish or Bulgarian or Arabic peoples but to 
each o f the Ottoman individual. All o f the Ottoman individuals, who recognized and 
confirmed principles o f this fact, are our fellow citizens irrespective o f their ethnicity or 
religion. Our Committee is not a nationalist fraction. Without regarding ethnic or religious 
affiliation, those who intended to divide this country, including Turks, are our enemies 
(Bayur, 1991: 116).
Thus, notions of “unity” and “progress” were the twin pillars of the CUP’s 
political philosophy. The concept of “union”, in their mind, indicated not assimilation of 
minority groups into a monolithic project of ethno-cultural form but a task of creating 
sincere unity {ittihad-i samimi) based on humanitarian and patriotic feelings of 
citizenship equality (Art. 3) (Tunaya, 1998: 76-80). Because of this, while confirming 
non-Muslim minorities’ rights to civil, political and legal equality, the CUP programs and
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declarations also affirmed traditional millet immunities particularly in the affairs of 
religion and education (Tunaya, 1998: 70-162).
Thus, the CUP adopted substantive principle of ethno-cultural diversity which 
embedded in the reformist ideal of ittihad-i anasır. However, the CUP believed that 
millet segregation was incompatible with the execution of political sovereignty and the 
ideal of citizenship unity. Non-Muslim minorities’ integration into an egalitarian 
Ottoman unity was to be the precondition of citizenship equality.^^ In their minds, 
corporate privileges had hitherto operated as an instrument of secessionist currents and 
external interference, on the one hand, and inhibited emergence of a genuine equality 
between Muslims non-Muslim minorities, on the other (Ahmad, 1982: 403-405). Hence, 
after the constitutional regime was restored in 1908, the CUP inclined to obliterate the 
corporate aspects of millet autonomy in the affairs of legal, political and administrative 
fields. In their view, traditional communities would, at most, be spiritual entities in which 
individuals would feel ecclesiastical affiliation to their own faith but temporarily would 
belong to state’s political authority (Berkes, 1998: 330-331).
The CUP authorities, therefore, attempted to dissolve legal, administrative and 
educational privileges of the non-Muslim minorities. To this end, the Law o f Associations 
prohibited political associations based on or bearing the name of ethno-cultural or 
national groups. Greek, Bulgarian and other minority clubs were immediately closed 
down (Lewis, 1968: 217). In following, the military exemption due (bedeli-i askerî) was 
cancelled in 1909 and non-Muslims were subjected to the terms of military obligation.
Talat Pasha is reported to have stated: “You are aware that by the terms o f the Constitution equality of 
Mussulman and Ghiaur was affirmed but you one and all know and feel that this is an unrealisable ideal. 
The Sheriat, out whole past history and the sentiments o f hundreds o f thousands o f Mussulmans and even 
the sentiments o f the Ghiaurs themselves, who stubbornly resist every attempt to ottomanise them, present
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Apart from being a natural extension of the principle of citizenship equality, the act was 
expected to operate as an integrative mechanism among the non-Muslim citizens who 
would come to identify themselves with the legal-political and social dimensions of the 
Empire (Gulsoy, 2000: 127-140).
On the other hand, minority educational establishments, in which curriculum and 
the language of instruction hitherto been decided by millet authorities, were taken under 
close scrutiny of the state. Apart from constraining the establishment of new schools, the 
Imw  on Private Schools {Mekatib-i Hususiye Talimatnamesi), dated 1915, urged minority 
schools to teach Turkish language and to instruct the Ottoman history and geography in 
that language (Sezer, 1999: 25-28). In particular, in order to make Ottoman citizens 
subject to the effect of a secular code, a new family law (Hukuk-u Aile Karamamesi) was 
enacted in 1917. The Law, for the first time, greatly disassociated the affairs of marriage 
and divorce from the judicial authority of religious hierarchy (Bayur, 1991: 374-376).^'*
The government attempted to revise internal rule of the millets as well. The 
Armenian Constitution {Nizamname-i Ermeniyan), to this end, was subjected to an 
essential regulation in 1916. In its new form, before being eligible to the position, the 
patriarchs were obliged to prove conditions of the Ottoman citizenship, to obtain the 
reliability of the state and community, to speak and write in Turkish (Ottoman) and to 
have knowledge about the basic laws of the state. The power of Patriarchate and the 
millet councils were considerably curtailed. It was affirmed that the patriarch would bear 
no power outside religious matters. The council of the lay members, on the other hand.
an impenetrable barrier to the establishment of real equality...There can therefore be no question of 
equality until we have succeeded in our task of ottomanising the Empire” (Lewis, 1968: 218).
Upon the application of the non-Muslim minorities, the scope of the millet system in family and personal 
law was restored in 1919 when Istanbul entered under Western occupation (Akyol, 1996: 70-71).
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was permitted to deal solely with religious and charity-based endowments of the 
community, and control on the community’s educational establishments was vested in the 
authority of the state (Bayur, 1991: 57-59).
It is significant to note here that these and similar regulations did not intend to 
dissolve minority identities but to create legal and political grounds of national unity that 
had remained unfulfilled for the reform period. As was underlined above, the CUP 
governments remained loyal to the policy of the Ottomanist cosmopolitanism as long as 
they believed that there was a chance to link non-Muslim minorities to the state. The 
notions of “Ottoman nation” (Osmanli Milleti), “Ottoman motherland” (Osmanli vatanı) 
and Ottomanism {Osmanlıcılık) constituted essential basis of their political philosophy 
(Tanör, 1996: 130). Although non-Muslims and the non-Turkish speaking Muslims 
wrongly viewed this inclusive policy as Turkish nationalism, in the Unionist minds, there 
was only one nation and that was nothing but the Ottoman nation (Küçük: 1987).
The c u p ’s enmity, as Atay (2001: 46) rightly observed, was exclusively directed 
towards those minority groups who were displaying divisive and secessionist tendencies. 
This approach was, in fact, a logical extension of the Unionist policy of ittihad-i anasır 
pertinent to the political project of national unity based on the principles of civil and 
political equality. However, despite the CUP’s Ottomanist orientation, the second 
constitutionalist regime too failed in its objective of creating an integrated Ottoman 
nation. Minority representatives in the parliament displayed almost no sentiment of 
Ottomanism but voiced more national aspirations of their minority communities (Tanör, 
1996: 159-161).^^ Indicating the failure of the ideal of ittihad-i anasır, Baso Efendi
The Parliament involved 288 deputies consisting o f 147 Turkish, 26 Greek, 60 Arab, 27 Albanian, 14 
Armenian, 10 Slavic and 4  Jewish representatives.
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(Boussios), a Greek deputy, remarked the then prevailing mood of minorities in the 
parliament that he was as Ottoman as the Ottoman Bank, which was a French bank in 
ownership (Ahmad, 1982: 409).
Thus, contrary to its fundamental objective of ‘union”, minorities continued to 
move out of religious-millet consciousness into a national consciousness without ever 
having accepted equal Ottoman citizenship. After the Young Turk revolution of 1908, 
Bulgaria declared independence, Bosnia-Hersegovina was annexed to Austria and Crete 
to Greece. Most of the Balkan Christians ceded to neighboring countries after the Balkan 
wars (1912-1913). Subsequently, Albania obtained independence (1912) and Arab 
provinces drifted towards separatist tendencies. It was in this context that the raison 
d ’etre of Ottomanist diversity almost completely withered away. This threw the CUP 
leaders ‘‘into a mood of anger, bitterness, and frustration” (Lewis, 1968: 214). 
Henceforth, the CUP policies started to shift from the political project of ittihad-i anasır 
towards an eclectic program of ethnic Turkism (Tunaya, 1998: 60).
Thus, their ethnic Turkism originated not from a deeply rooted ideological 
background but from the failure of the politics of ittihad-i anasır. It reflected a sense of 
resentment against the persistence of minority secessionism. As long as Ottoman 
statesmen believed that ethno-religious diversity would be united under a common 
Ottoman citizenship, great efforts were vested to win over minority groups. This attitude 
is obvious in Akçura’s Üç Tarz-i Siyaset (Three Ways of Politics) in which, having 
exhibited shortcomings of pan-Islamism and of Ottomanism, the author implicitly 
suggested to institute the basis of the new politics on the unity of Turkish peoples 
(Akçura, 1998). When he was answering Ottomanist criticisms, Yusuf Akçura
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subsequently made it rather clear that the Turkist turn in the policy of the Young Turks
had come to the fore after they convinced that there remained no chance to actualize the
ideal of ittihad-i anasır. In the words of Akçura:
When non-Muslims rebelled against the Ottoman State, the Port introduced a system of civil 
and political equality. It was admitted that the Empire would no longer adhere solely to 
Islamic doctrines. Having expected to unite different religious groupings, it was believed that 
peoples would henceforth share a common citizenship and to speak, to some extent, the same 
language, receive the same education, love the country with the same feelings, make 
sacrifices for and benefit equally from the common good. Muslims and non-Muslim citizens 
were treated on the same footing. Public offices, including prime ministry, opened to all of 
the Ottoman citizens. This was the general objective of the Tanzimat reforms but it remained 
a dream in the minds o f the rulers. The ideal would not be reconciled with the reality. (It 
became evident today that) this policy would no longer be lasted. Greeks and Armenians 
would in no way come to renounce their ethnic identity in favour of Ottoman citizenship. It 
seems no longer possible to assimilate Arabs, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Jews, Greeks, 
Bulgarians, Serbians, Turks and Armenians into a uniform identity o f Ottomanism. If it 
proved otherwise, we would readily give support to upholding this Tanzimat policy (of 
ittihad-i anasır) (Bayur, 1991: 431-433).
On the failure of the Ottomanist project of egalitarian diversity Lewis (1968: 218)
made a similar statement in his following words:
Whatever the measure of sincerity that lay behind the promises of the Ottoman Constitution, 
the march o f events soon made those promises unrealizable. The spread of 
nationalism...ended forever the ‘Ottomanist’ dream of the free, equal, and peaceful 
association of peoples in a... multi-national, multi-denominational empire.
One result of this failure, as was given above, appeared in the gradual growing of 
ethnic Turkism. The political project of “civic” nationhood, that had promised equal 
accommodation of the non-Muslim minorities within the legal-political structure of the 
Empire, began to be discredited. On the other hand, since the persistent minority 
secessionism threatened survival of the Empire, the failure prompted Young Turk leaders 
also to take radical measures. Due to fact that they had persistently denied inclusive 
promises of the Ottomanist policies and continued to engage in secessionist and fifth-
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column activities, hundreds of Armenians, for example, were deported from Eastern 
Anatolia towards the southern provinces of the imperial lands.^^
5.4.3. The Treaty of Sevres and the Failure of the Politics of Ittih a d -i A n a sır
It has been argued that the Ottoman statesmen, in the duration of the reform 
period, invested great hopes in the principle of citizenship equality in order to save the 
state from collapse under the centrifugal impacts of minority nationalism and western 
interference. It was expected that once provided with civil and political equality, non- 
Muslim minorities would no longer seek independence but become integral elements of 
an Ottoman nation consisting of equal individuals whatever their religion, ethnicity or 
language. However, egalitarian reforms could neither avoid disintegration of the imperial 
population nor did it prevent Western interference in the internal affairs of the state. The 
ideal of equal Ottoman nationhood, as was underlined above, has largely remained a 
dream in the minds of ruling classes. The final hit to this Ottomanist ideal came to the 
fore in the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres (1920) concluded between the Ottoman 
administration and the Allied Powers in the aftermath of the WWI.
Political clauses of the Treaty (Treaty of Sevres, 1956), indeed, made it clear that 
minorities and the western powers would no longer content with a framework of minority 
rights to be implemented in the then prevailing legal-political borders of the Empire. 
Instead, having limited the issue of minority protection to the borders of a smaller 
Turkish territory (Section I), almost whole of the minority peoples were either granted 
independent statehood or annexed to their kin states. In the Eastern Anatolia, for
The amount of Armenian deportees changes from source to source. As Turkish sources counted it 
around 1.176.000, foreign numbers amounted up to 1.600.000 (Courbage and Fargues, 1997: 126-127).
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example, an Armenian state was created (Section VI). Part of the Western Anatolia was 
left to the Greek control that was subsequently to be ceded to that state (Section IV). 
Most significantly, apart from non-Muslim peoples, in contravention with the traditional 
Ottoman policy of the Muslim millet, ethno-cultural distinctions of the Muslim 
population was conferred due recognition. Putting aside secession of the Arab lands, the 
Treaty established an autonomous Kurdish administration in the eastern and south-eastern 
regions where to be seceded from the Empire within a year (Section III).
In so doing, the Treaty of Sevres signified the final collapse of the politics of 
ittihad-i anasır. Civil and political equality culminated not in the creation of an Ottoman 
national unity within ethno-cultural diversity but in the disappearance of the Ottoman 
State. The process of ethno-cultural disintegration that had gradually proceeded along the 
demarcating lines of minority circumstances was almost complete. It was this failure that 
prompted much resentment among the Turkish-Muslim peoples of the core lands and the 
rulers of the Empire, prominently the Turks, who had invested great hopes in the 
principle of citizenship equality to save the state from collapse. Non-Muslim minorities 
and the persistence of communal immunities hence came to be considered one of the 
major causes behind the national and territorial dissolution of the Empire (Sonyel, 1993).
The issue of minority rights and the western interference relating to the question 
of minorities, therefore, came to be associated with centrifugal drives of ethno-religious 
groups not with those notions of respect, freedom, liberty or equality to be implemented 
within the borders of a shared polity. In particular, taking into account the role of the 
western powers in the dismemberment of the Empire and their intervention in the internal 
affairs of the state on behalf of the Christian minorities, the latter came to be regarded
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natural allies of the external enemies and pioneers of ethnic dismemberment (Gibb and 
Bowen, 1962: 232). On most occasions, in the eyes of the Turkish-Muslim peoples, non- 
Muslim minorities represented the “foreign”, “unreliable” and “disloyal” elements of the 
population who were to be treated accordingly. It was this legacy that has inserted greater 
impacts on the form and practices of the Turkish minority rights regime (Akgam, 1995: 
35-112).
5.5. Conclusion
Parallel to the practices of the European anden regime, the Turkish traditional 
regime of the classical Ottoman period disassociated political realm from ethno-cultural 
world. Ethno-cultural affairs were largely entrusted to the control of the corporate 
organizations of religion within an inegalitarian framework of rights and obligations. 
While non-Muslim minorities were provided with instruments of ethno-cultural 
protection, inegalitarian nature of the canonical law rendered the issue of universal 
equality out of question. Policies of different treatment in the classical Ottoman 
administration went hand in hand with practices of inegalitarian treatment which situated 
non-Muslim minorities in a second-class position as compared to the Muslim subjects.
It was not before the early decades of the nineteenth century that an idea of 
citizenship equality developed in Ottoman lands. Under the driving impacts of the 
minority nationalism and of the external interference, Ottoman reformers of the 
nineteenth century attempted to reconcile two notions of equality and different treatment 
in a substantive formula of rights and obligations. To this end, while no specific concern 
was attributed to the distinct circumstances of the Muslim subjects, non-Muslim members
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of the Ottoman population began to be treated on the same footing as those of the 
Muslims. Major reform documents of the period aimed at guaranteeing citizenship 
equality of the non-Muslims. However, corporate aspects of the classical system would 
hardly be melted away but largely preserved intact. Because of this, egalitarian turn of the 
reform period resulted in the emergence of a duality between the notion of Ottoman 
citizenship consisting of equal individuals and the corporate membership of millet 
system. Almost no mutual identification between the Ottoman state and its non-Muslim 
subjects would be attained. The latter, instead, continued to consider themselves 
primarily members of the corporate communities.
The reformist ideal of the “Ottoman unity within diversity”, the politics of ittihad- 
i anasır, could not obtain a common appeal. In place, egalitarian reforms accompanied by 
the gradual disintegration of both Ottoman population and territory. The reform process 
followed prospective anticipation of Resit Pasha, the father of the Imperial Rescript, who 
remarked that away from being an instrument of saving the country from collapse, the 
Reform Edict was “a dangerous instrument which would bring complete destruction of 
the country” (vasita-i tahrib-i memleket) (Engelhardt, 1999: 138).
In contravention with the essential incentives of the egalitarian reforms, the 
Ottoman administration could not prevent the further loss of Ottoman territories and 
peoples. Emancipation of the dhimmi peoples from inegalitarian and discriminatory 
doctrines and practices of the classical system did not satisfy their secessionist 
aspirations. In fact, what Ottoman authorities would not see, if even they wanted to, was 
the fact that non-Muslim minorities were not seeking equality within but political 
liberation without the Empire. Once harbored by the winds of nationalism, ethno-cultural
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disintegration recognized no internal solution. Emancipation and political liberation, 
therefore, went hand in hand in the Ottoman context. The ideal of creating an equal 
Ottoman citizenship out of the corporate millet structures remained unfulfilled. The issue 
of minorities and the question of minority rights, consequently, lost its naivete in the 
Turkish eyes and came to be considered not as a matter of respect, liberty, freedom or 
equality but more as an instrument of ethnic dismemberment and a pretext of external 
interference.
249
CHAPTER VI
TURKISH MINORITY RIGHTS REGIME 
The Republican Establishment
6.1. Introduction
The previous chapter delineated gradual transformation of the inegalitarian norms 
and practices of the Turkish ancien régime into an egalitarian project of Ottoman 
citizenship. While obliterating discriminatory aspects of the former, the reform policy of 
ittihad-i anasır aimed at creating a political unity of Ottoman individuals on the 
principles of civil and political equality. To this end, a substantive form of equality, at 
least at the level of legal regulations, was to a large extent achieved. However, under the 
influence of minority nationalism and external interference, citizenship equality could not 
create an Ottomanist unity. Almost all of the non-Muslim minorities opted not for 
Ottoman citizenship but citizenship of their national states. When the final collapse came 
in the aftermath of the WWI, the Ottoman statesmen and the general public understood 
that the ideal of ittihad-i anasır was a dream.
Minority issues, in the duration of reform years, had usually been associated with 
ethno-cultural circumstances of the non-Muslim minorities. Although the legal and 
political aspects of the millet system gradually withered away, religious 
compartmentalization continued to determine minority/majority categories. Egalitarian 
regulations consistently addressed non-Muslim minority distinctions. It had nothing to do 
with the sub-religious particularities of the Muslim population. Notwithstanding ethnic 
nationalism nascent in some sections of the CUP, Muslim differences continued to have
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been treated within an understanding of umma uniformity up until the final collapse of 
the Empire.' The Ottoman statesmen considered Islam as a national bond between its 
Muslim subjects and always placed all Muslims within a uniform social category.^
Demographic transformation of the period also sustained religious configuration 
of the Ottoman politics. Thus, while non-Muslim millets turned towards political 
secession and/or ethno-lingual disintegration, the core lands of the Empire (the Ottoman 
Thrace and Anatolia) entered into a process of religious homogenization. More 
specifically, after the Berlin Congress of 1878, Muslims of various ethnic and linguistic 
origins, inhabited lands lost to the European or newly created Balkan countries, began to 
flow into the lands of today's Turkey (Kirişçi, 1996).^ Secession of Albania and Arab 
lands, therefore, inserted almost no considerable impact on the Muslim character of the 
Ottoman population. A cultural combination of the Turks, Pomaks, Albanians, Cretan 
Muslims, Circassians, Crimeans, Bosnians, Kurds and Arabs came to constitute a new 
form of “Muslim millet” in the core lands of the Empire. Thus, despite the fact that the 
Empire lost larger groups of non-Turkish and non-Muslim territories during the 
disintegration, traditionally ethno-religious diversity of the imperial population was in no 
way exchanged with an ethnic homogeneity. The sole link uniting such a heterogeneous 
society was the common adherence to the Islamic religion.
‘ Although the CUP administration began to create ethno-lingual categories for the different sections of 
Ottoman Muslim population, which included Kurds, Circassians, Albanians, Bosnians, Arabs etc., the 
outcome was kept in secret. In accordance with the traditional official policy, Muslim population was given 
in a single category in the final declaration of the census (Dündar, 2000; 25-26).
 ^While the 1831 Ottoman census classified the Imperial population along the religio-communal eategories 
of the classical millet organisations, 1881/82 census included ethno-lingual categories specifically for the 
Orthodox communities. Henceforth, the Greeks and Bulgarians, who once took place within the same 
social and administrative classification, were registered in different social groupings (Karpat, 1985; 109- 
110/122-123).
 ^The total number of Muslim migrants from the Crimea, the Caucasus and the Balkan countries to Anatolia 
amounted in the first decade o f the nineteenth century approximately 5 million (Karpat, 1985; 55).
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Partly following this demographic reality, and partly under the influence of the 
Ottoman legacy, the nationalist leaders adopted traditional forms of inclusion/exclusion 
practices. The Muslim adherence was situated in the center of the majority identity or 
“imagined nation” of the new regime. The non-Muslim sections of the population, hence, 
continued to constitute categorically the other position. This chapter will first examine 
the legal-political roots of this final transformation which culminated in the minority 
provisions of the Lausanne Treaty. Here is where the secessionist-irredentist and fifth 
column activities of the non-Muslim minorities that took a significant place in the 
national struggle, will also be reviewed. It was on this factor that traditionally “other” 
position of the non-Muslim minorities was further consolidated. Secondly, this chapter 
will analyze the Muslim-inclusive characteristics of the national war which proceeded in 
a manner of Muslim movement. In one sense, the national war was fought on a Muslim 
front against nationalist aspirations of non-Muslim minorities. After examining the final 
configuration of the majority/minority categories of the Republican population, the 
chapter will set forth the legal framework of the new minority rights regime incorporated 
in the political clauses of the Lausanne Treaty.
6.2. From the Politics of İttihad-ı A nasır to the Practices of İttihad-ı A nasir-i
islam iyye: Crystallization of Minority/Majority categories
It was argued before that the failure of the politics of ittihad-i anasır aroused 
feelings of resentment among the Muslim people and the rulers of the Empire who had 
invested great hopes in the principles of equality to save the state from collapse. Beyond 
doubt, towards the end of the Empire, this failure prompted ethnic Turkism among
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several intellectuals and ruling cadres (Akçura, 1998). But imperial administration, in 
general, remained loyal to the ideal of the Ottomanist unity, in particular, to the uniform 
image of the Muslim millet.'* The result of the failure was seen in the attitudes of 
nationalist leaders when they had to fight a war of liberation against western and Greek 
occupation in 1919-22. Having learned much from the Ottoman experiences, the new 
leaders seemed to have lost their belief that a stable reconciliation would be achieved 
between different treatment of minorities and egalitarian implications of national unity 
expressed in the universal principle of citizenship equality. Unlike the late Ottomanist 
policies of ittihad-i anasır, the nationalist leaders, therefore, ceased to promote a political 
definition of Turkish national identity. Nevertheless, under the influence of the Ottoman 
legacy of inclusion/exclusion practices, the policy of ittihad-i anasır was by no means 
substituted with an exclusivist policy of ethnic Turkism but with a strong policy 
orientation of ittihad-i anasir-i îslamiyye (union of the Muslim elements).
Thus, while searching a new national form, the source of cohesion was sought 
within the imagined unity of the Muslim elements. Despite the fact that non-Muslim 
minorities still constituted 15 percent of the Anatolian population^, they were 
categorically excluded from this earlier stage of nation-building process. As against the 
disloyal acts of the non-Muslim minorities, legal-political developments of the war years 
delimited ethno-cultural borders of the Turkish majority identity with cultural 
characteristics of the Turkish-Muslim population.
While addressing egalitarian principles o f the Ottoman citizenship, the CUP programme, for example, 
continued to stress the compact unity o f the Muslim population (Tunaya, 1998; 70-75).
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6.2.1 Secessionist and Irredentist Activities
After the Ottoman state was defeated in the WWI, western interference in the 
internal affairs of the state turned into a real occupation. On the part of the non-Muslim 
minorities, the Allied occupation was widely conceived to have presented a great 
opportunity in order to have a final break from the Ottoman rule. Prominently the 
Christian minorities, therefore, not only welcomed the occupation but also actively 
participated in its due course. Under these circumstances, the issue of minority protection 
was almost out of question. Secessionist demands prevailed over the claims of minority 
rights (Alexandris, 1992: 52-76). Henceforth, particularly the Greek and Armenian 
minorities, in collaboration with the Allied forces, embarked strong claims against the 
territorial unity of the Ottoman state.^
Parallel to the nationalist dismemberment of the reform period, disloyal acts of 
the non-Muslim minorities made it clear from the outset of the Western occupation that 
they were no longer in search of equal treatment within. By contrast, having involved in 
intrigues in a manner of secessionist and irredentist activities, by the beginning of the 
WWI, the Armenian community, including its prominent members, for example, 
renounced even citizenship status for an armed struggle in the eastern regions.^ Although 
these activities had been silenced after the Armenian deportation, the question resurrected
 ^At the end o f the WWI (1919), the Ottoman population counted 12 million, out o f which %85 belonged to 
Muslim majority, %9 to the Greek minority, %5 to the Armenian minority, and less than %1 to the Jewish 
minority (Selek, 1987: 64).
 ^ The attitude of the Jewish minority retained contradictory views. On the one hand, it was argued that 
during the late nineteenth century, there emerged some Zionist attempts for the establishment of a Jewish 
state in Anatolia (see Atamer, 1968). It was suggested, on the other hand, that, at the end of the WWI, the 
Jewish minority refrained from involving in disloyal activities aiming at partition of Anatolia but remained 
loyal to the nationalist cause (Galanti, 1995: 57-68; Bali, 2000: 34-36).
' Prominent Armenian deputies o f the last Ottoman Parliament, Krakin Pastirmajian (Erzurum), 
Hamparsum Boyajian (Kozan) and Vahan Papasian (Van), released their responsibilities in the parliament 
and participated in the guerilla war being carried out in the eastern provinces (Tunaya, 1998: 603).
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by the defeat. Many deportees began to return back to the region in order to play the 
“fifth column” role of the occupation.*
The fall of the Empire also revitalized the Greek ambitions of the megali idea 
which sought incorporation of Istanbul and the Asia Minor (Anatolia) into the lands of 
the Greek Kingdom. To this end, both Greek leaders and the overwhelming part of the 
Anatolian Greek minority conceived the conjimcture properly ripe to actualise a greater 
Greece embraced all the Hellenes of the Ottoman lands (Smith, 1998: 1-20). Because of 
this, the Greek minority warmly welcomed the Greek occupation in Istanbul and 
Anatolia.^ In the eyes of the Greek minority this was the “accomplishment of a dream” 
and never hesitated in cooperating with the Greek occupation (Smith, 1998; 90-92).
The imperial Greeks, on the other hand, were expected to provide demographic 
legitimacy and a fifth column force for the Greek expansion in Anatolia. In order to 
create a Greek dominated region, for example, Muslim population of the Western 
Anatolia was subjected to a forced migration into inner parts of Anatolia (Beytulloğlu, 
1969). The imperial Greek minority, including Pontian Greeks, was, on the other hand, 
activated within several irredentist organisations. The Mavri Mira, the Union of Pontian 
Greeks {Pontus Rum Derneği) and the Cordus*® were the prominent Greek societies in
* Armenian volunteers constituted approximately 80 percent o f the French forces when it occupied those 
South-Eastern provinces o f Antep, Urfa and Adana (Selek, 1987: 197-198).
’ The Greek landing in Smyrna (Izmir), portrayed in Smith’s (1998: 88-89) following words, particularly 
illustrated irredentist ambitions o f the Greek minority: “Thousands of chattering Greeks converged on the 
seafront. Blue and white Greek flags waved on the quayside and fluttered on the houses along the front. For 
the Greeks o f Smyrna it was an infinitely moving occasion, the accomplishment o f a dream. Not one of 
them doubted that the occupation was to be permanent. With the flags and streamers waving in the early 
morning sun, the atmosphere was that o f a public holiday”.
The full name of the association was the Central Commission o f  the Greek Migrants (Yunan Muhacirler 
Komisyonu) which was a joint action o f the Greek State and the Orthodox Patriarchate. The Commission 
guided secessionist aspirations o f the Ottoman Greeks to annex the Greek populated lands with the Greek 
Kingdom. To this end, the Cordus was charged with several responsibilities including recruitment o f local 
Greeks to the Greek army, establishment o f paramilitary brigades and inducing population transfer towards 
Greek populated lands (Okte, 1971).
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which almost all of the Greek minority establishments, including schools and the 
Orthodox church, were directed to work for the Greek cause (Atatürk, 1994: 1-2).
As was argued before, the issue of minority rights has been associated with the 
citizenship status of minority peoples due to fact that the issue ascertained creating a 
genuine equality between minority and majority members of a state. In this respect, the 
position of non-Muslim minorities in the period would no longer be regarded in the 
context of minority rights. In addition to secessionist acts, when the Greek Patriarchate 
declared (May 1919) that the Greek minority relinquished its civic responsibilities as 
Ottoman citizens and prescribed its members to abstain from municipal and general 
elections, the imperial Greeks had legally become foreign (Alexandris, 1992: 57).
Therefore, particularly the Christian minorities came to represent a “category of 
foreign groupings” acting in collaboration with external enemies. Because of this, their 
treacherous acts further exacerbated relations between two historical blocks of the 
imperial population. They came to be viewed not only as the internal extension of 
external enemies but enemy of the country itself Public anger that mounted against 
occupation was directed against minorities as well. As a matter of fact, the target of 
nationalist forces involved not only the western occupation but also fifth-column and 
secessionist activities of the Christian minorities (Oran, 1997: 125-126; Öke, 1986: 114).
To sum up, treacherous acts of the non-Muslim minorities once again convinced 
the nationalist leaders that there remained no chance to promote principles of the policy 
of ittihad-i anasır. Legal and political diversity of the Ottoman citizenship had already 
proved insufficient to save the country from collapse. Because of this, in order to save, at 
least, the core lands of the country, nationalist leaders turned towards the Muslim peoples
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of Anatolia. Socio-political basis of the national struggle, therefore, came to be instituted 
upon traditional unity of the Anatolian Muslims. The first example of this new orientation 
appeared in the human composition and ideological drives of the nationalist societies.
6.2.2. Defense for the Rights Societies: A Muslim Front
The major objective of the national war was to secure national and territorial 
integrity of the country against the Western occupation and minority secessionism 
(Kansu, 1997: 231). In fact, the latter, for Atatürk, had grown under the protection and 
promotion of the former (Kansu, 1997: 81-82/587-589). The nationalist leaders further 
considered that the implicit motive of the Western occupation was to actualize territorial 
aspirations of the Armenian and Greek minorities. It was this widely shared belief that 
strongly alarmed the national forces (Selek, 1987: 65). Having been aware of their 
centrifugal tendencies given above, the founding leaders particularly worried about the 
presence of minority groups in Anatolia (Selek, 1987: 67).
The nationalist societies (müdafaa-i hukuk cemiyetleri), therefore, grown up in 
those specific areas of the Thrace, Izmir, Trabizond and Eastern Anatolia where were 
under territorial claims of either Greek or Armenian minorities.” This proved the fact 
that minority secessionism weighed concerns of the nationalist leaders who subsequently 
promulgated a direct correspondence which prescribed establishment of national 
detachments especially in those regions where minority population constituted a 
considerable proportion. For the leaders, in the absence of a standing army, national 
detachments would hinder mimical acts of non-Muslim elements (ARMHC, 1997: 22).
" Out o f 5 nationalist societies, founded just in the aftermath of the Mudros Armistice (Oct. 1918), 3 
targeted the Armenian and the other 2 the Greek minority irredentism (Oran, 1997: 125-128).
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Thus, the question of minorities occupied a central place in the Turkish liberation 
war. It was this essential factor that helped to characterise the national movement a front 
of Muslim peoples. Human composition and ideological drives of the societies were 
destined to represent Muslim inhabitants of Anatolia and their interests that was 
manifested more clearly when the regional societies were subsequently united under the 
name of the Defence for Rights Society of Anatolia and Thrace (Anadolu ve Rumeli 
Miidafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti-IKSMWC). Having obtained an institutional organization, the 
society formulated also a statute of action which laid down its ideological orientation and 
membership criteria. Minority/majority categorization and the principles of minority 
treatment, framed in the statute, largely determined basic norms and practices of the war­
time period (ARMHC, 1997; Kansu, 1997: 221-230).
The statute of the ARMHC projected a national vision on the indivisible unity of 
the Anatolian Muslim population. The statute affirmed having mutual respect to each 
other’s racial and environmental circumstances, anasir-i islamiye of Anatolia formed a 
brotherly unity with its territory which under no condition, be violated either by western 
powers or Christian minorities (Art. l).For being a nationalist front of the Muslim 
population, its membership was limited to the Muslim adherents of the Anatolian 
population (Art. 7.c). It was accordingly delivered in a secret correspondence that the 
new recruits to the national detachments {milli miifrezeler) were to be accepted after they 
sworn on the Qur’an.'^ In so doing, the statute delimited ethno-cultural and territorial 
borders of the country with the Muslim characteristics and Muslim populated lands of
After the declaration o f the statute, a secret correspondence was delivered to those officers who were in 
charge of implementing the content of the statute (DRSAR, 1997: 22).
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Anatolia. Unlike the cosmopolitan vision of ittihad-i anasir, non-Muslim residents were 
categorically excluded from the constitutive foundations of the national body.
Nevertheless, the statute examined also the question of minority rights in 
association with the condition of non-Muslim minorities. It was in this context that scope 
and limits of minority protection, occupied nationalist minds under the antagonistic 
circumstances of the war years, were underlined. In doing this, the nationalist leaders, in 
general, followed norms and practices of the Ottoman administration. It was, on the one 
hand, affirmed that the nationalist cause would respect citizenship rights of the non- 
Muslim minorities with regard to the protection of life, property and honour. They would 
also be allowed to practice their religious and national traditions. On the other hand, 
following the dominant view of the period, the scope of minority rights was conditioned 
by the loyal attitudes of the non-Muslim peoples. Having condemned nationalist 
aspirations of the latter, the statute worded that they would not be allowed to infringe the 
Ottoman authority, the rights of the Muslim majority and its national existence (Art. 2).
Thus, despite the fact that the nationalist leaders had strongly been motivated with 
the dangers of minority nationalism, it seemed unjust to conclude that the liberation war 
was an anti-minority movement in its full sense. Instead, the nationalist leaders constantly 
stated that traditional rights and immunities of the non-Muslim minorities would be 
respected provided that they did not involve in actions inimical to the territorial and 
national unity of the country. On most occasions, the nationalist leaders made a clear 
distinction between the issue of protecting loyal sections of the minority groups and the 
policy of combating with those sections of non-Muslim groups who actively engaged in 
irredentist or secessionist activities. Otherwise, they were well aware of the fact that
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international legitimacy of the war would be irrevocable. In the following words, Atatürk 
(1970: 18) clearly expressed this delicate minority policy:
It was an accepted principle for us that the prosperity and happiness o f the Armenian and 
Greek inhabitants o f the country would be guaranteed as long as they remained faithful to the 
Government and our national cause... Having seen it among the utmost interests of the 
country, we informed all the centres about the significance o f the protection of Armenians 
even in those days when the Anatolia had lost all of its commxmication with the out-world... 
Proving the inborn civilised quality of our nation, loyal sections o f the minorities took 
protection even when they obtained direct concern o f no foreign power.
Thus, while they preserved their firm objection to any form of minority claims, 
which would infringe national and territorial integrity and political independence of the 
country, the nationalist leaders, including M. Kemal, admitted to grant specific treatment 
addressing protection of minority particularities (Öke, 1986). To this end, for example, 
Atatürk often delivered warnings to the heads of nationalist societies, civil and military 
governors that national reactions growing against western occupation must have been 
taken under control before turning into an open attack against the Christian residents. 
Any adverse development, in the view of M. Kemal, would jeopardize legitimate grounds 
upon which the liberation war was founded (Kili, 1995: 39-40).
To sum up, with its human composition and political objectives, the nationalist 
societies represented, in general, a nationalist front of the Muslim residents of Anatolia. 
Although loyal sections were assured protection, the political program of the societies 
severely condemned nationalist and fifth-column acts of the non-Muslim minorities. In 
doing this, non-Muslim minorities were situated at the “other” position of the Turkish 
national movement that reproduced traditional practices of social classification in the 
country. A similar rationality prevailed in the local congresses of the nationalist leaders, 
those of Erzurum and Sivas, the Nationalist Pact and in the First National Assembly 
constituted.
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6.2.3 Erzurum and Sivas: Muslim Congresses
Regional centres of the national resistance were gradually united in aim and 
action in the two congresses that convened in Erzurum (23 July-7 August 1919) and 
Sivas (4-11 September 1919). Nationalist leaders participated in the two congresses as 
being military and political leaders of the liberation war. Because of this, the congresses 
marked both military and political aspects of the war. Final documents of the congresses 
introduced a programme of action and political objectives that were to guide the war and 
those legal-political developments that would occur after. Putting the matter differently, 
the embryonic form of the post-war territorial, political and national structures took an 
eventual shape in the final documents of the two congresses.
The congresses, in practice, went beyond a war committee and operated as a 
constitutive national assembly charged with the crystallization of a new regime. To this 
end, nationalist leaders concerned not only military-related questions but also outlined 
significant ideas about political and social visions of the nationalist front. Cultural and 
territorial aspirations of the nationalist front were crystallized. In relation to this, minority 
questions took among the hot topics of the congresses. In particular, having been 
formulated upon the troublesome position that minorities occupied in the nationalist eyes, 
membership and the wording of the final documents reflected the then prevailing 
inclusion/exclusion practices.
Having taken into consideration the role that non-Muslim minorities played in the 
expansion of the western occupation and that of their secessionist and irredentist 
tendencies, the focus of the congresses centered on the Muslim peoples of the core lands.
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Unlike the ethno-lingual and religious diversity of the Ottoman parliaments, both of the 
congresses brought together a number of delegates from different sections of the Ottoman 
Muslim millet. No representation was given to the members of non-Muslim 
communities.'^
The membership of two national congresses displayed a picture of a Muslim 
assembly. This religious brotherhood was not alien to the delegates. Since they 
traditionally had taken place within the uniform category of the Muslim millet, political 
culture facilitated emergence of a co-action between Muslim inhabitants of Anatolia. 
However, in addition to this historical and psychological background, circumstances of 
the time were also influential in the development of a common Muslim front. Thus, apart 
from traditional unity, western occupation and minority secessionism directed a common 
threat to the survival of the Muslim population as a whole that prompted emergence of an 
active cooperation between Turkish and non-Turkish Muslims of Anatolia (Mutluçag, 
1972: 11).
Not surprisingly, the final documents of the congresses reflected the vision and 
socio-political projects of the Ottoman Muslim population (Mutluçag, 1972; Erzurum 
Congress, 1968; Sivas Congress, 1969). Majority and minority classification of the 
population took shape under the common concerns of this Muslim front. On the one 
hand, therefore, similar to the ideological, legal and administrative categorisation of the
Although the number o f Armenian population had greatly decreased after the deportation of 1916, the 
amount o f non-Muslim population had constituted still a considerable proportion o f the regional 
population. For example, approximately one-third o f the population o f Erzurum had still belonged to non- 
Muslim residents. As against the 83.070 Muslim peoples, the province included 34.542 Armenian and 1097 
Greek minorities while its Muslim inhabitants numbered 83.070 (Gökbilgin, 1965: 83). All of the 57 
delegates who participated in Erzurum, from five different eastern provinces o f Bitlis, Erzurum, Sivas, 
Trabzon and Van, were Muslim in religious affiliation (Kansu, 1997: 78-80). Similarly, 38 delegates 
participated in the Sivas Congress from eleven Anatolian provinces, including Afyon, Ankara, Aydın,
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Ottoman Muslim millet, the “national society” of the nationalist front indicated the 
Muslim residents (of Anatolia) whatever their racial (ethnic), lingual or cultural 
distinctions. The documents stipulated that Muslim elements {anasir-i Islamiye) of the 
Anatolian lands, bound each other with the feelings of mutual sacrifice, respect for each 
other’s racial, communal and environmental circumstances, constituted a brotherly and 
indivisible unity. Cultural and territorial borders of the “imagined nation” were 
accordingly delimited by the religious characteristics of the resident population.
Obviously, religious language of the documents went counter to an ethno-lingual 
designation of nationality. Unlike the secular form of nationalist currents, state-society 
identification was built around religious adherence. Islam was preserved to be the sole 
linkage between the state and citizens. In doing this, nationalist leaders remained loyal to 
the traditional stratification of the Ottoman society that clearly signified prevalence of the 
ideas of ittihad-i anasir-i islamiye in the minds of the nationalist circles. The “national” 
component of the national struggle, in their eyes, indicated the unity of different sections 
of the Anatolian Muslim population.
The non-Muslim residents were, therefore, rendered ready-made “outsiders” of 
this imagined national form. As for the legal-political position of the former, nationalist 
leaders adopted again general framework of the millet system. Accordingly, it was 
affirmed in the final documents that the nationalist front was ready to grant to the non- 
Muslim minorities those privileges and rights that had officially been recognised so far 
by the Ottoman administration. The security of life, property and honor was guaranteed 
to the non-Muslim minorities who were also facilitated to practice, protect and promote
Eskişehir, Antep, Hakkari, Istanbul, Kastatnanu, Kayseri, Niğde, Samsun, were all from Muslim elements 
(Kili, 1995: 60-62).
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their religious and national traditions. Yet, as a general rule of the war-time period, it was 
clearly laid down that nationalist aspirations of the non-Muslim minorities would under 
no condition be admitted. The framework of minority protection was restrained in the 
congresses by the principles of political independence and territorial and national 
integrity.''* The Turkish minority rights regime followed this essential pattern when its 
principles were declared to the world with the National Pact {Misak-i Milli).
6.2.4. The National Pact: A Muslim Oath
Under the pressure of the Anatolian movement, new elections were held in the 
late 1919 and a new Ottoman parliament was convened on January 12, 1920. However, 
unlike the previous Ottoman parliaments, the composition of the new parliament reflected 
general picture of the nationalist front. The communal leaders of Greek and Armenian 
minorities had already released their members from the civic responsibilities of the 
Ottoman citizenship.'^ The elections, therefore, returned an overwhelming nationalist 
majority that had been nominated from among the members of the ARMHC branches in 
which non-Muslim membership had already been prohibited. Hence, it was unnatural to 
see that the nationalist vision would dominate the last Ottoman Parliament as well. In 
fact, even the agenda of the deputies, elected from Anatolian provinces, were pre-settled 
in Ankara by M. Kemal before they participated in the Parliament (Mumcu, 1986; 49).
Article 3 of the final document o f Erzurum Congress reads; “no privileges that would infringe our 
independence and social order shall be recognised to Christian minorities”. The same provision was 
incorporated in the third article o f the Sivas Congress.
In a correspondence addressed to Cemal Pasha, the Minister o f War, M. Kemal noted, on 20 January 
1919, that the abstention o f the non-Muslim minorities from elections would work at their own expense. 
When the independence o f the nation and the country was accomplished, for M. Kemal, they had to live in 
the Ottoman state as Ottoman citizens within the same rights (Atatürk, 1970; 13-15).
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Not surprisingly therefore, the National Pact, promulgated by the last Ottoman 
Parliament, on 28 February 28 1920, truly represented the then prevailing ideals of the 
nationalist leaders (National Pact, 1996; Mumcu, 1986: 49-50). In its essence, the Pact 
highlighted “the maximum of sacrifice that can be undertaken in order to achieve a just 
and lasting peace”. It was strongly insisted that the future of the state and the nation 
would, otherwise, be lost in the hands of western powers and the nationalist aspirations of 
non-Muslim minorities. Accordingly, the provisions of the Pact introduced a programme 
of action to be followed in order to reach to the ideal objectives relating to the internal 
and external relations of the country.
In the first place, therefore, the Pact drew national and territorial borders of the 
state. For doing this, the document implicitly conceded the secession of the Arab 
provinces from the country. The territorial and national frontiers were delimited with the 
core lands of the Empire (Tanor, 1995: 71). But, the ideal of the Muslim coherence 
prevalent in the minds of the nationalist leaders was by no means renounced. The 
religious formulation of the national population continued to be appreciated within the 
area of a more limited geography. The Pact, in this sense, concerned exclusively with the 
fate of the Ottoman Muslim majority. As Lewis (1968: 352) observed, on no part of the 
declaration, any specific reference was made to the ethno-lingual identity, including 
Turkish identity, separate from the all-embracing brotherhood of Muslim connotation.
In conformity with the premises of the Anatolian movement, new boundaries of 
the state and nation were rested upon the religious adherence of the resident population. 
“Having been united in religion, race and aim, and inculcated with sentiments of mutual 
respect for each other and of sacrifice, and wholly respectful of each other’s racial and
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social rights and surrounding conditions”, the document affirmed that the Muslim 
residents of Anatolia formed an indivisible whole. It was in this sense that the Pact 
represented the wishes and ideals of the amsir-i tslamiye who were to be liberated from 
either the irredentist acts of minorities and/or the forces of the western occupation.
Thus, in the rationale of the document, the concept of minority indicated a certain
section of the Ottoman population other than those of the different elements of the
anasir-i Islamiye. Parallel to the nationalist premises, the minority question in the Pact
was considered in terms of religious “others”, those of the the non-Muslim sections.
Bearing this traditional classification in mind, the fifth article of the document framed an
innovative formulation of minority rights. The article undertook that:
The rights of minorities as defined in the treaties concluded between the Entente powers and 
their enemies and certain o f their associates shall be confirmed and assured by us -in  reliance 
on the belief that the same Muslim minorities in neighbouring countries will also be given the 
benefit of the same rights (National Paet, 1996: 125).
The article was innovative in two points. On the one hand, as noted before, 
though constantly denied territorial claims of minorities and condemned their 
collaborative tendencies, the Turkish national struggle had hitherto confirmed traditional 
rights and privileges granted by the Ottoman administration. In the National Pact, it was 
recognised, for the first time, that the Ottoman government would adopt the then 
prevailing international standards with regard to the internal treatment of minority 
peoples. In place of millet privileges, the government promised to promote principles of 
the minorities treaties which settled standards of minority treatment in Europe in the 
aftermath of the WWI. The Turkish regime, hence, was, for the first time, integrated with 
the framework of the European regime. In this sense, the National Pact created a radical 
breakthrough in Turkish history in respect to the issue of minority protection.
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On the other hand, the same article brought into existence a condition of 
reciprocality in the national implementation of the international standards of minority 
protection. As was explained before, millet system was an instrument of the Ottoman 
governmental policy having no external dimension in implementation. Unlike the 
Westphalian regime of minority rights, for example, the communal autonomy of the 
millet system had been adopted and implemented without external coercion. The Pact, for 
the first time, associated the status of the non-Muslim minorities with the condition of the 
Muslim minorities resident in the neighbouring countries. In doing this, in conformity 
with the then prevailing religious form of the national population, the Ottoman state 
rendered itself the kin-state of the Muslim minorities resident neighboring countries, 
particularly those of the Balkan states. Muslim citizens of the neighbouring countries, 
irrespective of ethno-lingual and racial characteristics, were implicitly considered to be 
natural extensions of the Turkish national society.
6.2.5. The Grand National Assembly: A Muslim Assembly
Since it transformed the nationalist principles into a legislative action, the 
promulgation of the National Pact was met with anger by the western occupation. This 
resulted in the suspension of the last Ottoman Parliament. It was upon this Allied action 
that the nationalist leaders convened the first Grand National Assembly (GNA) in Ankara 
on 23 April 1920. It became once again evident with the opening of the GNA that 
whenever the connotation of the “national” appeared in the course of the national 
struggle, it signified the Muslim citizens of the country. Rights and obligations were 
accordingly conferred upon Muslim peoples who actively participated in the national
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struggle and whose representatives were permitted to take place in the political and 
military organisations of the period. The GNA was not an exception. Contrary to the 
demographic diversity of the then Anatolian population, the composition of the GNA 
displayed characteristics of a Muslim assembly. No non-Muslim member was permitted 
to participate in the GNA (Tunaya, 1997; BTTD, 1989).*®
The Muslim composition of the GNA resulted from two reasons. On the one 
hand, in response to non-Muslims’ nationalist aspirations, the leading members of the 
national struggle encouraged, if not prescribed, limitation of its electoral process solely to 
the Muslim citizens. In the eve of the elections, in the name of the Committee of 
Representation (Heyet-i Temsiliye), M. Kemal corresponded an official order to the 
provincial governors that non-Muslim minorities be prevented from participating in the 
elections (Selek, 1987: 338). On the other hand, nominees were selected from among the 
members of the ARMHC in which, as we noted before, membership had been limited to 
Muslim residents of the country.
Thus, the GNA represented not a national grouping in the modem sense of the
word, but the religio-cultural composition of the Anatolian population irrespective of
their sub-religious particularities. The composition of the GNA, hence, represented the
dominant policy of the national struggle expressed in the notion of the ittihad-i anasir-i
islamiye. In the GNA, Atatürk (1960: 73-74) accordingly pointed out:
Those who convened here and did compose our Grand National Assembly are not only 
Turks, not only Kurds, not only Circassians, and not only Lazes. Instead, it is a sincere 
Muslim unity which embraces all these different elements. Therefore, objectives represented 
by this assembly do not belong to any specific Muslim element. What is represented here is 
the will o f an entity which covers all Muslims o f our society (Ataturk, 1960: 73-74).
It is argued that although the number of deputies registered in the GNA is generally given 339, the actual 
amount o f the deputies far exceeded this official number with the irregular participants coming from 
various parts of Anatolia (Tunaya, 1997: 21). Indeed, in another document, the number of the first-term 
deputies was counted 377 (BTTD, 1989:46-67).
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This implied the fact that although ethno-lingual diversity of the participants was 
recognised, Muslim diversity was not seen in contravention with a national unity 
abstracted from sub-religious particularities of the founding elements. In place of ethno­
cultural particularities, universal brotherhood of religion was stressed. The cause of the 
Assembly was devoted to the interests of this religious nation. In so doing, apart from 
religious bond, Muslim diversity was totalised within an instrument of political 
association, if not of a political identity. For this reason, despite the fact that ethno­
cultural differentiation was recognised, this designation was believed to have lost its 
significance when all Muslim elements were defined as the integral parts of a Muslim 
entity. In proving this religious stand, Atatürk worded in another parliamentary speech 
delivered in 1922 that:
The People o f Turkey {Türkiye halkı) is a social entity united in race, in religion, in culture, 
and in ideals and interest, and that bound each other with the feelings of mutual sacrifice. In 
this entity, respect for each other’s racial, communal and enviroiunental conditions 
constitutes one of the fundamental references of our internal policy (Parla, 1991: 190).
Hence, it is clearly evident that the composition and the cause of the GNA 
demonstrated a religious substance. Nevertheless, it is unjust to claim that the question of 
minority rights was completely disregarded in the works of the GNA. Rather, following 
the principles of the National Pact, the framework of minority rights was delimited with 
the European standards of minority protection outlined in the minorities treaties of the 
post-WWI peace settlement. Atatürk noted in the same Assembly that the Christian 
minorities resident in Turkey would be granted rights identical with the standards of the 
European minorities treaties so long as the Muslim minorities of the neighbouring states 
were guaranteed the protection of the same rights (Parla, 1991: 190).
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Thus, the GNA remained loyal to the then prevailing aura of the 
inclusion/exclusion practices of the Turkish nation-building process. In doing this, 
Muslim elements were considered full and equal members of the Turkish society whereas 
non-Muslim communities were excluded from both social and political proceeding of the 
legislative instrument. This proved the fact that it was the Muslim millet and not an 
ethnic nation who was expected to fight the liberation war and participate in the building 
of a new state and nation. Although ethno-cultural distinctions of the Muslim population 
were implicitly recognized, the issue of official protection was voiced only in relation to 
the non-Muslim minorities. Particularly after the promulgation of the National Pact, the 
nationalist leaders affirmed to grant European standards of minority protection to those of 
the non-Muslim citizens so long as they proved loyal to the territorial and national 
integrity of the country and the political independence of the state.
6.2.6. Ethno-cultural Diversity of the Nationalist Discourse
The language of the national struggle, as was discussed so far, signified a 
significant breakthrough from the Ottomanist ideal of ittihad-i anasır. In place of 
developing a political approach superior to ethno-lingual, religious and sectarian 
distictions, the nationalist documents, in general, sought ethno-cultural basis of the 
national form in the concept of the ittihad-i anasir-i İslamiye. “National” component of 
the national struggle signified the religious unity of the Turkish-Muslim peoples resident 
in Anatolia. In this respect, traditionally uniform image of the Muslim millet was 
revisited whereas the “other” position of the non-Muslim minorities was reproduced.
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However, the concept of anasır (elements) itself symbolised an implicit 
recognition given to the ethno-cultural diversity that existed among Muslim peoples. In 
consistent with the literary meaning of the concept, the said documents incorporated 
several connotations, such as “racial and social rights” (hukuk-u ırkiye ve içtimaiye) and 
“social circumstances” (şerait-i muhitiye). It was this language that greatly blurred the 
traditional parameters of the minority/majority categorization prevalent in the minds of 
the nationalist leaders. Beyond doubt, these and similar designations tended, at least at 
face value, to prompt ethno-lingual stratification within the members of the Turkish- 
Muslim population. So far so that the uniform image of the anasir-i Islamiye appeared to 
have lost its traditional and ideological grounds.
Having been aware of the fact that Muslim peoples maintained ethno-lingual 
distinctions, the nationalist leaders often attributed attention to this diversity. However, 
they also believed that in order to preserve the strength of the national struggle, ethno­
cultural particularities of the Muslim peoples must have been pushed behind the scenes. 
To this end, despite the fact that ethno-cultural diversity of the Muslim population was 
implicitly recognised, its political accoimnodation was consciously left unresolved and 
uncertain for the sake of national unity needed in the period. As indicated this general 
policy, M. Kemal (1970: 5) subsequently stated:
This border (outlined both in the final documents o f the congresses and the National Pact) 
was not drawn exclusively with military concerns. It drew essentially a national border. 
However, no one can claim that this border involved only a single Muslim element. It 
embraced, instead, Turks and other Muslim elements. Hence, this border is the national 
border o f a mixed group of brother elements completely united in aim. Social, racial and 
environmental circumstances, that each o f these Muslim elements possessed, was, mutually 
and with honest feelings, confirmed. Naturally, because o f the prevailing state o f affairs, no 
explanation or detail would be given to this aspect but left to the deal o f brothers to be 
handled after the national survival was completely secured.
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Thus, although the nationalist leaders conceded recognition to ethno-cultural 
diversity of its Muslim citizens, the then prevailing war-time circumstances had avoided 
putting political requirements of this promise in practice. Yet, this phrasing proved also 
the fact that sub-religious distinctions of the Muslim population were not considered in 
contravention with the terms of a national unity based on religious brotherhood. Because 
of this, despite the fact that they recognized its diverse nature, nationalist leaders insisted 
on the brotherly unity of all Muslim elements and promoted a kind of religious 
nationalism against the non-Muslim sections of the Ottoman population. In other words, 
when they were referring to sub-religious features of the Muslim peoples, the founding 
leaders cautiously refrained from creating new minorities within the Muslim peoples of 
the country. In this respect, it was argued that plural formulation of the nationalist 
documents by no means indicated emergence of a rupture in the minority/majority policy 
of the nationalist discourse. In this view, the major incentive, which led to the 
development of plural designations in the documents, was a strategic maneuver imposed 
by national and international circumstances of the time (Ozbudun, 1997).
It seems appropriate to conclude that the nationalist leaders never renounced the 
legacy of the millet system with regard to the majority/minority classification. Although 
circumstances sometimes forced them to express respect to the ethno-cultural 
characteristics of the Muslim elements, they never went beyond making ambiguous 
references.'^ In the eyes of the nationalist leaders, the notion of minority had only one 
meaning and it was limited with the circumstances of the non-Muslim residents of the 
country.
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As was pointed out earlier, the end of the WWI transformed international norms 
with regard to the question of minority protection in terms of both content and 
geography. Formulated in the provisions of the minorities treaties, the post-WWI 
settlement, first, extended the issue of minority protection from the traditional category of 
religious groups to ethno-lingual and racial (ethnic) minorities. Second, the same process 
changed the question from state-to-state practices into a limited from of international 
regime. Concluded on 23 July 1923, the Peace Treaty of Lausanne represented the 
Turkish version of the minorities treaties (Turlington, 1924, 699-701).
The Treaty of Lausanne was the “birth certificate of the independent, national 
Turkish state” as Karal (1965: 74) observed. International borders and the national 
structures of the modem Turkey, including the issue of minority protection, took a final 
shape in this international document. Although the Turkish regime was an integral part of 
the minorities treaties, its scope in no way represented a complete break from the 
Ottoman legacy. Minority provisions of the Treaty could not impair itself from the 
imprints of the past. Inclusion/exclusion practices that had hitherto determined minority 
issues in Turkey inserted great influence upon the final shape of the Turkish regime. 
Bearing this fact in mind, this part will first elaborate on the meaning of the concept of 
minority. Secondly, the scope of the rights will be drawn and the form of the rights will 
be analysed. Finally, there will be an analysis of the relationship between the concept of 
national sovereignty and international supervision.
It has been asserted that M. Kemal promised in 1923 to grant regional autonomy to Kurdish populated 
areas of the country. However, the promise has remained uncertain and no step was taken in this direction
6.3. Republican Minority Rights Regime: The Peace Treaty of Lausanne (1923)
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When the National Pact marked objectives of the liberation war, major features of 
the Turkish minority rights regime to be adopted in the aftermath of the war had already 
been settled. As was noted before, the fifth article of the Pact affirmed that Turkish 
government would replace its traditional regime that of the minorities treaties. The same 
approach delimited the Tiu'kish government during the negotiations of the Lausanne 
Conference. Although the western powers insisted on the persistence of traditional 
privileges with regard to the treatment of non-Muslim minorities, ismet Pasha, the head 
of the Turkish delegation, denied that Turkey would recognise any measure outside the 
minorities treaties (Meray, 1969: 212). The Turkish delegate stated that traditional form 
of the non-Muslim privileges had already been replaced in the National Pact by 
contemporary European regime of minority protection (Meray, 1969: 327).
Not surprisingly, therefore, it was believed that Turkey would recognise 
minority/majority categorisation and the framework of the minority rights as they were 
documented in the Polish Treaty. For Curzon, the President of the Conference, Turkey 
had already made an overt commitment before the armistice to grant full protection to its 
ethnic and religious minorities (Meray, 1969: 181). However, contrary to the Turkish 
tradition, the minorities treaties had generally extended the concern of international 
minority protection from the sole category of religious communities to ethno-lingual and 
racial (ethnic) groupings. In addition to religious, ethnic and linguistic particularities had 
come to be subjected to protection (Bilsel, 1998: 264-265).
6.3.1. Definition of the Republican Minority
in the duration o f the Republican era (M. Kemal, 1993: 105).
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In the same manner, it was thought that the Turkish document would recognize an 
inclusive definition of the concept of minority that would cover racial (ethnic), religious 
and linguistic groups whether Muslim or non-Muslim. In other words, in addition to the 
Greek, Armenian, Jewish communities who had been included in the traditional Turkish 
conceptualisation, the new scope would urge minoritization of sub-religious 
particularities of the anasir-i Islamiye and the smaller Christian churches that had hitherto 
been excluded from legal recognition (Meray, 1969: 301). Due to this fact, apart from the 
Greek, Armenian and the Jewish, the western states were also concerned with the 
condition of Assyrian, Chaldians, and Nestorian minorities (Bilsel, 1998: 272). The draft 
treaty, indeed, covered all racial, religious, and linguistic minorities resident in Turkey 
whatever religious or sectarian affiliation (Meray, 1969: 164-166).
However, minority/majority categorization of the treaties was extremely alien, 
both in theory and in practice, to the Turkish political culture. As noted before, no section 
of the Ottoman Muslim population had ever been granted official recognition or different 
treatment. All Muslim peoples had, instead, been officially regarded as a uniform entity 
both in Ottoman times and in the years of the National Liberation. Ethno-lingual 
formulation of the first draft, therefore, greatly alarmed the Turkish delegation. In the 
eyes of the Turkish leaders, ethno-lingual designation was completely inapplicable for the 
Turkish case. In the Turkish view, even when the nationalist leadership promoted 
international standards in the National Pact, religious classification in minority
formulation had consciously been preserved intact. *18
* The Turkish government insisted on the view that historical practices in Turkey proved the fact that the 
question of minorities has referred to the circumstances o f the non-Muslim peoples. Just because o f this 
legacy, the concept o f minority had been associated both in the in the related articles o f the National Pact
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In fact, when legal-political borders of the concept of minority were drawn at 
Lausanne, the task contributed also to the crystallization of the Turkish majority. Once 
the non-Muslim citizens were reconciled with traditional status of minority, the category 
of the Turkish majority was identified with its traditionally religious “others”. In the view 
of Turkish authorities, unlike the traditional otherness of the non-Muslim elements, 
common history, traditions and morals had created a natural unity within the Turkish- 
Muslim population (Meray, 1969: 306). Further, Muslim elements of the country, in the 
same view, had shared civil and political equality without distinction of birth, ethnicity, 
or language and equally participated in the administration and the rule of the country. 
Depending upon this cultural and political legacy, the Turkish authorities insisted that 
ethnic and linguistic classification was truly a western practice and they believed that no 
Muslim country would treat any one section of the Muslim majority within the terms of 
minority rights. Minority commitments, associated with the circumstances of Muslim 
distinctions, would imply in the Turkish eyes, no more than interfering in the affairs of 
the national majority which no state would by no means be expected to undertake 
international obligations with regard to its own rights (Meray, 1969: 175-176).
The second concern of the Turkish authorities in refusing to give official 
recognition to ethno-cultural diversity of its Muslim elements depended on the 
experiences of the late Ottoman and the recent era of national struggle. It was believed 
that disloyal acts and nationalist aspirations of the non-Muslim minorities had played 
significant roles in the dismemberment and final collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In the 
eyes of the Turkish leaders, after minorities achieved final disintegration in the provisions
and those of the Turkish proposal submitted to the Sub-Commission with the non-Muslim sections o f the 
population (Meray, 1969: 160).
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of the Treaty of Sevres, the Turkish national struggle largely had evolved in a manner of
national survival against minority secessionism (Akçam, 1995: 55-68). In the eyes of
both state authorities and the general public, it was this recent past that had instituted
minority issues as an instrument of dismemberment. Multiplication of minority questions,
therefore, came to be identified with the expansion of centrifugal threats. In particular,
preservation of the territorial and national unity, and the political independence of the
country came to be closely associated with the task of minimizing minority questions to
its possible limits. Following limited diversity of the Ottoman legacy, Riza Nur (1999:
103) clearly expressed this nationalist view when he stated:
Western people recognise three kinds of minorities in Turkey: Racial minorities, linguistic 
minorities, religious minorities. This is a great evil and a great danger for us... Besides the 
Greeks and Armenians, the connotation o f “race” implied those o f the Circassians, Abhazas, 
Bosnians, Kurds etc.... of “language” intended to divide the non-Turkish speaking sections 
of the Turkish-Muslim population into minority groupings. The criteria o f “religion”, on the 
other hand, granted minority status to the two million Alevies (Kizilbash) o f the country. In 
other words, the Western conceptualisation o f the term of minority entailed a dangerous 
potential to divide us up to a complete extinction.
Thus, conceptualization of the term minority was strongly associated with the 
survival of the country. In order to avoid adverse developments, the Turkish leadership 
was determined to limit the definition of the concept exclusively to the religious 
communities of the non-Muslim citizens. To this end, “racial” (ethnic) and “linguistic” 
categories incorporated in the formula of the minority provisions were strongly denied. 
The Turkish government insisted, instead, on the limitation of the concept of “minority” 
to non-Muslim citizens of the country (Meray, 1969: 167-169). In so doing, unlike the 
secular formula of the minorities treaties, the Turkish side favored a non-secular 
categorization on the traditional compartments of the millet system. It was accordingly 
specified in each provision of the minority section that rights and privileges defined in the 
clauses addressed exclusively the “non-Muslim Turkish citizens”.
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Nevertheless, in contravention with the Turkish views, the Treaty implicitly 
recognised that Turkey embraced racial and linguistic minorities as well. But, this 
implicit recognition did not go to such an extent that ethnic and linguistic minorities other 
than those of the non-Muslim citizens would benefit from the general content of the 
minority section. Without taking into account substantive aspects of citizenship equality, 
the provisions provided the ethno-cultural distinctions of the Muslim elements with 
minimalist measures of equality and non-discrimination. In limiting minority status to 
non-Muslim citizens, the Conference thought that general scope of the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination would also protect ethno-lingual distinctions of the sub- 
Islamic elements of the Turkish society.’^
It seems to be right to conclude, therefore, that the Turkish conceptualisation of 
the concept of minority drifted from the mainstream standards of its contemporaries that 
had extended the effect of minority protection from religious communities to those of 
ethnic and linguistic groupings. Following parameters of the millet system’s limited 
diversity, the Republican state preserved its traditional and strategic concerns with regard 
to the definition of concept. Concerning the beneficiaries of minority rights, therefore, the 
Turkish minority rights regime established a strong continuity between the socio-political 
and legal stratification of the Ottoman millet system and minority/majority classification 
of the Republican Turkey. Contrary to the general scope of the regime then prevailed in 
Europe, minority provisions of the Lausanne Treaty constituted a minority rights regime 
in Turkey exclusively upon the religious distinctions of its citizens.
” M. Montagna, head o f the Sub-Commission on Minorities, expressed this concern o f the Commission in 
a report submitted to Curzon, the Head o f the First Commission (Meray, 1969: 309-314).
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6.3.2. The Lausanne Framework of Minority Rights
The Lausanne Conference was the last phase of the so-called Eastern Question in 
which minority issues had taken a central place. One of the prominent topics at the 
Conference, therefore, was the legal status of minorities in Turkey.^® It was in this 
context that notwithstanding secular scope of the then prevailing minorities treaties, the 
western powers intended first to restore traditional framework of minority treatment in 
Turkey. Thus, although they claimed that Turkish government would not treat its non- 
Muslims in accordance with the principles of the Islamic jurisdiction, the western 
delegation, at the same time, strongly promoted persistence of traditional scope of 
minority rights regime in Turkey (Akyol, 1998). Curzon, for example, proclaimed on 
different occasions that traditional rights and privileges should have been taken into 
consideration in deciding minority provisions of the Turkish treaty (Akyol, 1996: 147).
However, the era of the national struggle coincided with the emergence of a 
consolidated national state in Turkey at the expense of the corporative aspects of the 
Ottoman administration. This is to say, corporate dimensions of the administrative, legal, 
and political privileges of the millet system would no longer be maintained under the 
political organisation of the new state (Bilsel, 1998: 271). Since it had blurred areas of 
national and communal membership in the Turkish history, corporate autonomy had 
come to contradict with the modem aspirations of the national state. The Turkish 
objective at Lausanne, accordingly, centred on the elimination of the corporate forms of 
minority protection inherited fi"om the Ottoman legacy (Akyol, 1998).
Lord Curzon proclaimed at the Conference that the main objective of the Western occupation in Turkey 
was to provide political liberation or, at least, a secure emancipation for the non-Muslim minorities o f the 
Empire (Meray, 1969: 180).
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On the other hand, under the fresh influence of the recent past, the founding 
leaders had already expressed their will to give up traditional system in favor of European 
standards. The National Pact, as noted above, had bordered the nationalist regime of 
minority protection with international principles of the then prevailing European 
minorities treaties. Depending upon this fact, the Turkish government denied persistence 
of the millet privileges particularly on the grounds of the principle of external non­
interference. In view of Ismet Pasha, traditional system of minority protection had 
constantly been exploited by the external powers in furthering their political and 
economic interests in the Ottoman lands that had culminated in the final collapse of the 
state. The external sovereignty of the country, for him, had required limiting the scope of 
minority rights with the post-WWI European regime (Meray, 1969: 187-200).
Bearing these concerns in mind, the Turkish government insisted on the 
transformation of the Ottoman millet system into the general scope of the post-WWI 
regime. Thus, in place of the centrifugal institutions of millet privileges, modem rights 
and liberties must have been accommodated and its execution has been invested in the 
sovereign discretion of the state (Meray, 1969: 187-200). To this end, the Turkish 
government exhibited a complete determination and largely succeeded in obliterating 
corporate aspects of the minority provisions. Because, unlike previous conferences such 
as Vienna or Berlin, the Turkish delegation had come to the Conference “not as a 
conquered ‘Sick Man’ but as an invigorated reawakened nation determined at all costs to 
maintain what it believes to be the sovereign rights of the Turkish people” (Brown, 1923: 
290). As a result, unlike the issue of minority definition, the scope of rights and liberties 
was almost completely divorced from the imprints of the traditional Turkish practices.
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Having been agreed on the grounds of the then prevailing European minority 
rights regime, articles 37 to 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne instituted modem framework of 
the Turkish minority rights regime (Lausanne Treaty, 1956). The provisions made it quite 
clear that Turkish authorities denied millet-system-like formulations in favor of the 
contemporary standards of minority rights outlined in the minorities treaties. As was 
explained before, the scope of the treaties had, in general, created the legal-political 
grounds of substantive equality among individual citizens irrespective of ethno-cultural, 
religious or sectarian origin. In doing this, apart from universal rights and obligations, the 
said treaties had addressed group-specific rights pertinent to protection and promotion of 
the minority particularities. While the former category of rights covered measures of 
universal equality and non-discrimination, the latter aimed at creating instmments of 
differential treatment within the universal premises of citizenship equality.
Parallel to this general framework, the Turkish version aimed at constituting 
legal equality with its substantive aspects of protecting and promoting distinct identities 
of minority groups. On the one hand, therefore, minority provisions of the Treaty 
provided citizenship equality on the principles of civil and political equality and non­
discrimination. It was accordingly recognised that “the Turkish government undertakes to 
assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without 
distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion”. It was similarly stipulated that 
“all inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, 
of any creed, religion or belief...”. Additionally, the Turkish government undertook that 
no restriction would be imposed upon the movement, settlement or migration of minority 
peoples (art. 38).
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On the other hand, while the Treaty stipulated that “Turkish nationals belonging 
to non-Muslim minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Muslims”, the 
principle of political and legal equality was attributed an identical value. The Turkish 
government accordingly affirmed that “all the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction 
of religion, shall be equal before the law.” Upon the same principle, it was accepted that 
“differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in 
matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political rights.” The matters included, for 
example, “admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of 
professions and industries.” The measures of citizenship equality reflected itself in the 
question of linguistic rights as well. Notwithstanding the existence of the official 
language, the use of mother tongues was equally guaranteed for “any Turkish national” in 
private intercourse, commerce, religion, press and publications, public meetings as well 
as in the courts (Art. 39).^'
These provisions made it clear that the principle of equality by no means 
indicated any practice of uniformity. On the contrary, those measures of citizenship 
equality and non-discrimination were substantively supplemented with the instruments of 
differential treatment. Without renouncing principles of universal equality, minority 
groupings were facilitated to practice, protect and promote their particular characteristics. 
Bearing this substantive objective in mind, the provisions vested great interest in the task 
of creating legal-political grounds of differential treatment that would allow reproduction 
of minority cultures. To this end, minority citizens were provided with group-specific
Although the Turkish governments never practiced this aspect of the provisions, the wording of ‘any 
Turkish national’ has subsequently been interpreted to indicated that the provision brought linguistic rights 
to whole o f the non-Turkish speaking segments of the Turkish population including Muslim minorities 
(Oran, 2001:226-227).
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rights and immunities in the affairs of culture, education, religious practices and 
charitable foundations.
Concerning the group-specific rights, the Turkish government recognised that 
“non-Muslim citizens shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their 
own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other 
establishments for instruction and education” (Art. 40). Further, provided that the 
teaching of the Turkish language remained obligatory, minority languages would be used 
as the medium of instruction in the primary schools in those towns and districts where 
they constituted a considerable proportion of the regional population. The provisions 
affirmed that (in the same areas) “minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the 
enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds for 
educational, religious or charitable purposes” (art. 41).
In order to guarantee the non-Muslim minorities’ traditional heritage, the Turkish 
government undertook also “to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, 
cemeteries, and other religious establishments”. In particular, the government conceded 
to treat pious foundations, religious and charitable institutions of the non-Muslim 
minorities on the same footing as those of the majority. Unlike the classical practices of 
the millet system, it was accordingly affirmed that the “the Turkish government will not 
refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary 
facilities which are granted to other private institutions of that nature” (Art. 42).
As was discussed in chapter III, particularly the Greek version of the minorities 
treaties had conceded legal autonomy to their Muslim minorities with regard to the cases 
of family and private law. The same practice had also constituted an integral part of the
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imperial minority rights regime. However, devoted to the creation of a consolidated state 
having a single-unified legal system, the Turkish authorities, at Lausaime, had already 
come to impair its regime from the corporate effects of the legal autonomy. In spite of a 
strong Turkish resistance, the Lausanne provisions recognised traditional immunities of 
the non-Muslim minorities in the areas of family law and personal status, both of which 
still were considered in the realm of religion. The matters of religion, the settlement of 
the affairs of marriage, divorce, and inheritance was, therefore, left to the corporate 
authority of the minority groupings (Art. 42). Since the then prevailing Turkish law was a 
non-secular one, the government was obliged to admit corporate scope of this provision 
(Bozkurt, 1996: 182).
The Lausanne framework of the Turkish minority rights regime intended to 
reconcile the notion of citizenship equality with the group-specific particularities of 
minorities. For doing this, the regime promoted emergence of ethno-cultural diversity, 
legally and politically respected, that guaranteed, at the same time, civil and political 
equality embedded in the universal aspect of the citizenship status. Thus, minority 
differences would no longer be associated, in principle, with the terms of inequality and 
discrimination. It was in this sense that the new regime largely overcame shortcomings of 
the traditional duality that had long existed in the Ottoman context between the political 
status of state-membership and the ethno-cultural status of group membership. Therefore, 
the traditional Turkish minority rights regime that hitherto had relied upon traditional 
practices and instructions of the Islamic religion encountered with a sharp rapture. 
Although its minority/majority categories remained intact, administrative, judicial and
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political ramifications of the millet system privileges henceforth ceased to determine 
dynamics of the Turkish minority rights regime.
6.3.3. The Form of Rights: Collective or Individual
The Turkish ancien regime, as was examined before, rested upon corporate 
recognition of communal distinctions. Rights and privileges, incorporated in the millet 
system, were formulated and implemented in a collective-corporate understanding. Thus, 
socio-political, administrative and judicial privileges of the millet communities were 
bestowed upon the corporate personality of religious groupings. Subjects of the millet 
privileges, therefore, were not individual members of communities but the corporate 
body of the community itself. Individual Ottoman subjects held almost no legal standing 
unless they proved membership to a religious community. The communal autonomy of 
the non-Muslim minorities, in this form, had displayed characteristics of a decentralised 
system creating “states within a state”.
Thus, the classical Ottoman system represented a pre-modem and corporative 
state model which was contradicted with the sovereign aspects and centralised functions 
of a modem state. Because of this, non-Muslim minorities would no longer continue to 
carry out commimal autonomy in the form of corporate rights in the Republican Turkey. 
Minority provisions of the Turkish Treaty, therefore, were expected to obliterate 
traditional forms of religious, political, administrative, and judicial privileges. To this 
end, Lausanne provisions relegated non-Muslim minorities to a status of cultural 
groupings whose members would receive differential treatment in respect to the affairs of 
religion and language. But, their legal status would no longer stem from communal
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membership nor communal hierarchy would insert absolute authority over their 
individual members.
The founding leaders were well aware of the fact that collective dimensions of the 
traditional regime had concealed in itself seeds of minority troubles in the Empire. In the 
view of the founding leaders, collective form of rights and privileges had, on the one 
hand, avoided emergence of an integrated Ottoman nation out of the members of the 
“imagined nations” of religion. The process of the national awakening had evolved 
towards ethno-lingual and territorial emancipation but not for a common Ottoman 
nationhood. Putting the matter differently, corporate privileges had, in the long run, 
operated at the expense of national and territorial integrity. On the other hand, corporate 
personality of non-Muslim communities had paved the way for the external intervention 
of the western powers in the internal affairs of the Ottoman state. Benefiting from the 
collective autonomy of non-Muslim communities, the European powers had often 
infringed political independence, national unity, and territorial integrity of the state.
It is not unusual to notice, under these circumstances, that one of the prominent 
objectives of the Turkish authorities in figuring out its new minority rights regime aimed 
at releasing the Turkish regime from its corporate dimensions. To this end, given greater 
concern to the issues of internal and external sovereignty, and territorial and national 
integrity of the Republican state, the Turkish authorities, at the Conference, constantly 
denied collective formulation of minority rights, that of creating “states within a state” 
(Meray, 1969: 251). Because of this, corporate compartmentalization was almost 
completely eliminated from the scope of the new regime. Contrary to the communal 
identification of the millet system, individual members of the non-Muslim minorities
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were considered primarily individual citizens of the Republican state, not of the religious 
communities. The communal membership, if ever existed, remained secondary in the 
formulation of the new regime. Hence, unlike the dual practices of the late Ottoman 
reforms, citizenship status of minority peoples dominated their communal membership. It 
was because of this modem transformation that rights and freedoms specified in the 
document directly addressed religious, linguistic and cultural particularities of the 
“Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities”.
Nevertheless, implementation of religious, cultural and educational rights did not 
disregard, if not openly promoted, its collective dimension. After all, those affairs of 
schooling, charitable and religious establishments and the allocation of governmental 
funds implicitly indicated existence of a collective aspect. The exercise of the said 
principles called for, at least in practice, creating individual rights having a collective 
dimension. Parallel to its contemporaries, the new Turkish regime, hence, adopted several 
principles which set forth individual rights to be exercised “in community with others”.
In fact, despite the final document of the provisions compelled Turkish authorities 
to undertake no strong commitments in collective form, it was reached after several 
contrary proposals were defeated. In particular, four groups of collective rights, those of 
the legal privileges, the status of the Patriarchate, non-Muslims’ military obligation, and 
the question of the Armenian homeland, troubled the founding leaders in the duration of 
the Conference. Although some were immediately defeated or subsequently cancelled, in 
order to deploy modem transformation of the Turkish minority rights regime, the given 
areas of collective rights, which largely contrasted with the national ideals of the 
Republican regime, must briefly be elaborated here.
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6.3.3.I. The Question of Legal Privileges
The Lausanne regime largely integrated traditional norms of minority treatment in 
Turkey into the European standards of the minorities treaties. However, the latter had 
also incorporated several provisions addressing local and particular conditions. The 
Greek and the Serb-Croat-Sloven treaties, for example, had entailed country-specific 
provisions with regard to the cases of their Muslim minorities. In the same manner, the 
Western delegation at Lausanne insisted that the Turkish government should have 
undertaken specific obligations guaranteeing traditional privileges of its non-Muslim 
minorities in the affairs of family and personal law. It was believed that religious nature 
of the family and personal law urged the Turkish government to develop a multi-legal 
system in which the legal autonomy of non-Muslim minorities would be maintained 
(Akyol, 1996: 150; Bozkurt, 1996: 181).
Legal autonomy of the non-Muslim minorities was therefore recognised in the
affairs of family law and personal status including those matters of marriage, divorce and
inheritance. Article 42 of the final document provided:
The Turkish government undertakes, as regards non-Muslim minorities, in so far as concerns 
their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in 
accordance with the customs o f those minorities...these measures will be elaborated by 
special commissions composed o f representatives o f the Turkish government and o f  
representatives o f each o f the minorities concerned in equal number.
The execution of the provision was delegated to the corporate personality of the 
communal institutions. In so doing, similar to millet system, though unwillingly, Turkey 
recognised a compartmentalised form of the judicial system in protecting non-Muslim 
distinctions. It was accordingly affirmed that the Turkish government would facilitate
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establishment of joint commissions in charge of the settlement of the procedures 
according to which minorities would handle the cases of family and personal law.
However, the founding leaders were well aware of the fact that the issue of 
judicial autonomy contradicted with the national projections of the Republican regime 
which was seeking unity in the realms of cultural, administrative, political as well as legal 
affairs. However, the provision would not have been removed because of the non-secular 
features of the then prevailing judicial system (Bozkurt, 1996: 182). It was believed that 
“when the law depended upon religious regulations, governments are obliged to grant 
special laws for each of religious grouping. In order to attain political, social and national 
unity... the spheres of law and religion should be separated making it equally applicable 
to each section of the national population”. In this view, judicial privileges of the non- 
Muslim communities, inherited from the religious regime of the Empire, would be 
eliminated only after the Turkish law was truly secularized (Bozkurt, 1996: 193).
Therefore, soon after the ratification of the Treaty, the government determined 
itself to dispense with the collective aspects of minorities’ legal affairs. For doing this, 
while the government permitted minorities to establish joint commissions in order to 
produce specific judicial measures for the implementation of the article, it embarked a 
reform process to secularize its civil code. Non-Muslim communities, the Greeks, 
Armenians and Jews, established special commissions in order to exercise judicial 
autonomy. However, before they concluded final regulations, having taking into 
consideration that the government was working on the adoption of a secular civil code 
that would be equally applicable to all of the citizens irrespective of religion or creed, the 
Armenian and Jewish commissions renounced judicial privileges. Insisting for a longer
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time on the preservation of the legal privileges, the Greek commission too subsequently 
agreed with the Armenian and Jewish commissions.^^ The commissions declared in their 
petitions submitted to the Ministry of Justice that “upon the reception of secular 
principles, the community would no longer seek differential treatment in judicial matters 
but be considered within the universal terms of the national law” (Bozkurt, 1996; 182).
It is significant to note here that this was the abdication of one of the significant 
provisions of the Lausanne Treaty which had brought collective guarantees to the 
preservation of the affairs of family law and personal status. Because of this, 
communities’ act was sometimes viewed with suspicion as if it had been taken under the 
pressure of the govemment.^^ Alexandris, for example, argued that the Greek minority 
was actually unwilling to renounce legal rights for they were considered most important 
part of the minority provisions. In the eyes of the Greek minority, for him, the legal 
autonomy did not create a privileged position but an instrument of collective resistance 
against assimilationist policies. Alexandris accordingly suggested that since the universal 
views of the new code contradicted with the group-specific principles of the article 42, 
Turkish authorities urged the heads of the religious leaders to renounce guarantees 
accorded to them with the said provision (Alexandris, 1992: 135-139). With similar 
views, the Greek government protested the abdication of the legal guarantees and sought 
its restoration in the PICJ (Bozkurt, 1996: 182).
The Jewish community was the first in declaring their voluntary renouncement (15 September 1925). 
Armenian community followed the Jews on 17 October 1925, and finally the Greek minority declared the 
same decision on 27 November 1925. The Jewish petition to the government presented an example for 
other minority groups. The petition proclaimed that upon the adoption of a secular law equally applicable to 
the members o f Turkish citizenry, the Jewish community conceded judicial privileges o f the article 42 in 
favor o f being treated in the same footing as other Turkish citizens (Galanti, 1^5; 68-73).
German consulate to Istanbul reported that “through the means o f their own organisation, the Jewish 
minority renounced their rights established in Lausanne for the good o f the minority concerned. However,
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Thus, when the Turkish government adapted the Swiss Civil Code on 17 
February 1926, the long-lasting legacy of the compartmentalised juridical system ended 
in the Turkish law. Although implemented in violation of the Lausanne commitments, the 
Republican State obliterated the legal privileges of corporate nature. In the legal sphere, 
principle of equality excluded practices of differential treatment. The removal of the 
article 42 indicated that the principle of citizenship equality for the Turkish government 
required implementation of a uniform treatment, outside and above ethno-cultural 
particularities.
6.3.3.2. The Question of the Military Service
Another collective formulation appeared at Lausarme on the issue of non-Muslim 
minorities’ military obligation. As noted before, non-Muslim sections of the Ottoman 
population had been exempted from military service. Following this classical practice, 
the Lausanne negotiations vested a special interest in the collective exclusion of non- 
Muslim Turkish citizens from military obligation (Meray, 1969: 151-292). The issue 
occupied such a significant place in the eyes of the western powers that they even 
conceded to sacrifice minorities’ political rights in exchange of military exemption. 
Veniselos, the Greek President, for example, argued on different occasions that the Greek 
government was ready to recognise the curtailment of the political rights of minorities in 
Turkey in return of guarantees exempting those peoples from military service (Meray, 
1969: 299). Though the Greek proposal attracted little attention, western states generally 
displayed strong determination to making the issue of collective exclusion as an integral
the decision was not reached completely by the free will o f the Jewish minority but taken under strong 
pressures of the Turkish government” (cited in Bozkurt, 1996: 182, fn. 19).
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part of the Turkish regime. To this end, the draft proposal of the Allied states, for 
example, incorporated an identical provision which provided that “Turkish government 
undertakes measures which shall exclude the non-Muslim Turkish citizens from military 
obligation in return of an extra tax (bedel)” (Meray, 1969; 165).
The Turkish government, in response, insisted on the equal application of military 
obligation among the Turkish citizens upon three major grounds. First, the principle of 
the citizenship equality, for the Turkish authorities, required equality in citizenship 
obligations. On the Turkish side, the question of military service was, therefore, one of 
the most significant dimensions of citizenship equality incorporated in the minority 
provisions of the Lausanne. Second, for the Republican authorities, the principle of 
equality in exercising military service would function as an integrative mechanism when 
it was manipulated as an institution where national values, objectives as well as the spirit 
of national brotherhood would be cultivated in the hearts of minority citizens. It was 
accordingly argued that, notwithstanding deeply rooted communal divisions, equal 
circumstances of military service would produce a national unity while directing disloyal 
aspirations of minorities in favor of a loyal Turkish citizenship.
Third, military service was expected to adjust economic imbalances that had 
existed in the country between non-Muslim minorities and the Muslim majority. As long 
as it was reserved to the benefit of the latter, it was argued, military recruitment had 
hitherto served to the enrichment and expansion of the non-Muslim population at the 
expense of those of the Muslim majority. Ismet Pasha explained that a privilege of this
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kind would increase economic and numerical strength of minorities in Turkey against the 
interests and size of the Muslim majority (Meray, 1969: 306-307). '^*
Consequently, the Turkish thesis weighed at Lausanne while the contrary 
proposals were completely defeated in the final form of the minority provisions. The 
question of military obligation was henceforth removed from the framework of the 
Turkish minority rights regime while it was constituted both a right and an obligation of 
the all of Turkish citizens irrespective of religious, sectarian or ethno-cultural 
characteristics. In so doing, hundreds years old practice of the millet system ended in 
accordance with the unitary concerns of the national state.
6.3.3.3.The Status of Patriarchate
In connection with the collective rights to be granted to the non-Muslim 
minorities, the Status of Patriarchate in Turkey received significant concern in the 
proceedings of the Conference. Needless to repeat, being the heads of communal millet 
institutions, patriarchates, as an administrative organ of the Ottoman administration, had 
hitherto executed collective jurisdiction over the members of their conununities. 
However, in violation of their communal authority, both the Greek-Orthodox and the 
Armenian patriarchates had actively involved in the nationalist awakening of their 
members that culminated in the final collapse of the Empire. Because of this, secular acts 
of the minority leaders, primarily the patriarchates, had lost legitimacy in the eyes of both 
leading Republican cadres and the general Muslim population. In the aftermath of the 
liberation war, there had remained almost no positive incentive in the minds of the
For the concerns o f the founding cadres o f the Republic in insisting on the equality o f military obligation 
between Muslim and non-Muslim sections of the Turkish population see the speech delivered by Ismet
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leading cadres that would encourage persistence of collective privileges of the 
patriarchates. The Turkish authorities had come to promote removal of the Greek 
Patriarchate from Turkish lands (Sofuoglu, 1996; I§iksal, 1969).
On the other hand, as was indicated in the case of legal privileges, the Republican 
leaders were seeking to secularize the new regime. To this end, although retained non­
secular aspects of the millet system in respect to the definition of minority categories, the 
government had displayed enormous determination to the secularisation of the general 
framework of its minority rights regime. For this, in place of the theological regulations 
of the millet system, the post-WWI European regime had been accommodated. As noted 
before, the scope of the latter had confined the jurisdiction of the religious institutions 
exclusively to spiritual matters. Notwithstanding their traditional and religious functions, 
the Republican leaders had convinced that they would no longer tolerate existence of 
corporate agents between the state and citizens. According to Riza Nur,
...by separating the Caliphate and the State and by establishing a democratic regime, the 
government had suppressed the privileges which had been granted in the Ottoman Empire to 
the non-Muslim communities. The relations between the charitable, educational and 
philanthropic institutions o f the minorities and the State must henceforth be carried on 
directly; the clergy and its hierarchical chiefs must not in the future concern themselves with 
any but purely spiritual matters. The Patriarchate, which had hitherto been a political 
institution, ought to be removed outside Turkey; for its past activities will prevent it from 
adapting itself to the new situation which, by eliminating the political privileges of the 
Patriarchate and o f the organisations dependent on it, will remove all grounds for its 
continued existence. These conditions show that the necessity of abolishing the temporal 
privileges of the clergy and transferring the Patriarchate outside the country is just as 
inevitable for Turkey as it is salutary for the community concerned (Meray, 1969: 327-328).
This indicated the fact that in the aftermath of the national struggle, the Turkish 
government had intended to transfer corporate-collective privileges into the realm of the 
state. It was hoped that having freed from secular encroachments of the clerical
Pasha at the Conference on 9 January 1922 (Meray, 1969: 306-307).
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structures, the state then would bypass these intermediary institutions in dealing with its 
citizens.
However, this was not an easy task to do in the case of the patriarchate. Because, 
the western powers insisted not only that the Patriarchate would continue to be seated in 
Istanbul but also would continue to exert collective jurisdiction over its fellow adherents. 
In particular, the Greek state proclaimed, on many occasions, that collective authority of 
the minority religious institutions depended upon their religious distinctions that existed 
between the Muslim majority and the non-Muslim minorities. Relying upon this fact, it 
was argued that it was hardly possible to claim removal of the powers of non-Muslim 
institutions if the cultural and religious distinctions of non-Muslim minorities were to be 
properly taken under protection. In this sense, Veniselos suggested that traditional 
functions of the Patriarchate, which were regarded by the Turkish state as temporal 
powers irrelevant to the jurisdiction of a religious institution, was in fact, completely 
spiritual in instruction of the Orthodox church. For Veniselos, matters of family law and 
personal status had become so integral to the lives of Orthodox peoples that would be 
regulated by no secular reform. Since they were spiritual in essence, for him, the Turkish 
government was to recognise corporate powers of the patriarchate over its members in 
the affairs of family and personal law (Meray, 1969: 328).
Secularization of the minority rights had retained a close affinity with the general 
secularisation of state affairs in Turkey. The image of minority rights kept in the minds of 
the Republican leaders became one of the driving impetuses of secularisation. Perhaps 
because of this fact that as they were bringing forth their objection to the preservation of 
corporate millet forms in the new regime, Turkish authorities associated it with the
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secular reforms that were taking place in the policies of the new Turkish state. It was 
through the same secular commitments that a final compromise in the issue of the 
Patriarchate would be achieved. It was conceded at Lausanne that the Patriarchate would 
continue to remain in Turkey but without having collective jurisdiction of secular nature 
over its community members. In so doing, traditional framework of political, judicial and 
administrative capabilities of the Patriarchate was almost completely abandoned. Thus, 
the Republican State achieved to level off another remnant of the Ottoman millet system 
in shaping its new minority rights regime (Meray, 1969: 324).
6.3.3.4. The Question of the Armenian Homeland
When discussing collective dimensions of minority rights in the chapter I, it was 
underlined that the most concrete form of it appears in the delimitation of a geographical 
area to the autonomous organisation of a minority group. The right is collective in the 
sense that the said minority is considered as the majority population of the given region 
where the task of ruling is largely vested in the hands of that minority group as a whole. 
In this kind of formulation, authority of the central government over the rule of the 
regional population is significantly curtailed and comes to depend upon some pre-settled 
areas of jurisdiction. In other words, collective right to regional autonomy is most likely 
to create “states within a state” against which the founding cadres of the Republic had 
stood quite distasteful and suspicious. After all, the provisions of the Sevres Treaty that 
had divided Anatolia along ethno-lingual and religious borders were still fresh in the 
Turkish minds. Hence, Turkish leaders exhibited strong determination to the eradication 
of territorial designations fi'om the new framework of the Turkish minority rights regime.
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However, contrary to the Turkish concerns, the Lausanne proceedings considered 
also an option of regional autonomy in the formulation of Turkish minority rights regime 
especially with respect to the accommodation of Armenian and Assyrian interests. 
Particularly, the British and the USA governments insisted on the creation of a “gathering 
land” in the Eastern or South-Eastern parts of Turkey where the local and deported 
Armenians would have a “national home” under the rule of the Turkish state. According 
to the USA memorandum presented to the Conference, for example, the creation of an 
autonomous Armenian region was a humanitarian task which would provide the 
Armenian peoples with a living space (Meray, 1969; 242-244).
However, having learned much from the late Ottoman experiences, Turkish 
government naturally denied even talking about these specific regulations. For the 
Turkish side, collective rights accorded in the form of territorial autonomy would, in 
time, operate as a mechanism of secession. Hence, for the Turkish view, the question of 
minority protection should not have been confused with territorial-national aspirations of 
minorities. As concerned with this policy, Ismet Pasha stated in the Conference that the 
Turkish state would embrace all Armenians resident in Turkey with honest feelings of 
brotherhood. For Ismet Pasha, any form of territorial autonomy, to be granted to any one 
section of minority groups, would, however, end up in the final partition of the Turkish 
territory along national aspirations of minority communities (Meray, 1969; 298).
The question at Lausanne, after alt, was not the creation of national states but the 
adjustment of sub-national politics related to the protection and promotion of minority 
distinctions. Although the proposals did not claim an eventual partition, the form of 
geographical autonomy had concealed within itself seeds of complete secession that had
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clearly been proved, on many occasions, throughout late Ottoman period. In order to 
avoid resurrection of the problems of the past, the new Turkish regime denied any form 
of geographical designation including those claims of “Armenian homeland”. No parallel 
provision was accordingly incorporated in the final document of the Lausanne Treaty.
6.3.4. National Sovereignty and International Guarantees
As was explained before, external interference of the western states in the internal 
affairs of the Ottoman state on behalf of the interests of the non-Muslim minorities had 
culminated in the demise and final disintegration of the Empire. Having been aware of 
this fact, the founding leaders stood suspicious about external intervention in the national 
implementation of the new minority rights regime. To this end, the Turkish government 
denied possibility of direct supervision that would be carried out by an international 
commission seated in the country. Yet, parallel to the procedures that contained in the 
provisions of the other minorities treaties, the Turkish version too incorporated a form of 
international monitoring (Meray, 1969: 212).
In accordance with the post-WWI regime, national enforcement of the Lausanne 
rights was taken under a twofold guarantee of both internal and external mechanisms. 
Internally, the Turkish government undertook that minority provisions of the Treaty 
constituted an integral part of the fundamental law in the country which would be 
subjected to change by national arbitration under no condition. The provision of the 
Treaty, accordingly, provided that “no law, no regulation, nor official action shall conflict 
or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor official action 
prevail over them” (Art. 37). The treaty, hence, closed all the doors to the subsequent
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amendment of the established standards. Parallel to the regime of the minorities treaties, 
the modification of the provisions was entrusted to the discretion of the League of 
Nations. Thus, despite the fact that the government constantly rejected any formulation 
that would interfere with the regulation of internal affairs of the nation, this article 
externally regulated legal status of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey.
Indeed, it was clearly specified in the article 44 that national enforcement of the 
provisions fell under the guarantee of the League of Nations. Thereby, the Turkish 
government undertook to recognise that these provisions constituted obligations of 
international concern. It was accordingly provided that none of the provisions would be 
modified or changed without the assent of the majority of the League’s Council. The task 
of monitoring was vested in the hands of the members of the League Council who “shall 
have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or dander of 
infraction of any of these obligations”. This is to say, any change or modification in the 
original document would, under no condition, be a work of national legislation.
On the other hand, it was one of the outstanding aspects of the new regime that 
the settlement of disputes ceased to be a political issue. Instead, the regime installed a 
mechanism of judicial review through which disputes that would arise out of the national 
implementation of the provisions would legally be handled. It was accordingly provided 
that in case of internal or external disputes on the Turkish provisions, the case was to be 
referred to the PCIJ whose decision was final and binding for both parties. This was a 
very significant innovation when we remember traditionally political and armed 
intervention of the great powers in the internal treatment of non-Muslim minorities.
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Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that monitoring procedures of the regime, 
established in the articles 37 and 46 of the Treaty, contrasted to a greater extent with both 
internal and external aspects of national sovereignty that had preached by the Turkish 
authorities in the duration of the Lausanne Conference. In its exact form, the procedures 
assimilated the Turkish regime of minority rights into governance of an international 
regime. In so doing, Turkish authorities were given no free hand in the national 
enforcement of the concluded principles. Yet, unlike traditionally bilateral interferences 
of the European great powers, the new minority rights regime entrusted the procedure of 
supervision in the political competence of an international institution and the legal 
arbitration of a supranational court. Therefore, it is conclusive to claim that another 
aspect of the traditional system of minority protection was completely broken in Turkey. 
Having divorced from political considerations of the partied states, the area of minority 
issues, at least at face value, gained a humanitarian feature.
6.4. Conclusion
The Lausanne Treaty and its implementation procedures largely integrated the 
classical Turkish regime into European standards laid down in the provisions of the 
minorities treaties. A secular framework of rights and freedoms was accommodated 
within the general scope of the new Turkish regime. However, due to fact that 
inclusion/exclusion practices of the Turkish political culture has constrained the 
Republican minority/majority classification, the same regime differed from its 
contemporaries with respect to the definition of the concept of minority. As a result.
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traditional divisions that existed between Muslim and non-Muslim sections continued to 
characterize the minority/majority categorisation in Turkey.
In doing this, uniform image of the Muslim population was reproduced. In spite 
of the fact that sub-religious distinctions of the Muslim population were implicitly 
recognized, the early Republican politics of ittihad-i anasir-i Islamiye totalised the 
Muslim residents of the country within a religiously coloured configuration of national 
unity. Under the imprints of the limited diversity of the classical millet system, the issue 
of minority rights was associated exclusively with non-Muslim sections of the 
population, those of the Greeks, Armenians and the Jews, who had been granted millet 
status in the Turkish ancien regime. Although the Lausanne document had brought no 
detailed clarification for the general wording of the “non-Muslim minorities”, neither 
Catholics nor different persuasions of the Assyrian communities were officially entitled 
to the protective umbrella of the Lausanne regime. Parallel to the practices of the 
classical millet system, the latter group has been exempted from official recognition in 
the Republican state.
Nevertheless, the scope of the Lausanne’s minority provisions introduced 
innovative changes into the traditional scope of the Turkish minority rights regime. In 
particular, the formula of the Lausanne rights, which reconciled citizenship equality with 
the notion of ethno-cultural diversity, resolved, for the first time, the question of 
incongruity between state-membership and group-membership. Having granted civil and 
political equality, minority individuals were considered primarily as the individual 
citizens of the state but without abstracting them from their traditional and ethno-cultural 
circumstances. Although the tanzimat reforms had aimed to accomplish this congruity.
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facing with the overwhelming power of the minority nationalism, the reformist endeavour 
was doomed to a complete failure.
Indeed, the Turkish minority rights regime, within its new framework, provided 
legal norms and instruments of the principle of “equality within diversity” and/or of the 
“diversity within citizenship unity”. But, because the emergence of the modem regime 
had proceeded hand in hand with the nationalist and secessionist aspirations of the non- 
Muslim minorities, the latter group of Turkish citizens lost reliability in the eyes of the 
Turkish statesmen and the general public. Although they were guaranteed legal-political 
grounds of citizenship equality and ethno-cultural differentiation, they came to be 
regarded within the terms of the suspected residents of the country who were to be held 
under a constant and cautious supervision.^^ Hence, notwithstanding existenee of legal 
guarantees, the Turkish minority rights regime has, as the next chapter will exhibit, 
encountered with problems in practice.
A non-official report on minorities, which was prepared by the general secretary o f the RPP probably 
during the late 1930s presented a good example to the fact that minorities were considered unreliable and 
suspected citizens. They were regarded always ready to jeopardise national interests o f the country (Bulut, 
1998: 166-191).
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CHAPTER VII
REPUBLICAN PRACTICES AND THE CONTEMPORARY 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE TURKISH MINORITY RIGHTS REGIME
7.1. Introduction
Minority provisions of the Lausanne Treaty provided non-Muslim minorities with 
a substantive right to ethno-cultural and religious diversity as well as citizenship equality. 
However, the imprints of the millet system and Ottomanist experience continued to limit 
minority policies in Turkey in two ways. First, one’s creed has continued to determine the 
criteria of “inclusion” and “exclusion” in the Turkish regime so long as we referred to 
minority/majority classification. The imagined unity of the Muslim millet was preserved 
against the “other” position of the non-Muslims. Second, the fifth-column and/or 
secessionist acts of the latter resulted in the loss of confidence against both the issue of 
minority rights and that of the minorities themselves. In the eyes of both Turkish 
authorities and the general public, minority questions and minorities came to be viewed 
as a pretext of international interference or a tool of territorial secession. They usually 
were conceived as “suspicious”, “dangerous” and “foreign” elements within the Turkish- 
Muslim nation. Hence, though provided with a secure firamework at Lausanne, non- 
Muslim minorities in Turkey fi'equently found themselves in a vulnerable position.
Parallel to the classical dimensions of the millet system, the notion of minority 
difference has generally been associated with unequal and discriminatory treatment. 
However, the instrument of inegalitarianism was no longer the legal-political-social 
dimension of the millet system. In the Republican regime, legal-political
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conceptualization and practices of citizenship has operated as an instrument of inclusion 
and exclusion. Once the Turkish context established a close linkage between citizenship 
and nationality, it has, on the one hand, operated as an instrument of Muslim-inclusive 
policy in which the principle of citizenship equality has been equated with national 
uniformity. On the other hand, the same instrument has proceeded in an exclusivist 
manner to the ethno-cultural others who were often subjected to inegalitarian policies. 
Bearing this fact in mind, this chapter will elaborate on the socio-political, legal and 
foundations £ind practices of this linkage. In doing this, firstly, while pointing out 
Muslim-inclusive formula of the Turkish national category, emergence of a monolithic 
category of national formation will be discussed. Having delineated uniform 
establishment of the Turkish-Muslim category, secondly, the position of the non-Muslim 
minorities in the practices of the Republican minority rights regime will be examined. 
Lastly, under the light of the recent developments, we will review contemporary 
fi-amework of the Tmkish minority rights regime.
7.2. The Question of Muslim Diversity
Turkish minority rights regime, as was examined so far, illustrated main 
parameters of the Republican policies of inclusion/exclusion practices in which two 
exclusivist categories of “us” and “them” have been expressed in terms of religious 
distinctions. As was noted before, unlike the Ottomanist policy of ittihad~i anasır that 
had projected an abstract Ottoman nationhood superior to sub-national particularities, the 
Republican authorities had ceased to develop a political definition of nationality. Political 
and cultural grounds of an egalitarian unity between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens
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had almost completely been lost during the national struggle. It was also noted above that 
the Ottoman ideal of ittihad-i anasır was by no means substituted with a policy of ethnic 
Turkism but with a strong policy orientation of ittihad-i anasir-i Islamiye, union of the 
Muslim elements. In so doing, a religious substance was inherited from the Ottoman past 
and adopted to the national formulation of the Republican State. It was on this religious 
color that while a Muslim-inclusive national form was constituted, sub-religious 
characteristics of the Muslim peoples were denied.
7.2.1. Religious Delimitation of the Republican Nationhood and the Emergence of
“NationarV’Tormal” Categories of Citizenship
Discussing “the sources of Turkish civilisation”, Lewis (1968: 15) suggested that 
“one may speak of Christian Arabs, but a Christian Turk is an absurdity and a 
contradiction in terms... a non-Muslim in Turkey may be called a Turkish citizen, but 
never a Turk.” Thus, in view of Lewis, the Turkish tradition has made a clear-cut 
distinction between the notion of state-membership (citizenship) and that of the ethno­
cultural membership (nationality). In consistent with the legacy of the Ottoman past and 
of the legal-political formulations and practices of the national liberation, the Republican 
authorities delimited ethno-cultural borders of the Turkish nationhood, among others, 
with religious characteristics of citizens. Legal-political conceptualization of both 
“Turkish nation” and “Turkish citizenship” has proved this Republican tendency. It must 
be noted here that since the concept of citizenship was often entangled with the concept 
of nation, the distinction, in fact, carried further implications for the equal 
accommodation of non-Muslim distinctions. Despite the fact that the citizenship and
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nationality signified two different sources of identification, full and complete status of 
citizenship has generally been connected with ethno-cultural position of peoples. In order 
to attain political stability and national coherence, the ideal of the Turkish authorities has 
generally become to create a true congruence between the two sources of identity.
Turkish nationalism has sought the basis of this congruity in the religious/cultural 
unity of the Muslim population. Ziya Gokalp, the prominent advocate of the Turkish 
nationalism, for example, promoted a Muslim-inclusive formulation of Turkish 
citizenship and nationality. He believed that the main reason of the complete failure of a 
common Ottoman citizenship was the religious distinctions of subject populations 
(Berkes, 1981: 78). In his view, a working citizenship policy would be established on the 
existence of a coherent nation which was a cultural community speaking one language 
and professing one religion (Berkes, 1981: 136-137).
Having closely connected the two notions of citizenship and nationality, Gokalp’s 
argument implied the fact that a workable citizenship policy would successfully be 
established, in the Turkish context, only in cultural unity of the Turkish-Muslim peoples. 
He accordingly believed that belonging to the same religious and cultural backgroimd, 
non-Turkish speaking Muslims, irrespective of ethno-linguistic characteristics, would 
take place in the Turkish national category on the grounds of citizenship equality after 
they professed Turkish language (Berkes, 1981: 78).
Similarly, Atatürk intended to develop a comprehensive formula of Turkish 
nationalism which would be inclusive for all the inhabitants of the country irrespective of 
religious or ethno-cultural affiliation. In doing this, Atatürk denied religious substance of 
Turkish national formation in favor of common language, culture and history (Afetinan,
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1998: 18-25). However, his secular approaeh still concealed an implicit religious 
implication in the sense that traditional practices had hardly produced a cultural unity 
between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens of the country. As was explained so far, almost 
no cultural, historical or linguistic affinity had yet developed between Muslim and non- 
Muslim sections of the Turkish population. Practices of the Ottoman nizam had instead 
prompted the emergence of cultural and linguistic affinity among the members of the 
same religious category. Beeause of this, Atatürk’s national formula of the ‘cultural 
community of citizens’ implicitly connoted a national category consisting of the Muslim 
community of citizens. Having been aware of this historical legacy, Atatürk, in another 
definition, limited membership to Turkish nationality to those citizens who had 
participated in the founding process of the Republic from which non-Muslim citizens, as 
was given before, had completely been excluded (Afetinan, 1998: 18).
Although delimited with the condition of Turkish language, early Republican 
practices projected indeed a Turkish national category out of the Ottoman Muslim 
elements who had hitherto shared a common legal and cultural heritage. However, this 
did not imply assimilation of non-Turkish speaking Muslims into an ethnic-Turkish 
category but indicated “melding of all the various Ottoman-Islamic communities, 
including the Turks, into a new form of political organization” (Karpat, 1985: 57). Thus, 
parallel to the monolithic configuration embedded in the Ottoman Muslim millet, this 
political project by no means permitted legal-political accommodation of the Muslim 
particularities. Although the Ottoman Muslim category came to be expressed, this time, 
in an ethnic connotation of Turkish identity, it was not expected to operate as an upper 
identity under which sub-religious distinctions would acquire a legal-political status. By
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contrast, the name of the “Turkish nation” signified a political instrument in which 
neither Turkish ethnic identity nor any ethnic element of the Muslim population would 
gain predominance. Having amalgamated in the political formula of the Turkish national 
category, religio-cultural unity of Muslim population was expected to supersede, if not 
eliminate, Muslim peoples’ ethno-lingual distinctions. Atatürk himself, for example, 
implicitly affirmed ethno-lingual differences of Circassian, Kurdish, Boshnack and Laz 
elements in Turkey. But, depending on the existence of a long shared history in legal and 
cultural sphere, he strongly denied that Turkish-Muslsim distinctions would claim a 
national identity separate from that of the Turkish nationality (Afetinan, 1998: 23).
Thus, the national project of the Republican state could not impair itself from the 
imprints of the Ottoman legacy. Not language alone but also religious affiliation 
delimited Turkish national category from the outset of the new regime. Religious 
distinctions of the Turkish population, thereby, continued to constitute a socio-political 
instrument in identifying national “insiders” and “outsiders”. In following mainstream 
policy of the founding leaders, non-Muslim minorities were excluded from the ethno­
cultural borders of the Republican nationhood. In the case of non-Muslims, even adopting 
the Turkish language was conceived insufficient for being eligible to the membership of 
the Turkish nationality.'
It was the same religious substance that constrained legal-political borders of the 
Turkish citizenship and national classification. Parliamentary elaboration of the Article 
88 of the 1924 Constitution, which formally defined Turkish citizenship, manifested that
‘ Bearing in mind religious basis o f the Turkish identity, a “Turkish” non-Muslim blamed in the 1940s that 
“as it was the case in the pre-Republican years, no non-Muslim was considered to be Turk even during the 
Republican period but were constantly viewed within the traditional categories o f Jewish, Armenian or 
Greek” (Saul, 1999: 125).
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the formal status of citizenship was not sufficient to guarantee equal membership to 
Turkish national population. In fact, the article stipulated that “the name Turk, as regards 
to citizenship, shall be understood to include all citizens of the Turkish Republic without 
distinction of, or reference to, race or religion” (Kili and Gôzübüyük, 1985: 111-135). 
But, the Republican authorities denied formulating an identical citizenship status for both 
Tmkish-Muslim and non-Muslim sections of population. The dominant view of the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), at the time, was to restrict inclusive aspects 
of the Turkish citizenship with an exclusivist definition of Turkish nationality. In 
contravention with the formal scope of the article 88, civic features of the Turkish 
national identity, with its essentially inclusive formula of the name “Turk”, was limited to 
the privilege of the cultural community of the Turkish-Muslim population. In doing this, 
state-membership and ethno-cultural membership were situated in two different realms 
by creating a strict distinction between membership to “Turkish nationality” (milliyet) 
and the “Turkish citizenship” {tabiiyet). Non-Muslim minorities were included in the 
formal definition of the Turkish citizenship but excluded even from the legal-political 
content of the Turkish national category (Toker, 1979: 361-364).
Depending on this nationality/citizenship duality, the concept of citizenship was 
not completely neutralized in the Turkish context against the ethno-cultural 
particularities. The Republican regime instead constituted two categories of citizens in 
Turkey: ‘national citizens’ (citizens by nationality) and the ‘formal citizens’ (citizens by 
law). Under these circumstances, notwithstanding civic aspects of the legal definition, the 
distinction in nationality carried two significant implications for the Turkish citizenship 
practices with regard to the issue of minority treatment.
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On the one hand, with the Muslim-inclusive formula of nationality, which 
superseded ethno-lingual and sectarian differences of Muslim citizens, the Ottoman 
Muslim millet was culturally, legally, politically and practically reproduced within the 
national borders of the new state. The legal-political content of citizenship has largely 
been identified with ethno-cultural members of the Turkish nationality. Beyond doubt, 
Muslim-inclusive definition has provided measures of legal equality and non­
discrimination for the Turkish-Muslim citizens irrespective of sub-national 
characteristics. But, due to fact that the uniform configuration of the national citizenship 
has denied public expression of the Muslim population’s ethno-cultural distinctions, the 
socio-political and legal ramifications of citizenship equality have manifested itself, in 
the case of “national citizens”, in an understanding and practice of unanimous treatment. 
The formula of “national citizenship”, therefore, has operated in the form of totalizing or 
disregarding, if not completely denying, ethno-linguistic, cultural and sectarian 
particularities that existed among different sections of the anasir-i îslamiye.
On the other hand, in accordance with the Lausanne commitments, the 
Republican governments have bestowed official recognition and the measures of 
differential treatment to the members of the “formal citizens”. However, because of the 
dual formulation of citizenship, policies of differential treatment would not be reconciled, 
in the Turkish context, with the imiversal terms of citizenship equality. By contrast, 
contrary to the substantive aspects of the Lausanne commitments, egalitarian principles 
of the Turkish citizenship has often been reserved, in practice, to the “national citizens” 
of the country.
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7.2.2. Muslim Minorities: Equality within Uniformity
The Turkish constitution associated Turkish nationality formally with the 
condition of Turkish citizenship. Depending upon the distinction of national and formal 
categories of citizenry, however, the name “Turk”, in practice, has been used to refer to 
the cultural unity of the Turkish-Muslim population. Hence, few, if any, non-Muslims 
have been accepted into the conceptual category of the Turkish national identity whereas 
few, if any, Turkish-Muslim citizens have been allowed to legally accommodate, freely 
express or develop their particular characteristics. The unifying/dividing function of the 
Muslim identity has operated almost within the same rationality that religion had been 
fulfilling within the socio-political and legal compartment of the Ottoman Muslim millet.
Relying on this legal-political and traditional setting. Republican governments, 
from the outset, insisted on the idea of “one and indivisible” unity of the Turkish nation. 
To this end, contrary to ethno-lingual diversity that existed among different groups of the 
Turkish-Muslim population (Andrews, 1989), foundational ideology of the Republican 
state, in respect to its legal, political and administrative organisation, has rested upon this 
essential political and cultural concern. In this context, substantive aspects of the 
principle of equality, which prescribed treating different cases differently, have been 
neglected in the Turkish regime of minority protection with regard to the Turkish-Muslim 
differences. The scope of the Lausanne regime has been limited to the traditional 
circumstances of the non-Muslim citizens while granting each member of the Turkish- 
Muslim population formal (legal) equality of being treated alike within the indivisible 
unity of the Turkish national entity.
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Muslim-inclusive formulation of Turkish nationality and citizenship has 
guaranteed formal equality and non-discrimination for Muslim citizens irrespective of 
sub-national characteristics they possessed. But, since it denied public expression of 
Muslim population’s ethno-cultural distinctions in favor of a Muslim-inclusive 
nationality, socio-political and legal ramification of “equal treatment” have been 
implemented with an understanding and practice of “unanimous treatment”.
Turkish constitutions recognized equality of all citizens before the law 
irrespective of language, religion, ethnicity, colour, sectarian affiliation and political 
opinion. On the basis of legal equality, however, it was also affirmed that differential 
treatment would be accorded to no section of the (Turkish-Muslim) population (Art. 10). 
Both of the 1961 and 1982 constitutions put strong emphases on the “indivisible unity of 
the state with its nation and territory” (Art. 3) which would be subjected to amendment 
under no condition (Art. 4). To this end, legal-political organs of the Republican state 
were constitutionally charged with the task of preserving national and territorial integrity 
(Art. 5). That is why, the exercise of constitutional rights and freedoms including 
freedom of religion, thought, expression, communication, press and association were 
conditioned by the respect paid to this foundational unity. It was clearly laid down that 
rights and freedoms would be curtailed if they were used in contravention with the 
principles of the national unity and territorial integrity (Art. 13-14).^
 ^ The two article of the constitutions (13/14) were subjected to amendment, in the year 2000, thus for 
narrowing the grounds for fundamental rights and freedoms. The inherent spirit o f the articles was yet 
preserved intact. Article 13 now reads: “Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only on the 
basis o f specific reasons listed in the relevant articles of the Constitution without prejudice to the values 
defined therein and only by law. These restrictions shall not conflict with the letter and spirit o f the 
Constitution and the requirements o f the democratic social order and the secular republic and the principle 
of proportionality”. Article 14 now reads: “None o f the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution 
shall be exercised within the aim of violating the indivisible integrity o f the state with its territory and 
nation, or for activities undertaken with the aim of destroying the democratic and secular Republic based on
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Owing to this essential interest, Turkish constitutional setting drew further 
boundaries so as to inhibit political expression of socio-cultural diversity. The Turkish 
Law on Political Parties presents a good example (ÍHD, 2000: 254-258). In fact, the 
constitution granted full recognition to the principle that “political parties are 
indispensable elements of the democratic political system”. However, it was also brought 
forward that political parties are subject to the same constitutional limitations enforced in 
the exercise of civil and political rights. In particular, the constitution made it clear that 
their statutes and programs would in no way involve any objective contrary to the unitary 
features of the country (Art. 68-69). With the constitutional regulation, the Law has 
prohibited political expression of ethno-linguistic, cultural and sectarian distinctions (Art. 
78). Nor would they consider ethno-linguistic, religious, or sectarian criteria for 
membership or would claim that Turkey involves any national minority based on 
differences of national or religious cultures or on differences of sect, race or language 
(Art. 12). Political objectives seeking protection and promotion of sub-national languages 
and cultures or regional interests have, therefore, been conceived as an act of “violating 
the national integrity by creating minorities on the territory of the Republic of Turkey” 
(Art. 81). The provisions of the Law precisely concluded that any political party 
convicted of violating these principles would completely be closed down. As is well 
known, several political parties, including the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democracy Party 
(HADEP) and/or pro-Alavi Peace Party (Barış Partisi) were either banned or investigated
human rights. No provision o f this Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that grants the State or 
individuals the rights o f destroying the fundamental rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution, and 
of staging an activity with the aim of restricting rights and freedoms more extensively than is stated in the 
Constitution. Sanctions for persons undertaking activities in conflict with these provisions shall be defined 
by law” (Law No. 4709).
313
several times for pursuing separatist or divisive objectives on the basis of ethno-lingual, 
regional or sectarian differences of the national citizens.
Similarly, the exercise of the freedom of association was restricted by the 
principle of “indivisible unity of the state with its nation and territory” as it has been 
understood in the Turkish political culture. The Law on Associations (Law No. 2908; 
İHD, 2000: 175-183)) has banned the establishment of associations based upon peoples’ 
group-specific distinctions with regard to ethno-linguistic and sectarian affiliation (Art. 5- 
1). Associations were clearly banned from following particular interests relating to 
peoples’ regional or ethno-cultural characteristics (Art. 5-5). In particular, the Law 
specifies that no association would claim the existence of ethno-cultural, linguistic, 
religious or sectarian minorities on the territory of the Republican Turkey. Nor would 
they engage in any activity to create minorities by means of protecting, developing or 
promoting any language or culture other than the Turkish language or carrying out any 
activities to that effect (Art. 5-6). On the basis of this legal setting, among others, a 
sectarian group, that is the Cultural Association of the Union of Alavi and Bektashi 
Formations {Alevi-Bektaşi Kültür Birliği), for example, was dissolved on 13 February 
2002 on the grounds that according to articles 14 and 24 of the constitution, and article 5 
of the Law on Associations, it was not possible to found an association by the name of 
Alevi and Bektashi, which refer to Muslim sectarian communities.
Additionally, educational and cultural policies have also been subjected to the 
same unitary characteristics of the state and the nation. The right to learning or receiving 
instruction in mother tongues, in this context, has been delimited with the traditional 
circumstances of non-Muslim minorities. The Turkish language has been admitted as the
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sole medium of instruction in the schools. In accordance with Article 42 of the 
constitution, the Law on Foreign Language Education (Law No. 2923; ÎHD, 2000: 142- 
143) stipulated that no language other than Turkish would be taught to Turkish citizens as 
their mother language (Art. 2-a). Similarly, although the private and public use of non- 
Turkish minority languages was officially settled in 1991, the Turkish constitution has 
not yet come to recognize that minority languages would be used in radio/TV 
broadcasting. The law has stipulated that “radio television broadcasts will be in Turkish 
with the exception for languages that will contribute to the development of universal 
culture and science” (Art.4-t, Law No. 3984.
Another reflection of the unitary view has marked administrative organization of 
the country that has been projected on the basis of considerations which had nothing to 
do with ethno-cultural or linguistic characteristics of regional peoples. Political 
expression of regional distinctions, such as territorial autonomy or secessionist 
aspirations, was strictly prohibited. Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code made it clear 
that any such action would be legally considered within the terms of "inciting people to 
hatred and enmity on the basis of class, race or regional differences” (Law No. 765). 
Accordingly, the prevailing constitution stipulated that the rationality of administrative 
sub-divisions rested upon a set of functional concerns including “geographical 
limitations, economic conditions, and necessities of public services” (Art. 126).
In brief, the uniform image of the Muslim millet has been carefully preserved in 
the socio-political, administrative and legal structures of the Republican state. Having 
limiting practices of differential treatment to the case of non-Muslim minorities (formal 
citizens), principle of legal equality, with regard to different sections of the Turkish-
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Muslim population (national citizens) has been carried out in a form of uniformity. 
Putting the matter differently, Turkish governments never considered granting official 
recognition and legal accommodation to ethno-cultural, linguistic and sectarian 
distinctions that existed among the Turkish-Muslim majority. Whenever there emerged 
any ethno-cultural claims among its Muslim elements, these kind of particularistic 
demands have officially been interpreted not in ethno-cultural terms of minority rights. 
The prominent example was the Kurdish question. Thus, although the Kurdish identity 
underwent an ethno-lingual disintegration and has been seeking official recognition and 
legal accommodation, particularly since the 1970s, the Turkish governments never 
examined it in ethnic terms to be considered in the context of minority protection. The 
PKK’s separatist upsurge, which has dominated the Turkish politics for the last two 
decades, for instance, has officially been identified with economic backwardness, 
reactionary religious movements, or with tribal aspects of socio-economic relations 
prevalent in the region (Yeğen, 1996; Mesut, 1993).
7.3. Non-Muslim Minorities: Inegalitarian Treatment Revisited
One dimension of the Turkish minority rights regime centred on the socio­
political and legal totalisation of the Turkish-Muslim citizens. The constitutional 
principle of equal treatment has been implemented within the terms of national 
uniformity that has constantly inhibited political and legal accommodation of group- 
specific distinctions that remained outside the scope of the Lausanne Treaty. The other 
dimension of the regime proved almost the reverse. Since the official ratification of the 
Lausanne Treaty, the Republican governments have bestowed official recognition to non-
316
Muslim distinctions and treated them accordingly. Non-Muslim citizens have received 
differential treatment with distinctive facilities of positive measures, among others, in the 
affairs of education, religious practices and cultural development.
However, the Lausanne regime secured not only group-specific instruments of 
distinct treatment but also legal-political foundations of citizenship equality. The two 
essential dimensions of the issue of minority protection, thus, were reconciled in the 
substantive formula of the Lausanne settlement. Contrary to the Lausanne commitments, 
however, the Turkish authorities have been unable to create a harmonious conciliation 
between those policies of citizenship equality and group-specific treatment. It was in this 
sense that ethno-cultural neutrality of Turkish citizenship remained a myth with respect to 
the official treatment of the formal citizens. The rhetoric of Turkish citizenship has 
advanced on a duality of “national” and “formal” citizenship as equal and full citizenship 
status has, in most cases, been reserved to the national citizens made up of the Turkish- 
Muslim population. Demographic, linguistic, cultural, religious and economic dimensions 
of Turkish nationalism have, therefore, progressed in a discriminatory manner against 
and at the expense of the formal citizens’ ethno-cultural and demographic presence.
7.3.1. Nationalist Attitudes of the Single-Party Period
As was noted before, although they were granted civil and political equality apart 
from the rights to different treatment, non-Muslim minorities have occupied a suspect 
place in the eyes of both state authorities and the general public. Their loyalty to the state 
and nation has often been considered unconvincing. In order to achieve a coherent form 
of national entity, that meant emergence of a true congruence between nationality and
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citizenship categories, it was generally believed that the formal sections of the citizenry 
must have first been eliminated either through assimilation, integration or expulsion. 
However, in consistent with socio-political legacy of the Turkish-Muslim majority, the 
Turkish nation-building process has usually operated in an assimilationist (inclusive) 
manner only with regard to various Muslim elements whereas the same process has 
appropriated an exclusivist approach against non-Muslim minorities. It was these 
inclusion/exclusion practices, based on the peoples’ national characteristics that sustained 
non-Muslim-exclusive policies in the Turkish context.
The official establishment of the Lausanne commitments was accompanied with 
an intensive process of demographic nationalization which meant in the Turkish context 
nothing but homogenisation in terms of religious affiliation. The Turkish-Greek exchange 
of populations became one of the earliest steps taken in this direction.^ Unwilling to live 
with a larger minority presence'^, through the implementation of the exchange both states 
sought achievement of a this religious homogenisation. When the project was completed 
towards the end of the 1920s, more than 1.2 million Anatolian “Greeks” had been 
exchanged with Muslims of Greece who numbered about 400,000 (Aktar, 2000: 17).  ^ In 
conformity with the major premises of the Turkish minority rights regime, citizenship
 ^ The Turkish-Greek population exchange was agreed at Lausanne between the Turkish and the Greek 
authorities on 30 January 1923. According to the terms of the Convention, with the exception o f the Greeks 
of Istanbul and the Muslims o f the Western Thrace, Turkish citizens o f the Greek origin were subjected to 
exchange with the Muslim minority o f Greece (Psomiades, 1968: 120-126; Meray, 1969: 89-95).
■* Under the fresh memories o f minority secessionism, Turkish authorities, at Lausanne, declared on several 
occasions that the Turkish government was no longer willing to maintain a minority presence on the 
Turkish territory. In the view of Ismet Pasha, a population exchange, particularly between Turkey and 
Greece, was necessary in order to dispense with the social grounds o f confrontation and external 
interference (Meray, 1969: 186-200).
 ^ In fear o f a possible Turkish revenge, approximately 1.350.000 out of 1.5 million Ottoman Greeks 
resident in Anatolian had followed the Greek retreat in 1922 and taken refugee in Greece. In this sense. On 
the part o f the Greek side, the exchange was a fait accomplish (Tekeli, 1998: 61). In the duration o f the 
exchange, that took place between 1923-27, 149.851 Anatolian Greeks were exchanged with 355.635 
Muslim citizens of the Greek state (Geray, 1970: 10).
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status was reciprocally bestowed upon religious brethren, not ethno-linguistic kin, living 
on the other side of the national frontiers. Consequently, apart from Greek-speaking ones, 
the Turkish government exchanged many Turkish-speaking Orthodox citizens with many 
Greek-speaking or non-Turkish speaking Muslims including Pomaks, Albanians, 
Bosnians and Gypsies (Psomiades, 1968: 60-68)^. The population exchange, hence, 
resulted in “two deportations into exile, of Christian Turks to Greece and of Muslim 
Greeks to Turkey” (Lewis, 1968: 355).
The population exchange eliminated larger minority groups from the lands of both 
states. Since it credited those ideas of religious homogenisation, the practice eonsiderably 
contradicted with the then prevailing scope of the minorities treaties. Having been based 
upon the refutation of those values of toleration, ethno-cultural diversity and plural 
coexistence, the exchange transformed approximately two million peoples from a status 
of minority into refugees (Ari, 2000; Koufa and Svolopoulos, 1991). Yet, the formula and 
implementation of the Convention remained quite loyal to the general framework of 
Turkish minority rights regime. In line of the Turkish minority definition, population 
categories submitted to exchange were assessed under the imprints of the Ottoman 
legacy. One’s faith was taken as the signifier of his or her majority/minority status in both 
of the countries. Ethno-lingual or cultural distinctions were completely disregarded. 
Religious affiliation became the sole criteria of national belonging in the duration of the 
exchange.^ *
* Most of the deportees did not even know the language of the country to which they were sent. When the 
two parties met in Greece, the Greek deportees who were sent from Turkey and spoke only Turkish could 
not communicate with the Greek-Muslims who spoke only Greek (Yalçın, 1998; Aladag, 1995).
’ Article 1 o f the Convention reads: . . .“there shall take place a compulsory exchange o f Turkish nationals 
of the Greek-Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals o f the Muslim 
religion established in Greek territory”...
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During the years of demographic nationalization, the government initiated a new 
process of exchange, this time, in the personnel of minority or foreign-owned companies, 
as they were compelled to exchange their foreign and non-Muslim staff with Muslim- 
Turkish citizens.* It is estimated that by 1926 approximately 5,000 employees from the 
Greek minority had been replaced with Muslim Turks (Alexandris, 1992: 110). Indicating 
the “other’ position of the non-Muslim minorities, the government blocked avenues of 
public employment as well. The Law on Public Employment, dated 1926, conditioned 
public employment with “being Turkish”, not with “being a Turkish citizen”. Hence, 
because non-Muslim minorities had been considered Turkish only in terms of citizenship, 
the law, in practice, excluded non-Muslim citizens from the state sector, making it an 
exclusive privilege for Turkish-Muslim citizens (Aktar, 2000: 118-121). Although the 
law was subsequently amended in 1962, having been isolated for a long time from public 
works, non-Muslim citizens have experienced little change in their occupational status in 
the state sector.^
The law violated the civil and political equality guaranteed by the Lausanne 
commitments and the subsequently elaborated constitutional setting, and so, the working 
prospects of non-Muslim minorities in the public sector were to a large extent curtailed. 
The next face of nationalizing policies was in the issue of the linguistic rights. As was 
explained, the free use of minority languages, both in public and private, had been *
* Indicating the unequal position o f non-Muslim minorities, Fevzi Bey, the Minister o f Public Works, 
declared in 1923; “According to arrangements concluded with foreign companies, the latter must engage 
Turkish employees only. This does not mean that they can employ all subjects o f the Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey indiscriminately. They must employ Muslim Turks only. If the foreign companies do 
not shortly dismiss their Greek, Armenian and Jewish servants, I shall be compelled to cancel the privileges 
under which they are authorized to funetion in Turkey” (in Alexandris, 1992: 111).
’ A recent study demonstrated that though there remains today no official ban on employing minorities in 
the public sector, under the far-reaching influence o f past policies few minorities have tried to obtain such 
positions. Many seemed to have lost hope that they could be employed in state offices (Koçoglu, 2001).
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provided at Lausanne. However, from the early years of the republic, the liquidation of 
minority languages became one of the most delicate aspects of national cohesion (Üstel, 
1997: 240-242). Despite the fact that the first national census, dated 1927, assured that 
the overwhelming majority shared the ‘'same race, blood and the substance”, existence of 
minorities who differed in “language, culture and history” still troubled political 
authorities (Dündar, 2000: 50-51). The Turkish language, therefore, began to be 
emphasized as an essential criterion not only for Turkish nationality but also for Turkish 
citizenship. It was argued that if one desired to have an equal and full access to Turkish 
citizenship, he or she must has first mastered the Turkish language.
Therefore, instruction of minority languages was greatly limited even in minority 
educational establishments.'^ Subsequently, several municipalities agreed to discourage 
minority citizens from speaking a non-Turkish language in public places.'^ Parallel to 
official and intellectual approaches, overt expression of minority languages arose 
resentment in the general public who came to consider it as the proof of arrogance and 
disloyalty.'^ It was believed that linguistic Turkification was a moral obligation on the 
part of the non-Muslim minorities (Benbasa and Rodrigue, 1995: 103). A widespread
Indicating close linkages between Turkish nationality and full and complete citizenship, Celal Nuri Ileri, 
a prominent politician and journalist, delimited Turkish citizenship with the Turkish language. Ileri claimed 
that if minorities were to be admitted into equal framework o f Turkish citizenship, linguistic rights of the 
Lausanne must have first been liquidated. For Ileri, as long as they maintained linguistic distinctions, non- 
Muslim minorities would hardly be equally treated within the terms o f Turkish citizenship (in Bali, 2000: 
107).
The Unionist Law (1915), which had made it compulsory to reach Turkish language and to give the 
instruction o f history and geography courses in Turkish, was restored in 1923. In following, Turkish was 
admitted as the sole medium of instruction in all elementary schools o f the non-Muslim minorities (see 
Sezer, 1999: 17-35). As against the five-hour instruction o f the Jewish and French languages, the Jewish 
communal schools came to teach in 1927 twenty-hour Turkish weekly (Galanti, 2000: 39).
Several Turkish citizens o f Jewish origin were fined in Bursa and Balikesir for speaking Ladino (a 
Romance-Hebrew Sephardic Jewish language) in public places (Bali, 2000: 108).
A witness of the period remarked: “attitudes of the non-Muslims were quite arrogant. They did neither 
know nor try to learn Turkish but spoke mother tongues in high tones. I always took it as a demonstration 
of communal strength and disloyalty to the state. They were enjoying time in their closed communities
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campaign of ''Citizen! Speak Turkish' -  one periodically repeated throughout the 1950s -  
was, consequently, initiated in 1928 in the Turkish press, political circles and the general 
public against the persistence of minority languages.*'* The campaign intended to 
manipulate the government and public opinion. Although no legislative act was 
concluded in this direction, it succeeded in creating public hatred against minority 
languages. Many of the minorities were harassed, insulted, attacked or beaten in the 
streets for reading a non-Turkish document or speaking a minority language (Galanti, 
2000; Bali, 2000: 131-149).
Thus, notwithstanding national and international obligations undertaken in 
relation to the protection and promotion of minority languages, linguistic distinctions 
came to be perceived, by the early decades of the Republican regime, incompatible with 
the terms of national projects and equal citizenship. Having been aware of the fact that 
they had obtained international guarantees to protect and reproduce communal languages, 
non-Muslim citizens became the primary subjects of linguistic Turkification. Istanbul, 
Izmir and Edime, where non-Muslim minorities constituted a considerable proportion of 
the resident population, were the major centres of the linguistic campaign. In conformity 
with the general scope of the Turkish minority rights regime, almost no special attention
without bounding themselves with the interests o f the country. They were earning much and consuming 
pretentiously.. .(and) all these were irritating us” (Ilmen, 1998)
Under the pressure of the campaign, prominently the Jewish minority established a number o f communal 
institutions in order to disseminate Turkish language among its members. The Commission for the 
Dissemination o f Turkish Language {Türk Dilini Yaygınlaştırma Cemiyeti) and the Association o f National 
Culture {Milli Hars Birliği) presented two examples (see Bali, 2000: 133). On the other hand, in the same 
years, two Jewish intellectuals, A. Galanti (2000) and M Cohen (M. Tekinalp), introduced several projects 
of linguistic Turkification. For the former, expansion o f the role o f Turkish language in the minority 
educational establishments would be a useful method. In the view o f Cohen, if the Jewish community 
desired to become full and equal members o f the Turkish nation, they had to fulfill “ten commandments” 
which included: 1. Turkify names, 2. Speak Turkish, 3. Pray (at least partly) in Turkish, 4. Turkify your 
schools, 5. Send your children to state schools, 6. Become involved in state affairs, 7. Mingle with Turks, 8. 
Uproot the spirit o f communal separation, 9. Do your share for the national economy, 10. Know your rights 
(in Landau, 1984: 23).
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was given to the non-Turkish speaking Muslims who were already under the effect of a 
uniform educational system (Aktar, 2000: 131).
On the other hand, parallel to the rising trend of nationalist currents in Europe, the 
emphasis of Turkish nationalism shifted in the 1930s from Turkish-Muslim culture to 
Turkish-ethnic cores. It was in this context that Atatürk promoted the foundation of the 
Turkish Historical Society {Türk Tarih Kurumu) and the Turkish language Society {Türk 
DU Kurumu) whereby the “Tiukish history thesis” and the “sun-language theory” was 
introduced (Oran, 1997: 200-207; Özdoğan, 1996). This ideological transformation by no 
means instigated an essential change in the practices of the Turkish minority rights 
regime being based upon exclusivist categories of the Muslim/non-Muslim duality.'^ 
Nationalist policies continued to seek their targets in the presence of non-Muslim 
minorities. An immediate affect of this was seen, in the year of 1934, in the promulgation 
of a new settlement law {İskan Kanunu) which greatly restrained living conditions, 
especially for those non-Muslim minorities who inhabited strategic regions of the 
country. Citing the political, cultural and security considerations of the state, the Law 
closed certain parts of the country to non-Muslim minority settlement.'^
From the legal point of view, the Law contradicted with the third paragraph of the 
Article 38 of the Lausanne Treaty which stipulated that “non-Muslim minorities will
The Gagauz Turks, who spoke Turkish but followed the Orthodox-Christian faith, were not allowed to 
migrate to Turkey in the mid 1930s. Because o f religious distinction, they were not considered to fall under 
Turkish national identity. In the same period, however, large groups of Balkan Muslims from various 
ethnic and linguistic backgrounds were accepted into Turkey (Kirişçi, 2000: 1-22).
Article 2 o f the Law divided Turkish territory into three zones: 1. Areas assigned to the settlement of 
those who belonged to Turkish culture, 2. Areas assigned to the settlement of those who were to be 
assimilated into Turkish culture, 3. Areas closed to human settlement because o f military, health, security, 
economic and political considerations (Law No. 2510). The first two zones signified settlement areas of 
the Turkish-Muslim citizens whose cultural and linguistic amalgamation was traditionally desired. This 
reflected existence o f a persistent interest in the uniform categorization of the Turkish-Muslim population. 
As their settlement areas were limited, non-Muslim minorities’ assimilation into an all-inclusive Turkish 
national identity was considered unconvincing (TBMM, 1934).
323
enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration subject to the measures applied, on 
the whole or o part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals.. The law discriminated the 
non-Muslim citizens in regulating their movement and emigration conditions within the 
country. Although the dominant idea behind the Law was to assimilate non-Turkish 
peaking Muslims into Turkish national category, the practice was promoted at the 
expense of non-Muslim minorities. In particular, those non-Muslim citizens who 
inhabited strategic regions, such as the Turkish Thrace and Straits, were destined to 
evacuate the place (Bali, 2000: 246). In so doing, the legal act revived traditional 
practices with its legal-political aspects of inegalitarian treatment. As a result, political 
authorities and the general public once again reaffirmed traditionally ‘other” and 
“unreliable” position of the non-Muslim minorities.
The growing nationalism and those feelings of anti-Semitism, indeed, sustained 
the emergence of the settlement law (Toprak, 1996; Levi, 1998: 102). Because of this, 
after the promulgation of the Law, particularly the Jewish citizens found themselves 
under an increasing pressure of uprooting. The act was accompanied in the Turkish 
Thrace with economic boycotts and physical assaults carried out against minority 
citizens. Many Jewish houses and work places were either burned or plundered (AT, 
1934c: 53).*  ^ The Jewish residents of Turkish Thrace, consequently, were forced to 
evacuate the region, with more than 10,000 of them forced to seek refugee in Istanbul in
the summer of 1934 (Karabatak, 1996; Levi, 1998: 10). 18
It was admitted that the affair was organized by the nationalist sections who had no direct relationship 
with the government. Yet, it was also recognized that local braches o f the RPP would have involved in the 
emergence o f the nationalist attacks (Toprak, 1996). The government officially condemned the affair and 
promised that criminal officials and peoples were going to be subjected to administrative and judicial 
investigation, and plundered properties were going to be returned to their owners (AT, 1934c: 52-54).
'* According to official numbers, in the aftermath o f the affair, 3.000 out o f 13.000 Jews fled to Istanbul 
(AT, 1934c: 53).
324
Both political authorities and the press related the affair to affects of anti- 
Semitism which was then growing in the world (AT, 1934a: 78-79; AT, 1934c: 52). 
Another commentator thought that the affair resulted from economic exploitation of the 
Jews on the Turkish peoples who had made great sacrifices for the good of the country 
and most deserved to benefit its advantages (AT, 1934b: 78). But, it was also believed 
that the security concerns of the settlement law played a larger role in the emergence of 
the affair. The persistence of linguistic and cultural distinctions, in particular, in the 
strategic regions was seen inconsistent with security concerns of the country According 
the Yunus Nadi, the “real” ground of anti-Semitism in the region, was the fact that since 
the Jews had insisted on not speaking Turkish, Turkish residents of the region, where was 
a non-military zone, had considered them dangerous for the security of the country (AT, 
1934a: 78-79). Similarly, Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of Internal Affairs, reported to the 
government that due to fact that they continued to remain in a “foreign” language and 
culture, there was a widespread suspicion on the Jewish residents of the region (Thrace 
and Çanakkale), where was a non-military zone, that they would jeopardize the security 
of the country (AT, 1934c: 52).
By the beginning of World War II, discriminatory policies against non-Muslim 
minorities increased. In the early months of the war, for instance, in fear of minorities’ 
fifth column activities, non-Muslim males, aged 25-45, were suddenly taken into military 
service where they were held under a sort of surveillance for about one-and-half years 
(Bali, 1998). However, the Turkish minority rights regime presented a stronger 
inegalitarianism in the implementation of the Capital Tax (Law No. 4305-FarfiA:
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Vergisi).'^ When enacted in November 1942, the law had, in fact, been promulgated in 
order to levy extraordinary wealth earned through exploiting the then prevailing wartime 
conditions?® But, it has been argued that apart from the officially declared one, the law 
had concealed an implicit objective of levelling off the non-Muslim presence from the 
country’s commercial life (Akar, 1999: 166-167). Saraçoğlu,, the Prime Minister, for 
example, is reported to have stated in the parliamentary group of the then ruling 
Republican Peoples Party (RPP) that:
This law, at the same time, entails a revolutionary nature in the sense that it will introduce 
an opportunity to achieve our economic independence. (Because) in doing this, while 
eliminating the non-Turkish elements from Turkish economy, we will be able to hand 
over, on the one hand, the Turkish economy to Turks. On the other hand, with this law, 
we will be able to transfer importable estates in Istanbul to Turkish hands...In short, this 
law will put an end to the economic superiority of non-Turkish elements in the country 
(Barutçu, 2001:594).
In the same speech, the Prime Minister declared that the non-Muslim elements 
would be assessed %75 higher than those of the Muslim-Turkish citizens. Therefore, 
though Saraçoğlu insisted on several occasions that the government recognized no 
distinction between various citizens of the country (Yalman, 1997: 1253-1254), the 
taxpayers were categorized on the basis of the traditional duality rooted in the general 
framework of Turkey’s minority rights regime. One’s creed determined the amount of the 
tax to be assessed. The tax lists classified payers into two major groups of M (Muslim)
Provisions of the Tax stipulated that proportions were to be assessed by the Tax Assessment Boards 
composing o f governmental, commercial and local authorities o f each town, city or district (Art. 7). The 
amount had to be paid in cash within fortnight. Another 15 days were allowed but with the penalty of 
increasing the original amount by 1 percent weekly. In the cases that the tax was still unpaid, the entire 
property of the taxpayer was to be confiscated and himself was to be subjected to forced labor (Art. 12).
Saraçoğlu blamed the cause o f the economic problems to the passions and speculative acts of the 
commercial circles and thought that in order to dismiss economic illnesses, a special tax must have been 
levied upon the wealth o f those who earned much from economic circumstances of the war years (AT, 
1942a: 40). It was to be an extraordinary tax, because, for F. Ağralı (Minister o f Finance), traditional 
instruments were insufficient to tax earnings obtained war-time circumstances (AT, 1942b: 22-40).
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and G {Gayrimüslim, non-Muslim). Subsequently the two other categories of E {Ecnebi) 
for foreigners^' and D {Dönme) for the Jewish converts^^ were added (Ökte, 1987: 19).
The non-Muslim categories were assessed a proportion of five or ten times higher 
than those of the amounts levied on Turkish-Muslim citizens (Ökte, 1987: 34-35). Thus, 
the burden of the tax fell on the shoulders of non-Muslim minorities.^^ Most significantly, 
those who declared their inability to pay the assessed amount were banished to labour 
camps established in the remote comers of Anatolia where they were expected to pay off 
the tax by working for the state.^ "* Interestingly, though the liability to forced labour was, 
in principle, applied to Turkish-Muslim defaulters as well, in conformity with the 
inclusion/exclusion practices of the Turkish minority rights regime, the administrative 
organs and government refused to dispatch Muslim Turks to labour camps (Ökte, 1987: 
71-72). Notwithstanding the fact that many Muslim citizens too had failed to pay the 
assessed amount in Izmir, none of them took place among the deportees who were sent to 
the labour camps established in Sivrihisar (Güçlü, 1993).
Towards the end of the WWII, the government cancelled the implementation of 
both the Capital Tax and the labour camps. All those who had hitherto been kept in 
camps were released and the amounts still unpaid were rendered null. Many of the non- 
Muslim minorities, however, had already gone to economic min which created immense
Upon diplomatic protests, the category o f foreigners was dropped from the context o f discriminatory 
taxation and was assessed on the same footing as Muslim citizens (Ökte, 1987: 37).
The category o f the Dönme referred to those Jewish converts to Islam who belonged to the Sabataist 
persuasion. For a detailed study conducted on the community (Zorlu, 1998).
A number o f detailed study conducted on the implementation o f the Capital Tax (Ökte, 1987; Akar, 
2000; Aktar, 2000: 135-215).
Many deportees had been assessed taxes over TL 100.000, that is, they would have to undertake hard 
labor for over 250 years in order to clear his dept (Ökte, 1987: 25). Despite the fact that the law had 
exempted them from forces labour, many old-aged and sick peoples took place among the deportees 
(Kandemir, 1962).
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collapse in the psyehological and social situation of the non-Muslim citizens.^^ In order to 
pay the assessed amounts, many taxpayers had to sell their properties and real estates, 
approximately 98 percent of which was bought out by the Turkish-Muslim citizens 
(Aktar, 2000: 204). From the political point of view, therefore, the Capital Tax 
represented another stage in the inegalitarian practices of the Turkish minority rights 
regime. Muslim/non-Muslim segregation of the Ottoman legacy was reproduced with its 
internal aspects of legal-political inequalities. As a result, non-Muslims’ confidence to 
comprehensive framework of the Lausanne commitments was once again shaken. They 
largely lost their belief that non-Muslim distinctions would find an equal accommodation 
in the citizenship practices of the Republican state (Okte, 1987: 94).
7.3.2. Internalisation of External Crisis: Minorities in the Multi-Party Period
In the aftermath of the war, Turkey took its place in the Western world which was 
promoting democratic governments and individual human rights. Hence, the Turkish 
political system began to transform its autoeratic structures towards liberal-democratic 
model of politics. The single-party rule of the RPP was replaced by Democrat Party (DP) 
government in 1950. Liberal-democratic transformation of the political system raised 
hopes among members of minority groups as well. It came to be said among minority 
citizens that religious, linguistic and cultural distinctions would no longer be subjected to 
discriminatory governmental policies but would henceforth be treated equally in law and 
in fact. Indeed, during the early years of the DP government, inegalitarian practices lost 
effect. Although public employment of the non-Muslim minorities were still out of
 ^A good example o f this eventual collapse was illustrated by Zaven Biberyan (1999) in his famous novel 
named Babam Aşkale ’ye Gitmedi (My father did not Go To Aşkale).
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question, non-Muslim minorities, for example, came to be appointed to significant 
university posts and began to receive equal treatment in the military service (Bali, 
1998a). On the other hand, the Orthodox Patriarchate was permitted in 1951 to accept 
foreign students to the Seminar of Khalki. On the basis of a reciprocal agreement, the 
government subsequently allowed Greek teachers to take part in the educational 
establishments of the Greek minority (Oran, 2001: 592).
It was expected, therefore, that substantive principles of the Turkish minority 
rights regime, as established at Lausanne, would take higher respect in the new period. 
However, it became obvious by the mid-1950s that the democratic context would hardly 
wipe away the imprints of the foundational duality embedded in the Turkish minority 
rights regime. Ethno-cultural difference continued to be associated with socio-political 
and economic practices of inegalitarian and discriminatory treatment. Political authorities 
and the general public continued to rank non-Muslim citizens within exclusivist 
categories of “unreliable”, “undesirable”, and “foreign” residents of the country.
Unlike the previous decades, the position of non-Muslim minorities in the new 
period began to be shaped not by nationalist aspirations of internal politics but by 
diplomatic crises of external relations. Having been constituted in a category of internal 
extensions of external enemies, non-Muslim minorities frequently lost their socio­
political and economic security inside whenever the Turkish governments faced 
diplomatic crisis outside. The first example of this attitude surfaced by the mid-1950s 
from strained Greek-Turkish relations over the issue of Cyprus.^^ As Turkey and Greece
Parallel to the de-colonization movements of the period, the Greek Cypriots launched an anti-colonial 
struggle against the British rule by the early 1950s. However, the movement was seeking not only 
liberation but also union with its kin-country Greece that was undesirable for the Turkish residents of the 
Island. Because o f this, the target o f the Greek resistance involved not only the British rulers but also
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disagreed on the final status of the island, the loyalty of non-Muslim minorities once 
again began to be questioned inside. Anti-minority feelings were once again cultivated in 
the minds of the Turkish peoples (TT, 1986).
It was in this context that instead of being Turkish citizens with full and equal 
rights, members of the Greek minority began to be treated as “foreign” and “dangerous” 
residents of the country who were to be expelled en masse (Benlisoy, 2000). Most 
significantly, the Greek minority was frequently pinpointed as the target of a possible 
Turkish retaliation that came true on the night of 6-7 September 1955 (Alexandris, 1992: 
256). Having been inflamed by the Cyprus crisis, angry crowds in Istanbul and Izmir 
destroyed cultural, religious and economic presence of minorities. According to Nesin 
(1990: 30), the mass attacks of the night reminded the St. Barthelamov’s Day of the 
French Protestants. Toker (1991: 144) illustrated the excesses of the night in his 
following remarks:
I would never forget the situation that Beyoğlu street displayed at that night. The street was 
full o f elothes and other things thrown out o f shops. Refrigerators, radios, washing maehines 
were on the floor... it had any sense of nobility...Istanbul lived, perhaps, the worst night of 
its history. People were in panic. Everywhere was like a fire-place. Nobody knew what to do.
The authority o f both government and the state had been lost in the anger o f crowds.
The masses would only be taken under control after the government declared 
martial law. The total amount of damages assessed in Istanbul alone was estimated at $60 
million (Alexandris, 1992: 259).^^ Official sources reported that in the course of the 
incident 3 people were killed and 30 injured (Dosdoğru, 1993: 100). Helsinki Watch
Turkish Cypriots. Despite the fact that it denied hitherto to associate itself with the question, Turkish 
governments involved in the Cyprus crisis by the middle o f the 1950s. In order to find a final solution to the 
question, Turkey, Greece and Britain started negotiations. But, upon the failure, Greek-Turkish relations 
strictly strained by the fall of the 1955 (Gürel, 1993; 53-65).
The damages included 1004 houses, 4348 shops, 27 pharmacies and laboratories, 21 factories, 110 
restaurants, cafes and hotels, 73 churches, 26 schools, 5 athletic clubs, and two cemeteries (Alexandris, 
1992: 259). In Izmir, the attacks destroyed 14 houses, 6 shops, 1 pavilion, the Greek Consulate, and a 
Greek church. It was reported that 57 persons were wounded in the same city (Kiliçdere, 2000).
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subsequently reported that human losses totalled, in fact, 15 (HRW, 1992: 50). The Greek 
sources, on the other hand, estimated that 25 persons were killed and another 600 
wounded (Averoff-Tossizza, 1986: 49). A number of people were arrested and taken 
under custody in the aftermath of the night.^* The government promised compensation 
for material casualties. To this end, the Parliament enacted a special law, but the law 
limited the amount with TL 60 million in total (TT, 1986: 19). It was insufficient 
because, within a month, 4433 citizens had already applied for TL 69.578.744 
(Kocabaşoğlu, 2000: 47).
These incidents damaged the international prestige of the Republican State. The 
meaning of international guarantees relating to the circumstances of the non-Muslim 
minorities disappeared in the mass anger (Oran, 2001: 601). In particular, the Lausanne 
framework had lost effect within a few hours. Because of this, apart from material and 
human losses, 6/7 September contributed to spread those feelings of emotional 
destruction, regret, resentment and fear in the hearths of minorities. In contrast to widely 
shared expectations that minorities would benefit from the democratic transformation of 
the country, traditional vulnerability continued to mark social position of minorities in 
Turkey. The affair, hence, encouraged many persons from Greek, Armenian and Jewish 
minorities to opt for emigrating from Turkey (Akman, 1992: 27). Indeed, although no 
definite number has been given, it is estimated that an increasing number of minority 
persons with Turkish nationality sold their property and moved abroad in the aftermath of 
the affair (Çelik, 2000; Alexandris, 1992: 42-44). The most enduring affect of the 6/7
6000 persons in Istanbul, and 165 in Izmir were taken under custody in the aftermath o f the affair 
(Demirer, 1995: 114). The arrests were accused o f destruction o f property, looting, spread o f communist 
propaganda, theft, sabotage, murder, attacking against religious and sacred establishments and revolting
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September, therefore, appeared on the declining size of non-Muslim population. It was 
because of this, the affair was considered to signify the final stage in the gradual collapse 
of the imperial cosmopolitanism in Turkey (TT, 1986; 11).
The last blow to the presence of the Greek minority came to the forefront when 
the Turkish government cancelled the Ankara Convention (1930) which had granted legal 
status to the existence of more than 17.000 Greek citizens resident in Istanbul, those of 
the so-called établis Greeks (Gônlübol and Sar, 1974: 68-69).^^ Although they legally 
held Greek citizenship and subjected to population exchange, depending upon 
commercial and familial connections they had been permitted to stay in Istanbul. In so 
doing, many of them had engaged in intermarriages, joint investments, social and 
religious activities with Turkish citizens of Greek descent. By the 1960s, parents and 
children, grandparents and grandchildren had come to retain different citizenships (Demir 
and Akar, 1999: 90). Notwithstanding the absence of Turkish citizenship in legal terms, 
many établis had taken place in the political life of the country as well.^ *^
The terms of the Ankara Convention were generally observed until the middle of 
the 1960s. The London-Zurich accords, that established a partnership govenunent in 
Cyprus in 1960, further consolidated the status of the Greek citizens in Turkey. However, 
when the Greek-Cypriots turned, in 1962, to enosis policies in violation of the Zurich- 
London accords, diplomatic relations of the motherlands too exacerbated (Bahcheli, 
1990: 51-94). Its immediate consequence affected the shaky position of Greek minority, 
particularly that of the établis Greeks. Gradually an anti-minority atmosphere grew up in
against the authority of the government. No suspect, however, were found guilty and all were initially 
released (Dosdoğru, 1993: 17-93),
The Greek citizens of Istanbul numbered 26.431 in 1927, 17.672 in 1935, 13.598 in 1945 and 11.879 in 
1955 (Alexandris, 1992: 281).
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the government and the general publie. Starting from the year 1962, the Greek minority 
came to be represented again as the fifth column force of the Greek irredentism, a source 
of friction, enmity and social virus in the country. Both the public opinion and the 
government were convinced that the national security and the long-term interests of the 
country demanded expulsion of the Greek elements (Demir and Akar, 1999: 64-67).^’
First, bank accounts belonging to the Greek minority were frozen. Next, Greek 
citizens were prohibited to obtain real estate in Turkey (HRW, 1992: 9, fn. 12).^  ^ In 
following, the government cancelled the Ankara Convention on 16 March 1964 and 
began to deport établis Greeks from Turkey on the ground that they were dangerous to 
the internal and external security of the country. In a few months, approximately 9.000 
Greek citizens were obliged to leave Turkey for Greece on the ground that they 
endangered national security of the country (Bahcheli, 1990: 174). When the government 
refused renewing residence permits of the Greek citizens, the number exceeded 11.000 by 
the September 1964 (HRW, 1992: 9).
Nevertheless, measures of expulsion by no means limited to the Greek citizens. 
As was explained, due to the fact that many deportees had hitherto established familial 
and economic connections with the Turkish citizens of Greek origin, deportation of one 
Greek citizen resulted, in practice, in actual uprooting of the whole family. This is why, 
the affect of the governmental decision far exceeded its original objective. Apart from the
Before being expelled in 1965, Neoklis Sarris, for example, was one of the leading figures in the RPP’s 
youth branches in Istanbul (Interview).
M. Soysal, the spokesman o f the government, announced in July 1964; “in response to the unfriendly 
policy o f the Greek government, the Turkish goveriunent decided to terminate privileged treatment that has 
hitherto been accorded to the Greek nationals in Turkey (HRW, 1992: 9 )...unless the Greek government 
changed its prevailing attitude relating to the Cyprus question, all the Greek nationals in Istanbul might be 
expelled en masse" (Alexandris, 1992: 282).
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Greek citizens, throughout the implementation of the expulsions, 30.000 Turkish 
nationals of Greek descent permanently left Turkey (HRW, 1992: 9). Thus, despite the 
fact that most of them were under the scope of the Lausanne regime, the abrogation of the 
Ankara Convention resulted in the expulsion of more than 40.000 Greeks.
The impetus of the official action was a diplomatic objective undertaken in order
to force the Greek government to come to terms over the Cyprus question. The
government itself did not believe that the Greek minority would be held responsible for
the atrocities and enosis policies of the Greek-Cypriots and the Greek state. Later, Ecevit,
the then ruling Minister of Labor, admitted this point in his following words:
The impetus of the governmental action was the catastrophic atrocities o f the Greek-Cypriots 
that were intensified against the Turkish brethren during the late 1963 and the early 1964. 
Turkey, then, was unable to interfere in the Island to save the Turkish-Cypriots. Military 
capacity o f the country was not sufficient to accomplish this policy. Under these 
circumstances, Turkey manifested its reaction in a very erroneous way. Despite the fact that 
they played no role in what was going on in Cyprus, the Greeks o f Istanbul were compelled 
to leave Turkey (in Demir and Akar, 1999: 201-202).
Thus, Greek residents of Istanbulwere sacrificed to the Greek-Turkish diplomatic 
tensions. After the population exchange of the early Republican years, the expulsion 
became the second great wave in the emigration of the Greek minorities. Although no 
direct relation was officially expressed between two different issues of minority rights 
and external relations, the persistence of diplomatic tensions between Greece and Turkey 
reflected its effect on the educational facilities of the non-Muslim minorities as well. 
During the intense crisis in Cyprus and in the Greek-Turkish relations, new restrictions 
were induced on the implementation of the Lausanne’s minority rights regime. The most 
obvious example of this govermnental attitude, with far-reaching implications on the part
According to official reports, 2902 estates, with an estimated value of $261 million, were confiscated in 
the course o f the exodus (Demir and Akar, 1999: 89-90). The Greek sources estimated total value o f the 
deportees’ property about $500 million (Alexandris, 1992: 285).
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of Turkish minority rights regime, was the closure of the Theological Seminar Khalki 
{Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu) in 1971.
. In the context of the traditional immunities, the Seminar had been established in 
1844. Its mission was to educate clerical staff to the service of the Orthodox Patriarchate. 
After the Turkish government affirmed at Lausanne that non-Muslim minorities “shall 
have equal rights to establish, manage and control at their own ex p en se , . . . s ch o o ls  
and other establishment for instruction and education” (Art. 40), the original form of the 
Seminar was held intact in the new framework of the Turkish minority rights regime. 
Educational capacity of the school further expanded in the early 1951 when the Ministry 
of National Education permitted that the Seminar would incorporate the High-School of 
Theology and, apart from the Greek minority, foreign students would be accepted to the 
Seminar (Özyılmaz, 2000; Oran, 451).
The closure, however, was not a direct abdication of the right. The governmental 
act depended upon the existence of a legal inconsistency between constitutional 
principles and the identical provisions of the Law on the Private Educational Institutions 
{Özel Okullar Yasası). Thus, although the constitution had prohibited establishment of 
higher educational institutions by individuals or corporate agents outside the state, the 
Law had also retained permissive provisions in this direction. On the application of the 
Council of the State {Danıştay), the Constitutional Court amended in 1971 two articles of 
the Law. In accordance with the terms of the article 120 of the Constitution^^, the Court 
came to a conclusion that no private or corporate actor, except the state, would have any 
right to establish higher educational institutions (Özyılmaz, 2000: 96-98).
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It was upon this court decision that although its high-school (Heybeliada Özel 
Rum Erkek Lisesi) was preserved intact, the department of Seminar was closed down. 
However, following the gradual decrease in the number of enrolled students, the high 
school too was closed down by the Patriarchate in 1984 (Özyılmaz, 2000: 96-102; Oran, 
2001: 451). The seminary had been the centre of Orthodoxy for centuries in ecclesiastical 
learning. In consequence, the decision affected the educational capacity of the Greek- 
Orthodox Patriarchate. It is for this reason that since the early 1990s, the restoration of 
the institution to its original position has occupied a prominent place in the issue of 
minority rights in Turkey (Oran, 2001: 451).
Furthermore, during the 1970s and ’80s, attacks on Turkish institutions and 
diplomats by the ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia)^'' 
worsened particularly the social position of Turkey’s Armenian minority (Sivasliyan, 
1992). Under the influence of the ASALA terrorism and the increasing Greek-Turkish 
tension on the Cyprus question, corporate power of the foundations came to be regarded 
dangerous to Turkey’s national interests. It was legally documented by the Council of 
State two months before Turkey intervened in Cyprus that “since corporate bodies were 
likely to be stronger than private individuals, no corporate body, constituted by non- 
Turkish citizens, would obtain real estate. Otherwise, it would be impossible to prevent 
the emergence of inconvenient and dangerous circumstances for the security of the state” 
(CD, 999). It was in this context that governmental authorities began to liquidate real 
properties belonging to the corporate personality of the minorities’ pious foundations.
’ Article 120 reads: “Universities shall be established only by the state and in accordance to the regulation 
of a special law... under the supervision and inspection of the state authorities, shall be administered by 
autonomous bodies elected by the members o f these institutions”.
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In fact, apart from guaranteeing non-Muslims’ religious and charitable 
foundations, Turkish government had committed, at Lausanne, to treat the same 
foundations on the same footing as the Muslim ones. Article 42 of the Lausanne Treaty 
affirmed that “all facilities and authorization will be granted to the pious foundations of 
the said minorities...which are granted to other private institutions of that nature” (Art. 
42). The legal ground of the official action, under these circumstances, was based on the 
property lists that had been required in 1936 from both Muslim and non-Muslim 
foundations.^^ The government recognized the list of the 1936 declaration as the true 
property of a given foundation. Thus, although pious foundations of the non-Muslim 
minorities had continued to get new properties, through either donation or purchasing, all 
of these properties, obtained between the years 1936 to 1974, were considered illegal. 
The properties, therefore, were returned to heirs of those who had denoted them to the 
foundation. If no potential owner could be found or the property had been obtained by 
purchasing, then it was confiscated (Oran, 2001: 229).^^
The confiscation, in the eyes of the minorities, represented another phase in the 
discriminatory treatment. Liquidation has meant the financial collapse of the foundations 
that hitherto relied on the revenues earned merely from the rents of the properties. This is 
why, as the pious foundations lost its properties, their capacity to fulfill communal 
services in the affairs of religion, education and charity was also curtailed. Bearing this
ASALA staged 86 attacks against the Turkish nationals between the years 1975-1985, which killed 47 
Turkish citizens, 32 o f whom were officials, and injured 19 officials (Franz, 1994: 327).
In order to hold economic sources of pious foundations, particularly those of the Muslim ones, under 
state control, the Law on Pious Foundations {Vakıflar Kanunu), dated 1936, urged the foundations to make 
a declaration on the list o f properties that they possessed at the time 
It was asserted that with a secret declaration, the government o f the military rule assured in 1981 that no 
fiorther action was to be taken against the property o f the non-Muslim minorities’ pious foundations 
(Aktüel, 1999). However, the Law remained in force and the confiscation lasted especially upon the 
properties belonging to Armenian foundations (Oran, 2001: 229).
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fact in mind, it was rightly argued that the post-1974 acts on the communal properties 
indicated, in practice, not only the violation of property rights but also of educational 
rights. Having lost their financial sources, apart from several community hospitals, many 
minority schools were gradually closed down (Radikal, 1999).
To sum up, legal-political and administrative practices of the Republican minority 
rights regime helped to replicate the Muslim!dhimmi compartmentalization with its latent 
aspects of inegalitarianism. Although the Lausanne framework formulated a substantive 
framework of citizenship equality, almost no compromise would be achieved between the 
principles of civil and political equality and the group-specific dimension of minority 
treatment. In practice, the notion of full citizenship has exclusively been reserved to the 
Turkish-Muslim sections of the population. Thus, inegalitarian treatment of the 
Republican regime exhibited that though they were formally considered equal citizens 
irrespective of ethnic, religious and linguistic distinctions, the practice proved the reverse. 
In the case of the non-Muslim minorities, the right to ethno-cultural and linguistic 
differentiation went hand in hand with extensive practices of discrimination. Minorities, 
therefore, came to believe that only Muslim nationals were full citizens of the Republic 
and that they were not considered “citizen” even within the limited meaning of the 
concept (Bali, in Kaplan, 2000).
7.4. Towards a Regime of Substantive Equality: The post-Cold War Era
Two major transformations that occurred in Turkey by the middle of the 1980s, 
began to challenge traditional practices of the Republican minority rights regime relating 
to the official treatment of both Muslim and non-Muslim distinctions. Internally, the
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imagined unity of the anasir-i îslamiye that had been carefully upheld, at least, from the 
years of the national struggle, entered in a process of disintegration along the demarcating 
lines of ethno-lingual and sectarian particularities. Peoples’ interest in receiving legal- 
political recognition and accommodation for their sub-national identities that existed 
among “national citizens” of the country gradually became widespread.
It was quite evident by the 1990s that traditionally monolithic formulation of the 
Turkish millet would no longer meet identity claims brought forth by the different 
sections of the Muslim citizens. In particular, the ethnic-Kurdish, Alevi-sectarian and 
flindamental-Islamist groups came to take a critical stand against the uniform definition 
of the national citizenship. Islamist groups, for example, projected an Islamic version of 
“social contract” modeled upon the example of the plural practices of the golden age of 
religion and called for liberating religious life from judicial and administrative 
interference of the state (Bulaç, 1992). The Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin, on the 
other hand, came to attribute greater interest to the issue of official recognition, legal- 
political accommodation and of the free expression of ethno-linguistic characteristics 
particularly in the fields of education, radio/TV broadcasting and cultural activities 
(Ekinci, 1997). As well, non-Muslim minorities began to produce retrospective criticisms 
against the inegalitarian practices of the Republican citizenship, and have sought the 
implementation of substantive reforms that would relieve their “second-class” position in 
the country (Levi, 1998; Saul, 1999; Bali, 2000; Koçoglu, 2001). Discriminatory 
treatment, particularly, in the affairs of non-Muslim minorities’ religious education and 
property rights of the pious foundations came to the forefront in the Turkish minority 
rights regime (Oran, 1994; Oran, 2001: 449-452; Baydar, 1999; Berberakis: 1998).
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Externally, as was explained before, the end of the Cold War unleashed minority 
problems all over Europe in the 1990s that had been frozen within the ideological 
confrontations of the previous decades. The issue of equal accommodation of minority 
distinctions within a plural configuration of legal-political settings began to preoccupy 
national and international circles for both security and humanitarian considerations. It 
was in this context that as given above, apart from the UN, the CoE and the OSCE, the 
EU has attributed greater significance to the protection and promotion of cultural, 
linguistic and religious characteristics of minority peoples. As a result, humanitarian 
packages of the European regional organisations gradually shifted from the minimalist 
principles of equality and non-discrimination towards substantive accommodation of 
minority distinctions. Apart from citizenship equality, minority peoples have, therefore, 
been provided with positive measures of differential treatment allowing protection and 
promotion of their ethno-cultural particularities. It was in this context that the 
Copenhagen Summit of the EU Council affirmed in 1993 that a candidate country must 
have achieved, before accession, among others, stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.
7.4.1. The Impacts of the post-Cold War European Standards
The emergence of a comprehensive regime in the post-Cold War acts of the 
European-regional organizations has constrained traditional norms and practices of the 
Turkish minority rights regime. In particular, with the intensification of EU-Turkey 
relations, the Turkish governments became more prone to increasing international 
pressures in issues of democratization and minority protection. The same pressures
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strengthened the effect of minority claims within the country. Starting from 1998, for 
example, the EU Commission’s annual reports have included comprehensive assessment 
of the prevailing condition of minority treatment and the legal-political status of sub­
national differences in Turkey. Generally speaking, drawing attention to the traditional 
shortcomings of minority protection in Turkey, the reports have insisted on the extension 
of official recognition from three non-Muslim communities (Armenians, Greeks, and 
Jews) to the Kurdish, Alevi and Assyrian groups. As well, it was recommended that 
Turkish governments would facilitate cultural and political expression of minority 
differences. To this end, it was insisted that both Muslim and non-Muslim sections of 
minority groups were to be provided with legal-political instruments through which they 
would promote and protect their distinct identities. In doing this, the reports suggested 
that Turkey was to undertake appropriate steps in the direction of integrating its 
constitutional regime with the contemporary standards of minority protection specified 
particularly in the latest documents of the CoE and the OSCE (CEC, 1998; CEC, 1999; 
CEC, 2000a; CEC, 2001; CEC, 2002).
Give the limited aspects of the Turkish minority rights regime, the 1998 Regular 
Report of the Commission, for example, put emphasis on the traditional shortcomings of 
the Lausanne Treaty. It was accordingly laid down that in Turkey there is a de jure and de 
facto difference with regard to the official treatment accorded to minorities” those who 
are recognized under the Lausanne Treaty and those who are outside its scope. In 
accordance with the Lausanne Treaty, it was admitted, three minorities are officially 
recognized by the Turkish State: Armenians, Jews and Greeks, each of whom freely 
manages its own churches, schools and hospitals. As for those who remained outside the
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scope of the Lausanne Treaty, it was also pointed out that the Assyrian Orthodox religion 
is not recognized as a religious minority and is subject to pressures in the exercise of its 
religious education. In addition, the Commission drew attention to the fact that Turkey’s 
Alevi Muslims are not permitted to have legal-political measures pertinent to the exercise 
and development of sectarian distinctions. In particular, it was broadly argued that the 
Turkish authorities do not recognize the Kurds as a national or ethnic minority, 
considering them to be simply Turks of Kurdish origin. The Commission suggested that 
the latter should be provided with the recognition of certain forms of cultural identity and 
greater tolerance of the ways of expressing that identity. In this context, the Commission 
urged the Turkish government to allow the use of the Kurdish language in political 
communication or in education and radio/TV broadcasting (CEC, 1998).
Thus, in contravention with the traditional scope and practices of the Turkish 
minority rights regime, the EU documents promoted expansion of official recognition to 
those Muslim and non-Muslim elements of the population who had hitherto remained 
outside. Leaving aside the de facto minority status of the Assyrian communities, the 
Alevi and Kurdish concern of the reports particularly challenged the uniform 
configuration of the “national citizens”. For doing this, both the CoE and the EU organs 
suggested that Turkey would have to sign the CoE’s minority documents including the 
Framework Convention on Protection of National Minorities, the European Charter for 
Regional and Minority Languages as well as the Assembly Recommendation 1201 on an
additional protocol on the rights of national minorities to the ECHR (CEC, 1999).37
Turkey did not yet sign none of the minority-related documents concluded particularly in the context o f 
the CoE that have been brought to the fore in the EU organs too as regards to the political criteria of the 
enlargement process. Another document on minority rights, which Turkey did not sign, is the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities
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The post-Cold War agenda of the European-regional framework on minority 
rights challenged foundational parameters and traditional practices of the Turkish 
minority rights regime. Although the Turkish regime failed in creating a true 
reconciliation between two dimensions of minority rights, those of citizenship equality 
and ethno-cultural particularity, the said agenda compelled Turkish governments to adopt 
a substantive form of citizenship equality, which would allow legal-political 
accommodation of ethno-cultural distinctions going beyond the limited scope of the 
Lausanne Treaty. To this end, apart from civil and political equality embedded in the 
citizenship status, it was insisted that both Muslim and non-Muslim minorities of the 
Turkish population would be guaranteed differential treatment. In particular, the EU 
documents urged the Turkish governments to provide minority peoples with equal 
opportunities in the fields of education, press and radio/TV broadcasting. It was because 
of this EU concern that provisions of the Turkey’s Accession Partnership Agreement 
conditioned the Turkish membership on the removal of “any legal provisions forbidding 
the use by Turkish citizens of their mother tongue in TV/radio broadcasting” in the short­
term, and “in the field of education” in the medium-term (CEC, 2000b).
Notwithstanding driving impacts of the 1990s’ internal and external developments 
that have created socio-political and diplomatic pressures on Turkish governments to 
review traditional practices with regard to minority issues, the latter has long tended to 
associate the question of minority rights and its external dimension in those traditional 
categories of external interference, disloyal acts and secessionist aspirations. At first
(1992). The only exceptions to this steady policy are OSCE’s Copenhagen Document (1990), the Charter of 
Paris (1990) and the similar documents o f the OSCE follow-up meetings. Other exceptional cases are the 
UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the UN International Covenant on
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instance, the EU standards of minority rights, therefore, were largely received in official 
circles with great suspicion as if they would open the “Pandora’s Box” in the country 
paving way for national and territorial disintegration of the Republican state (Mete, 1998: 
18). More specifically, the act of granting public recognition to group-specific 
distinctions of both Muslim and non-Muslim groupings was generally considered an 
attempt destined to the restoration of the highly destructive provisions of the Sevres 
Treaty that had been defeated at Lausanne (Demirel, 1998a).
Nevertheless, this did not mean that the traditional fi'amework of the Turkish 
minority rights regime that has hitherto excluded non-Muslim minorities from the 
benefits of substantive equality and hindered the free expression of ethno-linguistic and 
sectarian differences of the Turkish-Muslim population would still be maintained intact. 
By the second half of the 1990s, as they faced increasing impacts of the post-Cold War 
standards in the field of minority treatment, Turkish governments instead began to seek 
an appropriate solution, which would reconcile those state interests of national and 
territorial integrity with legal-political settlement of ethno-linguistic and religious 
diversity that existed among national population. Partly, under the constraining impact of 
the EU integration, and partly, in response to the growing identity claims inside, Turkish 
authorities came to promote recognition of social particularities on the grounds of 
“individual freedoms” (Elekdag, 1999).
The Turkish National Programme, submitted to the European Commission in the 
years 2001, represented a good example to this policy of change that appeared at the state 
level. The Programme outlined the agenda of the Turkish govenunent relating to the
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). Both Documents were signed by the Turkish government in 
the August 2000, but have not yet been ratified in the TBMM.
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requirements of the Accession Partnership in which the contemporary standards of 
minority rights, as they were laid down in the European regional organizations including 
the CoE, the OSCE and the EU, had taken a significant place. Because of this, the 
document embodied several references to the policy prospects relating to minority 
circumstances in Turkey. However, having refrained from making strong and clear 
commitments, the government sufficed with a minimalist formula of non-discrimination 
based upon the guarantee of individual freedoms that signaled almost no shift from the 
traditional framework of the Lausanne regime. Instead of granting an official recognition 
to distinct characteristics of those Muslim and non-Muslim communities who remained 
outside the scope of the Lausanne, the question of cultural and linguistic rights was 
treated within the terms of individual freedoms granted to all of the Turkish citizens 
irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, political pinion, philosophical belief or 
religion (TNP, 2001).
Nevertheless, under the pressures of the EU integration and increasing internal 
claims to cultural identity, the issue of minority rights, by the time, has already taken a 
central place in the Turkish politics. It was in this context that the notion of constitutional 
citizenship was introduced and began to be widely discussed within the Turkish public, 
intellectual circles and the state (İçduygu, Çolak and Soyarik, 2000). As was suggested 
above, Turkish practices had established a close linkage between two notions of 
citizenship equality and nationality. Full and complete scope of Turkish citizenship has 
been reserved to the privilege of “national citizens” which has involved all of the 
Turkish-Muslim citizens irrespective of ethno-linguistic distinctions. Although non- 
Muslim minorities have been considered within the formal scope of Turkish citizenship.
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because of the nationality-citizenship connection they had, at times, been subjected to 
inegalitarian treatment of legal-political and economic policies. It was this identification 
of fiill citizenship and Turkish-Muslim nationality that had inhibited also legal-political 
expression and accommodation of Muslim distinctions.
It was against this state of affairs that the notion of “constitutional citizenship” 
would be promoted in order to disassociate citizenship status from particularistic 
identities of peoples, including those of the Turkish-Muslim ones. The notion suggested 
to fabricate legal-political ramifications of the constitutional bond a value-neutral source 
of identification for the Turkish population without prejudicing any one section of the 
Turkish-Muslim or non-Muslim citizens. In this view, the constitution was expected to 
operate as an integrative mechanism through which nationals of the country would be 
integrated into a common polity without divorcing themselves from their ethno-linguistic, 
sectarian and religious particularities (îçduygu, Çolak and Soyarik, 2000: 192). It was 
believed that situated at the rights and obligations of an all-inclusive constitution, full and 
equal citizenship would no longer be associated with national characteristics of an ethno­
cultural community but to the legal framework of a constitution. The issue of citizenship 
as state-membership would, therefore, be constituted at a different realm from that of the 
ethno-cultural membership. Thereby, the state would cease to be the representative 
institution of a single ethno-linguistic and religious community of citizens but would 
open room for the free expression of particular differences. In the name of constitutional 
equality, thus, the state would become equally responsible to all its citizens in protecting 
and promoting their cultural and linguistic features.
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The principle of constitutional citizenship, therefore, helps us not only to
transcend the traditional duality rooted in the Turkish minority rights regime but also to
satisfy those strong claims of social diversity brought forth by both the different sections
of the Turkish population and the EU integration. Having been aware of this fact, the
former President Demirel remarked, on several occasions, that social differences in
Turkey would be accommodated without violating uniform image of Turkish population.
While promoting development of a democratic response to the prevailing problems of
ethnic diversity in Turkey, the then ruling Prime Minister Demirel (1992: 33) stated:
Differences in culture, thought, belief, language and origin are natural among our citizens.
Such diversity is not a weakness in a democratic and unitary state. In a unitary structure, 
various ethnic, cultural and linguistic characteristics can be freely expressed, preserved and 
easily developed. This does not weaken the unity of the nation, but strengthens it. Everyone 
is equal and has the same status. The right to search for, preserve and develop one’s mother 
tongue, culture, history, folklore and religious beliefs falls within the framework o f human 
rights and freedoms. The law will ensure these rights.
“The law”, in DemireTs view of difference, is associated with the concept of 
constitutional citizenship. He subsequently recommended that “while granting xmiversal 
citizenship equally to every individual member of the state, the constitutional citizenship 
would, at the same time, recognise ethnic and sectarian differences” (Demirel, 1998b).
In one sense, this approach signalled the substitution of the dualistic 
conceptualisation of Turkish minority rights regime with a legal diversity of Turkish 
nationals united only in respect to formal connection held towards the same rights and 
obligations. Thus, constitutional affiliation to the Republic of Turkey would, on the one 
hand, not necessarily make one ‘Turk’, even in the formal sense of the word, but he or 
she would continue to assert his or her particular identity. On the other hand, non-Muslim 
minorities would receive identical treatment for being citizens of the Republic while, at 
the same time, continue benefiting group-specific treatment of the minority rights. In this
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way, the discourse of universal citizenship would neither be used as a neutralising 
instrument for the particular identities of the Turkish-Muslim population, nor be 
implemented at the expense of the non-Muslim minorities. In the case of Muslim 
differences, for example, as Demirel (1998b) argued, “a Turkish citizen of Kurdish origin 
would freely express his or her ethno-cultural identity provided that he or she maintained 
loyalty to the constitution and the essential principles of the Republic”.
While Demirel drew attention to the internal constraints on the transformation of 
the traditional form of the Republican citizenship, the High Coordinating Committee on 
Human Rights (Radikal, 2000b) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Radikal, 2000a) 
instigated similar debates for the sake of Turkey’s EU integration. Having devoted 
themselves to meeting the EU objectives, both of these public institutions declared that 
implementation of a monolithic formula of national identity upon the whole of the 
Turkish citizens has abstracted them from ethno-cultural circumstances and, hence, 
blocked the free expression of particular differences in religion, sect, language and 
ethnicity. Thus, if Turkey was to improve its human rights standards in the contemporary 
world, the Ministry and the High Coordinating Committee reported that social diversity 
and national unity must have been reconciled under the principle of a “comprehensive 
constitutional citizenship”. The idea is that “legal equality of citizenship is to be 
supplemented in Turkey with an inclusive form of equality”. In doing this, it was 
suggested that having supported with substantive aspects, the principle of citizenship 
equality should entail in itself a “right to difference” without which those citizens who 
differ from the mainstream identification category in ethnic, linguistic, religious and 
cultural terms would be less equal in enjoying contemporary standards of human rights.
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In so doing, it was argued that since the indivisibility of the country with its nation and 
territory would continue to remain a constitutional principle, no threat would originate 
from the official recognition of minority differences. It was within this legal-political 
context that Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin, for example, would freely use their 
mother tongues in TV/radio broadcasting and/or education.
Although there is little compromise among different departments of the state^*, 
these reports are indicative of the current trend in Turkey which tends towards 
constituting a socio-political and legal system of substantive equality. Several steps have 
already been taken in this direction. The ban on speaking Kurdish language in public and 
using it in press and publications was cancelled in 1991. In following, Demirel, the Prime 
Minister of the time, declared in a public speech delivered in one of the Kurdish 
populated cities that the state recognised the existence of the “Kurdish reality”. In a 
similar manner, a pro-Kurdish political party took part in the Turkish democracy since 
the early l990s. Tens of municipalities have been governed, for the last decade, by those 
majors elected from among the members of this pro-Kurdish party. On the other hand, the 
Supreme Court of Appeals passed a judgement on 31 March 2000 which confirmed the 
freedom of individual citizens to give their children any names of their choosing, 
including the Kurdish ones (CEC, 1999; CEC 2000).
On the other hand, unlike the legal-political practices of the previous decades, the 
Republican state has undertaken several steps in the direction of guaranteeing substantive 
equality for the non-Muslim citizens of the country. To this end, the Turkish government
The National Security Council, one o f the most influential constitutional institutions in Turkish politics, 
for example, has stood against any drift from the traditional parameters o f the Turkish minority rights 
regime that had found its final expression in the provisions of the Peace Treaty o f Lausanne (Radikal, 
2000c; Radikal, 2000d).
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has disregarded, for the first time, dual practices of the Turkish minority rights regime 
and attempted to treat non-Muslim minorities on the same grounds as the Turkish- 
Muslim citizens. In December 1999, an official circular, for example, recognised that 
non-Muslim minorities would no longer be required to seek permission from the state in 
order to restore churches and other buildings belonging to minority foundations. In the 
following year, the Turkish Presidency issued a message in the eve of the year 2000 to 
non-Muslim minority groups on the occasion of Christmas and Hanukah (Radikal, 
2000e). The massage carried a symbolic significance as it confirmed equal position of the 
non-Muslim minorities at the top of the state authority. Similarly, the Ministry of 
Education, for the first time, attempted to eliminate prejudices about Roma citizens. To 
this end, the Ministry issued a circular in 2001 in order to cancel pejorative words used 
about Roma people in the definitions of the dictionaries published by the same ministry 
(CEC, 2000).
Recent political orientation of the state indicated a substantive transformation in 
the classical duality of the Turkish minority rights regime. While non-Muslim minorities 
came to be treated with genuine equality of citizenship, sub-national identities of the 
Muslim population began to find an implicit recognition in the public realm of the state. 
It is too early to talk about the consolidation of a comprehensive constitutional 
citizenship expressed in a system of substantive equality tolerant to the ethno-linguistic, 
religious and sectarian differences of both Muslim and non-Muslim members of the 
Turkish citizenry. But, the EU reforms of the August 2001 considerably proved the fact 
that the post-Cold War transformation in the Turkish minority rights regime is likely to 
create an essential rupture from the framework of its traditional regime.
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7.4.2. The Framework of the EU Reform Packages
Comprehensive transformation of the last decade largely removed traditional 
aspects of the Turkish minority rights regime. Although ethno-cultural freedoms were not 
framed within the scope of minority rights, the spirit of contemporary standards came to 
be recognised in Turkey within the context of individual freedoms. Yet, changes of the 
last decade have also left several issues unsolved. Those problems relating to the free use 
mother languages in education and radio/TV broadcasting, property rights of non- 
Muslims’ pious foundations, and their ecclesiastical learning remained in the agenda of 
the Turkish minority rights regime. In order to overcome the given problems, the TBMM, 
during the last two years, legislated seven reform packages which addressed a wide range 
of human rights issues. The first reform package (February 2002) amended Article 312 of 
the Turkish Penal Code in the direction of expanding freedom of expression relating to 
ethno-cultural diversity.^^ The same package also clarified the meaning of ethno-cultural 
propaganda embodied in the article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law^^ The second reform 
package (April 2002) concerned basically with the Law on Associations that was 
subjected to several amendments in the direction of removing bans on international 
connections of the associations (Law No.4748, Art. 5-f). But, article 5 of the Law, which 
prohibited the formation of an association for the purpose of engaging in any activity on 
the grounds of or in the name of any region, race, social class, religion or sect was
’ The description o f the offense under article 312 (“incitement to hatred on the basis o f differences of 
social class, race, religion, sect or region”) was amended. The scope o f incitement was narrowed with an 
additional wording o f “in a way that may be dangerous for public order” (Law No. 4744, Art. 2).
^  Amendments to the article 8 of the Turkish Criminal Code clarified the meaning o f acts committed 
against the “unitary characteristics o f the state” and introduced the notion o f “propaganda in connection 
with the terrorist organization in a way that encourages the use of terrorist methods”. The maximum closure
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preserved intact. Establishment of associations based on the distinctions of “race, 
religion, sect, culture and language” was banned for being in search of “creating new 
minorities” on the lands of the Republic of Turkey (Law No. 4748, Art. 5-b).
It was only by the third reform package (August 2002) that the Turkish 
government introduced substantive amendments to such effect that greatly challenged 
traditional parameters and practices of the Turkish minority rights regime. Indicating its 
deep implications. Bardakçı (2002) noted on the enactment of the package that:
The venture o f westernization in Turkey started with the first Tanzimat o f the Imperial
Rescript (1839) and continued with the second Tanzimat o f the Reform Edict (1856).
Since then, no parallel document has been promulgated in Turkey. The recent reforms, in
this sense, represented the promulgation of the third Tanzimat.
In this historical view. Bardakçı associated the essential reforms of the Turkish 
history with the impacts of the westernization process that had constrained Turkish 
politics since the early decades of the nineteenth century. The third reform package, for 
him, represented no exception. Indeed, the major concern of the two reform documents, 
adopted in the early decades of the Turkish modernization, had centered chiefly on the 
ethno-cultural circumstances of the non-Muslim minorities. The “third Tanzimat, 
however, expanded the scope of this traditional concern to all Turkish nationals 
irrespective of ethnicity or religion.
Prominent amendments of the third reform package, in an attempt to satisfy the 
requirements of the Turkish National Programme, provided ethno-cultural freedoms to be 
equally applicable to both Muslim and non-Muslim sections of minority groupings."*' To
period for radio or television channels for propaganda against unity o f state was reduced (Law No. 4744, 
Art. 4).
"" Since the reforms intended to expand the traditional scope o f the Turkish minority rights regime, the 
nationalist part o f the coalition government brought strong criticisms to the new reforms. The package, for 
the leaders o f the Nationalist Action Party, was, on the one hand, satisfying requirements o f the separatist 
sections and, on the other hand, retaining potential to create national minorities on the territory o f the 
Republic. Because of this concern, the leaders found the reforms dangerous for the good of the country and
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this end, the package, in the first instance, was concerned with linguistic freedoms in 
respect to learning one’s mother language and using it in radio/TV broadcasting. Article 
26 of the Constitution, which specified that “No language prohibited by law shall be used 
in the expression and dissemination of thought” had already removed in the year 2001. In 
order to make it applicable in practice, the reform package facilitated radio/TV 
broadcasting in the different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens 
in their daily lives. In doing this, the package added to the Article 4 of the High Audio- 
Visual Board (RTUK) Law that “broadcasting shall be permitted in the different 
languages of dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives so long as 
it does not contradict the fundamental principles of the Turkish Republic and the 
indivisible integrity of the State” (Law No. 4771, Art. 8).
Related to the former, in order to facilitate mother tongue education, the package 
also amended the Law on Foreign Language Education and Teaching. The amendment 
provided for the possibility of learning different languages and dialects traditionally used 
by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. To this end, it was affirmed that the establishment 
of private courses, pertinent to teaching different tongues and dialects that have 
traditionally been used in the daily lives of Turkish citizens, was allowed provided that 
this does not contradict with the indivisible unity of the State (Law No. 4771, Art. 11). 
However, this did not mean that languages or dialects other than Turkish would be used 
in public education. Article 42 of the Constitution, which specified that “no language 
other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens,” remained 
unchanged (OG, 2002a).
depicted the leaders of the other political parties as siding with the aspirations o f the separatist PKK 
(Radikal, 2002b).
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As was noted above, the 1936 declaration had fixed properties of the pious 
foundations in the year 1936 and those properties that had been obtained after the given 
date have been either confiscated or returned to their original owners. Because of this, 
particularly pious foundations belonging to non-Muslim minorities have lost many 
properties and the remaining was at risk.'*^  In an effort to remedy problems related to 
these property rights of the non-Muslims’ pious foundations, the third reform package 
introduced an amendment to the Law on Foundations. Community foundations were, 
therefore, allowed to acquire and dispose of property. In this context, within a period of 
six months, these communities were entitled to register the property they actually use as 
long as they can prove ownership (Law No. 4771, Art. 4-a). Considering the fact that the 
six-months time period was insufficient to complete the bureaucratic procedures, the 
sixth reform package (July 2003) extended the time period to 18 months (Law No. 4928, 
Art. 2; OG, 2002b; OG, 2003).
The implementation of this provision, however, was subjected to a number of 
conditions. On the one hand, permission must be obtained from the Council of Ministers 
for the purpose of acquisition and disposal of new property. But, since the registry 
procedure was a complicated one with full of bureaucratic interference, the regulation 
tended to encounter with problems of political attitudes. On the other hand, the 
discretionary power of the Directorate General o f Foundations over religious 
foundations, including the possibility of dismissing their trustees, remains unchanged 
(Radikal, 2002a; Şık, 2002). Because of this, although the reform seemed, at face value,
Throughout the implementation o f the confiscations, foundations o f the Greek minority lost 152, o f the 
Armenian minority 48, and o f the Assyrian groups 6 of its properties. Today, the pious foundations of the 
non-Muslim minorities have 165 properties (77 Greek, 52 Armenian, 10, Assyrian, 19 Jewish, 1 Bulgarian, 
3 Chaldian and 2 Georgian) (Şık, 2002).
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to remedy shortcomings of the 1936 declaration, it was hardly possible to put its 
principles into practice After all, the amendment did provide nothing for the return of the 
already confiscated properties. This is why, the reform was considered to mean no more 
than giving legal legitimacy to confiscations that had been implemented so far (Reyna, 
2002; Ozuzun, 2002).
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the reforms aim to improve legal-political 
circumstances of minority distinctions in Turkey. Yet, non-Muslim minorities continue to 
have problems due to the absence of a legal recognition for pious foundations and 
restrictions on the training of clergy. Since it has not been considered within the scope of 
the Lausanne regime, the Assyrian community, for example, is not permitted to have its 
own educational establishments and, consequently, has no legal capacity to teach its 
liturgical language to its youth. Similarly, although they have traditionally been 
considered within the terms of the minority status and treated accordingly, the Greek- 
Orthodox and Armenian communities have not yet permitted to have theological schools 
pertaining to educating men of religion. For example, the governmental authorities have 
not yet permitted the re-opening of the Orthodox Seminary of Khalki which has been 
closed since 1971.
Thus, recent reforms succeeded, to a large extent, substantial transformation in the 
traditional parameters of the Turkish minority rights regime. A system of equality within 
ethno-cultural diversity gradually substituted dual practices of the Turkish regime which 
has treated Muslim-Turkish population within the uniformity of an abstract citizenship 
equality whereas non-Muslim minorities have largely been excluded from the universal 
scope of citizenship status under an exclusivist conceptualisation of national distinctions.
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It was only in the post-Cold War era that traditional attitudes of associating “ethno­
cultural difference” with practices of discriminatory and inegalitarian treatment came to 
be removed from the framework of the Turkish minority rights regime. True, several 
deficiencies remained unsolved. But, the transformation of the Turkish minority rights 
regime is in an intense process which seems likely that they will be removed at time.
7.5. Conclusion
In contradiction with the substantive aspects of the Lausanne regime, universal 
principles of equality and non-discrimination, embedded in the modem concept of 
citizenship status, was hardly implemented in the Turkish context with regard to the 
treatment of non-Muslim minorities. Apart from historical divisions, prejudices and 
nationalist policies of the Republican governments, the main reason of this inegalitarian 
practice lied in the world-wide demise of the post-WWI minority rights regime. When the 
League of Nations collapsed within the nationalist cmrents of the interim years, 
supervisory instruments of its protective umbrella also withered away. Therefore, within 
few decades, the Turkish minority rights regime released itself from the juridical and 
diplomatic scmtiny of the League system. Because of this, in place of international 
standards, traditional practices and national projects have prevailed in the Turkish 
minority rights regime.
Under these circumstances, the practices of the Republican minority rights regime 
culminated in the reproduction of the Muúim!dhimmi compartmentalisation with its 
inegalitarian aspects of socio-political, economic and legal inequality. As a result, almost 
no compromise would be achieved between the principle of civil and political equality
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and the group-specific treatment of minority rights. The full-fledged scope of citizenship 
equality has, in practice, been confined to Turkish-Muslim citizens and implemented in a 
form of uniformity. Turkish-Muslim population has been totalized under a religious-some 
definition of Turkish national category in which ethno-cultural and linguistic distinctions 
were denied. In so doing, without considering secular transformations of the Republican 
regime, religion has remained an integral feature of the Turkish national identity with 
regard to the minority/majority categorization of population. Non-Muslim citizens 
continued to constitute the “other” elements who, in conformity with the Lausanne 
commitments, have been granted measures different treatment which, however, has been 
implemented in an exclusivist manner. The issue of different treatment, in the Turkish 
context, has usually been associated with practices of inegalitarian treatment which 
resulted, in general, in the gradual homogenisation of the Turkish population in terms of 
religious affiliation as many of the non-Muslim minorities left Turkey for sanother
state.43
Although the first Republican census had counted % 2.8 non-Muslim, the proportion declined to % 2 in 
1935, % 1.6 in 1945, % 1.1 in 1955, % 1 in 1960, and to % 0.8 in 1965 (Dündar, 2000: 138). As come to 
1990s, the number further declined to % 0.2. According to estimations made in 1992, apart from earlier 
migrations, during the last three decades over 20.000 Armenians, 23.000 Jews and more than 55.000 
Greeks had emigrated from Turkey (Franz, 1994: 331). Today, the community sources count no more than 
50.000 Armenian, 27.000 Jewish and 3.000 Greek minority left behind (Dündar, 2000: 138). It is estimated 
that under normal conditions, the size of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey must count today around 1.2 
million (Courbage and Fargues, 1998: 115). During the last decades, Assyrian community of the South 
Eastern Anatolia also joined the venture of the “official” minorities. Beginning from the early 1960s, 
considerable numbers of Assyrian peoples migrated to Western countries. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 
an estimated amount o f 20.000 Assyrians, 40 percent of the community population, moved to Europe 
(Björklund, 1981: 54). Although economic difficulties have also played role in the Assyrian emigration, it 
is argued that Assyrian peoples largely shared the fate o f other non-Muslim minorities. They were affected 
from the exclusivist practices o f the Turkish minority rights regime (Bilge, 2001: 117-124). Indeed, it is 
suggested that surrounding Muslim-Turkish population has often treated the Assyrian communities as if 
they were Greek during the Cyprus crisis and Armenian when the ASALA attacks were intensified (Yelda, 
2000: 231). Having been unable to find a secure place within the Muslim-Turkish majority, the Assyrian 
peoples too have, therefore, opted for living in another country.
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It was only under the prevailing constraints of the post-Cold War Era that Turkish 
minority rights regime began to develop a substantive framework inclusive for both 
Muslim and non-Muslim minority distinctions. As the relevance of minority issues grew 
stronger in the European regional organizations and among different sections of the 
Turkish national population, a gradual transformation in the traditional practices and 
parameters of the Turkish minority rights regime gradually appeared during the last 
decade. In particular, Turkey’s EU integration has played a larger role in this essential 
transformation. In one sense, Turkey’s integration with the EU has proceeded in a 
manner of integrating with the contemporary standards of the European minority rights 
regime. It was in this context that not only Muslim minorities came to be granted official 
recognition and the legal-political instruments of differential treatment, but also 
shortcomings of the Lausanne regime, relating to the situation of the non-Muslim 
minorities, began to be removed. Turkish minority rights regime, today, came closer to 
creating a peaceful compromise between two foundational dimensions of minority rights, 
citizenship equality and group-specific treatment of ethno-cultural distinctions.
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CONCLUSION
In order to disclose historical, legal, political and social foundations and contemporary 
circumstances of minority issues in both contexts, this thesis examined the general framework 
of minority rights adopted in the European-regional organizations and in Turkey. Situated in a 
general regime of norms, principles, instruments and practices, the specific focus of the study 
fell upon the question of how the two regimes accommodated two distinct notions of 
citizenship equality and ethno-cultural particularity. In doing this, the thesis considered, on 
the one hand, legal-political acts of the European-regional organizations in which minority- 
related norms, principles, instruments and practices gradually reconciled universal scope of 
citizenship equality with group-specific dimension of ethno-cultural diversity. The Turkish 
regime, on the other hand, was examined from the perspective of major policy formulations 
and constitutional developments in which the prominent parameters of minority treatment 
have displayed a problematic tradition in creating a plausible balance between the two notions 
of citizenship equality and ethno-cultural particularity.
In the European-regional context, the concluding remarks of this work can be 
summarized in five points. In order to better analyze modem conditions of social diversity, 
the dissertation, first, argued that the contemporary position of ethno-cultural, linguistic and 
religious minorities were rooted in the emergence of the nation(al)-state system. In the 
absence of modem mling mechanisms and ideological incentives, political and ethno-cultural 
matters were situated at two distinct levels of human existence. The notion of state- 
membership (citizenship) was separately constituted from the particularistic impacts of ethno­
cultural membership. It was argued that since corporate organizations, gathered around feudal 
sources of identification located in fiefdom, region, town, guilds, religious or sectarian
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brotherhood, operated as useful instruments of rule in the hands of the rulers, cultural 
diversity was not only permitted but also encouraged. A political community involved several 
ethno-cultural groupings while an ethno-cultural community scattered over various political 
boundaries. In this context, the pre-modem diversity might have established a plural but never 
a pluralist system of government. There was no idea of universal equality either between the 
mlers and the mled or among the different sections of the mled. Ethno-cultural diversity was 
instead closely associated with an inegalitarian version of legal diversity which subjected 
legal-political status of corporate groupings to inegalitarian terms of the law. In the light of 
this fact, this dissertation suggested that the European ancien regime could not reconcile 
legal-political scope of the state-membership with group-specific particularities of ethno­
cultural membership.
Second, the dissertation argued that the emergence of a nation(al)-state system 
radically transformed state-society relations as it relates to the official treatment of ethno­
cultural diversity and of the terms of state-membership. At this stage, central authorities 
eliminated corporate communal stmctures and established direct linkages between state and 
individual subjects. The notion of citizenship, with its principle of individual equality, was 
created in order to connect the ruler and the ruled on an egalitarian basis of relationship. 
However, since theoretical discourse and practices of nationalism promoted the congmence of 
political and ethno-cultural realms, the modem transformation often conflated the legal- 
political notion of citizenship with an ethno-cultural category of nationality. There existed an 
implicit expectation in the nation(al)-state practices that citizenship and nationality (ethnicity) 
should coincide.
Ideal premises of the nation(al)-state system have, however, rarely been accomplished. 
Ethno-cultural, linguistic and religious diversity has, instead, continued to characterize 
modem conditions. Peoples have sought to enjoy not only universal benefits of eitizenship
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equality but also insisted on the protection and promotion of their ethno-cultural, linguistic or 
religious particularities. It was upon this moral basis that the idea of minority rights 
developed. At this point, it was believed that in order to promote the humanitarian value of 
both citizenship equality and ethno-cultural diversity, state practices should create a true 
reconciliation between citizenship equality and group-specific particularities of ethno-cultural 
minorities.
Relying upon this theoretical and political background, the third point raised in this 
work is that since the emergence of modem state system, national and international endeavors 
in the European continent have developed a number of norms, principles, practices and 
instmments in order to create a working balance between citizenship equality and ethno­
cultural particularity. At this stage, it was argued that the Westphalian state system and the 
post-WWI regime of the minorities treaties presented earlier examples in providing equal 
grounds upon which the persistence of minority distinctions would be guaranteed. From the 
former to the latter, the issue of minority protection evolved, on the one hand, from the mere 
protection of religious distinctions into a comprehensive regime which took ethno-linguistic, 
sectarian as well cultural groupings under the effect of minority rights. The same process 
developed, on the other hand, from a system of bilateral treaties into an international regime 
vested in the discretion of an international organization and a supranational tribunal. Although 
geographically limited in effect, minority peoples were treated both as being legal-political 
members of the polity with universal rights of civil and political equality and ethno-cultural 
members of minority groups with group-specific rights of differential treatment.
The forth argument of the thesis is that in the aftermath of the WWII, both the UN and 
the European-regional organizations projected a universal system of human rights in which 
group dimension of minority conditions almost disappeared. Within the ideological 
confrontations of the period, the Cold War regime concerned prominently with the protection
361
of individual human rights and neglected, in general, the distinct position of ethno-cultural 
particularities. During the Cold War, the issue of minority rights, therefore, content with those 
minimalist standards of equality and non-discrimination without having substituted it with 
group-specific rights and freedoms. Although the Cold War regime took significant steps in 
the direction of universalizing geographically limited scope of humanitarian concerns, its 
norms, practices and instruments fell short of creating a plausible reconciliation between 
minority particularities and the universal scope of citizenship equality.
The fifth point of the European-regional context is that it was only by the fall of the 
Cold War order that the UN and the European-regional organizations began to revise their 
universalist-individualist acts in the direction of developing a substantive formula sensitive to 
group-specific circumstances of minority peoples. At this stage, in addition to civil and 
political equality, embedded in the citizenship status of individuals, the post-Cold War regime 
has undertaken positive measures of differential treatment. To this end, multicultural 
configuration of legal, political and cultural policies began to receive an increasing appeal in 
the humanitarian acts of the regional organizations. It was in this context that rights to mother 
tongue education; using it in broadcasting, press, publications, audio-visual products, cultural 
activities, and in political communication and courts; originating in cultural and political 
associations; establishing cross-frontier relations with kin communities or other 
minority/majority groups, among others, have taken part among the norms of differential 
treatment.
Concerning the Turkish context, this dissertation argued five main points. First, rooted 
in the inclusion/exclusion practices o f the Ottoman millet system and the failures of the late 
Ottoman project of egalitarian citizenship, the Turkish concept of minority did not include 
ethno-linguistic or sectarian dimension nor did it create a true reconciliation between 
citizenship equality and legal-political accommodation of minority differences. The
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“majority/minority” or “us/them” classification of the classical Ottoman administration was 
basically between Muslim and non-Muslim sections of the population. While the Muslim 
peoples were totalized under a compact category of the Muslim millet, non-Muslims 
(Orthodox, Armenians and Jews) were organized within semi-autonomous communities of 
religion. Interestingly enough, parallel to the European ancien regime, although they were 
permitted to protect and promote their language and religion, non-Muslim communities were 
denied civil and political equality and located in a lower legal position as compared to the 
Muslims. In so doing, the classical Ottoman nizam relied on the principle of tefrik-i anasır in 
which peoples’ legal status depended not upon the terms of state-membership but that of the 
ethno-cultural (religious) membership. Irrespective of the fact that they were members of the 
same political community, Muslims and non-Muslims, even different sections of non-Muslim 
communities, were subjected to the effect of different laws.
At this stage, this dissertation also argued that under the influence of modem ideas and 
minority nationalism, the nineteenth century Ottoman reformers invested an exclusive 
concern on the policies of ittihad-i anasır (union of all elements). The latter attempted to 
dispense with corporate communities of religion and inegalitarian implications of the millet 
system with a political objective of creating a system of citizenship equality within ethno­
cultural diversity. However, since the secessionist aspirations of minority communities 
weighed their concerns of civil and political equality, the Ottomanist project of ittihad-i 
anasır failed as it culminated in the collapse of the imperial administration. Consequently, the 
Turkish statesmen and the general public lost faith that citizenship equality and minority 
particularities would be reconciled in the Turkish context.
After the general picture of the Ottoman legacy was drawn, the thesis secondly argued 
that political, legal and social grounds of minority/majority classification and the modem 
framework of minority rights in Turkey developed under the constraining influence of the
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Ottoman practices which found its final appeal in the duration of the national struggle. It was 
in this period that inclusion/exclusion practices of the Turkish regime initially built 
minority/majority classification and the principles of minority treatment. We underlined at 
this point that while they were in search of a new national form, the founding leaders 
abandoned the late Ottoman policy of ittihad-i anasır and adopted a more limited and 
religiously colored policy of ittihad-i anasir-i Islamiye. Ethno-cultural characteristics of the 
Turkish-Muslim population delimited borders of the Republican nationhood. Thus, parallel to 
the Ottoman Muslim millet, irrespective of ethno-cultural or linguistic particularities, Muslim 
peoples were included in the “imagined community” of the Republican nationhood which 
accordingly excluded non-Muslims from the national category of the new state.
Thirdly, the dissertation laid down the legal bases of the Republican minority rights 
regime. At this point, it was argued that political provisions of the Lausanne Treaty largely 
integrated the Turkish context into the general scope of the minorities treaties prevailed in the 
post-WWI western world. The Turkish regime henceforth adopted a framework of substantive 
treatment, at least, for the ethno-cultural circmnstances of the non-Muslim minorities. The 
legal framework of the Treaty reconciled the two notions of citizenship equality and ethno­
cultural particularity, and hence, resolved, for the first time in the Turkish history, the 
question of incongruity between state-membership and group-membership. The terms of civil 
and political equality were equally guaranteed for the Turkish citizenry. Members of the non- 
Muslim communities were primarily concerned as the individual citizens of the country but 
without having abstracted them from their traditional and ethno-cultural circumstances.
The thesis fourthly pointed out that even after the national reception of the Lausanne 
commitments, traditional norms and practices continued to draw the legal-political borders of 
the Turkish minority rights regime. In following religious configuration of the 
minority/majority classification, the inclusion/exclusion practices of the Turkish minority
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rights regime built up, from its outset, two categories of citizenship status: citizens by 
nationality (Turkish-Muslim citizens) and citizens by law (non-Muslim citizens). In so doing, 
the Turkish context conflated two distinct concepts of citizenship (state-membership) and 
nationality (ethno-cultural membership) that greatly reduced its legal neutrality.
In this context, the non-Muslim minorities have been accorded positive measures of 
differential treatment pertinent to the protection and promotion of their ethno-cultural, 
religious and linguistic circumstances. However, depending upon their national “otherness”, 
universal implications of citizenship equality have often been denied to the non-Muslim 
minority elements of the country. Measures of differential treatment have, instead, been 
associated, in practice, with inegalitarian and discriminatory forms of treatment. On the other 
hand, in conformity with religiously inclusive project of ittihad-i anasir-i Islamiye, the 
Turkish-Muslim population has been entitled to full and complete scope of citizenship 
equality. On the part of the Turkish-Muslim citizens, the principle of equality, however, has 
been equated with practices of uniform treatment. Ethno-cultural, linguistic and sectarian 
uniformity has become the gate in accessing into full-fledged scope of the citizenship status.
Under the shadow of this Muslim-inclusive and non-Muslim exclusive form of 
national classification, the Republican practices of the Turkish minority rights regime 
culminated in the reproduction of the M\is\ivaldhimmi compartmentalization with its 
inegalitarian aspects of socio-political, economic and legal inequality. As a result, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Turkish regime incorporated European-regional standards of 
the post-WWI settlement, almost no compromise could be achieved between the principles of 
citizenship equality and of the group-specific treatment of minority rights.
The next, but not the least significant factor which facilitated the persistence of 
traditional formulations and practices in the Turkish minority rights regime, depends on the 
demise of the League of Nations system. After the League of Nations’ supervision
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disappeared, the close linkages between Turkish citizenship and nationality frequently 
prompted Turkish governments to neglect the internal dimension of the League regime’s 
twofold guarantees. In complementary to this, the fall of the League system removed the 
effect of its external dimension as well. Thus, while the international appeal of the minorities 
treaties lost effect over the world by the 1930s, the Turkish regime released itself from both 
political and judicial measures of international supervision. It was in this context that in place 
of international norms, standards or instruments, traditional views and practices dominated 
policy formulations of the Turkish governments. Under these circumstances, not only 
universal aspects of citizenship equality was violated but also traditionally granted rights of 
differential treatment were often suspended in the affairs of education, religion or 
communities’ charity foundations.
The formulation and practices of minority rights underwent a comprehensive 
transformation by the outset of the Cold War years. But, this change had little impact on the 
legal and political implications, and practices of Turkish minority rights regime. During the 
Cold War period, the Turkish context faced almost no external pressure that would oblige 
governments to undertake effective obligations in respect to the issue of minority protection. 
On the contrary, since the Cold War regime discredited group-specific rights of differential 
treatment, its individualist-universalist framework rather sustained traditional practices of the 
Turkish minority rights regime. In the absence of external pressures, Turkish authorities 
ignored the point that the issue of minority rights proceeded on a dynamic ground upon which 
new norms and instruments were created in conformity with global transformations. Turkish 
authorities intensively realized this fact in the aftermath of the Cold War during which the 
issue of minority rights obtained a renewed interest in the humanitarian acts of the European- 
regional organizations.
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Under the constraining influence of internal and external developments, this 
dissertation fifthly argued that traditional parameters of the Turkish minority rights regime 
entered in a process of substantive transformation by the late 1980s. Internally, it was already 
evident by the 1990s that traditionally monolithic formulation of the Turkish millet would no 
longer meet identity claims that gradually arose among the ethnic-Kurdish, Alevi-sectarian 
and fundamental-lslamist sections of the population. Thus, the imagined unity of the Turkish 
national category began to lose meaning in the eyes of Turkish-Muslim citizens as the latter 
drifted towards their ethno-lingual, religious and sectarian particularities. Externally, the end 
of the Cold War unleashed minority problems all over Europe. As a result, the focus of 
humanitarian issues in the region gradually shifted from the Cold War’s minimalist 
formulations of citizenship equality and non-discrimination towards a substantive 
accommodation of minority distinctions. It was in this context that in addition to the universal 
scope of citizenship status, regional organizations, including the CoE, the EU and the OSCE, 
have developed a set of norms, rules, principles, practices and instruments sensitive to ethno­
cultural, religious and linguistic distinctions of minority peoples.
As the prevalence of minority issues grew stronger in the European regional 
institutions and among the different sections of the Turkish national population, the last 
decade witnessed a gradual transformation in the traditional practices and constitutive 
parameters of the Turkish minority rights regime. The Turkish context henceforth began to 
develop a substantive framework inclusive for both Muslim and non-Muslim minority 
distinctions. In particular, Turkey-EU integration has played larger role in the emergence of 
this essential breakthrough. The EU agenda has insisted that in addition to those universal 
measures of civil and political equality, Turkish governments should facilitate cultural 
expression and legal-political accommodation of ethno-cultural, linguistic, religious or 
sectarian differences whether Muslim or non-Muslim.
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It was in this context that Turkish governments have adopted a number of reform 
packages in the direction of creating a true reconciliation between citizenship equality and 
ethno-cultural particularities. To this end, basic laws on political parties, associations, 
language education, pious foundations, radio/TV broadcasting as well as the criminal code 
have been subjected to substantive changes. As a result, not only the uniform image of the 
Turkish-Muslim citizens was officially renounced, but also traditionally “second-class” 
position of the non-Muslim citizens largely withered away. This has paved way for the 
emergence of a comprehensive system of minority treatment going beyond traditional 
practices and limited scope of the Lausanne regime. Both Muslims and non-Muslims began to 
benefit ethno-cultural, linguistic and sectarian particularities under a comprehensive 
formulation of citizenship rights and freedoms.
It remains to be seen in the light of the recent transformations, whether it will be 
possible for Turkish governments to accomplish a true reconciliation between the universal 
scope of citizenship equality and group-specific aspects of minority treatment. For a complete 
reconciliation, Turkish governments will have to develop a complete disassociation between 
originally legal-political scope of the Turkish citizenship and cultural-religious characteristics 
of the Turkish-Muslim population {Turkish millet). Putting the matter differently, the Turkish 
authorities will have to dispense with the traditional connection that has hitherto existed 
between two distinct sources of identification: citizenship and nationality. It is in this context 
that the Turkish citizenship practices will cease to depend upon the existence of two exclusive 
categories of national and non-national citizens.
If, in the future, Turkish authorities decide to continue the reconciliatory process of 
establishing an inclusive model of citizenship defined by the legal-political membership of 
peoples, it seems likely to substitute the dualistic practices of the Turkish citizenship with a 
legal diversity of Turkish nationals united only in respect to formal connection held towards
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the same rights and obligations. Only then, traditional connection that existed between 
citizenship and nationality would disappear and the discourse of the Turkish citizenship 
would no longer be used as a homogenizing instrument over peoples’ particular identities nor 
would its practices entangle with inegalitarian forms of treatment on the part of the “different 
citizens”.
Given the fact that this dissertation was written at a time of transformation both in the 
European-regional context and in Turkey, it carries the trademarks of ambiguity and a sense 
of incompleteness in assessing the political, legal, social and cultural ramifications of the 
emerging scope of the Turkish minority rights regime. A particular shortcoming of this study 
is that it would not effectively analyze the recent legal-political reforms which appear to 
change the traditional definition and practices of minority, nationality and citizenship in the 
Turkish context.
It is significant to note that this thesis indicated emergence of a radical breakthrough in 
the traditional parameters of the Turkish minority rights regime. Parallel to the post-Cold War 
norms and principles, the Turkish regime began to open the doors wide to the group-specific 
claims of both Muslim and non-Muslim minorities. While traditional parameters of the 
Turkish minority rights regime have been subjected to innovative transformation, the same 
process has gone hand in hand with the emergence of new understandings in conceptualizing
■ m
Turkish nation and citizenship. Substantive accommodation of minority distinctions has 
constrained Turkish practices to divorce the universal scope of the Turkish citizenship fi-om 
ethno-cultural impacts of Turkish nationality. As a result, the traditional framework of the 
Turkish state, in the areas of national codes and citizenship practices, began to involve in a 
radical process of innovation. However, and here is where the general political ambiguity in 
the relationship between the European-regional context and Turkey resides. It remains 
uncertain whether a complete disassociation of Turkish nationality from Turkish citizenship
369
would end up with a legal-political framework which the European-regional organizations 
adopt.
In spite of the ambiguity on the part of both Turkey and the European-regional 
context, the Turkish minority rights regime evolved under the constraining influence of the 
European-regional norms and practices. It is in this context that this dissertation contributes to 
the existing literature in two ways. First, most of the studies in Turkey on the issue of 
minority rights have been limited by analyses of specific minority groups or minority-related 
cases. This dissertation, by situating the issue of minority rights in a historical, legal and 
political framework of norms, principles, practices and instruments, aimed to fulfill the gap in 
literature between the group-specific cases and the foundational dimensions of the issue. 
Second, this dissertation situated both the European-regional and Turkish regimes in a broader 
perspective of citizenship equality and ethno-cultural diversity. In so doing, it aimed to reveal 
the traditional foundations, contemporary formulations and practices of minority rights 
standards in both Europe and Turkey.
Having examined the general framework of the Turkish minority rights regime, this 
thesis left several questions unsolved in the Turkish context. In order to better analyze the 
current norms, principles and practices of the Turkish minority rights regime, this thesis 
provoked a number of complementary studies. In view of our shortcomings, it seems 
significant for the future studies to consider, first, legal-political scope of the new framework 
in the Turkish minority rights regime that has gradually developed during the last few years. 
In relation to this, in order to examine practical effects of the new scope, the thesis, secondly, 
put emphasis on the fact that case-specific and group-specific analyses must be undertaken on 
the policy implementation of the recent reforms. The next, but not the least significant, is that 
today it seems noteworthy to review newly emerging understandings on the Turkish
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citizenship and Turkish nationality, particularly, as it relates to the contemporary articulation 
of inherent connections between the two concepts.
On the other hand, having indicated gradual evolution of the minority issues in the 
context of the European regional organizations, the thesis displayed the influence of the 
European agenda on the recent transformations of the Turkish minority rights regime. It is in 
this sense that though considered contemporary standards of the European-regional 
organizations, this thesis remained limited in scope as a country-specific analysis. However, 
the same agenda has constrained, in the same period, not only policy formulations of the 
Turkish governments but also those of the other European countries. Because of this, in order 
to situate today the Turkish regime in a larger European context, it seems useful to examine 
the influence of the European regional norms on the legal-political formulations and practices 
of other European countries, particularly, those which are in a process integration with the 
EU.
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